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1 Assessing Changes in Living Standards 
in Southeast Asia in the Twentieth and 
Early Twenty-first Centuries
What Indicators Should We Look At?
Poverty and Development Indicators in Southeast Asia: An 
Overview
This book studies changing living standards in the ten Southeast Asian 
countries which are now members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), from the early years of the twentieth century to the 
early years of the twenty-f irst century. We know that in the second decade 
of the new millennium, these ten nations differed widely in terms of per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP). There was also considerable variation 
between them in other widely used development indicators such as adult 
literacy and life expectancy (Table 1.1). The Human Development Index 
(HDI), computed by the United Nations, is a weighted average of per capita 
GDP, life expectancy, adult literacy and years of schooling. This index ranked 
Singapore f ifth in the world in 2015, while at the other end of the scale, 
Myanmar was ranked 145 (Table 1.1). In spite of these differences, most 
countries in Southeast Asia have experienced some improvement in their 
HDI score since the 1980s, and several have improved their ranking. All now 
fall into what is termed the medium human development group, or higher.
But indicators such as per capita GDP, and composite indicators such 
as the Human Development Index are based on averages, and they tell us 
little about the distributional impact of economic growth. They cannot 
by themselves answer what is, for many students of human development, 
a crucial question: For any given rate of economic growth, or any given 
improvement in average life expectancy or educational attainment, who 
has benefited the most? Who has benefited the least? In order to answer 
these questions, we need evidence on the distribution of incomes and 
household expenditures. We also need evidence on the distribution of other 
indicators such as life expectancy and educational attainment by income 
or expenditure group, as well as by region and gender, and by social class. 
By the early twenty-f irst century, most ASEAN countries were collecting 
and publishing household survey data which allowed the calculation of a 
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range of poverty and distributional indicators. National and regional poverty 
lines were estimated and used to calculate the proportion of the population 
below these lines, a measure usually referred to as the headcount measure 
of poverty. The estimates of the headcount measure prepared by national 
governments for early twenty-f irst centuries also showed, as would be 
expected, wide variation.
It was not always the case that the poorest countries in the region in terms 
of per capita GDP had the highest proportion of the population in poverty, 
using the poverty lines computed by their governments. In the Philippines, 
the off icial f igures showed that 25 per cent of the population was poor in 
2012, compared with 20.4 per cent in Cambodia in 2014, although per capita 
GDP was over twice as high in the Philippines (Tables 1.1 and 1.2). In Thailand, 
the government estimated that 12.6 per cent of the population was below 
Table 1.1: GDP and other social indicators: Selected Asian countries
Country HDI rank Life expectancy MYS* GNI per capita** 
($PPP 2015)
2015 1970/75 2015 2015 
ASEAN-10
Singapore 5 69.5 83.2 11.6 78,162
brunei 30 68.3 79.0 9.0 72,843
Malaysia 59 63.0 74.9 10.1 24,620
thailand 87 61.0 74.6 7.9 14,519
indonesia 113 49.2 69.1 7.9 10,053
vietnam 115 50.3 75.9 8.0 5,335
Philippines 116 58.1 68.3 9.3 8,395
Lao Pdr 138 40.4 66.6 5.2 5,049
Cambodia 143 40.3 68.8 4.7 3,095
Myanmar 145 49.3 66.1 4.7 4,943
Other Asia
hong Kong 12 72.0 84.2 11.6 54,265
Japan 17 73.3 83.7 12.5 37.268
Korea (rep) 18 62.6 82.1 12.5 34,541
China 90 63.2 76.0 7.6 13,455
india 131 50.3 68.3 6.3 5,663
* Mean years of schooling for the population over 15 years.
** PPP data from the 2011 revisions; see World bank (2014a). 
note: 188 countries are ranked according to a composite index; countries ranked from 52 to 105 
are considered ‘high human development’ and those ranked from 107 to 147 are considered 
‘medium human development’. in the ASeAn group, no country is in the low human development 
group. 
Source: 2015 rankings from undP (2016); Life expectancies: undP (2003: 262-5); undP (2016); MYS: 
undP (2016). Per capita gdP in current international dollars: undP (2016).
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the off icial poverty line in 2012, which was higher than in Indonesia and 
Vietnam, although per capita GDP was considerably higher in Thailand 
than in either Indonesia or Vietnam. What explains these differences? It 
appeared that different countries across Southeast Asia were using different 
methods to estimate their national poverty lines, with the result that the 
poverty line was set higher relative to GDP in Thailand than in Indonesia 
or Vietnam. In addition, it was possible that the distribution of income was 
more skewed in Thailand and the Philippines than in some other parts of 
Southeast Asia, so that there were more people in the very poor segments 
of the population, and fewer in the middle.
Table 1.2:  Estimates of the headcount measure of poverty using national and 
international poverty lines, 2010 and 2012
National poverty lines International poverty lines
Country 2010 2012 A B
Malaysia 3.8 (2009) 1.7 0.4 2.3 (2009)
thailand 16.4 12.6 1.1 3.5 (2010)
indonesia 13.3 12.0 28.0 43.3 (2011)
Philippines 26.3 (2009) 25.2 26.9 41.7 (2012)
vietnam 14.2 11.1 22.4 12.5 (2012)
Laos 33.9 26.0 38.1 62.0 (2012)
Cambodia 21.1 18.9 25.4 41.3 (2011)
note: international poverty lines: A refers to the poverty line of $1.51 per day, converted using 
PPP-adjusted exchange rates. this was used by the Asian development bank in their estimates 
for 2010 (Asian development bank 2014c: 11). b refers to the poverty line of $2 per day, converted 
using PPP-adjusted exchange rates, as reported in Asian development bank (2015: 211). Countries 
are ranked according to actual individual consumption expenditures per capita.
Sources: national poverty lines: thailand: national Statistical office (2015), table 8.12; indonesia: 
Central board of Statistics (2015b: 175); Philippines: Philippine Statistics Authority (2016); vietnam: 
general Statistics office (2013: 739): 9. national headcount measures for Laos and Malaysia 
are taken from Asian development bank (2014a). Malaysian figures refer to 2009 and 2012; for 
Cambodia they are taken from Asian development bank (2014b: 4).
Because national poverty lines often ref lect the economic, social and 
political concerns of national governments and are not comparable across 
countries, or even over time in the same country, efforts have been made by 
international agencies to establish ‘international poverty lines’ which are 
supposedly more comparable, both across national boundaries, and over 
time. The best known in recent decades are the dollar-based poverty lines, 
which have been published by the World Bank from the 1990s onwards, 
and are very widely quoted in the literature. These are estimated simply by 
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converting a poverty line set in American dollars into the currency of the 
particular country and then adjusting the resulting number for differences 
in the purchasing power of the national currency, relative to the American 
dollar. The World Bank used the ‘dollar a day’ line for some years; this was 
raised to $1.25, and more recently to $1.90. Higher poverty thresholds of $2, 
raised to $3.10, have also been used. These dollar-denominated poverty lines 
are converted into national currencies using the data on the purchasing 
power of the national currency relative to the dollar. These ‘PPP adjustments’ 
are derived from the International Comparison Project (ICP), carried out by 
the World Bank (Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula 2009: 168). The ICP estimates 
of purchasing power parities have in turn been subject to several revisions, 
the most recent in 2011. These revisions have in turn led to signif icant 
changes in the headcount measure of poverty in many Asian countries.
In the Asian context, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also carried 
out estimates of poverty levels which have produced rather different results 
from those of the World Bank. An important study published in 2008 used 
a different methodology for estimating the purchasing power of individual 
currencies, which relied on data on the prices paid by the poor. These were 
used to construct poverty lines and headcount measures of poverty (Asian 
Development Bank 2008). But this study was not repeated, and the estimates 
have not been updated. More recently, the ADB put forward a poverty line 
of $1.51, again converted into local currencies using exchange rates adjusted 
for differences in the purchasing power of currencies but using the World 
Bank PPP data. The estimates of the headcount measure of poverty using 
national poverty lines were often lower than the ADB results using the $1.51 
poverty line (Table 1.2). This was especially the case for Laos, Indonesia 
and Vietnam. But in Thailand and Malaysia, the ADB estimate was much 
lower. The results for Indonesia were especially striking; according to the 
ADB estimates, 28 per cent of the population in 2010 was below the $1.51 
poverty line, which was a higher f igure than in the Philippines, Cambodia, 
or Vietnam in spite of the fact that per capita GDP in Indonesia was higher 
than in these three countries, at least according to the PPP data. Do these 
disparities reflect the fact that the cost of basic needs, especially foodgrains, 
was much higher in Indonesia than in these other countries? It is also possible 
that household expenditures were a much lower proportion of total GDP, 
or that the distribution of consumption expenditures were more skewed 
towards richer groups in Indonesia than elsewhere. Or do the data reflect 
problems in the household surveys on which the estimates were based? 
These questions are obviously important and will be taken up again in 
subsequent chapters.
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Conceptual and Measurement Issues
Before embarking on an analysis of trends in poverty and living standards 
over time in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to say something more about 
both conceptual and measurement problems, which have been extensively 
discussed in the literature. In recent years there has been much debate over 
how economic progress should be measured, and especially how changes 
in the standard of living should be captured in quantitative terms. It has 
already been noted that in recent years, development banks have published 
estimates of poverty based on income and expenditure data derived from 
household surveys. But other studies have cautioned against too much 
reliance on income-based measures. In a number of influential writings, 
Sen argued against using income data as the principal way of estimating 
changes in poverty. He put forward the alternative concept of capabilities. 
His argument can be summarized as follows (Sen 1999: 87-88; italics in the 
original):
1. Poverty can be sensibly identif ied in terms of capability deprivation; the 
approach concentrates on deprivations that are intrinsically important 
(unlike low income, which is only instrumentally signif icant).
2. There are influences on capability deprivation – and thus on real poverty 
– other than lowness of income (income is not the only instrument in 
generating capabilities).
3. The instrumental relation between low income and low capability is 
variable between different communities and even between different 
families and different individuals (the impact of income on capabilities 
is contingent and conditional).
Sen’s work was very influential in the construction of the Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI), the results of which for countries in Asia were reported 
in Table 1.1. The HDI has been used since the 1990s, both internationally 
and also in regional studies in a number of countries in Southeast Asia. 
More recently it has been argued that it should be possible to create new, 
and much broader composite indicators which include more non-monetary 
data. Ranis, Stewart and Samman (2006) suggested new composite indicators 
which include up to 40 quantitative measure on mental well-being, gender 
empowerment, political freedom, social relations, community well-being, 
inequality, work and leisure conditions, economic stability, political secu-
rity and environmental conditions. Many of these indicators have been 
incorporated in the Multidimensional Poverty Index, which is discussed 
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further below. By incorporating a broader range of non-monetary indictors. 
it is argued that more satisfactory ranking of countries in terms of human 
development can be achieved. Critics of the HDI point out that the non-
monetary components of the index (life expectancy, literacy, educational 
attainment) are highly correlated with per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP), and so the composite index produces a ranking of countries at a 
point in time which is little different from that which would be obtained 
by using per capita GDP alone. This may be true, although the correlation, 
while high, is not perfect.1 One of the advantages of the HDI is that it does 
make clear which countries, and regions within countries, have done well 
in terms of the non-monetary indicators in spite of relatively low incomes, 
and which have done badly in spite of relatively high incomes.2
Another argument in support of composite indicators such as the HDI is 
that they tend to give a different, and indeed a more optimistic picture of 
human progress over time than national income f igures alone. As is well 
known, the historical national income figures compiled by Maddison (2003, 
2007) show growing disparities between countries over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, a trend which Pritchett (1997) referred to as ‘divergence 
big time’. But because there has been a rapid decline in mortality and 
considerable improvements in access to education in almost all parts of 
the world over the last 50 years, especially in Asia and Africa, composite 
indicators such as the HDI show a greater degree of catch-up than do the 
national income data (Crafts 2002: 404). A more recent survey of well-being 
indicators conf irms the f inding that inequality in health and education 
indicators declined over the the twentieth century, and argues that this 
‘challenges the idea that per capita income provides a good predictor of 
welfare trends’ (Escosura 2018: 24).
A further argument in support of composite indicators as a measure 
of change over time is that historical national income series can, when 
extrapolated across decades and even across centuries, give rather misleading 
results. Inevitably measurement errors are cumulated over time, and the 
imposition of modern price structures on historical economies, which were 
producing very different goods and services from contemporary ones, is 
1 Ranis, Stewart and Samman (2006) have argued that many of the indicators they suggest 
are not highly correlated with per capita GDP.
2 Although it is often thought that composite indicators are a relatively recent innovation, 
some economists were estimating them as early as the 1950s. Bennett (1951) ranked 31 countries 
according to a range of non-monetary indicators in 1934-1938. He included calorie consumption, 
infant mortality, doctors per capita, household energy consumption, transport facilities and 
school attendance. His results will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
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highly problematic (Allen, Bengtsson and Dribe 2005: 9). Indeed, even over 
relatively short periods of two or three decades, indicators of growth of GDP 
can be misleading. Both the World Bank and other development agencies 
have published very high estimates of Chinese economic growth since the 
reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s. And yet in the early twenty-f irst 
century, per capita GDP in China was lower than in Malaysia, and lower than 
Thailand if PPP data are used. If the growth estimates are broadly correct, 
China must have had a very low per capita GDP in the 1970s, not just relative 
to Thailand and Malaysia but also relative to India. As Sen (1987: 34) pointed 
out, that is at odds with other evidence on Chinese GDP in the pre-reform era.
It can of course be argued that the non-monetary indicators of capabilities 
favoured by Sen, such as life expectancy, infant and child mortality rates, 
literacy and educational enrolments are also subject to measurement error, 
and in many parts of the world cannot easily be extrapolated backwards 
over time. Usually they are prepared by national statistical off ices, which 
in turn rely on population censuses, and a range of household surveys, or 
registration of births and deaths. All these estimates contain inaccuracies, 
and in some cases it is possible that governments have put pressure on 
statistical agencies to manipulate the f igures. Furthermore, like the GDP 
data, they refer only to national averages and often disguise very substantial 
variations by region, gender and social class. This point has been made 
by Therborn (2013: 48-49), who argued that inequalities in health-related 
indicators by region and social class are often considerable even in the 
European welfare states, let alone other parts of the world. It is important 
for countries to prepare more disaggregated indicators of infant mortality 
or literacy broken down according to region, gender, income class or ethnic 
group. Such data have become more abundant for many parts of Southeast 
Asia over the past three decades, and are now being analysed by several 
scholars. Their results are discussed in Chapter 7.
The poverty estimates shown in Table 1.2 are prepared not from national 
income statistics but from household income and expenditure surveys 
which by the 1990s were being conducted in all the ASEAN countries with 
varying degrees of regularity. These estimates do try to capture distributional 
aspects of changes in household income and expenditure over time. But 
the surveys from which poverty measures are derived have been the target 
of considerable critical scrutiny, in Southeast Asia as in other parts of the 
world, which are examined further below. However reliable the figures might 
be, it is diff icult to estimate similar indicators for most parts of the region 
further back than the late 1960s. Only the Philippines conducted national 
household income and expenditure surveys in the 1950s, and the few surveys 
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which were carried out before 1940 by colonial statistical authorities used 
small samples, and were often restricted to particular localities. To explore 
trends in poverty and indeed other measures of living standards during the 
colonial era, we have to use other, perhaps less reliable, indicators.3
If historical national income series are unreliable guides to changing 
living standards, and poverty estimates can only be estimated for the past 
four or f ive decades in many parts of the world, what other indicators are 
available? One indicator which has been widely used in a number of studies 
is the real wage. It has been argued that the real wage is a ‘distributionally 
sensitive’ indicator in that it measures the purchasing power of incomes 
accruing to the less well-off (Allen, Bengtsson and Dribe 2005: 9). To what 
extent is this really the case, especially in pre-industrial economies? The 
next section examines the problems associated with using real wage data 
to monitor living standards in Britain in the nineteenth century, and the 
lessons which the British debate offers more recent studies.
Another important source is demographic evidence. As we have seen, life 
expectancy at birth is one component of the HDI, and together with infant 
and child mortality, this indicator has been widely used in comparative stud-
ies of living standards across regions and countries. But such indicators can 
only be estimated with any degree of accuracy if reasonably comprehensive 
population census or survey data are available, or if accurate registration 
procedures are in place for births and deaths. This has not been the case 
everywhere in Southeast Asia over the twentieth century. Similar problems 
emerge with data on literacy and educational attainment. Some recent 
researchers who advocate including a measure of educational attainment 
in a composite indicator of human development base their arguments 
not just on eff iciency or ‘human capital’ grounds. They also point out that 
education endows people with a greatly enhanced capacity to participate 
in, and enjoy, leisure, cultural and community activities as well as making 
them more productive workers (Sen 1999: 128-129). But as with demographic 
data, f igures on literacy and school attendance are only available from 
off icial records on school attendance, or from censuses and surveys. These 
are not always very reliable, even for recent decades.
It has also been argued that the proportion of total consumption ex-
penditures devoted to basic commodities with low-income elasticities of 
demand, such as foodgrains or cotton cloth, are also good indicators of living 
3 Leigh and Van der Eng (2009) used income tax data to estimate trends in inequality in 
Indonesia in both the colonial and postcolonial eras, paying particular attention to the income 
share accruing to the top 1 and 5 per cent of the population.
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standards of the poorer classes of society in many societies. This reasoning 
is based on Engel’s law, originally put forward in the mid-nineteenth century 
on the basis of German consumption data, although analysis of data from 
several European and Asian countries in the 1930s showed that a fall in 
the proportion of consumption expenditures devoted to food only occurs 
at quite high levels of household expenditure (Zimmerman 1936: 99-107). 
When people are struggling to survive at a very basic level of subsistence, 
it is likely that a large part of any increment in income will be spent on 
more food, clothing and shelter.4 Once a certain threshold level of income is 
reached, increments in income are more likely to be spent on better quality 
food and clothing, and semi-luxuries such as more household furniture 
and utensils, consumer durables, or improvements to housing. Thus an 
increase in per capita availability of basic foodgrains is likely to indicate a 
fairly broad-based improvement in income among the lower groups in the 
overall distribution, while a fall may signal the onset of serious stress. On 
the other hand, some economists also consider a decline in the proportion 
of total household income spent on food as a sign of improvement in living 
standards, especially if it is sustained over long periods of time.
It is also important to bear in mind that in many parts of the world severe 
distress has been caused to large numbers of people by sudden increases in 
prices, especially of basic foods. Sen’s work on famines has demonstrated 
that it is possible to have a rapid, indeed catastrophic, increase in mortality 
without there being any evidence of a decline in per capita food availability 
for the country or region as a whole. This was the case in Bengal in 1943, 
and could have also been the case in parts of Southeast Asia, both in the 
1940s and in earlier times. During the Japanese occupation, inflation ac-
celerated in many parts of Southeast Asia with serious consequences for 
food consumption and mortality, especially in poorer regions, and among 
poorer households. In more recent times, there is evidence from Southeast 
Asia that sharp increases in food prices have caused an increase in the 
headcount measure of poverty.5
4 Shammas (1983) has argued that Engel’s law, and the theory that has been built up around it, 
was developed at a time when the proportion of household income devoted to food was falling 
in Europe and elsewhere. She pointed out that it does not hold for all time periods; her time 
series for English households suggests little change until well into the twentieth century.
5 Bengtsson (2004: 49) produced a table based on his research on villages in southern Sweden 
in the nineteenth century; he argued that high food prices affect different socio-economic groups 
in very different ways. The worst affected were those who depend on wages paid in cash for part 
or all of their income; those most likely to benef it were freeholders who paid a f ixed money tax 
and sold part of their output.
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Given both the problems of def ining living standards, and those of 
measuring changes over time, I would argue that any study must draw on 
a range of indicators, both monetary and non-monetary. In the context of 
Southeast Asia in the twentieth century, there is a wide range of material to 
draw on, although inevitably both the quantity and the quality diminishes 
in the early part of the century compared with the decades from 1970 to 
2000 and beyond. If it can be demonstrated that a particular country or 
region has experienced falling infant mortality rates, improved school 
attendance, and increased consumption of basic foodstuffs, sustained 
over a period of years, or decades, can we say that living standards have 
improved, even if there is little evidence of growing per capita GDP, or 
increases in real wages? The answer is probably yes, although the case for 
an improvement in living standards would be stronger if these indicators 
were supplemented with evidence that real GDP and per capita consump-
tion expenditures had increased, that inequality had not worsened, and 
that the headcount measure of poverty had also declined. Such evidence 
can only be obtained from national income statistics and household 
expenditure surveys, although in Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the 
world, such data have been subject to considerable critical scrutiny over 
the years.
Standard of Living Debates in Economic History: The British Debate
Anyone embarking on a study of changing living standards in any part of 
the world over the last century would do well to study some of the debates 
among economic historians about the consequences of accelerated economic 
growth and structural change on living standards in other parts of the world 
economy. The most famous, and longest running, of these debates concerns 
the impact of the Industrial Revolution on living standards in Britain over 
the nineteenth century. Controversies about the impact of economic change 
in Britain on living standards extend well back into the nineteenth century, 
but the modern debate was started by exchanges between Hobsbawm and 
Hartwell in the 1950s and 1960s. Both these authors re-stated their views 
in Taylor (1975). Subsequently important contributions have been made 
by Lindert and Williamson (1983), Crafts (1997), Mokyr (1988), Huck (1995), 
Szreter and Mooney (1998) and Feinstein (1998). In essence, the empirical part 
of the debate has revolved around which indicators are the most appropri-
ate for estimating changes in the standard of living in an industrializing 
society, and how these indicators can best be estimated. In addition to the 
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empirical discussion there was also some discussion about the theoretical 
underpinnings, especially of the pessimist case that there was in fact little 
improvement until the second part of the nineteenth century. It is useful 
to evaluate both these strands separately.
As far as the empirical part of the debate was concerned, the evidence 
reviewed dealt specif ically ‘with real incomes or consumption, such as 
information about wage-rates, earnings, prices, household expenditure, 
actual consumption and other relevant data such as unemployment etc.’ 
(Hobsbawm 1975: 179). Inevitably some of these data were easier to obtain 
than others, but most participants in the debate did try to review more 
than one indicator. The ‘super-optimist’ case put forward by Lindert and 
Williamson (1983) was based on a new series for the real wages of adult males 
which, according to the authors, nearly doubled between 1820 and 1850. It 
was argued that this implied substantial gains in real household incomes. 
Critics such as Mokyr (1988) pointed out that it was diff icult to reconcile 
this result with evidence that per capita consumption of commodities 
such as sugar, tea and tobacco grew little over these decades. In his review 
of the controversy, Feinstein (1998) produced new estimates of nominal 
full-employment earnings, and also a new deflator. His results showed only 
a ‘very moderate rate of improvement’ in real earnings adjusted for changes 
in employment (Feinstein 1998: 642).
Other participants in the debate have looked at demographic evidence, 
in addition to that on incomes and expenditures. Huck (1995: 546) found 
that ‘the biological evidence of life expectancy and average height provide 
evidence of stagnation in living standards after 1820, although they show 
improvement earlier’.6 Szreter and Mooney (1998: 110) found the super-
optimist case diff icult to reconcile with the ‘serious deterioration in the 
standard of living of the growing proportion of the population recruited 
into the urban industrial workforce’. This deterioration, according to their 
analysis, was reflected in low and in some cases declining life expectancies 
in most industrial cities. According to their estimates, while the average 
life expectancy for England and Wales was 41 in the 1850s, it was only 32 
in Manchester and 31 in Liverpool. The low life expectancy f igures in the 
large industrial cities reflected the very unhealthy conditions under which 
most people lived and worked, compared with smaller towns and rural 
areas; these conditions persisted until the end of the nineteenth century, 
6 Huck (1995: 536-537) used parish records to support his argument that levels of infant 
mortality were higher in cities than in rural districts. He suggested that infant feeding practices 
were often better in rural areas, in part because women worked less outside the home.
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and beyond. To the extent that the populations of large cities were growing 
faster than those in more healthy rural and small town environments, it 
could be argued that living standards for many were declining.
Other studies using demographic and educational data have not con-
f irmed the pessimists’ case. Crafts found a considerable improvement 
in the Human Development Index for Britain from 1760 through to 1850, 
due to increases in per capita GDP, life expectancies, literacy and years of 
schooling. Admittedly, there was little improvement in life expectancy after 
1820, but on balance he argued that the HDI estimates were consistent with 
‘a fairly optimistic assessment of aggregate trends in well-being during the 
industrial revolution’ (Crafts 1997: 625). Indeed, the main lesson from the 
long-running British debate would seem to be that different indicators 
produce different results. Certainly it is rash to draw strong conclusions 
on the basis of one indicator alone.
There has also been controversy about reliance on wage rates. Critics 
have argued that estimating trends in annual real incomes on the basis 
of daily or weekly wage rates is fraught with problems, as data on hours 
worked per year tend to be scarce or unreliable, even for industrial workers, 
let alone those in less stable employment in agriculture, construction, trade 
and transport (Feinstein 1998: 649). Simply multiplying daily or weekly 
wage rates by some arbitrary number produces unreliable results about 
annual household incomes. In addition, wage and earnings trends can differ 
markedly by region, as can prices. Much care needs to be taken in estimating 
deflators for wage earnings, especially where consumption patterns may be 
changing over time because of changing relative prices, or changing tastes.
A further criticism of studies which rely largely or solely on wage rates has 
been made by Horrell and Humphries. They compared trends in male wage 
rates with trends in household incomes and found that in the f irst part of 
the nineteenth century, family incomes grew less rapidly and were subject to 
more fluctuations than male wage rates, so ‘welfare gains imputed from the 
latter may overstate actual improvements’ (Horrell and Humphries 1992: 872). 
They also found that the family income data showed that industrialization 
brought with it greater inequality than was shown just by wage series alone. 
Their evidence indicated that in periods when nominal wages for males 
fell, such as the 1840s, the earnings of women and children also fell, and 
their ability to contribute to family incomes never recovered. In a further 
study, these authors also found that from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, participation rates and relative earnings for women in many parts 
of England tended to decline, leading to the rise of the male breadwinner 
family (Horrell and Humphries 1995).
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Recent work on the impact of industrialization on household budgets 
has confirmed the argument advanced by Thompson (1968: 347) that the 
‘controversy as to living standards during the Industrial Revolution has 
perhaps been of most value when it has passed from the somewhat unreal 
pursuit of the wage-rates of hypothetical average workers and directed 
attention to articles of consumption: food, clothing, homes: and beyond 
these, health and mortality’. This advice should be borne in mind when we 
turn to other debates on differences in historical living standards across 
countries and continents.
The Debate over the Great Divergence
Over the past decade there has been much discussion among economic 
historians as to when, and why, the ‘great divergence’ between ‘the West and 
the rest’ occurred. As with the debate on living standards in nineteenth-
century Britain, an assortment of indicators have been used by participants 
in this debate, although several studies have relied heavily on wage evidence. 
One of the main participants in this debate has compared indicators of 
living standards between China and Europe, and argued that there is ‘little 
reason to think that most Europeans – even northwestern Europeans – 
were uniquely well-off, even as late as 1750’ (Pomeranz 2000: 42). He bases 
this assertion mainly on calorie consumption and demographic indictors. 
Elsewhere he has argued that in the lower Yangtze Delta calorie consumption 
could have been as high as 2,400 per adult equivalent per day (Pomeranz 
2005: 24). This is lower than estimates for Sweden during the eighteenth 
century and roughly comparable with estimates for England. It is certainly 
higher than the estimates for France by Toutain in the nineteenth century, 
and higher than estimates for parts of Italy, Germany and Belgium (Das 
Gupta 1979: 37). Pomeranz (2005: 25) has also suggested that the supply of 
foodgrains in the Yangtze Delta was relatively stable, although this might 
not have been the case in other parts of China.
Other scholars have relied more on real wage data to compare trends in 
living standards across countries and continents. This ‘real wage revivialism’, 
to use Maddison’s (2005: 24) not entirely complimentary term, is due mainly 
to the increasing scholarly awareness of data on both wages and prices 
for many parts of Europe, the Mediterranean lands and also parts of Asia, 
not just for the twentieth century but for earlier periods as well. Several 
researchers have used their results to support often quite strong claims 
about trends in output and living standards in, for example, Europe and 
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parts of Asia prior to the nineteenth century (e.g. Parthasarathi 1998; Allen 
2005; Allen et al., 2005).7 Williamson (1998, 2000) has used a large data set 
to answer a broad set of questions regarding the emergence of disparities 
in income and living standards within Asia in the years from 1870 to 1940. 
Ozmucur and Pamuk (2002) have used their evidence on wages in various 
cities in the Ottoman Empire to make comparisons in living standards not 
just within the Ottoman economy but also between it and the economies of 
other parts of Europe. De Zwart and Van Zanden (2015) estimated a series 
on real wages from 1680 to 1914 for urban free workers in Java, which they 
used to compare with wage trends in other parts of Asia and Europe. They 
found that over the eighteenth century, real wages of ‘free coolies’ in urban 
Java were high in comparison with Bengal and Beijing and even cities such 
as Leipzig, although over the nineteenth century they declined.
While this work is certainly producing interesting and provocative results, 
it sometimes appears to rest on rather fragile foundations. Several key issues 
relating to the reliability of the data, and the extent to which meaningful 
comparisons can be made across countries and continents over long periods 
of time, are either not addressed at all by many authors or only in an ad hoc 
fashion. Some authors using wage data make no attempt to examine the 
underlying dynamics of the labour markets from which the wage data are 
extracted. There seems to be an assumption that markets for various types 
of labour operate in accordance with the simple supply-and-demand model, 
that they clear quickly and eff iciently and that wages equal the marginal 
product of the workers participating in that particular labour market. It is 
also assumed that workers have good information about the availability of 
jobs, and are free to move from their home regions to where wages are higher, 
or where more jobs are available. Problems such as nominal wage rigidity 
in the face of severe price shocks, or ethnic and regional segmentation 
of labour markets, are often ignored. So are issues relating to the role of 
markets for wage labour in the wider economy. The valuable insights of 
Horrell and Humphries on the divergence between trends in male wage 
rates and household expenditures are also often ignored.
In addition, many studies of living standards outside Europe have ignored, 
or underestimated the role of women in household production. Pomeranz 
(2000: 98-106; 2003: 132-141) discussed the role of women in household 
7 A more cautious analysis of wage data in England, India and China is given in Broadberry 
and Gupta (2006). They conclude that the most prosperous parts of Asia between 1500 and 1800 
look similar to the stagnating southern, central and eastern parts of Europe, rather than the 
developing northwestern parts.
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production in China. He argued that although Chinese women were im-
portant in home production of textiles, they rarely organized or marketed 
their production by themselves, but were usually supervised by husbands or 
mothers-in-law. Most were expected to stay at home; there were no markets 
for the labour of single women as there were for men. This contrasts with 
historical evidence from parts of Southeast Asia which shows that women 
not only produced goods within the home but were actively involved in 
trading and other activities outside the home (Reid 1988: 162-172). Bearing 
in mind the important role which women have played in both production 
and marketing of goods in parts of Southeast Asia, it could be argued that 
trends in male wages by themselves are not a wholly reliable indicator of 
trends in living standards of the population as a whole. Certainly claims 
by authors such as Williamson (2000: 19) that ‘living standards of ordinary 
workers as captured by real wages are a better indicator of the economic 
well-being of the vast majority in any society’ than per capita GDP in Asia 
in the early part of the twentieth century need to be treated with caution.
In most parts of Southeast Asia, data on sources of household income only 
became available in the 1960s, or later. But other evidence can be collected 
which gives important insights into how household members reacted to the 
challenges presented by growing domestic and global demand for tropical 
products in different parts of Southeast Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. By the 1930s, population censuses were gathering information 
on labour force participation by both men and women in British Malaya, 
Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia. These data together with other 
evidence show that some of the arguments about the divergence between 
the West and the rest put forward in the recent literature do not always 
apply in Southeast Asia. Female labour force participation rates were high 
in some parts of Southeast Asia in the 1930s; in Thailand the census carried 
out in 1937 found that women accounted for around 47 per cent of the total 
labour force. The percentage was lower in other parts of the region, although 
in parts of Java the 1930 census found high female labour force participation 
rates, with women employed in a range of non-agricultural occupations 
(Booth 2016: 171-174).
Theories of Immiserizing Growth
Having examined the various indicators which have been used in debates 
over trends in living standards in both Europe and Asia, it is useful to look 
at some of the theoretical approaches which have been used to explain why 
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economic growth, to the extent that it occurred, did not always result in 
improved living standards for large segments of the population. Inevitably 
in the Southeast Asian case, analyses of ‘immiserizing growth’ have become 
intertwined with debates over the impact of Western colonialism. For 
around a century, from the middle decades of the nineteenth century to 
the decade after 1946, most parts of Southeast Asia were under the control 
of foreign powers. The Dutch had occupied Java and some parts of Eastern 
Indonesia since the sixteenth century, and over the nineteenth century 
they consolidated their control over Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, 
often by co-opting local rulers.
The British also kept local rulers in place in much of peninsular Malaya 
although the Straits Settlements (Singapore, Malaka, the island of Penang 
and the adjoining hinterland) were directly governed, with the island of 
Singapore being transformed into a major port and naval base which served 
as an entrepôt not just for British Malaya but also for western Indonesia. 
From the mid-nineteenth century the French gained control over Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos, which they governed as Indochina. The Spanish had had 
a presence in the Philippines since the sixteenth century; after the defeat 
of Spain by the USA at the end of the nineteenth century, the Philippines 
became an American colony. Burma was also under the control of the 
British, but ruled until 1937 as part of British India. Only Thailand remained 
an independent kingdom, but its economic policies were influenced by 
pressures from both Britain and France, especially by resident British 
f inancial advisers.
Given these diverse experiences, it might be expected that economic 
policies and outcomes across Southeast Asia diverged considerably in the 
century up to 1940. To some extent this was the case, but for many indigenous 
people who participated in the struggle for national independence across 
the region in the f irst part of the twentieth century, it was widely believed 
that the economic policies of the colonial regimes had a number of com-
mon features. The main goal of colonial governments, in the eyes of many 
nationalists, was to extract prof its from the exploitation of the region’s 
abundant agricultural and mineral resources, which were then remitted 
abroad. It was further argued that the various colonial regimes had little 
interest in providing education or public health facilities for the indigenous 
populations they controlled; neither did they promote the growth of modern 
industry, except for a limited amount of agricultural and mineral processing. 
These concerns were shared by some colonial off icials who, especially after 
1900, were worried that the policies pursued by their governments were not 
leading to improved ‘native welfare’.
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One consequence of colonial rule in Southeast Asia was clear by the 
early twentieth century. Indigenous populations across the Southeast Asian 
region were growing fast in comparison with most other parts of Asia. 
The population of Southeast Asia was probably no more than 35 million 
in 1800, and grew by around 1 per cent per annum through the nineteenth 
century (Boomgaard 2014: 133). By 1931, when reliable census data became 
available for most parts of the region, the population was estimated to be 
around 134 million. The growth rates through the nineteenth and into the 
early twentieth century were thus much faster than in China or the Indian 
subcontinent. By 1931 the population of Southeast Asia was around 40 per 
cent of British India (excluding Burma) and 27 per cent of that of China. 
After 1950, population growth rates in Southeast Asia were about the same 
as in the Indian subcontinent, but faster than in China, with the result that 
by 2018 the population of Southeast Asia was almost 47 per cent of that in 
China (Table 1.3).
Table 1.3:  Population of Southeast Asia as a percentage of China, and the Indian 
Subcontinent, 1881-2018
Year China India+ 
1881 21.2 30.4 
1931 27.2 39.6 
2018 46.5 37.3 
note: 1881 and 1931 population data refer to british india excluding burma; in 2018 data refer to 
india, Pakistan and bangladesh.
Sources: british india, 1881 and 1931: visaria and visaria (1983: table 5.7), davis estimates; China: 
Maddison (2003: 160-162); Southeast Asia: boomgaard (2014: 133). data for 2018 from Population 
reference bureau (2018).
The evidence of rapid population growth, combined with slow improvements, 
or even declines in food availability, was by the early twentieth century 
causing concern on the part of colonial off icials in the more densely settled 
parts of Southeast Asia, about the possibility of ‘Malthusian traps’. It was 
argued that increasing populations on limited supplies of agricultural 
land were leading to diminishing returns to agricultural production, and a 
growing number of people living at bare subsistence. In addition, the influx 
of cheap manufactures from Europe, and after 1920 from Japan, was thought 
to be destroying traditional handicrafts which in earlier times had provided 
many households with extra sources of income. Paradoxically, these worries 
were often combined with the conviction that in the less densely settled 
regions, the development of agricultural and mineral resources was being 
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held back by small populations, most of whom had access to land under 
some form of traditional tenure, and did not wish to become involved in 
wage labour markets, where wages were considered low and the conditions 
of employment humiliating.
One solution was to encourage in-migration from the huge population 
reservoirs of China and India; another was to encourage migration of work-
ers from densely settled areas within the colonies to regions where local 
populations were sparse. The latter option was particularly appealing to 
Dutch off icials, who by the early twentieth century were worried about 
what they viewed as the problem of overpopulation in Java. They sought 
to promote both agricultural intensif ication in Java and out-migration, 
especially to the rapidly developing estate regions in northeast Sumatra. 
The French, worried about population pressures in Northern Vietnam, also 
encouraged people to move southwards. Over the 1930s, both French and 
Dutch off icials also became more preoccupied with policies to promote 
non-agricultural employment, especially through industrial development.
A second argument concerning ‘immiserizing growth’ which has been 
advanced in the literature, both in the colonial era and more recently, 
concerns the impact of growing involvement in international trade on 
living standards in Asia and Africa. That exports from Southeast Asia 
grew rapidly in the century from 1830 to 1930 has been well documented; 
as with the population data, a comparison with both China and India is 
instructive. Between 1830 and 1937, the value of exports from Southeast 
Asia increased from only 9 per cent of the Asian total to 37 per cent 
(Table 1.4). The percentage share of both China and India declined; by 
1937 exports from China comprised only 9 per cent of the Asian total. 
Southeast Asian exports as a percentage of total exports from the tropical 
world also increased rapidly between 1883 and 1937 (Booth 2004: Table 
3). Over much of the nineteenth century, it has also been estimated that 
the net barter terms of trade improved for several countries in the region 
(Williamson 2011: 37).
The impact of increased participation in global trade on living standards 
among the indigenous populations of Southeast Asia was, and remains, a 
contested issue. Williamson (2011: 231-234) has argued that three factors 
reduced the benef its of trade for the poorer countries in Asia and Africa 
through the nineteenth century and up until 1914, and led to the widening 
gap in incomes between the West and the rest. They were deindustrialization, 
rising inequality and volatility of primary product prices. To what extent 
did these factors affect living standards in the economies of Southeast Asia? 
Is there persuasive evidence of an absolute decline in living standards in 
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Southeast Asia, as distinct from a growing gap between the region and other 
parts of the global economy, both before and after 1945? Was there indeed 
a growing gap, or was there some catch-up, especially with the leading 
industrial economies? These questions are complex, and the answers vary 
both across colonies and within colonies over time. They will be investigated 
in more detail in subsequent chapters, but a few preliminary points can 
be made.
The f irst concerns deindustrialization, where the evidence is mixed, 
but increasingly many historians are casting doubt on the idea that de-
industrialization occurred, if the term is def ined as a decline in output of 
mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities as a percentage of total 
output. In fact, the evidence from national income accounts shows that the 
industrial sector at least maintained its share of national output in most 
parts of Southeast Asia in the years from 1913 to the late 1930s, and in some 
colonies it increased (Booth and Deng 2017: Table 3). The evidence for the 
nineteenth century is mixed but several scholars have challenged the view 
that indigenous textile industries declined over the nineteenth century; 
Meerkerk (2017) has examined the evidence for Java. Other industries in 
Table 1.4: Asian and third world exports, 1830 to 1937







Percentage of the Asian total







note: Asia includes the Middle east, as well as China, Korea, hong Kong and Southeast and South 
Asia. india includes Ceylon, burma, and other parts of british india. Southeast Asia includes french 
indochina, british Malaya, indonesia and the Philippines. data refer to three-year averages centred 
on the years shown.
Source: booth (2004: table 2).
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sectors such as agricultural processing grew rapidly, while the construc-
tion sector developed as a result of both public and private investment 
in infrastructure and buildings. While it is true that no government in 
Southeast Asia actively promoted industrial growth until the 1930s through 
protectionist policies or other means, and exchange rate policies were often 
harmful to traded good producers, that does not mean that the industrial 
sector stagnated or declined.
It is possible that inequality rose in some parts of Southeast Asia from 
1870 to 1940, although the evidence is not very robust. Williamson (2011: 
Table 9.1) provides estimates of the Gini coeff icient for Java in 1880 and 
1924 which shows a decline, although it is not clear how the estimates 
were derived. Williamson (2011: Table 9.4) also gives estimates of the ratio 
of wages to rents in Burma and Siam from the 1870s to the 1930s; in both 
countries there was a steep decline. But the mechanisms through which 
such a decline could have led to a rise in income inequality are not made 
clear, and, in addition, the wage data which he used are problematic. I 
return to this issue in Chapter 2. Williamson (2011: Chapter 10) also argues 
that volatility in the terms of trade was also a drag on growth in many 
Asian, African and Latin American countries between the 1860s and the 
1930s. While it true that the terms of trade were more volatile over these 
decades in the periphery than in the core industrial economies, it is not 
clear that this necessarily affected either economic growth or income 
distribution. For many producers across Southeast Asia of crops such as 
rice, timber, rubber, vegetable oils, sugar, coffee, tea, spices and minerals, 
the net barter terms of trade improved until 1913, and the income terms 
of trade in many cases increased until the depression of the early 1930s. 
Volume increases more than compensated for falling prices. While it is true 
that higher prices would have led to higher incomes for most producers, 
whether large companies or smallholders, the evidence does not support 
the argument that volatility in the terms of trade led to absolute falls in 
output of traded goods, or to lower incomes for producers, at least until 
the 1930s.
Indeed, it is diff icult in the Southeast Asian context to reconcile the 
Williamson arguments with the evidence that in several Southeast Asian 
colonies, per capita GDP grew more or less in step with that in the metro-
politan power from the late nineteenth century to 1940. In Indonesia, per 
capita GDP was around 27 per cent of that in the Netherlands in 1870: it fell 
to 23 per cent in 1913 and then increased until by 1939 the ratio was little 
different from 1870 (Table 1.5). A sharp fall in per capita GDP relative to the 
metropolitan powers only occurred after 1950. This was also the case in the 
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Philippines and Vietnam. The only colonies in Southeast Asia to experience 
a signif icant degree of catch-up with the former colonial power after 1960 
were Malaysia and Singapore. The reasons for this are complex and will be 
investigated in more depth in subsequent chapters, but it is clear that, in 
several parts of Southeast Asia, economic policies were pursued after 1950 
which proved more damaging to economic growth than those imposed by 
the colonial powers from 1870 to 1940.
Table 1.5:  Per capita GDP in Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore and 











1870 26.7 12.2 (1902) 28.7 25.2 29.5
1913 23.1 14.9 19.0 19.3 24.1
1929 28.1 16.4 n/a 30.7 39.0
1939 25.2 17.6 n/a 31.6 32.5
1960 13.7 9.9 13.0 (1950) 19.7 20.7
1990 12.6 10.0 4.9 64.5 35.3
2016 21.3 13.6 15.6 171.5 57.9
Source: bolt et al. (2018).
The Argument in Brief
It seems clear from Table 1.2 that, at the end of the f irst decade of the 
new millennium, poverty was still a serious problem in several ASEAN 
countries, according to estimates produced by both national governments 
and international agencies. According to the Asian Development Bank 
estimates published in 2014, well over 100 million people in Southeast Asia 
in 2010 fell below the $1.51 poverty line. Many of these people were located 
in three countries: Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The more recent 
estimates produced by the World Bank using the 2011 PPP data, and a poverty 
line of $1.90 also show that Indonesia and the Philippines have the highest 
number of poor people, around 26 million people in 2015/16 (Table 1.6). 
But the total number of poor, using the $1.90 poverty line, was much lower 
than 2010, in spite of the fact that the estimates used an aparently higher 
poverty line. Is it really the case that such a large fall in poverty occurred 
over f ive or six years? Or is the apparent fall the result of different estimation 
procedures? These questions are addressed in Chapter 7.
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Table 1.6:  Headcount measures of poverty in Southeast Asia using the $1.90 
poverty line and national poverty line
Country $1.90 National Numbers of poor 
(millions)
2015/16* 2010**
Malaysia (2016) 0 0.4 0.0 0.1
thailand (2016) 0 8.6 0.0 0.8
indonesia (2016) 6.8 10.9 17.6 67.2
Philippines (2015) 8.3 21.6 8.4 25.1
vietnam (2016) 2.0 7.0 1.8 19.4
Laos (2012) 22.7 23.2 1.5 2.4
Myanmar (2015) 6.4 32.1 3.4 n/a
Cambodia (2014) n/a 14.0 n/a 3.6
China (2014) 1.4 (4.5)*** 19.2 n/a
india (2011) 21.2 21.9 256.6 n/a
* using the $1.90 threshold
** using the $1.51 threshold
*** the national poverty line may not include the whole country
Sources: Asian development bank (2018); Asian development bank (2014c).
Given the problems which surround estimates of poverty and inequality 
based on monetary data, there have been renewed attempts to produce 
estimates based on non-monetary data, including attempts to measure 
poverty using a method which ‘shows whether people satisfy a set of specified 
basic needs, rights, or – in line with Sen’s capability approach – functionings’ 
(Alkire and Santos 2014: 251). As with the Human Development Index, the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) has been used to rank low- and 
middle-income countries according to a composite index. But the MPI 
excludes monetary indicators. The rankings for seven Southeast Asian 
countries together with China and India are given in Table 1.7. The rankings 
differ in several respects from those derived from the headcount measures 
of poverty produced by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 
Cambodia, which had a lower headcount measure of poverty compared to 
Indonesia and the Philippines in 2010, according to the ADB data, ranks 
below all the other countries in the table except Laos and India according 
to the MPI index. The Philippines ranks above Indonesia according to the 
MPI index, although its headcount measure of poverty was above Indonesia’s 
according to the World Bank’s $1.90 measure (Table 1.7).
The divergence between the headcount measures of poverty, and the 
rankings according to the Multi-dimensional Index (MDI) suggests that 
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some countries in Asia appear to be doing worse on a range of non-monetary 
indicators than their poverty estimates, and indeed their GDP numbers, 
would suggest. Indonesia stands out as the country where its score on the 
Multi-dimensional Index is low given its relatively high per capita GDP. 
Does the low Indonesian result for the MDI reflect low levels of government 
spending per capita on health and education over several decades? By 
contrast, Vietnam scores well on both the headcount measure of poverty 
and the MDI, given its relatively low per capita GDP. The use of multi-
dimensional indexes remains controversial, although these indexes were 
given somewhat grudging approval in the report of the Commission on 
Global Poverty, published by the World Bank in 2017. But they do serve to 
strengthen the argument that countries should track progress on a range 
of both monetary and non-monetary indicators rather than relying simply 
on headcount measures of poverty, derived from social survey data which 
may not be very accurate.
If particular countries have performed badly on estimates of poverty 
based on either monetary or non-monetary indicators, what are the reasons 
for their failures? Does the poor performance of Indonesia, for example, 
result from an unfavourable colonial legacy, or from the inability of post-
colonial governments to tackle deep-seated problems of deprivation and 
inequality? Chapters 2 and 3 review the evidence on poverty and changing 
living standards in the various colonial territories of Southeast Asia, and 
comparisons are made with colonies in other parts of Asia. Particular 
Table 1.7:  Countries ranked according to Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 
and headcount measure of population in multidimensional poverty
Country Index Headcount Data source/year
thailand (21) 0.003 0.9 MiCS 2012
China (37) 0.017 4.0 CfPS 2014
vietnam (46) 0.029 7.1 MiCS 2013/14
Philippines (52) 0.052 11.0 dhS 2013
indonesia (55) 0.066 15.5 dhS 2012
Myanmar (66) 0.134 30.1 dhS 2015/16
Cambodia (69) 0.146 33.0 dhS 2014
Laos (73) 0.174 34.1 n/a
india (76) 0.191 41.3 ihdS
note: figures in brackets give rankings: 113 countries were ranked. A score closer to zero means 
that the country was ranked higher. for full details on how the rankings were compiled, see Alkire 
and robles (2017a)
Source: Alkire and robles (2017b: table 1.1 [Main MPi results]).
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attention is paid to the question of how growing populations found employ-
ment, both in agriculture and in other sectors of the economy, in the context 
of both the land-scarce and land-abundant regions in Southeast Asia, and 
the consequences of these employment patterns for the living standards 
of the indigenous populations. Chapter 4 examines the consequences for 
living standards of the Pacif ic War, and the diff icult transition to independ-
ence in many parts of Southeast Asia after 1945. Evidence is presented 
that most countries in Southeast Asia in 1960 were, in terms of per capita 
GDP, behind many countries in Africa and the Middle East. Chapter 5 
examines the research on poverty and inequality which was carried out in 
Southeast Asia in the years from the 1950s to around 1980, including work 
by international agencies including the World Bank and the International 
Labour Organization.
The period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s is often seen as a golden 
era of accelerated economic growth in Southeast Asia, although the rapid 
growth was confined to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, while 
others stagnated or struggled to overcome the legacies of prolonged conflict. 
Chapter 6 addresses the sometimes contentious evidence concerning the 
impact of growth on poverty decline and improved living standards in the 
countries which achieved rapid growth. It also examines the evidence in 
those countries which were falling behind. In the latter part of 1997, several 
currencies in the ASEAN region including the Thai baht, the Malaysian 
ringgit and the Indonesian rupiah all underwent substantial devaluations 
relative to the dollar and other major currencies. These devaluations were 
the result of massive capital outflows which in turn caused not just a slow-
down in economic growth in the affected economies, but actual declines 
in national product in 1998. The impact of these declines on poverty and 
living standards is also discussed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 examines the sometimes contentious evidence on trends in 
poverty and income distribution after 2000. Has the return to economic 
growth led to a sustained reduction in poverty across the region, and an 
improvement in non-monetary indicators, including health and educa-
tion, in all regions and for all social classes? What was the impact of the 
f inancial crisis which erupted in the USA and parts of Europe in 2008? Did 
the Southeast Asian countries escape this crisis without serious effects on 
living standards, and if so why? Chapter 7 also reviews recent controversies 
on the measurement of poverty which have intensif ied, especially after 
the release of new poverty measures from the World Bank, based on new 
estimates of purchasing power parities (PPP) data prepared in 2011. The 
new PPP data was used to estimate new headcount measures of poverty, 
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shown in Table 1.6. These estimates caused considerable surprise among the 
development community, and in 2017 the World Bank published a substantial 
report, prepared by a committee chaired by Professor A. Atkinson of Oxford 
University, which reviewed the methodology used by the World Bank to 
estimates poverty across countries and over time, and made recommenda-
tions for change. The implications for poverty measurement in Southeast 
Asia of these recommendations are discussed in Chapter 7.
In most parts of Southeast Asia since the 1950s, governments have been 
implementing a range of policies designed to reduce poverty. Chapter 8 
examines the impact of a number of policy interventions, which began in 
the 1950s, including, land reform and land settlement policies, employment 
creation through public works, government intervention in food markets, 
and, more recently, targeted cash transfers. Most of these policies have been 
adopted by several countries in Southeast Asia. What impact have they 
had on the incomes and living standards of the poorest groups in society? 
Is there a case for using budgetary funds to expand these programmes in 
the future?
One question which has been raised repeatedly in the literature on 
economic growth since the 1970s concerns the relationship between eco-
nomic growth, poverty reduction and inequality. An influential school of 
thought, in both Southeast Asia and other parts of the world, argues that 
economic growth is not just a necessary condition for poverty decline but 
also a suff icient one. Policies which promote growth should focus on open 
trade and investment policies, infrastructure development and human 
resource development. It has been argued that the countries in Southeast 
Asia which have followed such policies, such as Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand and, more recently, Vietnam, have all had improvements in living 
standards, shared by the great majority of their populations. An implication 
is that targeted government policies intended to reduce poverty are probably 
unnecessary, and can even be counterproductive. Chapter 9 reviews the 
evidence for these arguments.
Chapter 9 also draws together the various arguments made in the book 
by addressing three questions. First, can we say with confidence that the 
evidence supports the view that living standards have improved across 
Southeast Asia, not just in the past three or four decades but over the past 
century? Second, to the extent that some countries and regions have been 
left behind, what are the reasons? Is it possible to sort out the contributions 
made by agricultural and rural development on the one hand, and urban-
industrial development on the other? What has been the role of demographic 
change? Third, to the extent that governments across the region have been 
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implementing policies which are intended to reduce poverty, and bring about 
broad-based improvements in living standards, which policy interventions 
have been most successful and why? Answers to these three questions should 
help both national governments and international agencies to frame more 
effective policies for egalitarian growth in future decades.
2 The Colonial Period: Population and 
Output Growth in Agricultural and 
Non-agricultural Sectors
Changing Official Attitudes to Welfare Policies
The previous chapter described the gradual assertion of control over 
Southeast Asia by the European colonial powers in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, and the American occupation of the Philippines after 
1900. But what did colonial governments do with the often large territories 
they had acquired? There is much evidence that by the early twentieth 
century, governments in several parts of Southeast Asia were adopting a 
more activist approach to promoting economic development in the territories 
they controlled, even if they did not def ine economic development in the 
way it came to be understood after 1945. This was at least partly motivated 
by a growing awareness among private businesses in the metropolitan 
countries that Southeast Asia had land and other resources which could be 
used to produce valuable agricultural and mineral commodities in increasing 
demand in the industrializing countries in Europe and North America.
The private companies which were formed to exploit both agricultural 
and mineral resources often operated in more than one colony. They had 
considerable influence with governments in London, Paris, the Hague and 
Washington and lobbied to get them to adopt policies which favoured their 
enterprises. But at the same time, non-governmental groups and some 
politicians began to realize that in developing the resources of their colonies, 
they had an obligation to improve the welfare of the indigenous populations. 
Such concerns were motivated not just by feelings of moral responsibility, 
but also by more hard-headed calculations about the importance of colonial 
markets for home industries. If the growing indigenous populations in 
Southeast Asia and elsewhere were getting richer, they would buy more 
products from the metropolitan countries, which in turn would benef it 
industries such as textiles, which were under growing competitive pressure 
in their domestic markets.
Ref lecting these various pressures, the Calvinist-Catholic coalition 
which had come to power in the Netherlands announced in 1901 that a 
‘new approach would be taken in colonial management’ (Penders 1977: 61). 
The emphasis was on enhancing the economic welfare of the indigenous 
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population in Indonesia by increasing agricultural output through irrigation 
and the dissemination of new technologies, by expanding education in 
vernacular languages, particularly at the primary level, and by moving 
people from the densely settled parts of Java and Bali to other parts of the 
huge Indonesian archipelago, where it was widely believed that economic 
development was held back by low population densities. Government 
expenditures on irrigation, education, transport infrastructure and land 
settlement all increased substantially over the f irst two decades of the 
twentieth century. In addition, the Dutch developed a rural credit system, 
established village rice banks and reformed the network of pawnshops, 
which were the most important source of credit for many indigenous 
Indonesians (Van Laanen 1990). These policies were intended to improve 
the incomes of the indigenous population, in part by improving their 
productivity in agriculture, and in part by encouraging them to diversify 
into non-agricultural activities.
These policies attracted considerable attention from off icials in other 
Asian colonies, who felt that Dutch policies offered them valuable lessons. 
To more modern eyes, they can be seen as fairly standard state-sponsored 
attempts to promote faster economic growth through education, infra-
structure and building institutions, especially in the f inancial sector, which 
would support a more diversif ied market economy. Indeed, many of the 
programmes initiated by the Dutch in Indonesia between 1900 and 1930 
were adopted again in the 1970s, in the development plans implemented by 
the Suharto government. But by the 1920s, criticism was mounting both in 
the Netherlands and in the colony. To some of the more conservative Dutch 
colonial off icials and businessmen, the policies which became known as the 
Ethical Policy (Ethische Politiek) were simply extravagant ‘welfare handouts’ 
to the indigenous population, who showed their gratitude by making ever 
more strident demands not just for better economic opportunities, but also 
for greater political participation in the governance of the colony. At least 
part of the growing expenditures were f inanced by borrowing, and the 
mounting debt worried both off icials and business groups in the colony 
and in the Netherlands (Booth 1998: 144-146).
The debates over the Ethical Policy in the Netherlands reflected a serious 
dilemma which confronted governments not just in the Netherlands but 
in also Britain and France in the early twentieth century. Colonies were 
seen as essential if European countries were to maintain their status as 
major players in global politics, and respond to the challenge of rising 
powers, including the USA and Japan. But at the same time it was becoming 
clear that the living standards of populations in Asia and Africa were, 
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on average, lower than those in Europe, and that impoverished colonial 
populations would not just be of little benef it to the metropolitan power, 
but could become a serious liability. In the early decades of the twentieth 
century, the metropolitan populations were making increased demands for 
economic security, as well as a stronger voice in political affairs. Lindert 
(2004: Table 1.2) showed that expenditures on social transfers (including 
unemployment benefits, pensions, health and housing subsidies) in France 
and the United Kingdom at least doubled, relative to GDP, between 1890 and 
1930; in the Netherlands they tripled. Given these growing demands on the 
public f inances from their own populations, the main European colonial 
powers were very reluctant to undertake policies in their colonies which 
might lead to further charges on the home budgets. If public expenditures 
were to increase in the colonies, the money would have to come from 
revenues raised by the colonial governments. And increased revenues 
would be easier to mobilize if colonial economies were dynamic and 
growing, rather than stagnating. The policy challenge was to accelerate 
economic growth in the colonies, without adding to the f iscal obligations 
of the metropolitan power.
Another reason why the policies of not just the Dutch but also the British 
and French colonial regimes in Southeast Asia were being rethought after 
1900 was that two important new colonial powers had emerged in the region, 
the USA and Japan. After the defeat of Spain by American forces in 1898, 
President McKinley decided to impose an American administration on the 
Philippine Islands. A bloody struggle with nationalist forces ensued, and after 
their defeat William Howard Taft was dispatched in 1900 to form a civilian 
government. McKinley instructed Taft to promote the ‘happiness, peace and 
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands’ (Hutchcroft 2000: 277). 
This reflected the strongly moralistic view that the administration took 
of its colonial mission, which both McKinley and Taft realized was deeply 
unpopular with large sections of American public opinion.
Although Taft and other supporters of the American colonial project in 
the Philippines thought that the Americans could learn from both Brit-
ish and Dutch colonial policies in Asia, especially as they related to the 
development of infrastructure and commerce, by the 1920s the idea of the 
‘exceptionalism’ of American colonialism was widely held (Adas 1998: 46-50). 
Unlike the Europeans, who, according to many Americans, viewed their 
colonies as economic assets to be exploited mainly for the benef it of the 
metropolitan power, American policy in the Philippines was dominated by 
the need to prepare the population of the Philippines for self-government, 
and ultimate independence. Crucial to this strategy was mass education. 
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In 1935, substantial self-government was granted to the Philippines, with 
a promise of complete independence after a further ten years.
The other new colonial power in Asia in 1900 was Japan. As the only Asian 
country to acquire colonial possessions in the early twentieth century, 
Japan was an ‘anomaly’ in the history of colonial Asia (Peattie 1984: 6). 
Japan’s empire in East Asia was created between 1895 and 1913, largely as a 
result of military victories over two decaying imperial states, China, and 
Tsarist Russia. The island of Taiwan (or Formosa, as it was known during the 
Japanese period) was annexed from China under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
and an administration was established under a Japanese governor-general 
in March 1896. The military pacif ication of the island in the latter part 
of the 1890s was not unlike similar exercises carried out by the French 
in Tonkin, the Americans in the Philippines, or the Dutch in northern 
Sumatra at about the same time, and was probably no more ruthless than 
these other military campaigns (Peattie 1984: 19). By 1900 the island was 
largely under Japanese control. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed in the 
wake of the Russo-Japanese conflict, gave Japan control over the Liaotung 
Peninsula, which became known as the Kwantung Leased Territory. Finally 
in 1910, Japanese control over the Korean peninsula was consolidated in its 
formal annexation. Unlike in Taiwan, colonial status was f iercely resented, 
and resisted, by Korean nationalists, but their opposition was put down by 
massive and often brutal police and military force.
Japanese military strength in the f irst decade of the twentieth century 
was based on the growth of its non-agricultural sectors, including manu-
facturing industry and f inancial services. But Japan at that time was still 
very much a developing economy. Its per capita national income was well 
below that of the European colonial powers in Asia, and little more than a 
quarter of that of the USA (Table 2.1). This relative backwardness was both 
an advantage and a disadvantage for its colonies. The main advantage was 
that with its own ‘superbly successful modernization efforts’ in the decades 
after the Meiji Restoration still fresh in their minds, Japanese colonial 
administrators could implement similar development policies in both Korea 
and Taiwan, especially in the agricultural sector (Peattie 1984: 23). The 
disadvantage was that the Japanese inevitably tended to view their colonial 
territories as assets to be exploited in their own race to catch up with the 
top industrial powers. This attitude to their colonial possessions became 
more pronounced over the 1930s, as the Japanese economy shifted to a war 
footing, and the colonial possessions became more tightly integrated into 
a rapidly growing military-industrial complex centered on metropolitan 
Japan.
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Table 2.1:  Per capita GDP in Japan and Southeast Asia as a percentage of per 
capita GDP in the USA, 1870-1960
Year Philippines Thailand Burma Singapore
1870 20.4 19.7 18.9 26.0
1913 14.9 12.6 11.9 15.3
1929 16.4 9.1 n/a 21.5
1939* 17.6 10.2 10.6 25.5
1960 9.9 7.6 4.4 13.1
Year Indonesia Malaysia Vietnam Japan
1870 20.5 30.3 18.3 26.4
1913 15.6 19.0 12.1 22.9
1929 14.9 27.2 n/a 25.7
1939 14.4 26.3 n/a 35.8
1960 8.2 13.7 6.0 28.7
* thailand and burma figures refer to 1938.
Source: bolt et al. (2018).
In spite of the different attitudes to their colonial possessions between the 
European powers, the USA and Japan, the issue of living standards attracted 
considerable attention across Asia, especially after 1920. At several confer-
ences of the Institute of Pacif ic Relations (IPR), an independent research 
organization funded mainly by American foundations, to which the principal 
colonial powers in the Asia-Pacif ic region were aff iliated, the diff iculties 
inherent in making cross-country comparisons of living standards were 
discussed. In the 1930 conference, a Japanese paper argued that the decline 
in consumption of grains other than rice in Japan between 1916 and 1929 
indicated an improvement in living standards of rural people, as did the 
increased consumption of legumes, fruits and animal foods (Morimoto 
1931: 47). The emphasis on changing household consumption patterns as 
indicators of changing living standards was taken up by other contributors 
to the conference panel on living standards. A Chinese paper compared data 
from household surveys on calorie consumption among working families in 
Shanghai and Peiping (Beijing), and also compared the percentage of total 
food expenditure devoted to cereals in Japan, Bombay, Shanghai and Peiping. 
It was much higher in Peiping than in the other locations (Tao 1931: 56). While 
the author was careful to stress the possible inaccuracies in the survey data, 
this paper argued that careful comparisons of family budget surveys could 
give important information on living standards across regions and countries.
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In the 1933 meeting of the IPR in Banff, Canada, there was more discussion 
of ways of measuring living standards. A representative of the International 
Labour Off ice (ILO) argued that:
In the vocabulary of many specialists, the term ‘standard of living’ implies 
principally the totality of goods and services consumed and utilized by 
a family or a category of people during a stated period and in a specif ied 
place. Large quantities and superior qualities of these goods and services 
indicate a high standard. Comparisons have proved feasible and even easy 
within the same region. The diff iculties multiply when different regions 
or unlike countries become the object of investigation.
However, the ILO delegate went on to suggest that
For everyday purposes, useful approximations may be arrived at chiefly 
by the judicious and critical use of two methods. The f irst consists in 
measuring the purchasing power of income in a certain aggregate of 
commodities and services. Between regions and countries with somewhat 
similar tastes, habits, and social conditions, real incomes usually indicate 
the prevailing standard of living with sufficient accuracy to be of practical 
service to statesmen and social scientists.
The second method consists in a minute comparison, item by item, of the 
elements entering into the daily consumption of the groups under investiga-
tion. The material may be found in the various national budget inquiries 
which supply the necessary figures for cost-of-living indices and give us the 
most reliable picture we possess at present of the actual needs and manner 
of living among working-class populations. (Lasker and Holland 1934: 87-88)
Both the IPR and the ILO carried out a number of studies of living standards 
and labour conditions in various parts of Asia in the 1920s and 1930s, often 
in conjunction with the various colonial authorities. The results of some 
of these studies in Southeast Asia will be examined below. But f irst, it will 
be useful to summarize the available data on changes in population and 
national output across the region between 1870 and 1940.
Growth of Population and Output
In 1939, the population of Southeast Asia was around 150 million people. Over 
the f irst four decades of the twentieth century, rates of population growth 
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varied from a little more than 1 per cent per annum in the more densely settled 
regions such as Java and Vietnam to well over 2 per cent per annum in British 
Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the faster-growing parts of Southeast 
Asia, especially British Malaya, high rates of in-migration contributed to the 
growth of total populations; elsewhere it is probable that falling mortality 
accounted for at least part of the growth in population. The evidence for this 
is reviewed below. In British Malaya, sustained in-migration from China and 
India meant that, by 1930, over half the population originated from these two 
countries (Table 2.2). Elsewhere the proportions were much lower; indeed, by 
the early part of the twentieth century, several colonial powers, including the 
Americans and the Dutch, had placed restrictions on further in-migration from 
China. Dutch official opinion was that, if more labour was needed to exploit 
agricultural and mineral resources outside Java, the Javanese should move.




as a percentage of total
Population growth 
(c. 1913-1939)
Java 47.0 98 1.1
outer islands 21.4 96 1.5
indonesia 68.4 98 1.3
tonkin 10.4 99 1.4
Annam 8.0 100 0.7
Cochinchina 6.1 96 1.1
vietnam 24.5 99 1.1
Cambodia 3.4 96 1.4
Laos 1.0 100 1.3
thailand 15.2 87 2.2
burma 16.4 90 1.2
Philippines 16.2 99 2.4
british Malaya 5.4 45 2.5
north borneo 0.3 24 1.3
Sarawak 0.5 26 1.4
Sources: indonesia: Central bureau of Statistics (1947: 6), with additional data from boomgaard 
and gooszen (1991); vietnam: banens (2000: 33); Cambodia and Laos: Slocomb (2010: 46) with ad-
ditional data from direction des Services economiques (1947: 271); thailand: Manurungsan (1989: 
32); burma: Saito and Lee (1999: 7); Philippines: national Statistical Coordination board (2000); 
british Malaya: department of Statistics (1939: 36). north borneo and Sarawak: Jones (1966: 39).
In spite of, or to some extent because of, quite rapid population growth, 
output growth was also rapid in many parts of the region after 1900, 
sometimes exceeding population growth by a considerable margin. It was 
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argued in Chapter 1 that per capita GDP in Indonesia, the Philippines and 
British Malaya grew at about the same rate, or even more rapidly than in 
the metropolitan powers between 1870 and 1939 (Table 1.5). The available 
estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) between 1900 and 1938 suggest that 
growth was fastest in per capita terms in British Malaya, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines, at least until the latter part of the 1920s (Table 2.3). Over the early 
part of the 1930s, per capita GDP fell in most colonies; the steep decline in 
Burma and Indonesia reflected the contraction in output of export-oriented 
agriculture and the processing of primary commodities. The colonies were 
unable to devalue their currencies; the problem was particularly severe for 
Indonesia, where the colonial guilder was tied to the Dutch guilder, and 
the Dutch government decided to stay on the gold standard when other 
countries left. Indonesia underwent a severe deflation between 1929 and 1935. 
The wholesale price index fell more sharply than in any other part of Asia 
(Touzet 1939: 220). The deflation in turn adversely affected both consumption 
and investment expenditures. Responding to evidence of output declines, 
colonial off icials in both Indonesia and Indochina began in the mid-1930s 
to promote economic diversif ication, especially industrial development, by 
imposing import controls on manufactures, and in the case of Indonesia, by 
a devaluation of the colonial guilder, in line with the metropolitan guilder.
Table 2.3:  Index of growth of real per capita GDP for selected years between 1902 
and 1940 (1938 = 100)




1902 94 40 59 46 85 89
1911 82 45 79 68 83 91
1913 51 82 73 102 81 99
1916 111 55 81 72 78 91
1918 71 82 90 80 90
1926 110 87 94 95 89 101
1929 128 103 98 96 96 91
1931 122 122 95 94 84 79
1936 113 115 93 95 96 95
1938 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1940 102 107 104
note: data for burma refer to net domestic product; Malaya refers to british Malaya excluding 
Singapore; the final estimate for Malaya refers to 1939.
Sources: burma: Saito and Lee (1999: 7, 214); indonesia: van der eng (2013a); thailand: Manurung-
san (1989: 251); Philippines: hooley (2005); vietnam: bassino, unpublished estimates supplied by 
J.-P. bassino; Malaya: Shah (2017: 197).
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Agricultural production, for both domestic and international markets, 
together with the processing of agricultural products, were the main 
drivers of economic growth everywhere in Southeast Asia over the f irst 
part of the twentieth century. However, in those countries for which we 
have national product data by sector, the share of agriculture tended to 
fall after 1913, although the decline only appears to have been substantial 
in Burma (Table 2.4). Even so, agriculture was the largest single sector of 
the economy in all parts of the region except the Straits Settlements, and 
by far the most important source of employment. In Thailand almost 90 
per cent of the labour force was estimated to be employed in agriculture, 
falling to 61 per cent in British Malaya (Table 2.4). Of course, many of 
those employed in agriculture were also engaged in various forms of 
non-agricultural ‘by-employment’. The implications of this for incomes 
and living standards are examined further below. But f irst, it is important 
to review the ways in which an expanding population was absorbed in 
agriculture.
Table 2.4:  Agriculture as a percentage of GDP, agricultural workers as a 
percentage of total labour force, and agricultural productivity ratios
Country Agriculture output as 
percentage of GDP
Agricultural workers as a 




burma 68.6 54.3 69 (1931) 86.3 (1931)
Philippines 38.5 37.7 65 (1939) 58.1 (1939)
thailand 44.7 44.3 89 (1937) 50.0 (1938)
indonesia 38.2 34.0 68 (1930) 48.6 (1930)
british Malaya n/a n/a 61 (1931) n/a
* output per worker in agriculture as a percentage of output per worker in the whole economy.
Sources: burma: Saito and Lee (1999: 27. 214); Philippines: hooley (2005: 480-482), labour force 
data: Commission of the Census (1941: 505-515); thailand: ingram (1971: 57), Manurungsan (1989: 
251); indonesia: van der eng (2013a), labour force data: Mertens (1978: Appendix table 1.5); british 
Malaya: vlieland (1932: 99-100).
Accommodating Growing Populations in Agriculture
From the latter part of the nineteenth century until 1940, three factors drove 
agricultural expansion in Southeast Asia. One was the growing popula-
tion, which, given limited employment opportunities in other parts of the 
economy, had to be accommodated mainly in the agricultural sector. A 
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second factor was the growth in international demand for many of the 
tropical agricultural products grown in Southeast Asia, including rice, 
sugar, tobacco, vegetable oils, tea, coffee, spices, and, after 1900, rubber. 
This growth was in part due to rising incomes in Europe and the USA; this 
increased demand for a range of foodstuffs, which had previously been 
viewed as luxuries by most of the population. But increasingly it was also 
due to the rise of new industries, such as automobiles and canned foods, 
which needed tropical products, including tin and rubber, as inputs. A third 
factor was technological change, which allowed more crops to be grown on 
existing supplies of land. Probably the best example was the increased use 
of irrigation, which allowed the double-cropping of rice land. In addition, 
some progress was made with developing higher-yielding crop varieties; 
here the most dramatic success was sugar in Java.
In many parts of Southeast Asia, growing populations were accommodated 
in agriculture simply through extending the land frontier. It is striking that 
in most parts of Southeast Asia, cultivated area seems to have grown more or 
less at the same rate as population in the f irst four decades of the twentieth 
century. Even in Java, which was already considered densely settled in 1900, 
harvested area of food crops per capita showed little change between 1915 
and 1940 (Tables 2.5 and 2.6). Even if yields of both food and non-food crops 
did not increase, growing populations could at least maintain output per 
capita through replicating existing agricultural technologies on more land. 
The process was analysed by Myint (1958) in terms of ‘vent for surplus’, a term 
originally used by Adam Smith. A crucial assumption of this approach was 
that ‘land suitable for the cultivation of food is not a scarce factor’ (Findlay 
and Lundahl 1994: 89). In addition, it was assumed that underutilized labour 
could easily be drawn out of subsistence food production, or other activities, 
to meet increased world demand for agricultural exports. These included 
food crops, such as rice, which had always been cultivated, and exotic tree 
crops, such as rubber and palm oil, which indigenous cultivators would never 
have grown had there not been an expanding world market. It was further 
implied that the land tenure system functioned in such a way that any 
household willing and able to cultivate larger holdings could easily obtain 
more land on favourable terms. But how realistic were these assumptions 
in the context of Southeast Asia by the early twentieth century?
Although Myint developed the vent for surplus concept in the context of 
colonial Southeast Asia, the evidence on its applicability is in fact mixed. 
Even if the cultivated land area did grow as fast as the population, was it 
the case that land was freely available to all those who wished to cultivate 
it, either to grow more traditional food crops which could also be exported, 
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such as rice, or to grow exotic export crops, such as rubber? Of particular 
importance in the Southeast Asian context was the impact of the expansion 
of estate agriculture. The term ‘estate’ was not always clearly def ined; it 
was sometimes used to mean any agricultural holding beyond the size 
which can easily be cultivated by a family, perhaps using some hired labour. 
But increasingly in Southeast Asia over the twentieth century it came to 
Table 2.5: Area of land under food crops per capita (hectares)
Burma Philippines Java
1900 0.42 n/a n/a
1905 0.45 n/a n/a
1910 0.45 n/a n/a
1915 0.46 0.29 0.19
1920 0.46 0.32 0.22
1925 0.47 0.31 0.20
1930 0.46 0.31 0.19
1935 0.45 0.30 0.20
1940 0.42 0.31 0.19
note; figures refer to five-year averages centred on the years shown. for 1940 the figures refer 
to 1940 and 1941 (burma), 1938 (Philippines), 1938-1940 (Java). for burma, the figures refer to net 
sown area; for Philippines, planted area; and for Java, harvested area of indigenous crops.
Sources: burma: Saito and Lee (1999: 37-42); Philippines: rose (1985: 255-259), population data: 
bureau of Census and Statistics (1947: 13); Java: boomgaard and van Zanden (1990: table 4.b1), 
population data: Central bureau of Statistics (1947: 5-6).






1900 0.18 0.21 n/a n/a
1910 0.21 0.22 n/a n/a
1911/15 0.23 0.23 n/a n/a
1916/20 0.24 0.23 n/a 0.10
1921/25 0.26 0.23 0.07 0.09
1926/30 0.25 0.24 0.07 0.09
1931/35 0.24 0.23 0.06 0.09
1936/40 0.23 0.23 0.06 0.09
* figures for vietnam and Cambodia refer to calendar years 1900, 1905, 1915, 1920, 1920, 1925, 
1930, 1935, 1940.
Sources: thailand: Manurungsan (1989: tables 1.1 and 2.7); vietnam: giacometti (2000a: 68-80), 
banens (2000); Cambodia: Slocomb (2010: tables 1.2 and 2.8); british Malaya: barnett (1947: table 
2.6); Java: boomgaard and van Zanden (1990: table 4.b2), population data: Central bureau of 
Statistics (1947: 5-6).
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mean a large-scale agricultural enterprise incorporated as a company and 
operated along capitalist lines, hiring in labour and selling output to global 
markets at a profit. Often such companies were owned by shareholders in the 
metropolitan power or in a third country, although in the Philippines many 
large estates were owned by local business groups. Ownership was usually 
separated from management which was carried out by hired managers, who 
in turn used labour hired on both permanent and temporary contracts. 
For such companies securing long-term use rights to land was essential. 
In most parts of Southeast Asia by the early twentieth century, colonial 
administrations were under considerable pressure from estate companies 
and their metropolitan owners to formulate land legislation which facilitated 
the acquisition of large tracts of land to grow export crops.
These pressures ref lected the fact that the growth in world demand 
for export crops was making land in Southeast Asia a valuable asset, even 
in those regions where it was in relatively abundant supply. It was thus 
inevitable that, as exports expanded in the last part of the nineteenth 
century, land markets evolved where none had existed before, and colonial 
administrations reacted to the increased demand for land by introducing 
new concepts of land titling, usually imported from other parts of the 
world and often quite alien to indigenous populations. In Thailand, and 
in parts of British Malaya and the Philippines, the Torrens system of land 
titling from South Australia was introduced, although the system required 
a detailed land cadastre, which was seldom available, even in the more 
densely settled areas, let alone in the frontier zones. Funds were very limited 
for both surveying and the drawing up and issuing of title deeds, and many 
smallholders never received any legal title, thus making them vulnerable 
to more powerful people seeking to gain control of their land (Pelzer 1945: 
109-110; Aquino 1931: 21-27; Feeny 1982: 96-97; Miranda 1991: 58). In the 
Malay states, the imposition of colonial land legislation ‘signif ied the end 
of the line for shifting cultivation which was practiced by most Malays in 
the peninsula outside the long-standing permanent Malay agricultural 
settlements’ (Sundaram 1988: 86).
As large estate companies expanded their operations from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards, especially in Indonesia, British Malaya and the 
Philippines, they used their influence with both colonial administrations 
and home governments to get access to large blocks of land on long leases 
or freehold tenure. Many small cultivators across Southeast Asia developed 
hitherto underutilized land close to their food crop farms so that they could 
grow more rice, or tree crops such as coffee, pepper and rubber. This was 
sometimes a reasonably peaceful process, with the smallholders acquiring 
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extra assets, and an extra source of cash income. But often there was the 
risk of expropriation by powerful land grabbers, both local and foreign, 
who had the tacit if not open support of ruling elites, both colonial and 
indigenous. Most vulnerable to predatory behaviour were those who did not 
cultivate land in their own villages and who had migrated to the so-called 
‘frontier’ regions where they developed homesteads and smallholdings. But 
even those indigenous cultivators whose families had lived in a particular 
locality for centuries, farming land under traditional, or communal tenure 
arrangements, were threatened by new demands for land. Cleary (1992: 
180) argued that in North Borneo, a remote region where there had been 
little European contact, foreign companies in the early twentieth century 
pushed the local off icials to change communal to individual tenures so that 
a ‘proper’ land market could develop which would allow them to acquire 
land with a secure title.
In his discussion of the growth of sugar production in Negros Occidental in 
the Philippines, Larkin (1993: 60) argued that the peopling and exploitation of 
the western Negros wilderness had ‘much in common with the global frontier 
phenomenon taking place at this time.’ No doubt mindful of its own recent 
pioneering history, the American administration in the Philippines was, 
according to Larkin (1993: 68), keen to follow ‘America’s own ideal of turning 
the frontier into the realm of the yeoman farmer’. A Congressional Act of 
1901, which set out the organization of civil government in the Philippines, 
stipulated that a maximum of sixteen hectares of public land should be 
available for each settler family. It seems that fear of land grabbing forced 
the American Congress to ‘appropriate wholesale the public domain of the 
country’ (Aquino 1931: 21). Sixteen hectares was a generous amount for many 
poor families, and numbers of applications grew steadily over the ensuing 
years. But a large number of applications for homesteads failed, partly 
because many potential settlers were often not aware of the legal status of 
the land they wished to settle. If the land was not considered to be in the 
‘public domain’ the application was refused. In addition, if the homesteader 
was not able to cultivate at least one-f ifth of the land allocated within f ive 
years, he lost the claim, which was then given to another applicant (Pelzer 
1945: 110-114). In parts of Luzon, some homesteaders found that the land they 
had cleared and farmed was registered by some of the powerful landlords 
in the area, and in effect taken from them by a legal titling procedure of 
which the homesteaders were ignorant (McLennan 1969: 673-674).
Other colonial administrations also stated that their goal was to establish 
an agrarian system based on small owner-cultivators. Where necessary, the 
government would facilitate the opening up of ‘empty lands’ with agricultural 
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potential on which to settle migrants from the densely settled areas, where 
rural poverty was seen as the result of too many people and not enough land. 
French policy in Southern Vietnam from the 1860s onwards was ‘intended to 
settle the majority of the population on the land, and thereby create a secure 
social order based on small proprietors’ (Brocheux 1995: 30). But often land 
under communal tenures were expropriated on the assumption that the 
land was not used. Brocheux and Hemery (2009: 156) stated that in the four 
decades from 1863 to 1902, 3.7 million hectares were taken over by the state, 
at least some of which were under some form of customary tenure. French 
policy veered between auctions of the land acquired and free concessions 
to indigenous cultivators and to European individuals and companies. By 
1942, it was estimated that 2.3 million hectares of land had been sold, of 
which 0.9 million hectares was to European companies and individuals. 
Native concessionaires, who were mainly Vietnamese, were granted almost 
1.4 million hectares (Brocheux and Hemery 2009: 156-157). A high proportion 
of the concessions, almost 90 per cent, were in Cochinchina. In Cambodia, 
French policy from the 1920s onwards was to grant concessions to both 
Cambodians and foreign companies; the latter usually got much larger 
amounts of land. Slocomb (2010: 55) argued that only a small fraction of 
the land conceded was actually developed; in many cases it appeared that 
wealthy Cambodians acquired the land for speculative purposes.
After 1900, the Dutch colonial authorities began an ambitious land set-
tlement programme which involved moving landless families from Java to 
Sumatra and Sulawesi (Pelzer 1945: Chapter VII; Hardjono 1977: 16-21). By 
1941, it was estimated that almost 174,000 Javanese migrants had settled 
in Lampung, the southernmost region in Sumatra, and the closest to Java. 
But only 35,000 had actually been moved in the government-sponsored 
programmes; the rest had either been born in Lampung or moved without 
off icial assistance. The settlers in Lampung were probably better off than 
they had been in Java, as the soil was suitable for rice agriculture and irriga-
tion systems had been built. But the settlers were not given much land and 
could not grow cash crops. In addition, the problem of rural indebtedness, 
of concern to off icials in Java, soon manifested itself in Lampung as well 
(Hardjono 1977: 20). Given the small numbers who moved under the off icial 
programme, it was obvious by 1940 that government-sponsored out-migration 
was having little impact on the problems of poverty and landlessness in Java.
In the delta regions of central Thailand and southern Burma, large tracts 
of agricultural land were opened up for cultivation in the latter part of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Siamwalla 1972). The impact of 
these ambitious schemes differed over time and space, but often they led 
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to consequences unintended by the governments which had initiated the 
process of land expansion. These consequences included purchases of land 
by speculators based in urban areas, and growing tenancy. In Burma, the 
problem of rural indebtedness became much worse over the 1930s, as more 
farmers borrowed from Indian moneylenders. When they could not pay 
back these loans, there was large-scale land alienation and many cultivators 
became tenants on their own land. It was estimated that only 15 per cent 
of land in Lower Burma in 1941 was owned by ‘genuine agriculturalists and 
unmortgaged’ (Andrus 1948: 81). In the Philippines, in spite of the American 
policy of supporting the land-owning smallholder, what actually emerged 
by the 1930s was a pattern of tenure in which around half the holdings 
were under two hectares in size, while 13 per cent were over f ive hectares. 
Over 40 per cent of all cultivated land was in holdings over f ive hectares 
(Pelzer 1945: 85). Tenancy was widespread. Only 49.2 per cent of all farmers 
in 1939 were owners of the land they worked; a further 15.6 per cent owned 
part of the land and the rest were tenants, mainly sharecroppers. The 1939 
population census found that 48 per cent of the male agricultural labour 
force, of almost three million, were classif ied as farm labourers, many of 
them working in rice, corn and coconut farms (Commission of the Census 
1941: 505).
Pelzer (1945: 86-89) considered the extent of tenancy in the Philippines 
‘astonishingly high’ and attributed it to Spanish policies which favoured local 
chiefs (cacique), many of whom acquired substantial holdings and reduced 
the traditional cultivators to the status of tenant. McLennan (1969: 659-662) 
stressed the importance of the pacto de retroventa arrangements, whereby 
moneylenders (often of mixed Chinese-Filipino ancestry) acquired parcels 
of land when loans secured on the land were in default. American policy, 
while ostensibly favouring the owner-cultivator, in fact did little to reduce 
the extent of tenancy, which might have increased in the f irst four decades 
of the twentieth century. Owen (1972: 50) argued that the large amounts of 
land acquired from the church (the friar lands) could have been used to settle 
landless families, but was in fact sold to wealthy speculators. Larkin (1993: 
61) pointed out that in the sugar-growing areas, small landowners were not 
infrequently dispossessed by ‘the new breed of planters’ seeking to build 
up large haciendas, and were forced into a precarious living as agricultural 
labourers on large plantations, with few alternative sources of income.
Although the high rates of tenancy in the Philippines attracted consider-
able critical attention from subsequent scholars, the proportion of land 
under tenancy was in fact lower than Burma by the late 1930s, or indeed in 
Taiwan (Booth 2007a: Table 3.5). In the central plains of Thailand, Thompson 
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(1967: 319) found that by the 1930s absentee landlordism was an increasingly 
serious problem, and more land was being expropriated by moneylenders. 
The agricultural census of 1937 found that around one-quarter of all land in 
the central plains was in tenanted holdings; for the country as a whole, the 
ratio was 15.7 per cent (Ingram 1971: 268). In lower Burma, it was estimated 
that almost 60 per cent of arable land was operated under tenancy by the 
late 1930s (Pfanner 1969: 221). The rather low amount of cultivated land per 
capita in Thailand by the end of the 1930s, together with the high proportion 
of the labour force employed in agriculture, meant that planted area per 
agricultural worker was quite low in comparison with Burma, the Philippines 
or Cochinchina (Booth 2007a: Table 3.1). This, together with the high rates 
of tenancy, especially in the central plains, would suggest that even in a 
country which was not a colony, and where foreign-owned estates were 
almost entirely absent, competition for agricultural land was becoming 
more intense by the 1930s, and land was not always freely available to all 
those wishing to cultivate it. The rural survey conducted by Zimmerman 
in 1930/31 indicated that around 36 per cent of all households in central 
Thailand owned no land at all (Zimmerman 1999: 25-36). It is probable that 
most landless households were able to access some land through tenancy 
arrangements, but in many cases they would have had to supplement 
income from tenant farming with wage labour and handicraft activities. 
The consequences of this for living standards are examined further below.
In Java, where data on cultivated area go back further than in most other 
parts of Southeast Asia, we can trace the growth of both population and 
cultivated area in the various residencies of the island from 1870 onwards. 
Those residencies with high rates of population growth also tended to have 
high rates of growth of cultivated area (Booth 1988: 64-66). Did the causation 
run from high rates of area growth to high population growth or vice versa? It 
seems that those regions which were experiencing high growth in cultivated 
area also experienced high rates of in-migration, and this process continued 
until the 1930s. The 1930 population census revealed that in some parts of 
East Java, over 20 per cent of the population was born outside the region, and 
these people were often found in the regions where growth in rice land was 
quite rapid. While the Dutch authorities might have had diff iculty moving 
Javanese to other parts of the archipelago, many moved within the island, 
usually to places where it was possible to open up new land.
But by the early twentieth century it was clear that, in spite of this mobility 
in Java, the average holding size was falling to below one hectare, and a 
substantial part of the indigenous population had little or no access to 
agricultural land, either as owners or tenants. They were largely, if not 
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entirely, reliant on handicrafts, trade and wage labour for their incomes. 
Boomgaard (1991: Table 1) estimated, on the basis of data collected in 1905, 
that only 40 per cent of the labour force were agricultural landholders, 
and 31 per cent landless. Some of the landless got access to land through 
tenancy arrangements, but on average only 5.3 per cent of all those engaged 
in agriculture could be classif ied as tenants, although the percentage was 
twice as high in parts of West Java and in Yogyakarta (Pelzer 1945: 257). The 
breakdown of the population of Java given by Meijer Ranneft and Huender in 
the 1920s indicated that poor farmers comprised 27 per cent of the population 
and sharecroppers with no land a further 3.4 per cent. Landless labourers 
were estimated to comprise 32 per cent of the population, roughly the same 
proportion as in the 1905 survey. Thus over 60 per cent of the population 
were ‘land poor’ (Wertheim 1964: 232). Although sharecropping and tenancy 
appeared to affect only a small proportion of the total rural population, a 
practice which became increasingly common in the 1920s and 1930s was the 
leasing of land in return for an advance payment. Usually the landowner 
continued to work the land, and the lessee received a share of the crop. Such 
arrangements were informal and seldom registered but surveys indicated 
they were widespread; in one district of East Java in 1939 it was found that 
almost three-quarters of landowners had leased part of their land in order 
to obtain cash (Pelzer 1945: 172).
That access to land, and especially irrigated rice land (sawah) was an 
important determinant of total household income in rural Java by the 
1930s can hardly be doubted. Just how important can be estimated from 
the detailed survey of household incomes carried out in Kutowinangun, in 
Kebumen in Central Java in 1932 and 1933 (Department of Economic Affairs 
1934). While the great majority of the households surveyed, 28 out of 30, did 
cultivate some sawah, most only had access to small parcels. Those who 
were able to access larger parcels earned higher incomes; around 70 per 
cent of the variation in total household incomes from all sources could be 
explained by the amount of sawah cultivated (Table 2.7). Most households 
also cultivated the dry land around their houses intensively with fruits 
and vegetables. On average slightly over 20 per cent of household income 
came from this source.
In Northern Vietnam (Tonkin), it appears that by the 1930s, cultivated 
hectares per person were even lower than in Java, and lower than elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia (Booth 2007a: Table 3.1). As in Java, landholdings were often 
divided into small parcels, with the great majority of cultivators operating 
very small, and often fragmented, holdings. Gourou (1945: 278) argued that 
it was not possible to establish how many households owned no land at all, 
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although Popkin (1979: 156) claimed that, by 1930, 69 per cent of all families in 
Tonkin were either landless or cultivated less than 0.36 hectares. As in Java, 
most cultivators were cultivating small plots with their own labour and there 
was relatively little land available to be rented or sharecropped out, although 
it was possible for households to supplement their holding with communal 
land (Gourou 1945: 283). Much the same was true in Annam, where 94 per 
cent of all holdings were under 0.5 hectares in 1930, and almost 90 per cent 
of holdings were cultivated directly by owners (Henry 1932: 211-213).
The situation in Cochinchina, in Southern Vietnam, was very different 
from the north. Between 1880 and 1910, land under cultivation almost trebled, 
from 0.52 to 1.52 million hectares. Thereafter, the rate of expansion slowed 
(Gran 1975: Table 2-2). Although on average, land under rice cultivation kept 
up with population growth in Vietnam and Cambodia between 1900 and 
1940, there were important regional differences, and after 1915 population 
growth in the north was faster than area growth. In order to bring more 
land under cultivation in the south, the French invested heavily in land 
reclamation, dredging and canal building, and to recoup these expenditures, 
government policy was to sell concessions. Especially after 1913, land was 
sold ‘to the highest bidder’ (Brocheux 1995: 30). The result was that the 
agricultural land was very inequitably distributed; in several provinces 
between 39 and 66 per cent of all agricultural land was in holdings over 50 
hectares (Henry 1932: 189). The process of land surveying and land titling 
was often farmed out to private companies who ‘carried out their duties 
unsystematically and sluggishly’ (Brocheux 1995: 36). Disputes over land 
rights erupted when squatters were evicted by new owners, who farmed 
Table 2.7: Correlations from the Kutowinangan sample
Land owned per capita and:
income from gardens per hectare -0.458
Percentage of household income from sidelines -0.397
Household income per capita and:
Land owned per capita 0.441
Calorie consumption per capita 0.857
Protein consumption per capita 0.875
Percentage from by-employment -0.393
Total household income and:
Sawah cultivated 0.839
All land cultivated 0.762
note: Sample of 30 households.
Source: ochse and terra (1934).
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the land out to tenants, often on short leases (Gran 1975: 252ff.). In spite of 
these problems, the government persisted with the idea that out-migration 
could solve the problems of Tonkin. In 1932 an off ice was created to plan 
migration to supposedly empty lands in the centre and south of the country; 
it was claimed that 1.2 million hectares could be made available for peasant 
settlement (Brocheux and Hemery 2009: 276). But experts such as Gourou 
doubted that this could be anything more than a temporary solution to the 
problems of Tonkin. There would have to be an improvement in crop output 
per unit of area, and much greater provision of non-agricultural employment.
It would be wrong to treat the evidence of growing disputes over land 
in Southeast Asia in the early twentieth century as evidence that the only 
benef iciaries of the growth in both land area and agricultural exports 
were powerful corporations or individuals who were closely connected to 
governing elites, whether domestic or foreign. There is evidence that many 
millions of small farmers did benefit from growing markets for their output, 
both domestic and foreign, and were often able to expand that output by 
opening up new land for cultivation. In those regions where there was 
potential for expanding the area under cultivation, people did move, even 
if government-sponsored efforts to encourage migration were not very suc-
cessful. In addition, local people responded to the opportunities presented 
by growing world markets, both for traditional staples, and for new crops 
such as rubber. In Sumatra and parts of Kalimantan, farmers expanded 
cultivation of smallholder rubber from the 1920s onwards; by 1940, it was 
estimated that over 700,000 hectares of land were planted to smallholder 
rubber outside Java, compared to 385,000 hectares planted by large estates 
(Creutzberg 1975: 94). Most of the smallholder land was under some form of 
traditional tenure, in which farmers appeared to have confidence.
But in spite of the success stories, very often colonial governments either 
neglected the welfare of smallholders or actively tried to prevent them from 
diversifying into different types of agricultural activity. In lower Burma, the 
government did not prevent the rapid expansion of rice land but neither did 
it do much to assist the smallholders who had to rely on f inance from Indian 
moneylenders. When rice prices fell over the 1930s and they were forced 
to default on debt, a substantial proportion of the rice lands passed out of 
their ownership. In addition, as Adas (1974: 62-65) pointed out, the farmers 
had little assistance from government off icials on cultivation techniques, 
and simply replicated the primitive rice technologies from the dry zones 
of Burma in their new surroundings.
A puzzle to some historians is why the British adopted an extreme 
laissez-faire policy towards land alienation in Burma while taking a much 
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more interventionist approach in Malaya. In 1913, the Malay Reservations 
Enactment gave the British resident in each of the Federated Malay States 
(FMS) the power to reserve any land in the state for cultivation by the 
indigenous population of that state; it could not be sold or leased to any 
non-Malay party. By the 1920s it was estimated that around 15 per cent of all 
land in the Federated Malay States was in Malay reservations (Brown 2005: 
19). The British policy in Malaya was influenced by the Dutch legislation in 
Indonesia enacted in the early 1870s, although it was more restrictive in that 
it prohibited any alienation of land from within the reservations including 
leasing. Brown argued (2005: 20) that the failure to take any similar action 
in Burma was mainly due to the fact that Burma was not, until 1937, a colony 
in its own right but a province of British India, where the authorities were 
reluctant to impose any legislative restrictions on the freedom of contract 
in land markets.
Neither the Indonesian nor the British Malayan legislation was intended 
to stop large estate companies from acquiring land either on long leases 
or on other forms of tenure. Planted area of estate rubber, which was the 
most important of the ‘new crops’ transforming the export economies of 
both British Malaya and Indonesia after 1900, grew rapidly in both colonies, 
especially after 1910 (Booth 2007a: Table 3.10). Part of this growth took place 
in regions where ‘empty land’ was still available for exploitation by estates 
but by no means all of it. Estate companies also acquired rights to the use 
of land in the more densely settled areas of Southeast Asia, where by the 
early twentieth century land was no longer an abundant factor. Even as late 
as the 1920s, there was as much land under the control of estate companies 
in Java as in the rest of Indonesia (Booth 2007a: Table 3.9). Some of this was 
land rented in from smallholder cultivators, and used for the cultivation of 
sugar. Planted area of estates in Java in the early 1920s amounted to around 
18 per cent of planted area of smallholder food crops and other crops in the 
early 1920s; this proportion fell over the following two decades but was still 
over 13 per cent in the late 1930s.
Even in the more land-abundant parts of Southeast Asia, tensions between 
estates and smallholders over land became more marked after 1920. In 
British Malaya, the off icial view of rural Malays was that they were cultiva-
tors of rice and other food crops, and should be dissuaded from growing 
‘speculative’ export crops such as rubber, whose prices on world markets 
were highly unstable (Drabble 1991: 103). These attitudes changed little, in 
spite of the evidence that growing rubber was considerably more profitable 
to smallholders than growing rice (Sundaram 1988: 65). Most economic 
historians of colonial Malaya agree that rubber policies were biased in 
the CoLoniAL Period: PoPuLAtion And outPut groW th 61
favour of the estates; this was in part at least because of pressures from 
the metropolitan government (Drabble 1991: 303-304). That smallholder 
acreage continued to grow until 1940 testif ies to the determination of the 
Malay farmer to take advantage of the opportunity to earn a cash income, 
however unstable, from rubber cultivation.
The process of accommodating growing populations in agriculture 
across Southeast Asia before 1940 varied considerably but some common 
conclusions can be extracted from the evidence. First, in those areas where 
population growth was faster than land area growth, especially Tonkin, 
Annam and parts of Java, it is probable that there was some decline in 
average holding size over the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. But this was not suff icient to give all households with available 
labour access to land, and a growing number of agricultural households 
either became completely landless, or operated only tiny parcels. These 
households operated whatever land they could access very intensively, but 
were also forced to seek extra income from other sources. The problem 
of land scarcity was made worse in at least some areas by the growing 
concentration of land in fewer households, although evidence on changes 
in inequality over time is diff icult to assemble.
A second conclusion is that, even in regions where arable land grew 
faster than the rural population, such as in many parts of the Philippines 
and Cochinchina, tenancy seems to have become more widespread. The 
reasons for this were complex, but the outcome was that tenants were often 
in a precarious position, with few rights. At worst their situation was little 
better than that of landless labourers. But several factors did offset the effects 
of diminishing holding size, and growing tenancy. One was the growth of 
double-cropping, which was the result of improved irrigation. Although rice 
and other food crop yields on average did not increase, double cropping did 
lead to more land under food crop cultivation. A further development was 
the growing international demand for export crops. This permitted millions 
of smallholder producers of crops such as rice, coffee, pepper and, after 1910, 
rubber to increase production, and their cash incomes. Government policies 
towards smallholder producers of export crops were seldom supportive and 
sometimes hostile, especially where the interests of smallholders conflicted 
with those of the large estates. But governments were unable to prevent the 
growth of smallholder production for markets, both domestic and global.
A third conclusion relates to the role of large estates, whether controlled by 
foreign interests or by domestic capitalists. They did provide employment to 
considerable numbers of workers who depended on wage labour for at least 
part of their incomes. This was especially the case in Java, and in regions 
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such as North Sumatra and Southern Vietnam where the growth of estates 
created employment for migrant workers from other parts of Indonesia, 
and Indochina. In the Philippines, the 1939 census reported that 187,000 
workers, over 5 per cent of the agricultural labour force, were employed as 
labourers on sugar farms, many of them large-scale. In British Malaya and 
in Burma, where most indigenous households had some access to land, 
employment in estates and in export-processing industries was considered 
by many indigenous workers to be both badly paid and demeaning. Most 
jobs were f illed by migrant workers from China and India. But even this 
was changing by the late 1930s.
A fourth conclusion relates to technological change. By the early twen-
tieth century, yields per hectare of rice were much higher in Japan than in 
monsoon Asia. The Japanese had learned from German scientists about 
the key relationships between water control, nitrogen application and 
higher yields, but these lessons had not spread to other parts of Asia, with 
the exception of the Japanese colonies of Taiwan and Korea. Agricultural 
research in the European colonies was mainly limited to estate crops, where 
there were some impressive achievements, especially in sugar. The new sugar 
varieties developed in Java led to yields per hectare increasing more than 
threefold between the 1870s and the 1930s, although much of the economic 
benefit was lost through falling world prices (Booth 1988: 222-223). In the 
food crop sector, agronomists working in research stations in India, Java 
and elsewhere were aware of the difference in rice yields across Asia, but 
they were unable to bring about any signif icant improvements. The lack of 
progress was attributed to low levels of funding for food crop research, the 
negligible use of fertiliser on food crops, poor water control and a failure 
to breed higher-yielding varieties which were suited to tropical conditions 
(Barker and Herdt 1985: 580). Signif icant breakthroughs had to wait until 
the 1960s.
The last and most important conclusion is that, in spite of the growth that 
undeniably occurred in agricultural output in many parts of Southeast Asia, 
at least until 1930, the goal of an agricultural economy based on land-owning 
smallholders with secure property rights proved elusive. Increasingly, many 
millions of households throughout Southeast Asia were cultivating only 
small parcels of land, or none at all, and were forced to depend on income 
from non-agricultural activities and wage labour. Even those farmers who 
had managed to expand their holdings to cultivate export crops usually 
relied on customary tenure systems to secure their rights to land, including 
their ability to pass their holdings to heirs. The impact of this on incomes 
is examined in the next section.
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Growth of Non-agricultural Sectors of the Economy
One result of the heavy emphasis on agriculture as the main motor of eco-
nomic development in colonial Southeast Asia was that rates of urbanization 
were low. Indeed, some historians have argued that the proportion of the 
population living in towns and cities could well have been lower at the 
end of the nineteenth century than during the ‘age of commerce’ in the 
f ifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Reid 2001: 59). But between 1891 and 1931, 
the populations of what Huff called the seven gateway cities in Southeast 
Asia grew to around 2.9 million people (Huff 2012: Table 1). These cities 
were all ports, and also provided f inancial, transport and other services. 
By the 1930s, the proportion of the population living in towns over 100,000 
was highest in British Malaya, at around 16 per cent. In the least urbanized 
parts of Southeast Asia, including Indochina, Burma and Indonesia, this 
proportion was under 5 per cent (Booth 2007a: Table 2.3). Chinese and other 
migrant groups accounted for a substantial share of the population of the 
gateway cities, and dominated the population in Singapore, although in 
Jakarta and Surabaya, indigenous people comprised the majority by 1930. 
But urban dwellers were in all cases a small minority of the total indigenous 
population, and the great majority remained in rural areas where access to 
agricultural land remained a key determinant of household income.
But not all rural households could access suff icient land to make even a 
basic living. As was argued in the previous section, incomes of rural house-
holds were becoming increasingly diversif ied in most parts of Southeast 
Asia by the early decades of the twentieth century. In the more densely 
settled regions this was to be expected; given that many households had 
only limited, or no, access to agricultural land, they were forced to f ind other 
ways of seeking incomes. The detailed study of farm household incomes 
carried out as part of the Kutowinangun (Central Java) study in 1932 and 1933 
found that, on average, ‘by-employment’, which included both wage work 
and self-employment, accounted for around 16 per cent of the incomes of 
the agricultural households, and a higher proportion of their cash incomes. 
For farm households owning less than 0.75 hectares around 30 per cent of 
household income came from by-employment. There was a negative cor-
relation between household income per capita, and the percentage of total 
income derived from by-employment, suggesting that poorer households 
were more dependent on sidelines to supplement their incomes than the 
better off (Table 2.7). But by the 1930s, even land-owning households had 
become more dependent on wages and other income sources for at least 
part of their incomes.
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Off-farm employment was also important in more land-abundant parts 
of Southeast Asia. In Thailand, where average holding size was larger than 
in most parts of Java, an investigation conducted in 1930/31 found that 
less than half of the cash incomes earned by rural households came from 
agricultural activities (crops, animals, f ish) in the northern, northeastern 
and southern parts of the country. Only in the more commercialized parts 
of central Thailand was the proportion around 41 per cent (Zimmerman 
1999: 53-72). In other regions, where access to markets was more limited, 
it is likely that cash incomes were a smaller proportion of total incomes. 
But in the north and the south of the country both wage labour and home 
industry were, by the 1930s, becoming more important to many households 
as a source of cash. Andrews (1935: 160) probably reflected the off icial view 
when he stated that ‘Siamese people plainly do not like to perform arduous 
daily labour on wages, and are very ready to leave this f ield of occupation to 
Chinese immigrants’. No doubt it was the perception of the governing elites 
that Thailand was a land-abundant country, and that the great majority of 
the population could make a reasonable living in agriculture, without the 
need to seek wage employment off the farm. But this view was increasingly 
at odds with developing trends in many parts of the country by the 1930s.
The evidence that cottage industries of various kinds were an important 
source of income to many households in Southeast Asia in the early decades 
of the twentieth century is perhaps surprising, given that several scholars 
have stressed the devastating impact of cheap imports of textile products and 
other manufactures on native industries in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. Legarda (1999: 177-179) discussed the impact of the decline of native 
textile production in centers such as Ilocos and Iloilo in the Philippines. 
In Ilocos he argued that the demise of native textile production deprived 
many households of supplementary income, which could not be replaced 
by agricultural production. The only solution for many households was 
out-migration. Furnivall (1957: 161-162) argued that in Burma traditional 
industries decayed as imports not just from Britain but also from India 
flooded in. The new industries established during British rule relied on Brit-
ish capital and Indian labour, and did not provide adequate compensation 
to indigenous Burmans for the loss of their own industries.
While there is little reason to doubt that cheap imports, especially of 
cotton textiles, did hurt industries in some locations across Southeast Asia, 
the idea that all cottage and small-scale industry was wiped out, and with it 
an important source of household income, is simply not correct. Boomgaard 
(1991: 34) argued that the f igures for non-agricultural employment in Java 
between 1815 and 1905 did not support the deindustrialization case; the 
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percentage of workers employed outside agriculture grew. The advent of 
cheaper cloth allowed many men and women to take up more prof itable 
tasks, either in agriculture or in a range of non-agricultural employment. By 
the early twentieth century, household income studies showed that cottage 
industry was still an important source of cash income; this evidence was 
supported by employment data collected in censuses carried out during 
the 1930s. In both Indonesia and Burma, the censuses carried out in 1930 
and 1931 found that around 10 per cent of the labour force was employed in 
industry, including cottage industry. The most important sub-sectors in both 
colonies were food processing, textiles and clothing, and wood and bamboo 
crafts (Mertens 1978: Appendix Table 1.6; Saito and Lee 1999: 27). While 
part of their output was non-tradable, and not directly subject to import 
competition, it appears that industries such as textiles and garment-making 
did manage to survive. In some cases these industries were helped by access 
to imported inputs such as yarn and machinery (Norlund 1991: 87-89). In 
addition, some handicrafts, such as batik in Java, were aimed at niches in 
the market which imports could not f ill.
An important aspect of industrial employment as it developed across 
the region in the decades after 1850 was that it was often dominated by 
women workers. In her study of the textile industry in Java in the century 
up to 1920, Meerkerk (2017) has argued that in spite of increases in imports 
of cotton goods, indigenous textile production was not destroyed. Workers, 
especially women, continued to allocate time to hand-weaving and batik 
production, in addition to other household tasks. Van der Eng (2013b: 1038-
1040) has argued that the advent of cheap imported plain cotton cloth in 
Java led to the rapid growth of the batik f inishing industry, increasingly 
aimed at a mass market. Both men and women were engaged in turning 
cotton cloth into a range of inexpensive batik products, often using a stamp 
to reproduce the designs. In the Philippines, the 1939 census found that 
manufacturing employed 7.9 per cent of the male labour force but almost 25 
per cent of all female workers (Kurihara 1945: 16). Embroidery, dressmaking 
and native textile manufacture together employed more workers than any 
other sub-sector of manufacturing, and almost all were women. Women 
also dominated in hat and mat manufacture. These occupations were often 
contracted out to homeworkers, and the work could be combined with 
childcare and other domestic chores. Critics such as Kurihara pointed to 
the low wages typically received by women workers and the lack of any 
worker protection. But clearly many thousands of women were prepared to 
work under what some considered bad conditions in order to supplement 
household incomes.
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As was argued in the previous chapter, the arguments of Williamson 
about deindustrialization are not supported by the evidence, if the term 
is def ined as a decline in industrial production in absolute terms, or as a 
proportion of GDP. But another argument can be advanced that colonial 
governments could have been more active in promoting industrialization 
as a policy goal. It was often argued by critics of colonial policies in Asia 
that, even if a range of cottage and small-scale industry did survive in spite 
of the growth of imports, off icial policies tried to prevent the emergence 
of a modern industrial sector, which might compete with imports from 
the metropolitan economy. While there was some truth in this, at least 
in the early part of the twentieth century, there is evidence that by the 
1930s views were changing. Especially in Indonesia and Indochina, there 
was growing support for industrialization policies as a means of improv-
ing living standards, due in large part to the realization that the growing 
populations could not continue forever to be accommodated in agriculture. 
While irrigation and improved crop varieties might allow more output per 
unit of cultivated land, and out-migration might ease pressures in some 
densely settled regions, many colonial off icials, not to mention indigenous 
nationalists, realized that these policies would not be enough. The argument 
became more frequently heard that ‘the permanent raising of the standard 
of living of the backward countries of Southeast Asia can only be obtained 
by the industrialization of these countries’ (Rueff 1945: 14). These were the 
words of a French businessman with long experience in Indochina, and 
they found many sympathetic listeners both in the 1930s and after the 
Japanese defeat in 1945.
In Indonesia, Dutch policy during the 1930s was aimed at restricting the 
inflow of cheap manufactures from Japan and encouraging the growth of 
large-scale industry, at least partly by encouraging foreign multinationals to 
establish plants in the colony (Booth 1998: 41-44). In Indochina, it was argued 
that abundant reserves of coal and metals, the potential for developing 
hydro-electricity, and a large and cheap labour force made it highly suitable 
for the rapid development of manufacturing industry (Shepherd 1941: 13). 
French policy had in the early part of the century placed more emphasis on 
extraction of raw materials, but by the 1930s a number of food-processing 
industries had emerged, including rice mills and alcohol distilleries, as well as 
a large-scale cement industry and a modern textile industry. Shepherd (1941: 
21-22) pointed out that the emergence of textile production was especially 
surprising, given that French textile producers were very dependent on 
colonial markets. But the home and colonial industries did not always 
compete. Part of the Vietnamese industry produced yarn for small-scale 
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weavers, and part produced cheap textiles for poorer Vietnamese who could 
not afford the more expensive French imports.
Perhaps paradoxically, Thailand, which was not a colony, made little 
progress with industrialization before 1940. Indeed, until the 1930s, there is 
little evidence that successive Thai governments attached much importance 
to industrialization as a policy goal. This view was to change after the 1932 
coup, which brought a group of army off icers and civilian professionals to 
power. They embarked on policies designed to ‘take the urban economy 
under state control’ by controlling the rice trade, and distribution net-
works and fostering state enterprises, both in manufacturing and services 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 119). But these policies met with only limited 
success, and the share of non-agricultural activities in total GDP changed 
little between 1913 and 1938. Thailand also had a much higher proportion of 
the labour force in agriculture than was the case in the colonial territories 
(Table 2.4). It was only in the late 1950s that Thai government policies towards 
private sector involvement in industrial development and towards foreign 
investment were to undergo a major change of direction.
Summing Up
The last decades of the nineteenth century and the years from 1900 to 1930 
saw important changes in economic policies across Southeast Asia, as 
the colonial governments had to deal with the consequences of growing 
international demand for tropical agricultural products, and competition 
for land between indigenous populations and corporations, which needed 
land to grow crops on a large scale for export markets. At the same time, 
as a result of both political changes at home, and changing conditions in 
the colonies themselves, the metropolitan powers were under increasing 
pressure to spend more at home on welfare policies, while at the same time 
improving living standards in their colonial possessions. Each colonial 
power tackled these conflicting demands in different ways, but there were 
common factors which became more obvious by the early decades of the 
twentieth century.
Perhaps the most striking concerned access to land. Although all colonial 
powers claimed that they wanted to build a ‘yeoman farmer’ class, with 
secure tenure over enough land to afford their families a reasonable living 
standard, in practice this proved diff icult. In the more densely settled 
regions, growing populations were leading to smaller holding sizes and, in 
some areas, many rural families cultivated very small plots, or no land at 
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all. At the same time, business groups were demanding more land to grow 
commercial crops in regions which were already densely settled such as Java, 
and in regions which the colonial authorities considered ‘empty’. Households 
in rural areas with little or no land were forced to seek alternative sources 
of income, from non-agricultural activities or from wage labour. When the 
global depression hit Southeast Asia in the early 1930s, global markets for 
tropical products contracted, as did domestic markets for wage labour. The 
implications of these developments for living standards will be examined 
further in the next chapter.
3 The Colonial Period: Measures 
of Welfare and Changing Living 
Standards
Growth of the Wage Labour Force and Trends in Wage Rates
The growth of both large-scale commercial agriculture and non-agricultural 
enterprises in mining, manufacturing, construction and services together 
led to a growth in the wage labour force in most parts of Southeast Asia in 
the f irst four decades of the twentieth century. Labour force data collected 
before 1940 did not usually distinguish between self-employed workers, 
those working for wages and salaries, and those working as ‘family workers’ 
on farms and in other small enterprises, often without direct wage pay-
ments. Many workers in the last category were women. It is thus diff icult 
to distinguish between workers who were largely if not entirely dependent 
on wage employment and those for whom wage employment was only an 
addition to the family income, the bulk of which was derived from other 
activities. In the early part of the twentieth century it is probable that most 
permanent wage employment was provided by large estate companies, and 
export-processing industries such as sugar ref ineries, rice mills, saw mills, 
and mining companies.
But by the end of the 1920s, government employment was becoming more 
important, especially for indigenous workers. This trend accelerated over 
the 1930s, as wage employment in parts of the private sector contracted. The 
special enquiry into industrial (largely wage) labour conducted in Burma 
in February 1939 found that more than 26 per cent of the industrial labour 
force was in public employment (Baxter 1941: 64-65). Increasingly over the 
1930s, indigenous Burmans rather than Indians and Europeans were taking 
up government jobs; by 1940 they accounted for around half of all jobs in 
the government professional services compared with only 22 per cent in 
1920 (Saito and Lee 1999: 19). In Indonesia, a report on government reform 
submitted in 1941 found that by 1938 Indonesians comprised 78 per cent of 
the civil service; only the more senior ranks were dominated by Europeans 
(Visman et al. 1941: 55-56). The data compiled by Polak (1943) on wage and 
salary payments accruing to indigenous Indonesian workers between 1921 
and 1939 showed that total payments to government employees, including 
central and local officials and those in the police and armed forces increased 
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relative to wages and rents paid by estates after 1929, although it lagged 
behind incomes of foreign Asians and Europeans (Table 3.1).1
Table 3.1:  Index of real income accruing to Indonesians, Foreign Asians and 
Europeans, 1921-1939 (1921-1924 = 100)
Year Indonesians Foreign Asians Europeans
Government Trade etc. Estates
1921-1924 100 100 100 100 100
1925-1929 103 111 127 148 140
1930-1934 167 116 145 179 146
1935-1939 173 129 124 207 152
Source: Polak (1943: tables 7.3, 9.1, 10.3, 12.1); deflators: Polak (1943: table 16.2).
Employment opportunities in large estates and in agricultural processing 
shrank in the early part of the 1930s in both Indonesia and Malaysia as the 
impact of the global depression was transmitted through falling demand 
and declining prices. In the Java sugar industry, which was badly hurt by 
growing protection in the British Empire, numbers of workers fell from 
132,000 in 1929 to only 25,000 in 1935 (Table 3.2). There was also a sharp fall 
in numbers employed in both rubber estates and tin mining in Malaya, from 
a peak of 363,000 in 1929 to 167,000 by 1933 (Khor 1983: Table 4.1). There was 
some recovery after 1934, although the pre-depression level of employment 
had not been reached again by 1938 in either Java or Malaya. Huff (2001: 
302-304) argued that employment fell in Singapore across a range of f irms, 
and this affected real wages. He estimated that real wages for estate rubber 
workers in Singapore fell by almost half between 1929 and 1932, although 
there was a recovery in 1933. Choy and Sugimoto (2018: 39), using a different 
deflator, found the fall was less severe. They also found that wages for skilled 
construction workers fell less in real terms than those for unskilled workers.
The slump in employment in the Java sugar industry (both f ield and 
factory employment) was very severe, and by 1938 numbers of workers were 
still less than half the 1929 level. Total wage payments (in 1929 prices) also 
fell after 1929; for the Java sugar estates 1938 wage payments in 1929 prices 
1 The data given in Visman et al. (1941) used a narrow def inition of the civil service; many 
more Indonesians were employed in the government sector, including local government and 
village off icials, the police, and the army. The 1930 census reported that 492,000 native workers 
were employed in these categories (7.4 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force).
the CoLoniAL Period: MeASureS of WeLfAre And ChAnging Living StAndArdS 71
were little more than half those in 1929 (Table 3.2). This sharp fall in real 
wage payments would obviously have affected demand for a range of goods 
and services provided by local suppliers. It might have been expected that, 
given the fall in both employment and the total wage bill in the Java sugar 
sector, there would have been a sharp decline in real daily wages in the 
early 1930s. But a marked feature of labour markets, not just in Java but in 
other parts of Southeast Asia over these years, was considerable degree of 
rigidity in nominal wages. Although they did fall, the extent of the decline 
was much less than the decline in prices. Thus real wages actually increased 
even though wage employment opportunities were declining. By 1934, real 
wages for unskilled workers in Java, Sumatra, Hanoi, Saigon and Bangkok 
were all above 1929 levels (Booth 2007a: Table 7.5). The data for workers in 
Table 3.2:  Trends in total wage bill, numbers of workers and real wages, Java 
sugar industry, 1921-1940




Daily wages (cents: 1929 
prices)
Male Female
1921 77 98 41 34
1922 90 101 47 37
1923 90 109 46 36
1924 87 114 43 34
1925 88 115 47 34
1926 86 116 41 32
1927 97 120 45 36
1928 112 129 49 39
1929 102 132 46 37
1930 101 130 48 38
1931 128 119 68 55
1932 109 97 79 62
1933 56 55 84 63
1934 26 29 72 57
1935 17 25 64 52
1936 24 28 60 55
1937 48 54 55 48
1938 54 56 61 52
1939 64 59 64 55
1940 n/a 62 62 53
Sources: daily wages of factory coolies: department van Landbouw, nijverheid en handel (1922-
1930) and Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek (1932-1940); Java food price deflator: Central bureau 
of Statistics (1947: 125); total wage bill: Polak (1943: 46).
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the Java sugar industry illustrate the problem very clearly; by 1935 numbers 
employed as factory and f ield workers had fallen to less than 20 per cent of 
the 1929 level, but average daily wages in 1929 prices for both male and female 
workers were still well above those prevailing in the late 1920s (Table 3.2).
Several explanations have been suggested for these apparently paradoxical 
trends. First, as often happens in periods of business downturns, it is likely 
that many employers dismissed the most junior and least experienced 
workers f irst. Thus, the average nominal wage might appear to be stable 
because those receiving the lowest wages had been dismissed, although 
those more experienced workers remaining in employment could well have 
been getting a lower nominal wage (Goudal 1938: 145). Second, employers 
would have been uncertain as to how long the bad conditions were going to 
last, and thus would have continued to pay their more experienced workers 
enough to retain their loyalty because they would be needed again when 
conditions improved. Third, conditions of work probably deteriorated for 
many workers who remained in employment, even if the nominal wage 
did not decline; they might have been expected to work longer hours per 
day, and could have lost some fringe benefits not incorporated in the wage 
(Ingleson 1988: 309).
Even if nominal daily wages did not fall as fast as prices, for many workers 
hired on a daily or weekly basis both in Java and elsewhere in Southeast 
Asia, fewer days or weeks of employment were available, so total earnings 
per worker on a monthly or annual basis could have dropped sharply. Even 
if they were lucky enough to keep some wage employment, many millions 
of workers across the region must have had lower annual incomes, and 
lower purchasing power, which in turn would have affected many small 
enterprises in manufacturing, trade, or transport. Thus, the decline in output 
and the total wage bill in the sugar sector in Java and in the Malayan rubber 
estates would have had severe repercussions for employment in many other 
enterprises, which either depended on the sugar and rubber sectors as sub-
contractors, or which depended on selling goods and services to their workers.
For all these reasons it would be unwise to interpret apparent increases in 
real daily wages over the 1930s as indicative of broad-based improvements in 
living standards. If labour markets were indeed subject to various rigidities, 
caution should be exercised in using wage data to make any generalization 
about living standards of the kind that Williamson has made about the 
Philippines. He argued that living standards in the Philippines doubled 
under the American occupation because a series on real wages which he 
compiled showed that real wages more than doubled between 1895-1899 
and 1935-1939 (Williamson 2000: Table 1.2). He found that real wages in 
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the Philippines were 80 per cent higher than those in Japan in 1920-1924, 
and more or less the same as in Japan by 1935-1939, although he cautioned 
that the deflators he used might not be reliable. After 1910, he argued that 
real wages in the Philippines were higher than in either Korea or Taiwan, 
or in Thailand and Indonesia. But other data from the Philippines throw 
considerable doubt on these assertions.
Certainly it was true that wages for labourers on public works projects 
in Manila in the late 1930s were high in comparison with most other parts 
of Asia (Booth 2007a: Table 3.11). But this was a market where minimum 
wage laws would have been applied, albeit weakly, by the late 1930s. The 
data from Runes’s survey shows that wages for sugar workers in rural areas 
were much lower than the urban unskilled wage, and indeed lower, in rice 
terms, than the wage for estate workers in Sumatra. A series on wages for 
unskilled rural workers in Camarines Sur compiled by Owen (1984: 47-52) 
showed a very different trend between 1900 and 1939 than the Williamson 
series. By the 1930s real wages were substantially lower than in 1900-1904 
(Booth 2012: Table 8). The surveys conducted by Runes (1939), Lava (1938) 
and others indicate that many Filipinos in rural areas were living at a very 
low level in the late 1930s. Their f indings, together with other investigations 
from the Philippines in the 1930s which are examined in the next section, 
would suggest that living standards were not as high, relative to other parts 
of the region, as the urban wage data alone might indicate.
A further problem in using wage data to deduce trends in living standards 
relates to ethnic segmentation in labour markets in several parts of Southeast 
Asia. Ingram (1964: Table III) produced a long-term series on wages for 
unskilled coolie labour and rice prices in Bangkok from the late seventeenth 
century to 1950, and found considerable variation but no rising trend. But 
for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the coolie labour 
market in Bangkok was dominated by immigrant Chinese, ‘recruited from 
the marginal groups of a Chinese economy in severe crisis’ (Phongpaichit 
and Baker 1995: 177). Thus, trends in real wage rates in Bangkok probably 
said more about living standards and the availability of wage employment 
in southern China than in the rest of Thailand. Until the early twentieth 
century, a system of corvee labour was in place in much of Thailand which 
restricted the mobility of most Thai men; attempts to reform, or abolish 
corvee met with considerable opposition (Terwiel 2011: 220). During the 
1930s, the government began to encourage more participation by indigenous 
Thais in the urban labour market, and placed quotas on Chinese employment 
in rice-milling (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 179). This was possibly one 
reason for the fall in real wages which occurred after 1934.
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In many parts of Southeast Asia, it is probable that those who were in 
full-time wage employment, and kept this employment through the 1930s, 
were better off than many households who relied on both self-employment 
and irregular wage employment, which declined as the full force of the 
world depression was transmitted to Southeast Asia. Given the rigidities 
which characterized many labour markets, it is unwise to use trends in 
real wage rates, even for unskilled workers, as an indicator of trends in 
household incomes. As Huff (2001: 319-320) argued, those Chinese and Indian 
workers who became unemployed in Singapore had no rural hinterland to 
fall back on; they had no option but to scrape whatever living they could in 
self-employment. Even in Java, the workers who lost employment in the sugar 
industry often came from land-poor households, and would have had few 
alternative employment opportunities in the rural economy. Their families 
would have supported them as best they could, but household incomes and 
expenditures would have suffered.
If wages are an unreliable indicator, and if data on total household incomes 
from all sources are not available, what other indicators can we use to assess 
trends in living standards prior to 1940? Are non-monetary indicators such 
as food availability or mortality rates more satisfactory? The next sections 
evaluate the evidence on non-monetary indicators, beginning with per 
capita availability of basic needs such as food and clothing.
Availability of Basic Goods: Food and Clothing
By the early twentieth century, colonial governments in most parts of 
Southeast Asia collected data on food production and consumption, and 
for the main food crops, especially rice, it is possible to compare yields per 
hectare, output growth and per capita availability (Booth 2012: Table 1). 
Everywhere in Southeast Asia, rice yields were lower than in either Taiwan 
and Korea. These two Japanese colonies also experienced more rapid growth 
rates of rice output than anywhere in Southeast Asia. This was in large part 
due to the successful transfer of Japanese yield-raising rice technologies to 
its two colonies, which by the 1920s had become important suppliers of rice 
to the metropolitan Japanese market. But the growth in exports from both 
Taiwan and Korea meant that less was available for consumption within the 
colonies, and by the latter part of the 1930s per capita domestic availability 
in Taiwan was lower than in Indochina and British Malaya. Per capita rice 
availability in Korea was lower than in any part of Southeast Asia except Java. 
Many Koreans consumed more millet, and other coarse grains, than rice.
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In spite of the greater integration of rice markets within Asia after 1870, 
there were always fears among colonial off icials in regions that depended 
on imports that exportable surpluses from Thailand, Burma and South 
Vietnam might diminish, which would inevitably lead to higher prices in 
local markets. These fears were justified in 1919, when supply from the surplus 
regions declined and prices in markets in Malaya and Singapore doubled, 
leading to food riots in several towns. Choy and Sugimoto (2018) estimated 
that between 1918 and 1921 the real wage of skilled construction workers 
in Singapore fell, although it recovered rapidly over the rest of the 1920s. 
In the Philippines, imports fell and prices in urban markets also increased 
rapidly (Chiba 2010: 534-539). The government distributed rice in Manila at 
low prices to stave off unrest, and enacted legislation to control stockpiles 
and speculation and regulate prices. The crisis gradually eased as exports 
from the three main surplus regions increased again, but in the Philippines 
the tariff on imports was raised in the hope that domestic production would 
increase. Domestic production in the Philippines did increase over the 1920s, 
although imports also accelerated again, suggesting that a broadly based 
increase in incomes was taking place. In British Malaya, in spite of attempts 
by the British authorities to increase rice output, around two-thirds of total 
rice availability was still supplied by imports (Grist 1941: Table 32).
In the years from 1920 to 1940, it was clear that whether a country or 
region in Southeast Asia was an importer or exporter of rice was not the 
main determinant of per capita domestic availability. Rather, it was the 
preferences and purchasing power of the local populations on the one 
hand, and the price at which rice was available on international markets 
on the other. In both Java and the Philippines, rice was supplemented by 
other food staples including corn, vegetables, beans and root crops; this was 
also true in other parts of Southeast Asia to varying extents. Mears et al. 
(1974: Appendix 4.1) estimated per capita availability of rice and corn in the 
Philippines from 1910 to 1940; they found that it reached a maximum in the 
mid-1920s and fell thereafter. A moving average of both rice and rice plus 
corn consumption per capita tended to move together, which suggests that 
corn was not just a substitute for rice. Consumption of both staples were 
determined by changes in purchasing power, which fell in the Philippines 
over the 1930s, in spite of declining prices (Booth 2007a: Table 7.3).2
2 Consumption of rice also fell in Taiwan over the 1930s, although it has been argued that this 
was in part at least due to substitution of rice for sweet potatoes as rice became more expensive. 
Booth and Deng (2017: 90-93) examine the evidence on rice consumption in Asian colonies in 
the interwar years.
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In Java, where population densities were higher than in most other parts 
of Southeast Asia, rice availability per capita fell to around 95 kg per capita 
in 1928-1932 (Scheltema 1936: Table 2). It was almost certainly low in many 
regions outside Java as well, with the exception of the less densely settled 
rice-producing regions such as Aceh, West Sumatra and South Sulawesi. Van 
der Eng’s estimates for Java show a steady decline in calories derived from 
rice supply between 1880-1885 and 1937-1941, although total calorie supply 
increased by 26 per cent because of greater consumption of non-rice crops 
(Van der Eng 2000: Table 1). He estimated that, for Indonesia as a whole, by 
1936-1940 food supply in calorie terms had increased to 2,000 per capita, 
compared to only 1,524 in 1886-1890. By 1936-1940, only around 40 per cent 
of total calorie consumption came from rice (Van der Eng 2000: Table 6). 
Given the paucity of data outside Java, these f igures must be treated with 
caution but it is certain that in parts of Java as well as in many regions 
outside Java, corn, sago, and root crops played an important role in the 
diets of many people by the early twentieth century. Cassava was eaten 
in several forms: many poorer families in Java consumed it in dried form 
(gaplek) in the paceklik, or months before the main rice harvest. Fresh 
roots were also consumed, usually with some form of sauce to make the 
taste more palatable.
Cassava, whether consumed fresh or dried, was a cheaper source of 
calories than rice and indeed cheaper than corn or sweet potatoes (Van 
der Eng 1998: Table 7). But in spite of cheap supplements to rice, average 
calorie consumption per capita in Java by the 1930s was, for most population 
groups investigated by Dutch off icialdom, well below 2000 per day. Polak 
(1943: 88) estimated that the average per capita daily calorie availability 
from the seven main food crops was 1,803 in 1921-1925, and fell to 1,658 in 
1931-1935. The sample of farmers living near estates investigated in the f inal 
report of the Coolie Budget Commission found that average daily calorie 
consumption was only 1,391, and protein consumption per capita around 35 
grams. Plantation factory labourers living off the plantation were consuming 
about the same, while f ield labourers were consuming less (Van Niel 1956: 
108-111). This report found that calorie consumption rose with increased 
household incomes, especially among those living off the plantation. This 
f inding appears to hold also for the sample of rural households investigated 
in the Kutowinangun study in Java in the early 1930s, which found a strong 
positive correlation between income per capita and calorie and protein 
consumption (Table 2.7). Nonetheless, the medical experts who participated 
in the Kutowinangun study found the state of health and nourishment of 
the entire village to be ‘most satisfactory’ (De Langen 1934: 405).
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One possible explanation for the reasonable state of health in such a 
densely settled area was that those households who owned little land 
cultivated their house gardens very intensively. The Kutowinangun study, 
and other studies carried out in Java in the interwar years, found that as 
average holding size decreased, the amount of land allocated to house 
gardens, and the intensity of planting, increased (Ochse and Terra 1934: 
355). This is confirmed by the data collected from Kutowinangun, which 
showed a negative correlation between land owned per capita and household 
income per hectare from house gardens (Table 2.7). The tendency for those 
households where land availability per capita was low to exploit their gardens 
more intensively was to persist into the post-independence era. There was 
also a signif icant negative correlation between land owned per capita, and 
the percentage of household income derived from ‘sideline’ occupations, 
which suggests that land-poor households were able to get at least some 
income from off-farm activities, and this extra income helped them to 
consume more calories.
Elsewhere in Java, there was evidence of more severe malnutrition in 
the 1930s, especially in regions where cassava was a staple food, and where 
opportunities for earning extra cash income were limited. In 1939, the 
director of public health instructed the National Nutrition Institute (Instituut 
voor Volksvoeding) to carry out a dietary survey in the Bojonegoro region 
in northeastern Java, where the food situation was causing grave concern 
(Penders 1984: 131). In the f ive villages selected for detailed f ieldwork, it 
was found that most families were consuming well below the stipulated 
minimum of 1,500 calories per day. Poor diet made the population more 
prone to malaria, which in turn made hunger oedema more widespread. 
The governor of the province of East Java, Charles van der Plas, argued that 
effective programmes to combat hunger oedema across East Java would cost 
millions of guilders, and the money might be better spent on other policies, 
including improved irrigation and agricultural extension in poor areas, and 
better education on subjects such as child nutrition. Other senior off icials, 
such as H.J. van Mook, argued that the situation in Bojonegoro was extreme, 
although it was widely acknowledged that the growing dependence on 
cassava as a source of calories was causing dietary problems in other parts 
of Java, and that, given the expected growth in population, out-migration 
and the provision of more non-agricultural employment would have to play 
a greater role in improving living standards on Java (Penders 1984: 142).
It was not just in the densely settled parts of Java that, by the early 
twentieth century, many households were reliant on non-rice foods for a 
signif icant part of their food supply. It has been argued that in many parts 
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of the Outer Islands of Indonesia, colonial policy encouraged rice cultivation 
and consumption in regions where more diversif ied food consumption 
patterns had been the norm. In parts of Sulawesi, root crops were widely 
consumed by the common people in the late nineteenth century, and rice 
was mainly consumed by elites (Henley 2004: 117-118). In the Philippines, 
according to Miller (1920: 78),
[d]uring the regular annual periods of food scarcity which occur in certain 
backward communities, it is customary to make the chief food go farther 
by adding less appreciated foods. Thus in rice-eating regions, ground 
corn is added to the morisqueta [boiled rice], and more root crops are 
consumed. In corn-consuming regions the people resort to cultivated 
roots and even to wild roots and starches from wild palms. In the most 
backward communities the coarsest forms of wild food supplement the 
chief diet. In these localities the period of famine is a time of real want, 
when the hunger belt must be drawn tight.
Miller did not estimate what proportion of the total population was subject 
to severe food shortages on an annual basis; he argued that in the most 
advanced regions such as Laguna and Pangasinan, where production was 
diverse, or in those regions producing export crops such as coconut, where 
there were buoyant world markets, annual food shortages were largely 
absent, and the effects of periodic droughts less severe. But in those parts of 
the country surveyed in the 1930s, there was evidence of persistent shortages. 
Lava found that the Ilocano families he investigated were consuming fewer 
calories per day than prisoners; indeed, most families of f ive were consuming 
fewer than 6,000 calories (Lava 1938: 24-25). The investigation into living 
standards of sugar workers in the Philippines conducted by Runes did not 
include estimates of calorie consumption, although Runes suggested that 
they might be consuming less than the Ilocano families surveyed by Lava, as 
they were often not able to cultivate their own land. His estimates suggested 
that sugar workers were spending around 80 per cent of their earnings on 
food, much of it inferior in quality (Runes 1939; 22).
In French Indochina, reliance on rice as the staple foodstuff varied 
considerably across different regions. Gourou (1945: 322-323) found that, 
while rice monoculture often prevailed in Cochinchina, in the centre and 
north of Vietnam more diversif ied cultivation systems were found, and 
millet, sweet potatoes, yams, beans and manioc were grown as winter 
crops for household consumption. In addition, maize was cultivated 
both for local consumption and for export. Given the def iciencies in the 
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statistics on hectarage and yields, it was not possible to estimate precise 
production and consumption data even for the Tonkin Delta, let alone 
the more remote areas. Gourou (1945: 547-553) estimated that the average 
Tonkinese adult consumed 400 grams of rice per day, and at least 60 
grams of root crops. Small amounts of f ish were consumed but virtually 
no meat. These f igures suggest a calorie intake of well below 2,000 per 
day, although other foods were probably consumed as well, especially 
at feasts and ceremonies. Brocheux and Hemery (2009: 274) quoted the 
f indings of one study in the Red River Delta in Tonkin which found that 
80 per cent of the population had only one meal a day for much of the year. 
Gourou did not think that food availability in Cochinchina would have 
been much higher than in the north, in spite of the fact that the average 
household cultivated more land. He argued that living standards in general 
did not differ greatly between north and south; as in many parts of Java, 
the population in the densely settled regions of Tonkin cultivated their 
land more intensively, and derived more income from artisanal pursuits. 
To some extent this compensated for the very small amounts of land 
cultivated by most families.
Although Thailand was usually considered a land-abundant country in 
the pre-1940 era, the available data indicate that planted area per person 
was lower than in Burma, British Malaya, Cochinchina and the Philippines 
(Booth 2007a: Table 3.1). Area of rice land per capita was about the same in 
Thailand as in Vietnam and Cambodia, although higher than Java (Table 
2.6). Detailed information on the diets of over 9,000 people in rural Thailand 
in 1930-1931 was reported by Zimmerman (1999: 273-286). The investigators 
found very few cases of severe malnutrition, or of diseases such as rickets, 
scurvy or beriberi. On average, 693 grams of glutinous rice was consumed 
per adult per day in those areas in the north and northeast of the country 
where this was the staple, and 553 grams of non-glutinous rice in central and 
southern regions. Glutinous rice was usually produced by hand pounding, 
which left more pericarp on the grain, thereby improving the nutritive 
content. Zimmerman argued that this compensated for the lower amount 
of f ish and meat consumed in the northern part of the country.
If these f igures are representative, it would appear that rice availability 
per capita was considerably higher in Thailand than in most parts of French 
Indochina, the Philippines or Indonesia. Thus there was less need to gain 
extra calories from root crops. But Zimmerman pointed to some worrying 
trends in the diet of many Thais. Hand pounding was in decline, and prefer-
ences were shifting towards milled rice, and imported dried fish, rather than 
fresh, locally produced foods. He argued that ‘milled rice without more f ish 
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and animal food is probably not a complete diet’ (Zimmerman 1999: 276). 
This study argued that, to the extent that malnutrition existed in Thailand, 
it was the result of a lack of knowledge and understanding, rather than a 
lack of food. The problem of the switch from hand-pounded or parboiled rice 
to polished rice also worried off icials in British Malaya, who were worried 
about the prevalence of beriberi among immigrant Chinese in particular. 
It was only in the 1920s that scientists understood the association between 
this disease and vitamin B intakes; beriberi was largely unknown among 
Malays, who ate hand-pounded rice, and Tamils, who consumed parboiled 
rice. The possibility that Malays would be tempted into consumption of less 
nutritious foods was yet another reason why the British wanted to keep 
them in traditional rural occupations (Manderson 1996: 90-91).
The budget studies which were carried out in various parts of Southeast 
Asia over the 1930s found that many categories of worker, including small 
and middle tenants in Cochinchina, small proprietors in Tonkin, farmers 
in Ilocos, poor coolies in Batavia and f ield and factory workers on estates in 
Java were all devoting more than 60 per cent of household expenditures to 
food (Booth 2012: Table 2). Poorer groups, such as the sugar workers surveyed 
by Runes, farmers surveyed in Java and landless coolies in Cochinchina, 
were spending over 70 per cent on food. Other studies did report lower food 
expenditure ratios; for example, the f ifteen farm households surveyed in 
Kutowinangun in 1932 only devoted about one-third of total expenditures 
to food, although among the sample studied in the following year the 
proportion was 59 per cent (Ochse and Terra 1934: Table 9 and Table 22). 
These high ratios do suggest that many households across Southeast Asia 
were struggling to provide basic necessities for their families in the 1930s.
Apart from food, the most essential basic need in a tropical climate was 
cotton cloth. Although domestic production of cotton cloth was growing in 
several parts of Southeast Asia by the latter part of the 1930s, only in French 
Indochina did domestic production f ill most of the domestic market needs. 
Elsewhere, with the partial exception of Indonesia, reliance on imports was 
high (Table 3.3). Imports from Japan amounted to over f ive yards per capita 
in Indonesia in the latter part of the 1930s, and almost 31 yards in the Straits 
Settlements, although many of these imports would have gone to other parts 
of British Malaya, and to other parts of Southeast Asia, including Thailand 
and Sumatra. Total imports per capita in dollar terms were much higher in 
British Malaya than in any other part of colonial Asia, and even allowing 
for the fact that some of these imports would have ended up elsewhere, it 
would appear that the inhabitants of British Malaya were spending more on 
cotton cloth than their neighbours. This, together with the rice consumption 
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data, indicates higher per capita expenditures there than elsewhere. But 
for a more complete picture of living standards, we need to turn to the 
demographic and anthropometric evidence.
Table 3.3: Production and imports of cotton cloth, c. 1939
Colony/ 
country
Production of cotton 
cloth (yards per 
capita, 1939)
Japanese imports 
(yards per capita, 
1937/39)
Total imports ($ per 
capita 1937/39)
Malaya n/a 6.85* 4.08
Philippines 1.21 3.31 1.42
burma n/a n/a 1.26
indonesia 2.01 5.28 0.92
Siam n/a n/a 0.79
indochina 4.08 n/a 0.52
british india 11.79** 1.26 0.20
* imports are to the Straits Settlements only. it is assumed that they were transported to other 
parts of british Malaya.
** 1943 figures.
Source: Stewart (1949), Appendix ii.
Demographic and Anthropometric Measures
By the early twentieth century, most governments in Southeast Asia were 
collecting information on demographic indicators, either through improved 
procedures for registration of births and deaths, or through surveys and 
censuses. This emphasis on demographic statistics could have been a 
reaction to a widespread concern about slow population growth, or even 
population declines in at least some parts of the region in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century. In Java, there was evidence of population decline in 
several residencies in the 1880s after the Krakatoa eruption of 1883, which 
caused substantial loss of life in both West Java and Lampung (Boomgaard 
and Gooszen 1991: Table 4). In addition, the huge deposits of ash damaged 
agricultural land across wide areas in western Java and southern Sumatra. 
Baten, Stegl and Van der Eng (2013: 115-116) argued that the Krakatoa eruption 
together with a series of droughts, cholera outbreaks and cattle disease all 
had an adverse impact on food consumption and on population growth in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century.
In the Philippines, Bassino, Dovis and Komlos (2018) used data on heights 
of soldiers enlisted by the US military between 1901 and 1913 to argue that 
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the average height of the cohort born in the mid-1870s was short in com-
parison with other parts of Asia. Furthermore, the average male height in 
the Philippines appeared to be on a downward trend in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century, compared with an upward trend in Japan. Their 
f indings support those of De Bevoise (1995: 12-13), who argued that the 
very high mortality rates in 1902 were the result of disease rather than the 
military campaigns against the Americans, although the two could have 
been connected. Malaria was widespread, as was smallpox and cholera, 
as well as def iciency diseases such as beriberi, all of which contributed to 
high mortality. Corpuz (1989: II, 521-522) analysed population by province 
between the Spanish census of 1887 and the American one of 1902. He found 
population declines in 11 out of 30 provinces. There also seem to have been 
declines in area under food cultivation.
The demographic information collected after 1900 could in turn be used 
for estimating crude birth and death rates, and other demographic indicators 
such as infant mortality rates and life expectancies. Most of these estimates 
were hedged with caveats about the reliability of both the data and the 
estimation techniques. But they do allow some comparisons to be made 
of demographic indicators, both across countries, across regions within 
countries, between ethnic groups and over time. Infant mortality rates 
are perhaps the most important indicator as estimates were quite widely 
available by the late 1930s. They show to what extent populations, and 
especially nursing women, in a particular country or region had access to 
modern healthcare, were eating a good diet and were possessed of suff icient 
knowledge to give their babies the right food and protect them from the 
main waterborne and insect-borne killers, including diarrhoea, cholera, 
and malaria.
By the latter part of the 1930s, the lowest infant mortality rates were 
reported in the Philippines, the Federated Malay States, and the Straits 
Settlements. Rather higher rates were estimated for the city of Hanoi, 
and in Burma and Java (Table 3.4). To place these f igures in a broader 
international perspective, infant mortality rates in Romania in the late 1930s 
were estimated to be 179 per 1,000 live births, 138 in Poland, 65 in France, 
54 in England, 50 in the USA and 36 in the Netherlands (Zeldin 1981: 206). 
In all the colonial territories, there was a gap between their estimates of 
infant mortality rates and those in the metropolitan powers. There was 
also by the 1930s a large gap in life expectancies between colonies and 
the metropoles; life expectancy in Indonesia was estimated at 34 years 
in the 1930s compared with 66 years in the Netherlands (Van Zanden et 
al. 2014: 109).
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Table 3.4: Infant mortality rates in Southeast Asia, 1910-1938
1910 1925 1929 1938
hanoi n/a 440 430 190
Philippines n/a 157 151 139
Straits Settlements 269 194 189 155
federated Malay States n/a n/a 178 147
burma 233 189 202 186
note: figures for burma refer to 1910, 1925, 1930 and 1935; for the Philippines, 1926-1930, 1931-
1935 and 1936-1940; for the Straits Settlements, 1910, 1925, 1929 and 1937.
Sources: hanoi: banens (2000: 36); Philippines: Zablan (1978: 105); Straits Settlements: Manderson 
(1996: 44); federated Malay States: evans (1939: 25); burma: Sundrum (1957: 18).
In all the Southeast Asian colonial territories where data on crude death 
rates and infant mortality rates are available over a period of years, there 
seems to have been declines in the f irst part of the twentieth century. The 
crude death rates estimated by Vlieland (1932: 109) from the population 
censuses of 1911, 1921 and 1931 showed quite sharp declines in both crude 
death rates and infant mortality rates in the Singapore municipality and 
the Straits Settlements. Gooszen (1999: 205) argued that ‘it is likely that the 
average level of mortality declined in the late nineteenth century in the 
north coast of Java’, most probably because of improvements in the supply 
of clean drinking water. Vaccination against another killer, smallpox, had 
in fact begun in Java in the early part of the nineteenth century and by the 
1870s smallpox had largely been eradicated, although it was still rife in parts 
of the Outer Islands (Boomgaard 2003: 610). In spite of increased attention 
given to public health measures after 1900 in Java, there does not seem to 
be any evidence of declining mortality rates until the 1920s. Java, like many 
other parts of Asia, was badly affected by the influenza pandemic which 
struck at the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, and which 
caused sharp increases in mortality rates (Brown 1987).
After 1920, infant mortality rates appear to have declined in Hanoi, 
the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States and 
Burma (Table 3.4). Huff (2001: Table 5) showed that in Singapore death 
rates and infant mortality actually fell between 1930 and 1933, in spite of 
the worsening economic conditions. In urban Java, crude death rates fell 
between 1912 and 1929 in Batavia, Surabaya and Semarang (Boomgaard 
and Gooszen 1991: 59). In all these cases, colonial authorities would have 
attributed these declines to increased expenditures on health personnel, 
and on programmes designed to address specific health problems, especially 
those of nursing mothers and infants in both urban and rural areas. That 
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such programmes did feature more prominently in colonial government 
priorities is clear, although the amount devoted to health expenditures in 
the colonies and in Siam (Thailand) varied considerably, both over time and 
across countries. The comparative study carried out by Schwulst (1932: 57) 
showed that in the early 1930s, the Federated Malay States were spending 
the highest proportion (15 per cent) of the budget on health followed by 
the Philippines (8 per cent). Other colonies and Siam seem to have given 
health expenditures a lower priority at that time, compared with public 
works, and the military.
A further point to emerge from the evidence on infant mortality rates 
was that there were considerable variations between urban and rural 
areas, with urban areas often registering much higher rates than rural 
areas. Perhaps this was not surprising, bearing in mind the evidence from 
nineteenth-century Europe that urban mortality rates were often very high, 
to the point where cities only grew because of high rates of in-migration. In 
British Malaya, the 1931 census data indicated that infant mortality rates 
were considerably higher in the Singapore municipality than in the more 
rural Federated Malay States (Vlieland 1932: 110). Higher rates in Singapore 
than in most of the Malay states persisted into the late 1940s (Smith 1952: 
54). In Java, one medical off icer found extremely high infant mortality 
rates, ranging between 400 and 500 per 1,000, in overcrowded kampong 
areas of Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1917-1919 (Gooszen 1999: 192). Although 
these rates horrif ied the Dutch investigators, they were little different from 
the rates prevailing in Hanoi in the mid-1920s (Banens 2000: 36). Infant 
and child mortality rates were much lower in the city of Bandung, which 
was situated in the healthier mountain region of West Java, and in some 
rural areas, including the regency of Purwokerto in Central Java, where 
infant deaths per 1,000 lives births in 1935 and 1936 were estimated to be 
below 100 (Brand 1958: 256-259). Apart from the healthier climate, Brand 
argued that the higher educational levels of the Sundanese, who were 
the majority ethnic group in the western areas of Java, made them more 
receptive to modern medical ideas than the populations of other parts of 
Java. Outside Java, the evidence assembled by Boomgaard and Gooszen 
(1991: 63) show that infant mortality rates varied from over 200 per 1,000 in 
Maluku and the Karo highlands to 170 in Minahasa, although the absence 
of systematic reporting of deaths in most regions outside Java render the 
f igures unreliable.
Apart from rural-urban differences in mortality in many parts of 
Southeast Asia, there were also often glaring differences in mortality rates 
between ethnic groups. The study of infant and child mortality rates in 
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Batavia (Jakarta) carried out by De Haas in 1935-1937 found that infant 
mortality rates were around 30 per 100 for native children, 15 per 100 for 
Chinese and only 5 to 6 per 100 for European infants. Similar interethnic 
differences prevailed in mortality rates for preschool children (De Haas 1939: 
239-240). The rate for Europeans in Batavia was only slightly higher than 
in the Netherlands in 1929-1932. Although subsequent scholars, including 
Nitisastro (1970: 113), considered the De Haas estimates of infant mortality 
to be too high, they did gain considerable currency and were widely cited 
by other authors (Hull 1995: 5). Other studies, including that carried out by 
Brand in Bandung, confirmed the large differences between ethnic groups 
(Table 3.5). Recent scholars have attributed the relatively high mortality 
rates among the indigenous populations in Java to the slow progress made 
in the shift from curative to preventive medicine in the interwar years. 
Certainly the budget cuts in the early 1930s impeded the development 
of public health programmes aimed at increasing awareness among the 
indigenous population of modern medical advances (Mesters 1996: 61).
Table 3.5: Infant mortality rates in Southeast Asia by ethnic group, 1930s
Indigenous Chinese European Indian
Straits S’ments (1934) 235 154 25 145
Kedah (1928) 112 137 n/a 263
fed.Malay States (1936) 149 139 n/a 136
batavia (1935/7) 300 150 50-60 n/a
bandung (1935/8) 145 111 35 n/a
Saigon (1936) 250 220 n/a n/a
note: SS = Straits Settlements; fMS = federated Malay States.
Sources: Straits Settlements and Kedah: Manderson (1996: 55-56); federated Malay States: evans 
(1939: 25); batavia: de haas (1939: 239); bandung: brand (1940: 238, 248, 256); Saigon: Statistique 
generale de l’indochine (1937: 832).
There were also very marked differences in infant mortality rates among 
the various ethnic groups in the Straits Settlements. Manderson quotes 
off icial data from 1934 that put the infant mortality rate among the Malay 
population at 235 per 1,000, compared with 154 in the Chinese population 
and only 25 per 1,000 in the European population (Table 3.5). In the FMS the 
gap between Malay and Chinese infant mortality was less marked than in 
the Straits Settlements, as it was in Saigon. In the northern Malay state of 
Kedah, infant mortality rates among both Chinese and Indian populations 
were higher than among the Malays, although this might have been due 
to under-reporting of deaths among rural Malays. As many of the Chinese 
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and Indians worked as estate labourers, this probably reflected the poor 
standards of healthcare available on at least some plantations (Manderson 
1996: 130-137). Boomgaard and Gooszen (1991: 62) reported higher death rates 
among Chinese workers than Javanese in Western enterprises in Sumatra’s 
East Coast residency, which might indicate that Chinese workers in both 
Sumatra and Malaya were more prone to local diseases. By the 1930s, the 
government of British Malaya had established infant welfare centres in 
most of the Malay states, as well as in the Straits Settlements, where it was 
estimated in 1937 that 300,000 mothers and babies had been in contact with 
clinic staff (Manderson 1996: 216). They received guidance on feeding and on 
protecting babies and young children against malaria, cholera, respiratory 
tract infections and other common killers.
Many colonial health off icials attributed high infant and child mortality 
rates to both poor feeding habits and parental ignorance. Doctors deplored 
the tendency to feed babies with rice as soon as they were weaned, as well 
as the custom of carrying young children around on the backs of mothers 
or elder siblings all day. They also pointed out that parents usually ignored 
minor illnesses, bathed young babies in cold water, and placed them in 
draughts, which encouraged respiratory diseases (Brand 1958: 265). At the 
same time, some health officials stressed that, in many parts of Europe until 
the latter part of the nineteenth century, infant and child mortality rates 
were as high as those found in many parts of Southeast Asia in the third 
and fourth decades of the twentieth century. Brand (1958: 256) argued that 
the mortality situation among the native population of Bandung ‘is only a 
few decades behind the situation in the Netherlands itself’. This optimism 
was based on an awareness that high infant and child mortality rates were 
not always the result of economic conditions, but rather of ignorance, which 
could and should be remedied by better advice and education. But budgetary 
cuts over the 1930s slowed down the development of more innovative health 
outreach projects in several colonies.
Further evidence on living standards in Indonesia in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century has used evidence on heights of various 
groups from the 1770s to the twentieth century (Baten, Stegl and Van 
der Eng 2013). This study found that human stature declined during the 
mid-nineteenth century, probably as a result of the impact of the cultiva-
tion system on food crop consumption. A series of natural disasters, 
epidemics and cattle plague seem to have led to a further deterioration 
in stature in the 1870s and 1880s. There was some recovery in the early 
twentieth century, although the improvement was slow in comparison 
with other parts of the world. Van Zanden et al. (2014: 127) found that in 
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the 1930s, heights in Indonesia were lower than in Thailand and India, and 
much lower than in Germany, Britain and the Netherlands. Although the 
Indonesian evidence refers only to males, and probably suffers from sample 
selection bias, it would seem to conf irm the data on food consumption, 
which shows a decline in the last part of the nineteenth century and only 
a slow recovery thereafter.
A large survey of heights and weights of children from birth to 21 years 
was carried out in the Philippines by Concepcion (1933). She studied data 
from over 30,000 Filipino children, and compared her f indings with studies 
from China and Japan. While she found some improvement compared with 
earlier studies carried out by American doctors, she argued that ‘compared 
with Chinese children, the Filipino children compare favourably in weight 
and stature in certain ages only’ (Concepcion 1933: 14). Compared with 
Japanese children, Filipino girls seemed to be doing less well than boys, 
which might have reflected a bias towards boys in allocation of food, and 
expenditure on medical care. Her f indings led to the conclusion that ‘Filipino 
children seem to possess all the potentialities found in other races especially 
during the f irst two years after birth but somehow they cannot keep up and 
they are left behind’. She suggested that poor nutrition and the widespread 
prevalence of intestinal parasites were perhaps the main reasons for this 
(Concepcion 1933: 15).
Education and Literacy
In the early 1990s, the Human Development Index included both adult 
literacy rates and mean years of schooling as well as life expectancy and 
an income variable. In subsequent revisions the literacy variable has been 
dropped, possibly because of diff iculties of definition and estimation across 
so many countries. In Southeast Asia, questions about literacy were asked 
in several censuses carried out between 1930 and 1950, although the results 
have been criticized on the grounds that they often excluded people who 
were literate in non-European languages and scripts. In both Indonesia 
and Malaysia, people who had learnt to read Malay-language publications 
written in the Arabic script were often not considered literate in colonial-era 
censuses. It is also possible that people who had at least some knowledge of 
Chinese characters or of Indian scripts such as Tamil were also excluded from 
census def initions of literacy. This might explain, at least partly, the very 
high rates of illiteracy found in both Singapore and the Malayan Federation 
in the 1931 and 1947 censuses (Table 3.6).
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Table 3.6:  Percentage of the population illiterate in the Malayan Federation and 
Singapore, 1931 and 1947
Male Female Total
Malayan Federation:
1931 59.3 93.3 72.2
1947 43.0 83.5 61.6
Singapore
1931 53.4 83.6 63.5
1947 35.3 77.5 53.5
note: data exclude the aboriginal population.
Source: uneSCo (1957: table 37).
In Thailand and the Philippines, the censuses held in 1947 and 1948 respec-
tively gave a breakdown of illiteracy by age group. As would be expected 
the percentage of the population judged to be illiterate rose in the older age 
groups in both countries (Table 3.7). For males, the proportion illiterate was 
only 31 per cent in Thailand, and 36 per cent in the Philippines. In Thailand, 
many boys gained the rudiments of literacy in Thai in the monastic schools, 
although the curriculum was largely restricted to religious texts. Secular 
education was slower to develop, although primary education received more 
government investment after 1932 (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 368). In 
the Philippines, the impact of the expansion of educational facilities in the 
American period was clear; people born between 1904 and 1928 had lower 
rates of illiteracy compared with the older age groups. Another striking 
feature of the Philippine data was the low rates of illiteracy for women 
compared with both Thailand and British Malaya. This reflects the expanded 
provision of secular education for both boys and girls in the American era, 
together with the continued importance of the Catholic church in providing 
education to both boys and girls.
In Indonesia, no population census was held between 1930 and 1961; the 
1961 results showed that around 53 per cent of the population were illiterate, 
in the sense that they could not read in any script. The percentages were 
much higher in the older age groups, which conf irmed the very limited 
access to education in the colonial era (Nugroho 1967: 141). The estimate given 
in the UNESCO study (1957: Table 7) of 80 to 85 per cent of the population 
illiterate in the early 1950s is probably overstated; other estimates suggest 
a lower f igure, of around 63 per cent in 1947 (Booth 2016: 56). The illiteracy 
rates for Vietnam and Cambodia given by UNESCO of 80-85 per cent should 
also be considered rough estimates, given the lack of reliable census data 
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in either country. However, it is probable that illiteracy rates were higher 
in both Indonesia and French Indochina at the end of the 1930s than in 
other parts of Southeast Asia, given that numbers enrolled in educational 
institutions as a percentage of the total population were lower than in 
other colonies, or in Thailand (Table 3.8). By 1940, it was estimated that 
the average Indonesian had 0.4 years of schooling compared with 6.8 years 
in the Netherlands (Van Zanden et al. 2014: 96); the gap between French 
Indochina and metropolitan France was probably just as large.
Even if children in many parts of late colonial Asia were able to enrol for 
a few years in a primary school, their chances of going on to secondary and 
post-secondary education were extremely small. Fees were often high relative 
to average household incomes; in addition, many families could ill afford to 
lose the labour which a teenager could supply. The Philippines stands out as 
having the highest total enrolment f igures relative to population in colonial 
Asia, along with Taiwan (Table 3.8). The Philippines was also unusual in 
having a signif icant number of students enrolled in secondary and tertiary 
institutions. The University of the Philippines was founded in 1907 on the 
model of the state university systems in the USA, and grew rapidly through 
the American era. By the late 1930s, government and church universities in 
the Philippines were estimated to be enrolling over 10,000 students, which 
was far more than in any other colony or in Thailand (Reid 2015: 302-303). 
When the country was granted self-government in 1935, there was already 
quite a large educated labour force, including many women, who were able 
to take over almost all government jobs as well as move into professional, 
Table 3.7:  Percentage of the population illiterate in Thailand (1947) and the 
Philippines (1948)
Age Group Thailand Philippines Thailand Philippines
Male Male Female Female
15-19 19.5 24.3 27.3 25.2
20-24 20.4 25.0 44.0 30.9
25-34 26.4 31.5 65.2 38.9
35-44 35.0 36.9 84.0 48.5
45-54 45.0 47.6 91.9 64.6
55-64 52.7 58.8 94.3 76.2
over 65 59.2 72.0 94.4 83.7
Total 31.4 35.9 64.4 43.8
note: for thailand the data in the over-55 age groups refer to 55-59 and over 60.
Source: uneSCo (1957: tables 94 and 109).
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administrative and technical employment in the private sector. The situation 
in Indonesia was much worse; the 1961 census found that only 3 per cent of 
the population over ten had more than primary education (4.4 per cent for 
men and 1.9 per cent for women). For those over 25, the percentages were 
even lower (Nugroho 1967: 143-144).
Gender and Inequality
It was noted in Chapter 1 that the historical evidence suggests that women 
had a high degree of economic and social autonomy in premodern South-
east Asia, compared with their counterparts in China, India or the Arab 
world. It has been asserted that they ‘monopolized textile and ceramic 
production, shared agricultural tasks (dominating planting, harvesting and 
foraging), and most importantly did most of the marketing and business’ 
(Reid 2015: xviii). Some of these tasks were carried out inside the home, 
Table 3.8: Development indicators: East and Southeast Asia, (late 1930s)









enrolments as % of 
total population*
Singapore 2,296 155 n/a                  **(53.5)
Malaya** 2,328 147 21 7.8 (61.6)
taiwan 2,161 142 21 11.4 (n/a)
Philippines 1,763 139 23 11.5 (40)
indonesia 1,526 225-250 28  4.0 (80-85)
Korea 1,266 n/a 23 5.8 (60-65)
burma 1,037 232 30 5.4 (40-45)
thailand 1,003 n/a 22 10.6 (48)
vietnam n/a 190 24 2.5 (80-85)
* figures in brackets show the percentage of the population over 15 judged to be illiterate in the 
late 1940s, or early 1950s.
** Crude death rate data refer to Malaysia (british Malaya less Singapore). infant mortality rates 
refer to the federated Malay States only. educational enrolments refer to british Malaya including 
Singapore.
Sources: gdP data: bolt et al. (2018); educational enrolments: furnivall (1943: 111), with additional 
data on Korea from grajdanzev (1944: 264); illiteracy data from uneSCo (1957: tables 5, 9, 10); data 
on infant mortality rates and crude death rates for indonesia: nitisastro (1970: 113, table 39) and 
refer to Java only; Korea: Chang (1966: 268); Philippines: Zablan (1978: 100-105); taiwan: barclay 
(1954: 146, 161); thailand: Manurungsan (1989: 35); vietnam: banens (2000: 36-37), crude death 
rates refer to Cochinchina, infant mortality rates refer to hanoi only; burma: Sundrum (1957: 20, 
52); british Malaya: evans (1939: table Xv), crude death rates: Palmore, Chander and fernandez 
(1975: table 4.1).
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but it appears that women also became gainfully employed outside the 
home, especially in trade. Reid points out that for status reasons men 
were often reluctant to be involved in managing money or in marketing 
goods and services. Both European and Chinese visitors to the region in 
the f ifteenth and sixteenth centuries noted the involvement of women 
not just in the small-scale bazaar economy but also in large-scale trade 
and transport enterprises, as well as in public entertainment, and even 
in diplomacy and government. In those regions where Islam gained more 
adherents, West Asian and North Indian customs such as face veils and 
purdah never really took hold.
In the early nineteenth century, several Europeans with experience in 
other parts of Asia, including Raff les and Crawfurd, commented on the 
role of women in employment in various parts of Southeast Asia. Reid (2015: 
269) quotes Crawfurd, who found that women in a number of occupations 
in agriculture and trade in Cochinchina (Southern Vietnam) were as well 
remunerated as men, which reflected their high skills and intelligence. In 
Java, Raffles (1978: I, 353) found that, in managing money,
[t]he women are universally considered superior to the men, and from the 
common labourer to the chief of a province, it is usual for the husband 
to entrust his pecuniary affairs entirely to his wife. The women alone 
attend the markets and conduct all the business of buying and selling. 
It is proverbial to say that the Javan men are fools in money concerns.
What impact did the intrusion of Western colonialism across Southeast 
Asia, especially in the century up to 1940, have on the economic position 
of women? There is some evidence that changes did occur over the course 
of the nineteenth century as new crops were introduced, new farming 
systems evolved and imports of manufactured goods increased. Where 
labour demands were imposed on male cultivators, as in the cultivation 
system (cultuurstelsel) in Java, women often had to perform those functions 
previously carried out by men (Elson 1997: 180). Where households were free 
to respond to the opportunities offered by the rapid growth of international 
markets for crops such as rice, sugar, rubber, coffee, pepper and spices, 
women as well as men became more involved in cultivation and marketing 
of these crops.
At the same time, there were negative consequences for women’s eco-
nomic opportunities. Boomgaard (1991: 27) argued that over the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century in Java, large trading houses owned by Dutch and 
Chinese wrested trade from indigenous Javanese, and women were largely 
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consigned to inter- and intra-village trade. Over the nineteenth century, 
the importance of spinning and handloom weaving also declined as cheap 
British and later Dutch textiles poured into Java. This would certainly have 
had an adverse impact on female employment in those industries but, as 
was argued above, the decline of certain industries, to the extent that it 
occurred, did not necessarily force women out of gainful employment. 
Both male and female workers were able to take up other income-earning 
opportunities, in agriculture, manufacturing and trade, which often gave 
higher returns than traditional handicraft industries.
By the early twentieth century, surveys and census data give greater 
insight into the role of women in the labour force in various parts of 
Southeast Asia. The labour force data collected for Java in 1905 have been 
analysed by several scholars, including Fernando (1989) and White (1991). 
White (1991: Table 1) found that the size of the female labour force was only 
slightly smaller than the male labour force (6.4 compared with 6.6 million) 
but almost 60 per cent was in a residual category, not adequately def ined. 
He suggested that most were family workers, rather than those working for 
wages. The more comprehensive data on the labour force in Indonesia from 
the 1930 population census found that male workers outnumbered female 
workers in agriculture, where women were about 25 per cent of all workers. 
But there were often more women than men employed in non-agricultural 
occupations. This was especially the case in Java, where women accounted 
for 54 per cent of the total native non-agricultural labour force (Mertens 
1978: 48).3
During the 1930s, population censuses were carried out in British Malaya, 
Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines, as well as in Indonesia. They all 
collected some labour force data. The 1930 census in Indonesia found that 
female labour force participation rates were very high in Central Java and 
Yogyakarta compared to other parts of Java, and most regions outside Java. 
Almost 60 per cent of adult women were considered to be employed in 
Yogyakarta and 46 per cent in Central Java. These figures surprised the Dutch 
enumerators; it is worth noting that in the early part of the twentieth century 
female labour force participation was very low in the Netherlands, even in 
comparison with other parts of Europe (De Vries 2008: 212). Whatever the 
3 Locher-Scholten (2000: 59-63) discusses the evidence on female employment from the 
1930 census in detail; her discussion should be read in conjunction with that of Mertens. She 
argues that the women comprised 44 per cent of the workforce in Java, which is a higher f igure 
than that given by Mertens (1978; Appendix Table 1.3 and 1.5). This disparity might ref lect the 
different f igures on female employment in non-agricultural activities given in different tables 
in the census.
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reasons for the emergence of the male breadwinner family in the Nether-
lands, and in other parts of Western Europe at this time, it did not appear to 
have been prevalent in much of Java, or indeed in some parts of Sumatra and 
Eastern Indonesia. Around 40 per cent of the female labour force in Java was 
employed in non-agricultural occupations, which was a higher proportion 
than in the rest of the country, or in any other country in Southeast Asia 
except the Philippines (Table 3.9). This reflected the importance of both 
manufacturing and trade as sectors which employed women.
At the other extreme, in British Malaya (comprising the Straits Settle-
ments, and the Federated and Unfederated Malay States), only about 23 
per cent of women workers were in non-agricultural employment. Women 
comprised less than 20 per cent of the total workforce, which was low in 
comparison with other parts of the region. In Burma, women were estimated 
to comprise around 32 per cent of the total labour force, while in Thailand 
and the Philippines, the proportion was almost 50 per cent (Table 3.9). In 
Thailand, a very high proportion of both the male and the female labour 
force was employed in agriculture. Some of these differences were probably 
due to inconsistencies in def initions and enumeration procedures, but 
it is arguable that the census data from the 1930s do capture important 
differences in female employment patterns across Southeast Asia in the 
closing years of the colonial era.
Table 3.9: Percentage breakdown of the labour force, 1930s*
Country Total (millions) % Women** % TIA*** % WIA****
Java 14.7 26.0 64.0 58.9
outer islands 6.2 27.5 77.5 74.9
indonesia 20.9 26.4 68.0 63.8
burma 6.2 32.0 69.6 72.0
british Malaya 2.0 19.1 60.8 76.9
thailand 6.8 47.3 88.6 93.4
Philippines 8.5 50.2 40.8 11.2
***** (5.3) (20.7) (65.0) (43.1)
* indonesia (1930); burma and british Malaya (1931); thailand (1937); Philippines (1939).
** Women as percentage of the total labour force.
*** Percentage of the total labour force in agriculture.
**** Percentage of the female labour force in agriculture.
***** figures in brackets are estimates excluding those classified as housekeepers and housewives 
from the labour force in the Philippines.
Sources: indonesia: Mertens (1978: Appendix table 1.5); burma: Walinsky (1962: 33); british Malaya: 
vlieland (1932: 99); thailand: Central Service of Statistics (c. 1946: 81-83); Philippines: Common-
wealth of the Philippines (1941: 505-514). 
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Particularly striking are the f igures for the Philippines. The 1939 census 
f igures found that only about 41 per cent of the labour force was employed 
in agriculture, which was lower than in other parts of Asia. One reason for 
this was that the census counted both housekeepers and housewives as part 
of the labour force, which led to high female labour force participation rates 
and also a high share of the female labour force working outside agriculture. 
But it appears that many women who gave housekeeping as their primary 
occupation were also engaged in other tasks, in both agriculture and other 
sectors. Even when women classif ied as housewives were excluded from 
the labour force estimates, only 43 per cent of the female labour force was 
employed in agriculture, which was lower than elsewhere in the region 
(Table 3.9). The Philippine census also revealed that, of those employed 
in agriculture, 48 per cent of all male workers and 86 per cent of female 
workers were employed not as farmers or farm managers but as agricultural 
labourers. Many women classif ied as agricultural labourers were probably 
working as unpaid family workers.
The Impact of Government on Indigenous Welfare
By the early twentieth century, there were striking differences between 
Asian colonies in government expenditures and revenues per capita, and 
in the mix of tax and non-tax revenues (Booth 2007a: Tables 4.1 and 4.3). 
On the expenditure side, the early years of the twentieth century witnessed 
a marked change in the role of governments in many parts of the region. 
Colonial governments across Southeast Asia began to assume responsibility 
for a much broader range of activities than simply the maintenance of law 
and order and the collection of revenues. They adopted policies which were 
intended to enhance the productivity of indigenous workers in agriculture 
and also equip at least some workers with the skills which would allow them 
to take on employment outside the rural sector. To a greater or lesser extent, 
colonial governments in various parts of Asia also began to provide modern 
healthcare facilities as well as formal schooling. But there were considerable 
differences across Southeast Asia in the allocation of expenditures. The 
comparative study produced by Schwulst (1932) found that, in the early 
1930s, the Philippines stood out as the colony where a high proportion 
of budgetary expenditures were devoted to education and healthcare, 
and very little to defence. This contrasted with both Indonesia and Siam, 
where defence expenditures accounted for more than 20 per cent of total 
government outlays (Table 3.10).
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Table 3.10: Percentage breakdown of government expenditures by sector, 1931*
Sector Philippines Siam Indonesia FMS French Indochina
education 28 6 9 5 3
health 8 2 3 15 1
Public works 8 12 6 20 30
Agriculture 10 3 1 8 6
Administration 31(8) 45(9) 38(6) 34(6) 35(1)
Military 0 22 26 2 13
Public debt 12 9 13 9 4
other 3 1 4 7 8
total 100 100 100 100 100
* Percentages in brackets refer to expenditures on law and order. figures for the Philippines 
and french indochina refer to central government expenditures only. All figures are for ordinary 
budgets only and may understate some capital expenditures.
Source: Schwulst (1932: 57).
On the revenue side, there was by the 1920s considerable variation in rev-
enues relative to population; by 1920 they varied from US$24 per capita in 
the Federated Malay States (FMS) to only $3 in Vietnam. Although in the 
1930s revenues fell in per capita terms in most Asian colonies as a result of 
the global depression, there was still a substantial difference between the 
FMS and the Straits Settlements on the one hand and most other colonies 
and Thailand (Booth 2007a: Table 4.3). There was also considerable varia-
tion in the revenue mix. By the late 1930s, the proportion of total revenues 
derived from direct taxes on income and land, and from customs duties 
varied from zero in the Straits Settlements to 67 per cent in Burma. There 
were several reasons for these variations; in the Straits Settlements and the 
FMS, governments relied on excises on tobacco, petroleum products and 
alcohol, as well as revenues from the sale of opium. The British authorities 
tried to justify this reliance on equity grounds; it was argued that these 
revenues fell on the better-off Chinese to a greater extent than the Malays. 
In Indonesia, Burma and Vietnam, off icials were reluctant to increase taxes 
on the indigenous populations for fear of provoking unrest. Government 
enquiries into tax burdens in Indonesia in the 1920s found that most of the 
indigenous population was being taxed to the limit, and extra revenues 
would have to come from taxes on the upper income groups (including 
European and Chinese) and on corporate profits.
But in spite of this emphasis on equity, a frequent criticism of colonial 
revenue systems in many parts of Asia was that they were regressive in their 
impact. Critics pointed to the high reliance on land taxes, excises and export 
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duties whose incidence fell mainly on the indigenous populations living in 
rural areas. Income taxes on both corporations and individuals were either 
not assessed at all, as in British Malaya, or assessed at low rates with many 
exemptions. The main exceptions were Indonesia and the Philippines, 
although in the Philippines, the business taxes were often not progressive 
in their incidence. Excises on petroleum products, tobacco and alcohol, and 
revenues derived from the sale of opium were thought to fall more heavily 
on the Chinese, who were on average richer than indigenous populations. 
But by the 1930s there were worries about their incidence, especially as many 
poorer labourers, whether Chinese, Indian or indigenous, spent a significant 
part of their incomes on these products. All colonial governments, as well 
as Thailand, had to strike a balance between raising more revenues, which 
could lead to popular unrest and curbing expenditures.
A further aspect of revenue policy in Asia which is often overlooked 
concerns compulsory labour demands. Pre-colonial governments imposed 
labour demands on the populations under their control, and slavery and 
debt bondage were not uncommon.4 Colonial governments in most parts of 
Southeast Asia viewed labour shortages as a crucial constraint on the rapid 
development of both export-oriented agriculture and industries based on 
the extraction and processing of minerals. But they tackled the problem of 
labour shortages in different ways. In British Malaya the government decided 
that indigenous Malays were usually unwilling to work for wages at all, and 
certainly reluctant to take on arduous regular employment on estates and 
in mines. Malays were encouraged to stay in their reservations and pursue 
traditional occupations as farmers and f ishermen. Labour was procured 
cheaply from China and India, and came in large numbers. The 1931 census 
showed that 1.71 million Chinese lived in the Straits Settlements and the Malay 
states, and 624,000 Indians. Together these two groups comprised over half 
the total population of 4.4 million. In Burma, migrants from India also grew 
rapidly, taking up many of the unskilled jobs in urban areas. In 1931 there 
were 1.02 million Indians living in Burma, out of a total population of 14.65 
million. In both colonies, those migrants who had some knowledge of English, 
and some entrepreneurial skills moved into non-agricultural jobs as clerks, 
shopkeepers and traders. A small number moved into the professions. But 
most were trapped in unskilled jobs, and were prepared to work long hours, 
which removed any necessity on the part of the British to force indigenous 
workers into unpaid labour in public works or as plantation workers.
4 Lasker (1950) gives a comprehensive historical overview of serfdom, debt bondage, and 
compulsory public services in Southeast Asia from pre-colonial times to the 1940s.
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Other colonies faced different problems. In Indonesia, the 1930 census 
found that there were 1.23 million Chinese, around 2 per cent of the total 
population. Some were recent migrants, but many came from families which 
had already been in the country for several generations. Only a small number 
of recent migrants took up employment as estate labourers or unskilled 
workers on public works projects. Many preferred to work in f irms owned 
by more established Chinese migrants. The Dutch authorities encouraged 
young men from Java to move to the plantation sector in North Sumatra, 
usually as indentured labourers with penal clauses in their contracts. The 
harsh treatment of these workers led to campaigns in both Indonesia and 
the Netherlands to improve their conditions, and a labour inspectorate 
was established in the early years of the twentieth century.5 But given the 
long history of labour coercion through the nineteenth century, both in 
Java and elsewhere, the Dutch were slow to abolish the various forms of 
forced labour which had been used by both the colonial government and 
indigenous rulers. The formal abolition of the cultivation system in Java 
in the 1870s, and the introduction of more liberal policies which relied on 
free markets had some impact, and obligations under the pantjendiensten, 
desadiensten and heerendiensten were reduced or eliminated in most parts 
of Java by the early twentieth century (Kloosterboer 1960: 42; Lasker 1950: 
176-179; Furnivall 1944: 181-187). By the 1920s, they only persisted in the two 
native states of Yogyakarta and Surakata. But outside Java, heerendiensten 
demands for public works continued until the late 1930s and imposed a 
considerable burden on the indigenous populations.6
In Thailand, a large part of the male population had traditionally been 
obliged to work for the aristocracy and local patrons, often for several months 
in the year. This system of corvee labour underwent considerable change 
over the nineteenth century, as part of wider changes in government revenue 
policies. There were several reasons for these changes. Migrants from China 
grew in numbers, and many were willing to work for wages on projects such 
as canal building. As the rural economy became more monetized, many 
Thai men began to pay a money tax in lieu of their corvee obligations. These 
payments were then used to hire Chinese workers, or those Thais who were 
willing to work for wages (Ingram 1971: 58-59; Baker and Phongpaichit 1995: 
5 Controversies over the impact of the labour inspectorate and other efforts to improve the 
conditions of estate labourers in Sumatra continue; see Breman (2002) for one side of the debate.
6 These services were all compulsory and unpaid: pantjendienstem services were personal 
obligations for local rulers, desadiensten were for village off icials and heerendiensten were for 
supra-village off icials.
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24-25; Terwiel 2011: 175). By the early twentieth century, most forms of forced 
labour had been eliminated in central Thailand although they persisted in 
parts of the north and the south of the country, where laws and regulations 
passed in Bangkok were implemented more slowly. As late as the 1930s, 
Andrews (1935: 160) argued that many Thais were still reluctant to work for 
wages, and a high proportion of non-agricultural wage labour, especially in 
urban areas, was supplied by Chinese migrants.
In Vietnam, the French authorities introduced regulations which abol-
ished forced labour in Cochinchina in 1898, and in other parts of French 
Indochina soon after, but implementing these regulations proved diff icult 
(Lasker 1950: 194-195). More regulatory controls on the use of forced labour 
were issued in subsequent decades, and in December 1936 a law was passed 
which banned forced labour in Laos and Cambodia, as well as in Vietnam. 
Thompson (1947: 186) reported that by the late 1930s ‘forced labor still existed 
but only as a vestige and in remote parts of the colony’. The exceptions 
were obligations to provide labour for public works, although the 1936 
law stated that these could be commuted for cash payment in all parts of 
Vietnam. The length of annual service was reduced to between 16 and 20 
days. There were also more controls over the labour contracts used to attract 
workers from the north into wage employment in the south (Thompson 
1947: 204-207). Wages in Saigon were almost twice those in the north in 1931, 
which should have been a strong incentive for workers to move, and the 
French government was keen to develop a more unif ied labour market in 
Indochina. But employers in Tonkin were worried that large-scale migrations 
from north to south might deplete their own supplies of cheap labour, and 
there appears to have been little change in differentials over the 1930s 
(Giacometti 2000b: 204-205).7
Most studies of forced labour in colonial Asia and Africa agree that it 
should be viewed as a form of taxation, although placing a value on the 
labour supplied under coercion is not straightforward, given that labour 
markets in many parts of Asia were undeveloped until well into the twentieth 
century, and often segmented by region and ethnicity. But where the practice 
of making money payments to escape corvee duties was widespread, it is 
possible to value the labour supplied by those who chose to work out their 
corvee obligations, using the amounts of ‘ransom’ paid by those who decided 
to make a cash payment. Estimates for the outer islands of Indonesia (both 
7 Giacometti estimated a series for unskilled male workers in Hanoi/Haiphong from 1912 to 
1953. He also estimated a series for unskilled male workers for Saigon/Cholon from 1925 onwards. 
Wages in the south fell behind those in the north after 1945.
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the native states and the directly governed territories) in selected years from 
1925 to 1937 are given in Table 3.11. In 1930, usually considered the last year 
before the full impact of the global depression hit the regional economies 
outside Java, numbers paying the ransom were higher than those contribut-
ing labour in the directly governed territories, and the value of labour was 
thus estimated to be lower than the ransom paid. But by 1934, when the full 
impact of the global slump was being felt in Indonesia, numbers choosing 
to pay the ransom fell sharply, while the amount of the ransom increased in 
the directly governed territories, although it fell in the native states. There 
was some increase between 1934 and 1937 in the amount of ransom paid, 
although the total amount of both ransom and work contributed was still 
less in 1937 than in 1930.
The Dutch authorities claimed that the continued use of corvee labour 
on public works (heerendiensten) outside Java was justif ied as most regions 
were not assessed for the land tax. But in 1930, the total amount of the corvee 
(ransom plus actual labour) was greater in per capita terms than the land tax 
in those regions where it was assessed. This confirms the argument that the 
burden of taxation in the regions outside Java in the 1930s was higher than 
on Java, although it is worth noting that in the native states of Java, and in 
directly governed Bali and Lombok, cultivators were assessed for the land 
tax as well as being liable for heerendiensten obligations.8 While the land 
tax revenues fell sharply over the 1930s, numbers liable for heerendiensten 
fell only slightly in the directly governed territories and actually grew in 
the native states outside Java, although the value of the ransom per worker 
paying it did fall after 1930 (Table 3.11).
The continued use of corvee in colonial Indonesia attracted adverse 
comments internationally, given that other colonial territories in Asia had 
largely abolished it by the interwar years. A convention of the International 
Labour Off ice banning forced labour was ratif ied in 1930, and became 
operative in 1932. The Netherlands was a member of the ILO and its conven-
tions applied, at least in principle, to colonies as well as to the metropolitan 
state. In fact, the value of the heerendiensten was by 1930 less than 3 per 
cent of total government receipts. Why was it not abolished and replaced 
by paid labour? The most probable answer is that the colonial government 
was determined to improve infrastructure outside Java, but doubted that 
suff icient labour would be available at wages which the Dutch authorities 
8 Numbers obliged to contribute heerendiensten labour in the native states of Java in 1933 
amounted to around 362,000 people, or 8.7 per cent of the total population. Most of these (around 
275,000 people) were in the native state of Surakarta.
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deemed reasonable. The only alternative was to maintain the old practices 
of forced labour, albeit with some restrictions.
To what extent did the emergence of centralized systems of revenues 
and expenditures across much of colonial Asia in the decades up to 1940 
improve the living standards of the indigenous populations? It is true that 
many governments tried to modify, or in some cases abolish regressive 
taxes, probably more from a fear of popular unrest than because of any 
real concern about equity. On the expenditure side, indigenous popula-
tions might have benefited from modern infrastructure, including roads, 
railways and irrigation, and from greater access to educational and health 
services. But the benefits from these expenditures often accrued to a small 
part of the population and many were excluded altogether. The perception 
that colonial f iscal systems benefited particular regions or ethnic groups 
more than others was exploited by nationalist politicans, keen to use such 
grievances for their own purposes. After independence, governments 
throughout Asia had to take these grievances into account in fashioning 
new revenue policies while at the same time addressing widespread demands 
for increased government expenditures, both on infrastructure and on 
health and education.
Table 3.11:  Numbers liable to public works duties (heerendiensten), ransoms per 
worker, total ransoms and value of labour, 1925, 1930, 1934 and 1937














dgoJ** 1,366 6.51 (41) 3.7 5.2 8.9
nSoJ*** 1,142 5.87 (24) 1.6 5.1 6.7
1930
dgoJ 1,469 7.67 (58) 6.5 4.1 10.6
nSoJ 1,306 6.65 (30) 2.6 5.4 8.0
1934
dgoJ 1,432 5.39 (16) 1.2 5.7 6.9
nSoJ 1,295 4.17 (12) 0.6 4.3 4.9
1937
dgoJ 1,421 5.47 (23) 1.8 5.1 6.9
nSoJ 1,367 4.10 (22) 1.2 4.1 5.3
* figures in brackets show the percentage of all those liable who paid the ransom.
** dgoJ refers to directly governed territories outside Java.
*** nSoJ refers to the native states outside Java.
Source: Indisch Verslag 1938: Part II, Statistical Abstract for the Year 1937, tables 405, 427.
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Winners and Losers in the Colonial Era
A striking feature of Southeast Asian growth in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was the fast growth of both population and exports, 
relative to other parts of Asia, and probably to many other parts of the 
global periphery. In the century up to 1930, many parts of the region were 
transformed. Land under various types of agriculture grew rapidly. As far 
as can be ascertained from the available evidence, cultivated area of food 
crops more or less kept up with population growth in most parts of Southeast 
Asia until the 1930s, although this was not the case in some densely settled 
regions. In addition, millions of hectares were developed for the cultivation 
of export crops, both by large estates and by smallholders. By 1930, Southeast 
Asia was no longer an ‘empty garden’ but an increasingly populated garden 
buzzing with activity. In parts of Java, and in Northern Vietnam, colonial 
off icials were justif iably worried about population outstripping available 
supplies of land. Their solution was to try and move people to less densely 
settled areas, or to non-agricultural employment. Many did move, often 
without government assistance, either to develop new farms where land 
was available, or to take up wage employment in estates, mines, off ices and 
factories. In addition, many rural households managed to diversify their 
income-earning activities away from agriculture, and into manufacturing, 
trade and other activities. In many regions, women were active in a range 
of income-earning activities both inside and outside the home.
After 1900, governments across Southeast Asia assumed some responsibil-
ity not just for the provision of infrastructure, but also for education and 
healthcare. The results varied considerably by country and region, but the 
evidence does suggest that in most colonies there was some fall in crude 
death rates and infant mortality and an increase in literacy, albeit from 
very low levels. To the growing numbers of people across the region who 
had some sympathy with nationalist demands for greater participation by 
the indigenous majority in government, if not for complete independence, 
the achievements of the years from 1900 to 1940 seemed a case of ‘too little, 
too late’. But they did lead to more people being able to read and write in 
both vernacular languages, and the language of the colonial power, even if 
they were still only a small percentage of the total population. They also led 
to an expansion of literature and journalism in indigenous languages. For 
all these reasons, the assessment of Reid (2015: 261) that ‘levels of income 
and welfare rose scarcely at all in most parts of Southeast Asia until the 
1970s’ seems too pessimistic. Apart from the improvements in health and 
literacy, millions of small cultivators were able to increase their incomes by 
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cultivating crops for global markets. On the other hand, in all the Southeast 
Asian colonies, large gaps opened up in life expectancy and literacy between 
ethnic groups within the various colonies, and with the main metropolitan 
powers, Britain, France, the Netherlands and the USA.
A further important change in the early decades of the twentieth century 
concerned employment patterns. By the 1930s, the evidence from censuses 
and surveys showed that in most parts of the region, the majority of people 
employed in manufacturing, commerce, trade, government employment and 
in the professions in most parts of Southeast Asia were indigenous, rather 
than Europeans or migrant Chinese, Arabs or Indians. The main excep-
tions were the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States, where 
fewer than 10 per cent of the labour force in manufacturing and commerce 
were Malays. A larger proportion of the labour force in government and 
the professions was indigenous but it was still much lower than in other 
colonies, or in Thailand (Booth 2007a: Table 6.4). It was true that many of 
the indigenous workers in these occupations were employed in the lower 
grades and in less responsible positions, but they gained crucial experience 
which they were able to carry over into the post-1945 era. Another striking 
feature of labour markets across the region by the 1930s was the high labour 
force participation rates of women, many of whom were in non-agricultural 
occupations.
Did Southeast Asia diverge markedly in terms of national income from the 
metropolitan economies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? 
In fact, the evidence suggests that there was already a considerable gap in 
per capita GDP between Southeast Asian colonies and the metropolitan 
economies in the late nineteenth century, but it does not appear to have 
widened before 1939 (Table 1.6). But if we compare the performance of these 
colonies and Thailand with the USA, which had emerged as the leading 
industrial country by the early twentieth century, a rather different story 
emerges. In all parts of Southeast Asia for which we have data, GDP per 
capita grew more slowly than in the USA between 1870 and 1913. This was 
also the case in Japan (Table 2.1). But between 1913 and 1939, there was some 
catch-up with the USA in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. Only in 
Burma and Indonesia was the gap with the USA wider in the late 1930s than 
in 1913. But everywhere in the region, growth in the 1940s and 1950s was 
slower than in the USA and by 1960 the disparities in per capita GDP were 
much wider than they had been before 1939. The reasons for this divergence 
after 1939 are explored more in the next chapter.
In his study of the global periphery in the decades from 1870 to the 1930s, 
Williamson (2011) claims that ‘the Third World fell behind’ although in fact 
the CoLoniAL Period: MeASureS of WeLfAre And ChAnging Living StAndArdS 103
the data on gross domestic output per capita does not really support this 
argument in Southeast Asia, especially if we compare colonies with the 
metropoles. He claims that deindustrialization occurred across much of 
Asia in the era of colonial control, and this led to growing disparities in 
GDP between the core and the periphery. While it is probable that some 
indigenous handicraft industries, particularly textiles, contracted as imports 
from Europe and later from Japan expanded, other industries including those 
based on agricultural and mineral processing grew. Even in the textile sector, 
the greatly increased availability of cheap cotton cloth allowed f inishing 
industries to develop. By the 1930s, governments in both Indonesia and 
Vietnam were adopting policies to foster further industrialization in order 
to provide more employment for the growing populations. These policies 
were brought to an abrupt end by the outbreak of World War II, and the 
subsequent defeat of the colonial powers by Japan. We do not know what 
the results would have been had the Dutch and the French governments 
been given longer to pursue these policies but it is wrong to argue that they 
did not even try.
But in spite of attempts by governments to mitigate the impact of the 
depression years on indigenous populations, there seems to be little doubt 
that the years from 1931 to 1936 were ones of hardship for many millions 
in Southeast Asia. Employment opportunities in the large estate sector 
contracted in both Indonesia and British Malaya; it is likely that employment 
opportunities also fell in other parts of the region as well. Falling food prices 
across the region helped consumers but hurt exporters of rice. Prices of most 
other export crops also fell, which caused hardship among smallholder 
exporters of crops such as rubber, coffee, vegetable oils, pepper and spices. 
Restrictions on exports of most staples made it impossible to increase output 
and many producers must have experienced falls in money incomes. The 
sharp fall in the numbers of workers who were able to pay the ransom to 
escape the heerendiensten after 1931 suggests that money became much 
scarcer in many regions outside Java. Food consumption per capita fell in 
Java and the Philippines, and possibly in other parts of the region as well.
Authors such as Williamson argued that inequality in income and wealth 
increased in many parts of Southeast Asia in the century from 1840 to 1940 
(Williamson 2015: 35-37). There is certainly support for this hypothesis. 
Evidence from several parts of Southeast Asia, and from other parts of the 
periphery, indicates that the wage/rental ratio fell quite rapidly between 1870 
and 1913. Williamson (2015: 37) found that in Burma, the ratio fell by 44 per 
cent from 1890/94 to 1910/14; in Siam it fell by 98 per cent between 1870/74 
and 1910/14. The decline for Siam in particular can be contested because of 
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rigidities in the labour market which have already been discussed. But it 
seems probable that some decline did occur after 1900, especially in the more 
densely settled parts of Southeast Asia, where extension of the cultivation 
frontier was becoming more diff icult. Figures from Java assembled by Polak 
(1943: Table 7.3) show that between 1921 and 1939 the ratio of rental payments 
to wage payments on estates in Java rose continuously from 1921 to 1937, 
with only a slight decrease in 1938 and 1939. This does indicate that in those 
parts of the region where arable land was not growing rapidly relative to 
population, those who could rent out land gained relative to those who 
relied on wage labour for at least a part of their income.
Williamson (2015: 36) also argued that ‘globalization appears to have 
helped land concentration’ in at least some parts of Southeast Asia after 1870. 
He points to the increase in tenancy in Burma, and in parts of Indochina, 
and to the increase in land controlled by large estates in the Philippines 
and Indonesia. By the 1920s, surveys in Java showed that the majority of the 
rural population were land poor in the sense that they cultivated very small 
holdings, and had to supplement their incomes from other sources, including 
wage labour or petty trade. At the same time, an ‘off icial class’ of well-paid 
indigenous workers in government jobs was emerging in several parts of the 
region. The data put together by Polak (1943) show that while real incomes 
of most categories of indigenous workers in Indonesia increased between 
1921 and 1939, the increase was greatest for those employed in government 
(Table 3.1). Indeed, their incomes seem to have increased more rapidly than 
those of Europeans. The argument that inequality grew in Indonesia in the 
years from 1920 to 1939 receives further confirmation from the estimates 
of Leigh and Van der Eng (2009: Table 1). They showed that the share of the 
top 0.5 and 0.1 per cent of the income distribution increased between 1920 
and 1934, and fell only slightly until 1939. Their estimates rely heavily on 
income tax returns over these years.
Williamson (2015: 37-38) also drew attention to the impact of falling terms 
of trade on agricultural producers across the region from the early years of 
the twentieth century down to 1940. The net barter terms of trade appears 
to have deteriorated in most parts of the region, especially after 1913. But the 
income terms of trade continued to improve, at least until the late 1920s. In 
the Indonesian context, it appears that the income terms of trade increased 
steadily from the 1850s right through to the end of the 1920s (Booth 1998: 
Table 2.1). This reflects the fact that total export earnings continued to grow, 
in spite of the fall in prices. Many smallholder cultivators across Southeast 
Asia contributed to the expansion of export production, and they continued 
to produce and market crops until the international restriction schemes 
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were introduced in the 1930s. In several cases, such as rubber production in 
Sumatra and Kalimantan, smallholders were challenging the dominance 
of estate producers well before the end of the colonial era.
By the 1930s, all the evidence points to an increasing stratif ication of 
populations throughout Southeast Asia. While Furnivall was correct that 
part of this stratif ication was along ethnic lines, it was also increasingly 
visible within the indigenous majorities which existed everywhere except 
in British Malaya. Those who controlled reasonable amounts of agricultural 
land, especially if it was irrigated, were probably able to maintain their 
real incomes, even if they, and their families, had to seek extra work off 
the farm. The fortunate few who had access to regular wage employment, 
either in government or in the private sector, experienced growth in real 
incomes, even in the depression decade of the 1930s. They also acquired 
social prestige, and often made advantageous marriages. In some cases, 
their children were able to access education in schools which taught in the 
language of the colonial power. They were for the most part men; women 
were excluded from these jobs because of their low literacy rates, as well 
as for cultural reasons. Only in the Philippines were female literacy rates 
catching up with those of men by the end of the 1930s. It was these men 
who were well positioned to take up senior and more lucrative posts in the 
post-independence era.
Rankings in the 1930s
Although most colonial governments in Southeast Asia at the end of the 
1930s expected to be in control of their various territories for much of the 
rest of the century, and possibly for longer, in fact matters turned out very 
differently. The Japanese army inflicted humiliating defeats on the British, 
the Dutch and the Americans in 1941/42. A pro-Vichy regime in French 
Indochina remained in place until 1945, but only after many concessions 
had been made to the Japanese. After 1945, the colonial powers were forced 
to grant independence, willingly in the case of the Americans in the Philip-
pines, more slowly and often after bitter conflict in the Dutch, French and 
British colonies. The consequences of the transition to independence for 
living standards in Southeast Asia will be assessed in more detail in the 
next chapter. But how should we rank the achievements of the countries in 
Southeast Asia at the end of the 1930s, in what turned out to be the closing 
years of colonial control? If we look simply at per capita GDP, it seems clear 
that Singapore and Malaysia were well ahead of the rest. In 1938, what were 
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to become two independent countries in the 1960s were still part of British 
Malaya, and per capita GDP in both was above the other colonies in Southeast 
Asia, and independent Thailand (Table 3.8). They also scored quite well on 
health indicators. But on educational and literacy indicators they did less 
well; the percentage of the adult population considered illiterate remained 
very high until well into the 1950s. British Malaya was also characterized by 
deep ethnic divisions. By the 1930s, Malays were in a minority. British policy 
was aimed at keeping them in rural areas as farmers, while Chinese and 
Indian migrants dominated non-agricultural occupations in urban areas.
Although per capita GDP in the Philippines was lower than in Singapore 
and Malaysia in the late 1930s, the country was comparable on health indica-
tors, and achieved higher rates of literacy. Indeed, literacy rates, and the 
proportion of the population in schools were higher in the Philippines than 
in most other parts of colonial Asia, especially for women. Bennett (1951) 
ranked 31 countries, including 4 in Southeast Asia, according to nineteen 
non-monetary indicators in the years from 1934 to 1938. The indicators 
included calorie intakes, infant mortality rates, physicians per capita, textile 
consumption, school attendance, pieces of mail handled, vehicles per capita, 
freight transported by rail, cinema attendance, energy consumption and 
several other indicators estimated on a per capita basis. On an unweighted 
average of these indicators, the USA, Canada and Australia were top, followed 
by several European countries. The Philippines was ranked higher than any 
other Asian country except Japan. It was also ranked higher than Romania, 
Turkey and Egypt. Thailand was below these countries, but above India, 
Korea, Persia and China. French Indochina and the Netherlands Indies were 
ranked near the bottom; only Nigeria was below them.
Bennett expressed the hope that those countries which were ranked 
towards the bottom of his table would be able to catch up in the second 
part of the century, and indeed many countries in Asia and elsewhere have 
made progress on the indicators which he included. Thailand, Indonesia 
and Vietnam have moved ahead of the Philippines on the composite HDI 
index for 2016, although Vietnam was still below the Philippines in terms 
of per capita GDP (Table 1.1). The reasons for the relatively poor economic 
performance of the Philippines, in spite of its favourable colonial legacy, 
have attracted much attention in recent decades, not least from social 
scientists in the Philippines, and we will examine this literature in greater 
detail in subsequent chapters.
4 Confronting the Challenges of 
Independence
The Impact of the Japanese Occupation
The previous chapter examined a number of welfare indicators includ-
ing availability of basic needs (especially food), demographic indicators 
(especially mortality rates), anthropometric measures and wage data. The 
chapter concluded that in spite of the growth in GDP which occurred in most 
parts of the region between 1900 and 1930, improvements in living standards 
were modest, and by the late 1930s most colonies still had low educational 
enrolments and high mortality rates, compared with the metropolitan 
powers. The Philippines had probably the highest living standards in the 
region, using educational indicators, mortality rates and per capita GDP 
estimates. These indicators suggested that living standards in the Philippines 
were similar to Taiwan and above Korea. But even in the Philippines, rice 
availability per capita was low and fell over the 1930s. Surveys carried out 
in the 1930s showed that nutritional levels among some segments of the 
population were well below acceptable standards. In other parts of Southeast 
Asia, including independent Thailand, food availability was higher but access 
to modern healthcare and secular education was very limited.
By the late 1930s, most economies had begun to recover from the ravages 
of the global depression, and in at least two cases (Indonesia and Vietnam), 
colonial governments were taking a more activist approach to industrial 
policy. Per capita GDP increased in many parts of Southeast Asia in the 
latter part of the 1930s after the decline in the early years of that decade. In 
the Philippines and Indonesia it was higher in 1940 than in 1929, although 
in Burma, and in British Malaya excluding Singapore, domestic product 
per capita in the late 1930s was still lower than in 1929 (Table 2.3). But in 
spite of the recovery, resentment against the policies of the colonial powers 
still simmered. In 1941/42, when the Japanese Imperial Army swept across 
Southeast Asia, inflicting humiliating defeats on the British, Dutch and 
American armed forces, they were greeted as liberators by many indigenous 
people. Nationalist leaders who had been imprisoned in remote locations 
in Indonesia were released although their activities were controlled by the 
Japanese.
But quite quickly the negative impact of the Japanese occupation on food 
supplies was felt across much of the region. The Japanese paid little regard 
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to the colonial boundaries in the region, and established governments 
which suited their strategic purposes. These were chiefly to extract and 
export the commodities needed for the Japanese military machine, while 
procuring enough food to feed the Japanese troops across Southeast Asia. 
Sumatra and peninsular Malaya were governed from Singapore, while the 
island of Borneo, with its oil f ields, was under the control of the navy. Across 
most of the territories controlled by the Japanese, trade in basic foods was 
discouraged or forbidden, even within quite limited areas. Rice supplies 
were commandeered from local populations to feed the armed forces; the 
local populations survived from what was left, supplemented with whatever 
non-rice food crops they could grow on the available land.
Those regions, including British Malaya, the Philippines and much of 
Indonesia, which had depended on rice imports from Burma, Thailand and 
Vietnam, were severely affected as regional rice trade ceased. For people 
who had been relatively prosperous before 1942, the occupation was ‘life 
in a time of tapioca’ as they supplemented their diet with non-rice foods 
which they had seldom consumed in peacetime (Bayly and Harper 2004: 
327-330). But for others, food scarcity led to famine conditions, especially 
in 1944-1945. The regions worst affected were those which were already 
living on borderline subsistence diets in the 1930s, including parts of 
Java, and Northern and Central Vietnam. Van der Eng (2002: Table 6) 
estimated that population in Java, which had grown at over 1 per cent per 
annum through the 1930s, declined between 1943 and 1945. The rate of 
decline was fastest in Bojonegoro, Pati and Semarang, all residencies where 
there had been off icial concerns about food availability in the 1930s. Part 
of the decline was due to out-migration and part to falling fertility, but 
the main reason was higher death rates from lack of food, which in turn 
weakened the resistance of poorer people to common illnesses. Studies 
have estimated that around 2.4 to 2.5 million premature deaths occurred 
in Java as a direct result of the occupation (De Jong 2002: 280; Baten, Stegl 
and Van der Eng 2013: 118).
Famine conditions also prevailed by early 1945 in large parts of Central 
and Northern Vietnam. Vietnamese nationalists, and several historians, 
have argued that between one and two million died in Vietnam in 1944/45, 
although these f igures have been disputed (Dung 1995: 575-576). The 
emergence of famine in Vietnam over this period might seem strange as 
exports of the rice surplus in the south to other parts of Asia had largely 
stopped by 1944, leaving more for domestic consumption. Although the 
rice was badly needed in mainland Japan, and in other regions occupied by 
the Japanese army, allied bombing had largely brought shipping to a halt 
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by 1944 (Huff 2019). But it seems that transport shortages also prevented 
the movement of rice from the south to the north, or to Laos (Dung 1995: 
614-615; Huff 2019). In addition, abnormally heavy rains led to falls in rice 
output in both the north and south of the country. Giacometti (2000a: 76) 
estimated that rice output in Cochinchina was 3.27 million tons in 1943, but 
had fallen to 2.25 million tons in 1945. Further falls occurred in the years 
after 1945 in many parts of Vietnam, which suggests that food shortages 
and high mortality could have persisted after the Japanese were defeated. 
The full extent of famine mortality remains unclear. The reconstruction 
of Vietnamese population statistics carried out by Banens (2000: 9) found 
that ‘extra annual deaths’ might have numbered between 250,000 and one 
million in 1944/45, and that total famine-related deaths could have been 
anywhere between 500,000 and two million. His estimates indicate that 
the average annual growth of population between 1934 and 1939 was 0.9 
per cent per annum. Had this growth rate continued over the 1940s, the 
population would have been 26.8 million in 1949. In fact, he estimated it 
to have been 25.9 million, which indicates that the mortality rate over the 
1940s must have been much higher than prior to 1940, although it is possible 
that fertility also fell after 1942.
Another factor which contributed to declining real incomes and increas-
ing hardship for many people across Southeast Asia after 1941 was the high 
rates of inflation, caused by falling availability of food and other basic needs, 
and also the large amounts of banknotes issued by the Japanese (Booth 
2007a: 154). Price indices showed very rapid growth between 1941 and 1945 
in Hanoi, Saigon, Bangkok and Manila. It is unlikely that the incomes of 
most urban dwellers kept pace with inflation, especially after 1943. High 
rates of inflation persisted after 1945 in most cities; only in Manila did the 
price index show some decline, although prices were still much higher in 
1953 than in 1941 (Table 4.1). The high inflation in urban centres would have 
been transmitted to rural areas; farmers with surplus production might have 
benefited from higher food prices but those depending on food purchases in 
at least some months of the year would have suffered. Those who depended 
on wages for at least part of their incomes would also have been hit. In 
addition to growing inflation, demand for workers in both government and 
the private sector fell. To the extent that the Japanese conscripted labour 
for public works projects, workers often received little beyond basic food. 
Evidence on real wages over the 1940s is limited; in Vietnam, Giacometti 
(2000b: 192) has argued that there was a continuous decline from 1937 to 
1954. It is likely that these trends were also found in other parts of Southeast 
Asia, at least until the late 1940s.
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Table 4.1:  Index of urban consumer prices in Southeast Asian cities, 1941-1953 
(1951 = 100)
Year 1941 1945 1951 1953
rangoon 29 n/a 100 92
bangkok 10 66 100 n/a
Singapore 24* n/a 100 102
Jakarta 6* n/a 100 111
Manila 28 196 100 90
hanoi 2 24 100 149
Saigon 3 10 100 156
* 1938.
Sources: rangoon: Central Statistical and economics department (1963: 257); bangkok: ingram 
(1971: 164); Singapore: Sugimoto (2011: 181); Jakarta: Central bureau of Statistics (1959: 229); Manila: 
Journal of Philippine Statistics, vol 13 (10/12), p. 229; hanoi and Saigon: giacometti (2000b: 211-212).
The Japanese occupation, together with the post-1945 attempts to reimpose 
colonial control in Indonesia and French Indochina, led to a sharp decline 
in real GDP in most parts of Southeast Asia. Only Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore had regained pre-war levels of per capita GDP by 1950 (Table 4.2). 
In Burma where the British had granted full independence in early 1948, 
per capita GDP was little more than half the pre-war level, and was still 
below the 1938/39 levels in 1960.1 Recovery was also slow in Indonesia. The 
Dutch were determined to regain control of their most important colony 
after the Japanese surrender, and ignored the declaration of independence 
issued by Sukarno and Hatta on 17 August 1945. The struggle between the 
Dutch and the Indonesian nationalists lasted for over four years, and the 
economic consequences were severe. When the Dutch f inally conceded 
independence in late 1949, it was on terms which were far from favourable to 
the new republic (Booth 2016: 36-39). In 1950, per capita GDP was estimated 
to be only about 72 per cent of the 1940 level.
In the Philippines, per capita GDP in 1950 was also around 70 per cent 
what it had been in 1940; it had only just caught up in 1960 (Table 4.2) The 
American re-conquest of the Philippines, led by General McArthur, caused 
substantial loss of life and destruction of infrastructure. There was bitter 
f ighting in the capital, Manila, large parts of which were almost completely 
destroyed. Nevertheless, it was decided to honour previous promises and 
1 Estimates published by the Ministry of National Planning (1960: 16) showed that total 
GDP in Burma only returned to the 1938/39 f igure in 1957/58, by which time population was 
considerably higher.
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grant full independence in 1946. The transfer of power was largely peaceful, 
and American economic support continued for some years. The favourable 
educational legacy left by the Americans meant that there was a relatively 
large educated class to f ill jobs in the civil service, as well as in private 
business and the professions. But in the Philippines, as well as in Indonesia 
and Burma, independence brought about a massive rise in expectations 
on the part of populations who felt they had been deprived of economic 
opportunities in the colonial era. Meeting these expectations proved difficult 
in all three countries, whatever the political orientation of the governments 
which assumed control in the immediate post-independence years.
The four protectorates and one colony which comprised French Indochina 
had a different experience, both during the Japanese occupation and after 
the Japanese defeat. In 1941-1942, the Japanese cooperated with the pro-Vichy 
government, which in turn was instructed to give the Japanese military the 
support it demanded. But as famine conditions took hold in the north, the 
Japanese finally ousted the French in March 1945 and tried to set up a local 
government structure which had been installed in Burma in 1943 (Bayly 
and Harper 2007: 143-144). The Japanese initiatives were welcomed by some 
Vietnamese, but little was achieved before the Japanese surrender and the 
arrival of a British force of Indian troops commanded by General Gracey. 
Gracey displayed little knowledge of, or sympathy for Asian nationalism; his 
mission as he saw it was to pacify Indochina and hand the country back to 
France. Although the British commander who was dispatched to Java took a 
more sympathetic approach to the Indonesian nationalists, neither he nor his 
superiors could control the returning Dutch, who viewed the nationalist leaders 
as Japanese collaborators with no following among the Indonesian masses.
Table 4.2:  Index of per capita GDP in pre-war peak, 1950, 1960 and 1975 (pre-
war = 100)
Country c. 1940 1950 1960 1975
Singapore (1939) 100 (2,671) 100 89 245 (6,556)
Malaysia (1940) 100 (2,186) 122 113 229 (5,014)
Philippines (1940) 100 (1,845) 71 96 145 (2,033)
indonesia (1940) 100 (1,627) 72 91 122 (1,977)
burma (1938) 100 (1,037) 54 76 83 (863)
thailand (1938) 100 (1,003) 99 136 256 (2,569)
taiwan (1940) 100 (1,880) 74 113 336 (6,320)
South Korea (1940) 100 (1,238) 91 120 416 (5,146)
note: figures in brackets show per capita gdP in 2011 dollars.
Source: bolt et al. (2018).
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The Netherlands in 1945 had a devastated economy, with limited capacity 
to f ight a prolonged colonial war on the other side of the world. As the 
USA became more convinced that the Indonesian nationalists were not 
pro-communist, they were not prepared to help the Dutch reassert control. 
France was in a rather different position regarding French Indochina. Al-
though the colony did not have the same economic signif icance to France 
as Indonesia had to the Netherlands, there was an awareness in France that 
surrender in Indochina could lead to the dissolution of the French Empire 
in Africa. This was unacceptable to large parts of French public opinion 
in 1945, not least because of the influence of the large settler community 
in Algeria. The French fought on in Indochina, with some American help, 
until their defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. There followed a conference in 
Geneva, when a decision was taken to divide Vietnam into two parts, and 
grant independence to four new nations. Far from solving the problems of 
Indochina, the partition ushered in two more decades of conflict, which 
ended with the reunif ication of Vietnam in 1975. Communist governments 
took control in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. As will be seen in subsequent 
chapters, the consequences for the living standards of the people of Indo-
china were very serious.
Responding to the Challenges of Independence
In the immediate aftermath of independence, most governments in Asia 
were concerned with accelerating economic growth and diversifying their 
economies away from what was perceived as the colonial pattern of produc-
tion. The expectation was that faster economic growth would lead over time 
to a broad-based improvement in living standards. The governments which 
had assumed power across the region in the decade after 1946 differed in 
their political views, but all shared a common reaction against what they 
saw as the colonial economic pattern. Almost without exception, it was 
argued that, while export growth might have been rapid in the colonial era, 
the benefits to indigenous populations were often meager. Even moderate 
nationalists thought that colonial economic policies were aimed at extracting 
prof its from the exploitation of agricultural and mineral resources in the 
colonies, and that most of these profits had been remitted abroad. Although 
the colonial governments might have built infrastructure, including roads, 
railways and irrigation systems, it was widely believed that the benefits of 
infrastructure development accrued mainly to foreign estates and mining 
companies.
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There was also considerable bitterness that most colonial governments 
had paid so little attention to improving the skills of the indigenous popula-
tions. In Malaysia there was added resentment that the British had done 
little to educate Malays, compared with the Chinese. This resentment was 
also felt in Indonesia. Although the Chinese were a much smaller percent-
age of the population than in British Malaya, only around 2 per cent, they 
had managed to get better access to Dutch-language education through 
the network of government schools for the Chinese resident in Indonesia 
(Govaars 2005). These produced graduates with a command of Dutch, who 
often moved into clerical and administrative jobs in the private sector. 
More wealthy Chinese families sometimes sent their children abroad for 
post-secondary education. Almost everywhere it was argued that more overt 
government interventions in the economy were needed, which would repair 
the deficiencies of the colonial period. Most politicians and senior off icials 
across Asia in the 1950s and 1960s would have agreed with the assertion of 
Singapore’s deputy prime minister that the policies of the colonial era had 
led to ‘little economic growth, massive unemployment, wretched housing 
and inadequate education. We had to try a more activist and interventionist 
approach’ (Goh 1976: 84).
But did this mean turning away from involvement with the international 
economy? Singapore had experienced negative economic growth in per 
capita terms through the 1950s, as had Malaysia (Table 4.2). Rapid population 
growth in Singapore after 1945 had aggravated the problems of overcrowding 
and inadequate housing which were already obvious in the 1930s. The 
government felt that its future lay with the Malayan Federation, and in 
1963, Singapore had joined with the Federation, and the British territories 
of Sarawak and North Borneo on the island of Borneo to form the new 
federal state of Malaysia. But the Singapore leadership, ruling over an island 
with a Chinese majority, found it impossible to cooperate with the Malay-
dominated government in Kuala Lumpur, and broke away to become an 
independent state in 1965. This presented difficult problems. Could Singapore 
become a viable economy on its own, having abruptly severed links with 
the hinterland of which it had been part for over a century of colonial rule?
The Singapore government sought advice from several foreign experts; 
one of the most influential was a Dutch economist who had been involved 
in framing the policies which led to the recovery of the Dutch economy 
after 1945. Dr Winsemius encouraged the government to develop the port 
as a container hub, as Rotterdam was doing in Europe, and recommended 
several industrial sectors where the government should attract foreign 
investment (Peebles and Wilson 2002: 35). The domestic Singapore market 
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was small, and it was recognized that those industries which located in 
Singapore should aim to produce for export. The Economic Development 
Board had in fact been established in 1961; after independence it became the 
lead agency for attracting foreign investment into the Singapore economy.
The Malaysian government also realized that it would need to continue 
to produce for the international economy, although after 1957 economic 
planners gave higher priority to import-substituting industrialization than 
had been the case in the colonial era. Foreign investors were encouraged to 
locate in Malaysia, but it was expected that they would produce largely for 
the domestic market, with tariff protection. This strategy was also adopted 
in Thailand and the Philippines, albeit with some restrictions. But Burma 
and Indonesia seemed to have had serious doubts about the benefits of links 
to the international economy from the early 1950s onwards. Although in 
the immediate aftermath of independence, some ministers recognized the 
importance of foreign investment in Indonesia, by the late 1950s the forces of 
economic nationalism had gained the upper hand. Dutch enterprises were 
nationalized without compensation, which gave Indonesia a bad reputation 
in international investment circles (Lindblad 2008: 177-208).
Burma also adopted an increasingly hostile approach to foreign invest-
ment after 1960. Myint (1971) termed these two economies ‘inward-looking’, 
and contrasted their policies with the more ‘outward-looking’ policies 
adopted in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. According to 
Myint (1971), while these four countries also reacted against what they saw 
as the colonial economic pattern, they realized that it would be easier and 
quicker to change the pattern of distribution if the economy was growing 
than if it was stagnating. Myint argued that Burma and Indonesia were 
still ‘obsessed by the fear that once the foreign enterprises were allowed to 
re-establish themselves in the export industries, they would regain their 
old stranglehold on the economy’. Post-independence governments must 
prevent foreign enterprises from reasserting their control, even if there was 
a cost in terms of economic growth.
In the case of Burma, Brown (2013: 205) argued that the extremely strong 
character of Burmese nationalism, including its ‘ferocious rejection of the 
colonial economic structure’ was the result of the Indian domination of 
the colony, as much as of British policies. It can be questioned whether the 
rejection of the colonial economic structure in Burma was stronger than in 
North Vietnam, where the Viet Minh had taken control after the 1954 Geneva 
Accords, or indeed in Indonesia after 1957. But there can be little doubt that 
many in government in both Burma and Indonesia, together with large 
swathes of public opinion, were doubtful about the benef its of continual 
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links with the global economy, and especially with the Western economic 
powers. In the Indonesian case, the moderate pragmatists who supported 
at least some role for foreign investors in the national economy after 1949 
became increasingly marginalized over the 1950s, while those advocating 
more extreme measures gained more popular support (Booth 2016: 40-46).
But whatever their doubts about continued links with the global economy 
after 1950, most Asian governments felt that a more activist and intervention-
ist approach on the part of government was needed, and that this would 
involve medium-term economic planning. Such plans would set targets 
across a range of economic sectors, and then government agencies would 
implement policies designed to achieve these targets. New government 
planning agencies were established in most former colonies and in Thailand. 
But it soon became clear that, while establishing plan targets was relatively 
easy, implementation was far more diff icult. Planning agencies often faced 
diff iculties in getting cooperation from the government departments which 
were responsible for plan execution in sectors such as transport, irrigation, 
agricultural extension, education and health. Sometimes the sectoral agen-
cies had different ideas about projects to be prioritized, but even where they 
agreed with the plan targets, they faced severe shortages of skilled people 
and, crucially, of f inancial resources.
The problem of mobilizing resources for the implementation of develop-
ment projects, whether in infrastructure or in social sectors, including 
education and public health, proved to be diff icult in most of the newly 
independent countries of Asia. The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD, later the World Bank) began to give loans for 
infrastructure projects but the amounts were usually small. By the early 
1960s Indonesia had severed links with both the International Monetary 
Fund and the IBRD, as well as with the United Nations agencies. In spite of 
much rhetoric about socialism, especially in the Guided Democracy years, 
Indonesia struggled to maintain real per capita government revenues and 
expenditures at the level they had reached at the end of the 1930s. By 1958, 
real per capita expenditures were lower than in 1938; in the Philippines they 
were no higher (Table 4.3). They were higher in Burma, but as Brown (2013: 
122-124) pointed out, the increased expenditure was devoted to achieving the 
three key goals of post-independence policy: nationalization, Burmanization 
and industrialization, mainly through the creation of state enterprises. 
These goals were criticized by the American advisers who worked in Burma 
in the 1950s. But most Burmese, even the more critical ones, argued that 
given the complex political and economic diff iculties which the country 
faced, there was no alternative.
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Table 4.3:  Index of real per capita government expenditures in local currencies 
(1953 = 100)
1938 1953 1958
indonesia 130 100 117
Philippines 129 100 130
burma 58 100 104
thailand 52 100 89
note: Price indexes for burma: gdP deflator from Ministry of national Planning (1960); for 
indonesia, 1938-1953: Average retail prices in Jakarta of 30 home-produced and imported 
products, 1953-1958: eCAfe (1964: 240); for thailand: cost of Living index in bangkok and after 
1951 gdP deflator; for the Philippines: cost of Living of lower income groups in Manila.
Sources: indonesia: Creutzberg (1976: table 4), Central bureau of Statistics (1971: 317), population 
data from van der eng (2002); burma: Ministry of national Planning (1960); Philippines: Com-
monwealth of the Philippines (1941: 164) and Central bank of the Philippines (1956, 1960); thailand: 
ingram (1971: 329-330).
A further problem which affected development planning in many parts of 
Southeast Asia in the 1950s was a shortage of reliable statistics (Chander 
1980: 88-89). While most planning agencies were primarily concerned with 
increasing economic growth, they were also under considerable political 
pressure to demonstrate that growth was leading to improved incomes and 
living standards for the indigenous populations. But how were they to do this, 
when they often had only unreliable estimates for even basic indicators such 
as population? In most Southeast Asian colonies, population censuses had 
been conducted in the 1930s, although in some areas the census information 
was incomplete. Statistics were also collected on production, foreign trade and 
prices, which have been used by subsequent scholars to assemble GDP series. 
But the decades from 1940 to 1960 were often not conducive to the orderly 
collection of data. Statistical agencies were reconstituted after independence, 
but they often suffered from lack of both funds and qualified personnel. After 
1945, the Philippines led the way with household surveys and population 
censuses. These were also conducted in other parts of Southeast Asia in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, although the coverage was often incomplete. 
Agricultural and industrial censuses and labour force surveys were also 
initiated. By the early 1970s, the availability of data had improved in most 
parts of the region, although there were still problems of quality. In the next 
chapter, the statistical evidence used for monitoring living standards will 
be examined for six countries: Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Burma, with particular emphasis on the use of household 
survey data for the estimation of poverty and income distribution.
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The International Debate on Growth, Poverty and Distribution
After 1945, new international agencies were established which were man-
dated to promote development planning and assistance. Former colonial 
powers, which had never provided development aid to their colonies before 
they were granted independence, established aid agencies, which often 
concentrated their assistance on the countries which had been their colonial 
possessions. The international agencies were usually not permitted to 
become involved in the internal political processes of the countries they 
were operating in. This was true of the IBRD, and also of the United Nations 
agencies, which were also constrained by a lack of funds, and in some cases 
by internal arguments over what their role should be. The articles of agree-
ment of the IBRD expressly prohibited the organization from engaging in 
political activity. Its lending was almost entirely directed to infrastructure 
projects aimed at improving productivity in agriculture and industry (Konkel 
2014: 281). Although many countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa did 
experience some growth through the 1950s, by the 1960s, doubts began to be 
expressed about the extent to which the benefits of economic growth were 
benefiting the poorest sections of society. The United Nations decided to term 
the 1970s a ‘development decade’ in order to focus global attention on the 
problems of these countries, and their specialist agencies were encouraged 
to promote research on issues relating to the distributive consequences of 
economic growth.
One agency which responded to this challenge was the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), which had been established in 1919 to encourage 
tripartite cooperation between governments, employers and trade unions, 
so that working conditions and terms of employment could be improved 
in various parts of the world. After 1945, the ILO became an agency of the 
United Nations, and in 1969 it established the World Employment Program 
(WEP), with the ambitious goal of encouraging research on poverty eradica-
tion, employment promotion and economic growth (Ghai 1999). Several 
important studies were carried out in Southeast Asia under the auspices 
of the WEP, including a report on the Philippines, written by a team led 
by Professor G. Ranis of Yale University. Research carried out by the WEP 
tried to answer a number of key questions on the links between poverty, 
income distribution and employment. Were poor people usually unemployed, 
conventionally def ined as those without employment but actively seeking 
work? Or were they working long hours, but trapped in low-productivity 
work, in sectors such as agriculture and small-scale manufacturing and 
trade, with no opportunity to move to more productive employment either 
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as wage workers or as self-employed workers? If the poor were mainly in 
the latter category, what policies should governments adopt to encourage 
the generation of more productive employment opportunities across the 
economy in agriculture, industry and services?
The WEP research, while of considerable value to the scholarly com-
munity with an interest in development issues, inevitably had only a limited 
impact on the policies of national governments, either in Southeast Asia or 
elsewhere. The ILO report on the Philippines received considerable publicity 
but the Marcos government displayed little appetite for the kind of policy 
reform that the report advocated. A World Bank country economic report 
on the Philippines published in 1976, which contained extensive analysis 
of agricultural and industrial growth, as well as demographic and labour 
force trends, also had little discernable impact on policy. The problem of 
limited policy impact also affected other research carried out over the 
1970s, including the influential series of studies on trade and development 
carried out by the OECD. These studies stressed the costs of high rates of 
protection in countries such as India, Pakistan and the Philippines. While 
many academics involved in development research became convinced that 
the problem of mass poverty in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America 
could only be tackled through comprehensive reform of f iscal, monetary, 
and trade policies, it was often diff icult, if not impossible, to persuade 
governments that such reform was needed. The IBRD was reluctant to 
attach overt conditions to its lending and anyway it was still a small player; 
one estimate claimed that its total lending f inanced less than 1 per cent of 
all development spending in poor and middle-income countries (Konkel 
2014: 283).
The World Bank stance on poverty-related issues changed over the 1970s, 
after Robert McNamara became president. The watershed is often seen to 
be the speech McNamara gave to the Board of Governors of the World Bank 
(IBRD) in Nairobi in 1973, where he argued that reducing absolute poverty 
should become an important, if not the main, goal of development policy. 
He defined absolute poverty as a condition of life ‘so limited as to prevent 
realization of the potential of the genes with which one is born; a condition 
of life so degrading as to insult human dignity’ (Konkel 2014: 289). The 
World Bank commissioned a study jointly with the Institute of Develop-
ment Studies at the University of Sussex in 1974. Its title, Redistribution with 
Growth, implied that growth alone would not necessarily bring about an 
improvement in the incomes of the bottom two quintiles of the population 
(Chenery et al. 1974). The report argued that greater attention must be paid 
to the problems of employment, poverty and income distribution. Inevitably, 
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this emphasis raised a number of issues relating to the measurement of both 
poverty and income distribution, which influenced subsequent research in 
Southeast Asia as in other parts of the world.
The Redistribution with Growth (RWG) study suggested two approaches 
to the measurement of poverty. The f irst was to use household survey data 
to measure the percentage of the population below poverty lines of $50 per 
capita and $75 per capita per year. The second was to def ine the poor as 
the bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution (Ahluwalia 1974: 10-21). 
Although it was not made clear, the poverty lines expressed in terms of 
dollars were converted into the currencies of the countries in the study using 
market exchange rates. The results for the headcount measures of poverty 
in 1969 showed that the problem was worse in Asia than in either Latin 
America or Africa (Table 4.4). But the Asian data were heavily influenced by 
India and then undivided Pakistan. No estimates for China were available 
and only four Southeast Asian countries were included (Burma, Thailand, 
Philippines and Malaysia). The estimates showed over half the population 
of Burma was below the $50-a-year line, although the estimates were ap-
parently made using only the survey carried out in Rangoon in 1958. The 
estimates also showed that the percentage of the population below the $50 
line was almost 27 per cent in Thailand, more than twice as high as in the 
Philippines or Malaysia.
Table 4.4: Estimates of the population below two poverty lines, 1969
Region/Country % below poverty line Numbers (millions)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Latin America 10.8 17.4 26.6 42.5
Africa 30.9 48.2 370.4 578.2
Asia 36.7 57.2 320.0 499.1
burma 53.6 71.0 14.5 19.2
thailand 26.8 44.3 9.3 15.4
Philippines 13.0 30.0 4.8 11.2
Malaysia 11.0 15.5 1.2 1.6
note: (1): poverty line of uS$50 per year. (2): poverty line of uS$75 per year.
Source: Chenery et al. (1974: table 1.2).
Critics of the new emphasis on poverty and distributional issues pointed to 
the diff iculty of generalization across a large number of countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. As Little (1976: 105) argued, ‘it is very diff icult to 
write with great cogency and relevance about the forces which affect the 
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lot of the poor in so many, and such different countries, and especially so 
when there are so few solid f igures and so little research has been done’. In 
addition to the problems of data, there were disagreements about how the 
poor should be defined. Ahluwalia (1974: 18-19) argued that the poor could be 
def ined as the lowest 40 per cent of the population, distributed by income, 
and this approach was used by several World Bank studies in Indonesia. 
But this method of measuring poverty contrasted with that advocated in 
India, where debates about poverty measurement had begun soon after 
independence. In the early 1960s, a study group established by the govern-
ment recommended a minimum national consumption level of 20 rupees 
per capita per month (1960-1961 prices). Indian economists pointed out that 
that the basis for calculating this f igure was never clarif ied (Dandekar and 
Rath 1971: 8; Rudra 1974: 36). Dandekar and Rath (1971: 9) argued that a more 
satisfactory poverty line should be based on calorie consumption of 2,250 
per capita per day. A poverty line set in terms of calories could incorporate 
differences across regions in prices of basic foods. It could also be adjusted 
upwards to include the cost of non-food needs, including clothing and shelter.
The concept of a poverty line set in terms of calories in fact became widely 
used, both in Asia and elsewhere. But that concept in itself was ambiguous. 
The monetary value of a poverty line suff icient to purchase 2,250 calories 
could vary depending on what foods were selected and what adjustments 
were made to allow for non-food expenditures. Some analysts used linear 
programming techniques to determine ‘least-cost’ diets, but these often did 
not reflect consumer preferences.2 While a national poverty line could be 
set in terms of averages for the whole country, most governments in Asia 
realized that regional variations in both prices and consumption patterns 
meant that different poverty lines would have to be set for different regions. 
It was also assumed the cost of living was higher in urban than in rural 
areas, and urban poverty lines should reflect this. But how much higher 
should urban poverty lines be? What allowance should be made for higher 
housing and transport costs in urban areas? Or for the fact that many people 
bought prepared food from market stalls, whereas in rural areas they were 
able to obtain food from their own holdings, even if these holdings were 
small house gardens?
2 A linear programming exercise carried out in Indonesia using the 1969/70 Household 
Expenditure Survey data (Susenas) found that a least-cost diet, providing adequate calories, 
protein, iron and vitamins, comprised four staples: cassava, f ish, buffalo meat and spinach 
(Beenstock 1980: Table 5.3). But this diet ignored the strong preference for rice among most 
Indonesians.
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Although the RWG report had considerable influence on development 
debates over the 1970s, the idea of a common poverty line, which could be 
used to measure poverty across countries and indeed continents, did not 
immediately catch on. The World Development Report, published in 1980, 
which included a section on poverty and human development, emphasized 
the diff iculties inherent in measuring poverty. This report argued that 
‘absolute poverty means more than low income’. Malnutrition, poor health 
and lack of education were all factors which both caused poverty and made 
it diff icult for people to overcome it. This report also pointed out that there 
was often ‘disagreement about where to draw the line between the poor 
and the rest, and about the correct way to calculate and compare incomes 
and living standards at different times and in different places’ (World Bank 
1980b: 33).
It was these problems, together with changes in personnel after McNamara 
left office, that led to changes in World Bank thinking on development issues, 
and a change of focus in the 1980s. Both the World Bank and important 
bilateral donors turned away from the concerns expressed in the RWG 
volume, and concentrated more on macroeconomic reform and also reform 
of trade and investment policies. ‘Structural adjustment’ policies became 
the order of the day, and most of these paid only cursory attention to the 
impact of these policies on the poorer groups. It was only after agencies such 
as UNICEF began to point out that the impact of structural adjustment on 
the least prosperous groups was often adverse that the global development 
debate changed direction again, and economists once more began to address 
issues relating to poverty. The consequences of this for the countries in 
Southeast Asia will be examined in Chapter 5.
To produce headcount or other measures of poverty, statisticians had 
long realized the need to adjust the poverty lines set in dollars to allow 
for differences in living costs between countries, which are often not fully 
captured in exchange rates. In his pioneering study of national income in 
the years from 1920 to 1939 in Indonesia, Polak (1943: 90-94) had stressed that 
the difference between per capita GDP in Indonesia and the USA narrowed 
once differences in prices were allowed for. But a thoroughgoing attempt to 
estimate the extent of these price differences, and to assess their implications 
for estimates of global GDP, only began in the 1960s, with the establishment 
of the United Nations International Comparison Project (ICP), based at 
the University of Pennsylvania and led by Professor Irving Kravis. This 
project published several reports in the 1970s, which examined price and 
output data for a limited number of countries. The range was increased in 
subsequent studies.
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The early work of the ICP included estimates of gross domestic product 
(GDP) converted using market exchange rates, and ‘international dollars’, 
which were dollars which purported to have the same overall purchasing 
power in the particular country as the American dollar had in the USA. 
Fifteen countries were included in the 1978 report, including two from 
Southeast Asia (Philippines and Malaysia). The results for both countries, 
together with the Republic of Korea, are given in Table 4.5. In all three 
countries the difference between per capita GDP converted using the market 
exchange rate, and per capita GDP in international dollars is considerable. The 
exchange rate deviation index was around three in the Philippines, although 
it was lower in both Malaysia and Korea. The main reason for the disparities 
was the lower prices of non-traded goods and services in Asian countries 
compared with the USA and Europe, which reflected lower wages rates.
Table 4.5:  Estimates of GDP in US$: exchange rate and PPP conversions, 1970 and 
1973
Philippines Republic of Korea Malaysia
1970
Per capita gdP (exchange rate) 185 258 388
Per capita gdP (PPP $) 576 580 915
deviation index 3.11 2.25 2.36
1973
Per capita gdP (X rate) 259 366 633
Per capita gdP (PPP $) 755 904 1,180
deviation index 2.91 2.47 1.86
Percentage breakdown of GDP: 
1973 (Int $)
Consumption 75 68 62
investment 15 20 26
government 10 11 11
Total 100 100 100
Source: Kravis, heston and Summers (1978: tables 1.2, 1.6).
Southeast Asia: An International Perspective in the 1950s and 
1960s
The poverty estimates given in Table 4.4 indicate that, in spite of their best 
intentions, the governments in Asia which became independent in the two 
decades after 1946 struggled to deliver the improvements in income and 
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living standards which their populations had been promised. Although 
there was some growth in per capita GDP in all countries in the years 
from 1950 to 1965, only in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines were 
estimates high by Asian and African standards in 1965 (Table 4.6). Thailand 
had experienced some growth, from a low base in 1950, but by 1965 per 
capita GDP was still lower than in several North and West African states 
(Algeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Ghana). Indonesia had about the same 
per capita GDP as Nigeria, while Vietnam, then divided, was only slightly 
higher than India. Cambodia, Laos and Burma were all lower than India. 
The estimates of poverty prepared by World Bank economists showed that 
the headcount measure of poverty in Thailand was only slightly lower than 
the African average (Table 4.4). With rapidly growing populations, all the 
countries in Southeast Asia struggled to provide the improved education, 
healthcare and housing that their populations had expected as a result of 
independence.
Table 4.6:  Per capita GDP: Southeast Asia and international comparisons, 1950 
1965, 1980 and 1996 (1990 international GK$)
Southeast Asia 1950 1965 1980 1996
Singapore 2,219 2,667 9,058 19,160
Malaysia 1,559 1,804 3,657 7,608
thailand 817 1,308 2,554 6,820
indonesia 817 990 1,898 3,576
Philippines 1,070 1,633 2,376 2,267
vietnam 658 877 757 1,490
Laos 613 712 876 1,077
Cambodia 482 687 828 1,056
burma 396 617 828 1,005
Other Asia
taiwan 916 1,810 5,260 14,050
South Korea 854 1,436 4,114 12,860
China 448 702 1,061 2,892
india 619 771 938 1,635
Africa
Algeria 1,365 1,870 3,152 2,702
ivory Coast 1,041 1,581 2,041 1,378
nigeria 753 944 1,305 1,028
Senegal 1,259 1,511 1,268 1,212
ghana 1,122 1,393 1,157 1,207
Source: Maddison Project database, 2013; for more details on estimation, see bolt and van Zanden 
(2014).
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In the latter part of the 1960s, Southeast Asia had become an arena of great 
power conflict; some saw the war in Vietnam as a proxy war between the 
USA and the USSR. Not only was the war causing serious problems for a 
divided Vietnam but it was threatening to spill over into neighbouring 
countries, including Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. It was far from clear 
that the political systems in these countries could deal with external threats 
while at the same time delivering higher living standards to their own 
populations. Even in those countries with relatively high GDP and less 
immediate threat from the war in Vietnam (Singapore, Malaysia and the 
Philippines), and where poverty was lower than the Asian average, there 
were doubts about the ability of governments to deliver sustained economic 
growth, and improved living standards for their populations.
But these doubts did at least mean that the non-Communist governments 
across the region were encouraged to take the measurement of poverty and 
inequality more seriously, both by international agencies and also by various 
pressure groups in their own countries. They had to demonstrate that the 
economic growth to which they were committed as a policy goal would lead 
to improved living conditions for all their people, in both urban and rural 
areas. The next chapter reviews the measurement initiatives which were 
adopted in six countries. With its favourable legacy from the colonial era, 
the Philippines was the leader, followed by Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Myanmar (Burma).
5 Estimating Poverty and Inequality : 
Country Estimates from the 1950s to 
the 1970s
Estimates from the Philippines, 1965 to 1975
In the 1950s the Philippines, with its relatively favourable legacy from the 
American period, was widely considered to have the best economic prospects 
of any country in Asia. Self-government had been granted in 1935, after 
which Filipinos occupied almost all the key posts in the civil service, and 
were prominent in business and the professions as well. In spite of the 
devastation of the war, the American government honoured promises to 
confer full independence in 1946. Together with the British territories which 
became the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the Philippines was considered 
to have the best capacity for implementing and analysing household surveys 
(Chander 1980: 90). In the decades from the 1950s to the 1970s, the Philippines 
led the way in the analysis of poverty and income distribution in Southeast 
Asia, mainly because of its more abundant statistical data, together with a 
well-staffed research system. A number of studies were carried out, some 
by government statisticians, and some by university-based researchers, 
especially faculty members of the University of the Philippines School of 
Economics. A survey of research on the distribution of income and wealth in 
the Philippines compiled in the late 1970s ran to almost 140 pages (Mangahas 
and Barros 1979).1
The main statistical source was the Family Income and Expenditure 
Surveys (FIES) carried out by the Bureau of the Census and Statistics from 
the mid-1950s onwards.2 The results of these surveys were analysed by 
government statisticians and articles were published in the Journal of 
Philippine Statistics3 The analysis revealed some growth in average real 
household incomes in the years from 1957 to 1965, but also a very skewed 
1 Another survey of the literature on the Philippines is given in Alburo and Roberto (1980).
2 Chander (1980) gives details on the history and design of these surveys, including the 
sampling frame used.
3 The Journal of Philippine Statistics commenced publication around 1950, and was published 
by the Bureau of the Census and Statistics, now the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). In 
recent years it has been published quarterly. It contains statistical series and special articles 
written by employees of the government statistical agency, which are not signed.
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distribution of household income. The ratio of the income share of the top 
10 per cent to the poorest 40 per cent of the distribution was over three in 
1956/57 and increased over the next decade (Table 5.1). The FIES data were 
also used in several academic studies including Abrera (1976), Berry (1978), 
Tan and Holazo (1979), Mangahas (1979, 1982), and Boyce (1993). They were 
also used in a book-length study on social indicators in the Philippines 
(Mangahas 1976). In addition, the National Economic and Development 
Authority published a series of studies on national income accounts and 
food balance sheets, as well a series on demographic data.4 Several scholars 
also computed real wage series.
Table 5.1:  Share of total family income received by quintile groups, and top 10 
and 5 Per Cent: Philippines, 1956/57, 1961 and 1965
1956/57 1961 1965
Quintile Groups:
Lowest 20% 4.5 4.2 3.5
Second 20% 8.1 7.9 8.0
third 20% 12.4 12.1 12.8
fourth 20% 19.8 19.3 20.2
top 20% 55.1 56.4 55.4
top 10% 39.4 41.0 40.0
top 5% 27.7 29.0 28.7
Palma ratio* 3.1 3.4 3.5
* top 10 per cent as a ratio of the bottom 40 per cent.
Source: Journal of Philippine Statistics, vol 19 (2), 1968, table 4. 
These studies produced conflicting evidence, and led to a debate on the 
impact which the growth in per capita GDP between 1950 and 1975 had 
had on the lower income groups. Between 1950 and 1975, real per capita 
GNP in the Philippines doubled (NEDA 1978: 10). What was the impact on 
living standards of different groups in both urban and rural areas? The 
paper by Tan and Holazo (1979) was a pioneering attempt to tackle this 
question. These authors identif ied a basket of basic needs which met what 
they considered to be a minimum subsistence standard, including nutritional 
standards, shelter, health and educational requirements (Tan and Holazo 
1979: 467-468). The poverty line was estimated for a household of six (mother, 
father and four children), using price data for ten regions of the country. A 
4 A series on national income from 1946 to 1975 were published in NEDA (1978). Food balance 
sheets were published in NEDA (1975).
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linear programming model was then used to f ind the least-cost basket of 
food that met the nutritional needs recommended by an official committee. 
Two poverty lines were estimated, one based on food requirements and the 
other including not just food, but also shelter, fuel, clothing, medical care and 
education. These poverty lines were then applied to the FIES data for 1965, 
1971 and 1975 to give estimates of the percentage of the population below 
the poverty line. The results showed considerable variation across regions 
and some increase in the headcount measure of poverty, especially between 
1971 and 1975. Using the full poverty line, they found that the percentage 
of families below the poverty line increased from 41 per cent in 1965 to 44 
per cent in 1971 and 51.5 per cent in 1975 (Tan and Holazo 1979: 473-474).
Tan and Holazo qualif ied their f indings in several respects. They pointed 
out that ideally the estimates should be prepared for urban and rural areas 
separately. Prices for food were usually lower in rural areas while prices 
for non-food items might be higher. But in the absence of rural price data 
they could not prepare separate estimates. They also tried to adjust their 
estimates for family size, making reasonable but arbitrary assumptions 
about marginal increments in consumption as family size increases. These 
adjustments led to some fall in the poverty incidence estimates for 1965 
and 1971. They also argued that, given the strong tendency for households 
in the lower income deciles to dis-save, poverty incidence might better 
be estimated from the expenditure data rather than the income data.5 
Poverty incidence based on household expenditures was found to be much 
lower than that estimated from the income data in both 1965 and 1971 in 
all regions and for the country as a whole. But they stressed that all their 
estimates showed an upward trend in poverty incidence between 1965 and 
1975, a decade in which per capita GNP increased by thirty per cent. They 
did not present any detailed explanation for this, but pointed out that both 
f iscal and monetary policies might have been regressive over this period.6
Other studies including that by Abrera (1976: 245) found that there was 
an increase in the proportion of the population below a stipulated poverty 
threshold between 1961 and 1971, with a sharp increase between 1965 and 
1971. These f indings were supported by the drop in the share of the lowest 20 
per cent of households in total incomes between 1961 and 1971 (Berry 1978: 
5 An earlier study by Abrera (1976: 228) also argued that poverty estimates based on expenditure 
data would be more satisfactory but pointed out that income data were more readily available.
6 Tan (1975) carried out a study of the incidence of taxes and expenditure in the Philippines 
in the early 1970s. She found that the regressive impact of the tax system was just offset by the 
slight progressive impact of government expenditures.
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316). Berry also drew attention to the evidence of declining agricultural 
wages between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, a decline which was 
confirmed by Boyce (1993: Table 2.7). This decline might seem surprising 
given that agricultural output was increasing, in part as a result of increased 
yields for rice and corn. The government did increase the legislated wage 
rates for non-plantation workers in agriculture between 1974 and 1980, 
but it was widely believed that compliance with this legislation was low 
(Bautista 1994: 100).
Bautista (1994: 99-100) argued that by 1965 around 20 per cent of all 
rural households in the Philippines were landless, in the sense that their 
incomes were derived mainly from wage labour in agriculture. By 1975, the 
labour force survey of that year showed that around 15 per cent of male 
agricultural workers were classed as employees, and a further 19 per cent 
as family workers (Table 5.2). Bautista suggested that they probably did not 
benefit much from the accelerated growth in agricultural output, especially 
as it was accompanied by increased use of labour-displacing machinery on 
larger farms. He also pointed out that the distribution of income gains from 
agricultural growth was influenced by the distribution of landholdings, which 
in the 1970s was very different from that in Taiwan (Booth 2002b: Table 2). 
Around one-third of all land was in holdings over ten hectares in 1971; much 
of this land was rented out in small holdings to farmers who owned little or 
no land. It was argued that many tenants had to pay over half of their output 
to the landowner and were frequently forced into debt (Berreman 1956: 27).
The studies of Tan and Holazo and others using the FIES data were not 
without their critics. While concurring that poverty in the Philippines 
probably did worsen through the 1960s, and remained high in 1975, Mangahas 
(1979) raised several problems. He pointed out that the linear programming 
approach used by Tan and Holazo resulted in a consumption basket that 
contained no rice, and was weighted towards other foods which, while 
affording the basic number of calories, might not reflect the known prefer-
ences of most consumers. In another paper he raised the problem of the 
divergence between the FIES data on household consumption and those 
from the national accounts. In the surveys carried out in 1961, 1965 and 1971 
the FIES income coverage amounted to between 60 and 67 per cent of the 
national accounts data (Estudillo 1997: Table 2) but in 1975 it fell to about 
half (Mangahas 1982: 133-134). Mangahas argued that the undercoverage 
revealed in the 1975 survey meant that the data should not be used to esti-
mate inequality indicators, including decile shares and the Gini coeff icient.
Setting aside the problems with the 1975 FIES, the poverty estimates 
for the Philippines over the 1960s do present puzzles. This was a decade 
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when per capita GDP in the Philippines grew by around 25 per cent, and 
there were also improvements in per capita calorie and protein consump-
tion, and in infant mortality rates (Table 5.3). There appeared to have 
been little change in total inequality between 1956 and 1971, at least as 
measured by the Gini coeff icient, although the ratio of income received 
by the top quintile to the bottom quintile did increase between 1961 and 
1971. The poverty estimates presented by Abrera showed a marked increase, 
especially from 1965 to 1971. Those presented by Tan and Holazo, using 
expenditure data from the FIES, also show some increase between 1965 
and 1971, although not as large as the Abrera estimates. The evidence of 
declining real wages in the agricultural sector supported the argument 
that poverty increased, but the wage data were not easy to reconcile with 
improved calorie and protein intake. The ILO report, published in 1974, 
which drew on the work of many of the researchers cited above, did f ind 
evidence of increasing inequality in rural areas, as shown in an increase 
between 1956 and 1971 in both the index of quintile inequality and the 
Gini coeff icient.7
7 Boyce (1993: Table 2.12) estimated the ratios of the top 10 per cent of the real income distribu-
tion to the bottom 30 per cent for 1961 and 1971, using three different approaches. He found that 
that in each of the three approaches, the ratio in rural areas increased between 1961 and 1971.
Table 5.2:  Labour force indicators in Thailand (1971), the Philippines (1975) and 
Indonesia (1980)
ALF/ TLF Wage/ ALF Family/ ALF Wage/ TLF
Thailand 1971
Male 75.5 4.8 42.0 20.1
female 83.5 3.4 91.9 10.5
total 79.3 4.1 64.4 15.6
Philippines 1975
Male 63.3 14.8 18.8 37.3
female 34.4 15.0 30.2 45.9
total 53.5 14.8 22.7 40.2
Indonesia 1980
Male 57.0 15.9 18.2 30.6
female 53.8 17.2 41.5 23.3
total 55.9 16.4 25.5 28.2
note: ALf = agricultural labour force; tLf = total labour force; Wage/ALf = percentage of the ALf 
working as wage labourers; family/ALf = percentage of the ALf from within the family.
Sources: thailand: national Statistical office (1976: 79-80); Philippines: national Census and Statisti-
cal office (1976: tables 1 and 17); indonesia: Central bureau of Statistics (1983: 175-177, 247-249).
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Table 5.3:  Per capita GDP, infant mortality rates, food availability and poverty 
estimates: Philippines, 1961-1971
1961 1965 1971
Per capita gdP (1990 int gK$) 1,512 1,633 1,808
infant mortality rates 73.0 65.5 63.7
daily food intake per capita:
Calories 1,846 2,047 2,092
Protein 44.9 50.1 54.0
gini Coefficient 0.50 0.51 0.49
top 20%/bottom 20% 11.6 13.7 13.5
Poverty (headcount: 1) 51.2 48.3 56.9
Poverty (headcount: 2) n/a 25.0 25.9
Wages (1965 pesos) 3.49 2.93 2.25
Sources: Per capita gdP (1990 international gK$): bolt and van Zanden (2014); infant mortality 
rates: Zablan (1978: 105), data refer to averages for 1958-1962, 1963-1967, and 1968-1972; daily 
food take: nedA (1975), gini and quintile shares: estudillo (1997: table 1); poverty headcount (1): 
Abrera (1976: 245); poverty headcount (2): tan and holazo (1979: table 18), using expenditure data; 
wages: berry (1978: 325); figures refer to a series compiled by the iLo, using data from the bureau 
of Agricultural economics.
Some researchers claimed that output growth, and especially growth in the 
agricultural sector, did not lead to poverty decline in the 1960s and 1970s 
because most of the income gains in the rural sector accrued to the already 
better off part of the rural population (Bautista 1990: 63; Bautista 1994: 
99-107). Bautista argued that the larger farmers operating ten hectares or 
more benefited from the improvement in the agricultural terms of trade, and 
that the ‘effect on the structure and growth of rural consumption demand 
was to favour capital-intensive products and imported goods rather than 
labour-intensive, locally produced goods’ (Bautista 1990: 63). This pattern 
of demand reinforced the anti-employment bias of import-substituting 
industrial development which favoured large f irms concentrated in the 
Metro Manila region. There was agreement among many researchers that 
the problems in rural areas in many parts of the Philippines were made 
worse by the high degree of protection afforded the manufacturing sector 
from the 1950s onwards, which had resulted in slow growth of both output 
and employment opportunities, and a failure to take advantage of the 
opportunities of growing world demand for labour-intensive manufactures. 
It was clear that the Philippines was not following the Taiwan model of a 
successful land reform followed by policies which encouraged the growth of 
small- and medium-scale industry producing for both local and international 
markets.
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An International Labour Organization (ILO) report concurred with this 
analysis. It argued that ‘the particular growth path chosen in the past has 
tended to be adverse to the interests of the average worker, and still more so 
to that of the below-average worker’ (ILO 1974: 13). The report recommended 
that a two-pronged strategy be adopted in the Philippines, which would 
involve agrarian reform on the one hand, and a labour-intensive industrial 
export drive on the other. The Marcos administration did implement a land 
reform programme in the 1970s; its impact will be examined in greater 
detail in Chapter 8. The main focus was on tenancy reform, which did 
enable rice and corn farmers in some parts of the country to purchase the 
land they were cultivating, but large farms cultivating other crops were 
for the most part untouched. Little was done to promote the development 
of labour-intensive industries. In addition, population growth remained 
high in the Philippines in comparison with Taiwan and Southeast Asian 
neighbours, including Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, which had begun 
to sponsor family planning programmes in the 1960s and 1970s.
The relative abundance of data on income and expenditure distribution for 
the Philippines meant that the country was included in several cross-country 
comparisons of income distribution. A study prepared under the auspices of 
the World Employment Programme included the Philippines with a number of 
countries from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America for which comparable 
estimates of income per household could be generated for years ranging from 
1967/68 to 1979 (Van Ginneken and Park 1984). The results indicated that the 
Philippines had a rather skewed distribution of income, although the Gini 
coeff icients and Palma ratios were not as high as for Mexico, Iran, Panama, 
which had higher per capita GDP than the Philippines, or for Zambia and 
Kenya, which had lower per capita GDP (Table 5.4). These results throw 
some doubt on the widely held view that the distribution of income in the 
Philippines was by the 1970s similar to that found in parts of Latin America.
Estimates from Malaysia, 1957 to 1980
Along with the Philippines, Malaysia was considered by the 1970s to 
have reasonably good household survey data. It was the only Southeast 
Asian country selected by Visaria (1980) for detailed examination in his 
comparative study of poverty and living standards in Asia.8 But in the 
8 The other countries were India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Taiwan. The Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand were initially selected but their surveys were not analysed in depth.
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Philippines most of the work on income distribution and poverty was done 
by university-based academics and published either in academic journals 
or in publications sponsored by international organizations. In Malaysia, 
early estimates were made by both Malaysian and foreign scholars, but after 
1970 the government also began to publish ‘off icial’ estimates of poverty in 
planning documents. In one of the early analyses of the f ive surveys carried 
out between 1957/58 and 1970, Snodgrass (1975b: 254) argued that none could 
be accepted as wholly accurate. He used three of them to estimate trends 
in poverty and distribution between 1957/58 (when the f irst household 
budget survey was carried out) and 1970 (when a post-enumeration survey 
was attached to the population census of that year).
In spite of the problematic data base, Snodgrass argued that the trend 
was towards increasing inequality in the distribution of personal income, 
both within ethnic groups and for the population as a whole. In 1970, the 
median income for ethnic Malays was well below that for the Indian and 
Chinese populations, but the Gini coeff icient for the three groups was 
broadly similar. The lower average income meant that the proportion of 
Malay households with incomes of less than RM120 per month was much 
higher than for Indian or Chinese households (49 per cent in 1970 for Malay 
households, 20 per cent for Indian households and 14 per cent for Chinese 
households). These proportions had not changed much between 1957/58 and 
1970, but as the population was growing quite rapidly, the absolute numbers 
below this line had increased (Snodgrass 1975b: 261-264).
As in the Philippines, increasing absolute numbers of households below 
the poverty line in Malaysia had occurred in spite of growing per capita 
GDP. Between 1960 and 1975, GDP growth was faster in Malaysia than 
Table 5.4:  Per capita GDP, Palma ratio and Gini coefficient: Philippines and 
selected countries, c. 1970
Per capita GDP (1970) Palma ratio Gini coefficient
Mexico 6,214 5.1 0.56
iran 6,173 3.7 0.52
Panama 4,504 6.1 0.57
Philippines 2,196 2.8 0.46
egypt 2,137 2.0 0.40
Sierra Leone 2,154 2.5 0.44
Zambia 2,031 4.3 0.56
Kenya 1,701 5.1 0.59
Sources: gdP data: bolt et al. (2018), 2011 prices; decile shares and gini coefficient: van ginneken 
and Park (1984: table 1). 
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in the Philippines. But the growth did not appear to have reduced the 
incidence of poverty. Snodgrass argued that the distributive pattern was 
somewhat improved by f iscal policy (taxes and expenditures). Anand (1983: 
273) in his analysis of the 1970 post-enumeration survey cast doubt on the 
comparability of this survey with earlier surveys, and disputed the claim 
that inequality had worsened between 1957 and 1970. He found that in 1970 
the Gini coeff icient for all racial groups was 0.51; the Gini estimates for each 
ethnic group separately were slightly lower but still in the region of 0.47 to 
0.49 (Anand 1983: Table 6-5). Using a poverty line of 25 Malaysian ringgit 
per capita per month, he found that 40 per cent of the total population of 
Peninsular Malaysia was under this line. The difference in poverty between 
ethnic groups was large; 56.2 per cent for Malays, 33.4 per cent for Indians 
and 18.3 per cent for Chinese (Anand 1983: Table 4-2).
These f igures confirmed the widespread perception, especially among 
Malays, that they were not benefiting from the economic growth which had 
occurred since the granting of self-government in 1957. They suggested that 
rural Malays were falling behind urban dwellers, the majority of whom were 
not Malay. The Malays were behind not just in terms of income but also 
education, which was the passport to white collar occupations in both the 
public and private sectors. Violent race riots, which erupted after disputed 
election results in 1969, led to the adoption of the New Economic Policy in 
1970. This was an ambitious aff irmative action policy, designed to increase 
Malay incomes and assets relative to those of other ethnic groups, and 
bring more Malays into non-agricultural employment. The NEP led to the 
publication of detailed estimates of poverty and distribution in off icial 
documents. Estimates published in the Fourth Malaysia Plan claimed that 
in 1970, 49.3 per cent of the total population was below the poverty line. In 
the agricultural sector, which was dominated by Malays, the f igure was 68 
per cent (Jomo 1990: Table 7.1). These proportions fell only slightly between 
1970 and 1975, and the numbers of poor increased.
The data published in the plan documents attracted criticism from inde-
pendent scholars who pointed out that the surveys on which the estimates 
were based were only available to government analysts. There was no way 
that outsiders could verify the f igures. Shari (1979: 421) claimed that the 
official data did not even specify the poverty line used, although independent 
researchers deduced that it was RM33 per household member per month 
which was a higher f igure than that used by Snodgrass or Anand.9 The 
9 It appears that the poverty lines were only made public in the mid-term review of the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan. See Government of Malaysia (1989: 45).
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Economic Planning Unit, attached to the Off ice of the Prime Minister, did 
f inally disclose the methodology for estimating the poverty line; it was based 
on a minimum cost food basket plus expenditures deemed to be suff icient 
for other essential non-food items. Shari’s own estimate of the poverty line, 
applied to 1973 data, gave a poverty estimate of 49.7 per cent, almost the 
same as the off icial estimate given for 1970. Broken down by ethnicity, the 
percentage of the population below this poverty line was 68.5 per cent for 
Malays, 29.7 per cent for Chinese and almost 40 per cent for Indians. Shari’s 
estimate of the incidence of poverty among households earning most of 
their income from agriculture was 67.5 per cent, which was little different 
from the f igure given in the off icial publications (Shari 1979: 428).
Estimates published in the Fourth Malaysia Plan document showed 
that the proportion of the population below the poverty line fell sharply 
between 1975 and 1980, from 43.9 per cent to 29.2 per cent of the popula-
tion. In spite of population growth, a fall of this magnitude was suff icient 
to reduce the absolute numbers below the poverty line from 835,000 to 
666,100 (Jomo 1990: Table 7.1). Almost 80 per cent of the fall in numbers 
below the poverty line took place in the agricultural sector. While this was 
at least partly due to government rural development policies, including 
an ambitious land settlement programme aimed mainly at rural Malays 
with little land, and to increasing output per hectare on rice and rubber 
farms, higher prices for export crops such as rubber also helped. Rubber 
prices more than doubled over the 1970s which probably explained much 
of the fall in poverty among rubber cultivators between 1970 and 1980 
(Shari and Ragayah 1990: 121).
It seemed clear that the fall in poverty over the 1970s was not the result of 
declining inequality in the distribution of income. Lim (1975: 184) estimated 
that the Gini coeff icient of household income had increased from 0.42 to 0.5 
between 1957/58 and 1970. Shari and Ragayah (1990: Table 1) gave estimates 
of the Gini of household income for 1970, 1976 and 1979. There was some 
increase between 1970 and 1976, especially in rural areas, and only a slight 
fall between 1976 and 1978. In 1979 they estimated the Gini to be 0.49, 
compared with 0.5 in 1970. The share of income accruing to the top 20 per 
cent of households did fall between 1976 and 1979 (from 58 to 54 per cent) but 
the share accruing to the poorest 20 per cent also contracted slightly. Only 
in the 1980s did the share of the bottom 20 per cent show some increase. 
This was true for the Malay population as well as the total population.
Since 1970, it has been diff icult for independent scholars, whether 
based in Malaysia or abroad, to access the household survey data on which 
the estimates of poverty and distribution published in the off icial plan 
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documents are based. It is therefore diff icult to assess the reliability of 
the survey results. Visaria (1980: 17) found that per capita expenditure, as 
reported in the household expenditure survey of 1973 was only about 15 
per cent smaller than the component in the national accounts. This might 
suggest that the surveys at that time were quite accurate. In subsequent 
chapters, more recent evidence on, and criticisms of, the Malaysian f igures 
will be evaluated.
Estimates from Singapore, 1953/54 to 1997/98
From the 1950s onwards, Singapore was a very different economy from 
most other parts of Southeast Asia. Until 1942, it was the dominant part 
of the British colony known as the Straits Settlements, along with Melaka 
and Penang. After the end of the Pacif ic War it became a separate colonial 
territory. Compared to other parts of Southeast Asia it was highly urbanized 
with only a small agricultural sector. It had by far the largest port in the 
region, and its entrepôt function embraced not just the other parts of British 
Malaya but also Sumatra and the Indonesian territories on the huge island 
of Borneo, which historically had looked to Singapore as the main market 
for their commodities, especially rubber. In addition, Singapore was an 
important banking centre and a naval base. In the 1950s, the population was 
growing rapidly as a result of both in-migration and high rates of natural 
increase. Housing had already been a serious problem before 1942, and the 
problem became worse after 1945, with increases in population leading to 
massive overcrowding in some parts of the city.
The report on the Social Survey of Singapore carried out in 1953/54 found 
that 20 per cent of households were living in acutely overcrowded conditions 
compared with 21 per cent in 1947. Acutely overcrowded was defined as two 
adults and four children, at least one over ten years, living in one room (Goh 
1956: 73). A further 28 per cent lived under conditions of overcrowding, and 
only 15 per cent were deemed to be living in spacious conditions. Off icial 
documents also admitted that a large part of the population, not just the 
poorest, lived in very crowded conditions (Colonial Off ice 1955: 47). Using a 
poverty line which included the costs of food, clothing and housing but not 
education, 21 per cent of all households were estimated to be poor, and 29 
per cent of households consisting of a man, wife and children (Goh 1956: 141). 
About a quarter of all people in the households surveyed were considered 
poor. It was hardly surprising that, when the author of the 1953/54 report 
became deputy prime minister of the independent Republic of Singapore, 
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a national family planning programme was launched, together with an 
ambitious public housing project.
In 1966, after Singapore had become an independent state, the Ministry of 
National Development together with the Economic Research Centre at the 
University of Singapore carried out a further sample survey of households (Rao 
and Ramakrishnan 1976: 97). Analysis of the results produced a Gini coefficient 
of around 0.5.10 Further surveys were carried out in 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975, 
although these were not primarily household income surveys, and there were 
issues of data comparability. Rao and Ramakrishnan thought that the 1966 and 
1975 data could be compared; between these years the Gini dropped slightly. 
They argued that the decline was mainly the result of the decline in rates of 
unemployment together with an increase in female labour force participation 
rates. They also pointed out that the decline in real income inequality was 
higher when post-tax real income distributions were adjusted for the imputed 
benefits from public housing (Rao and Ramakrishnan 1976: 121).
In a subsequent paper, Rao (1990: 147) found a slight decline in the Gini 
coeffcient between 1972/73 and 1977/78, and an increase in the share of 
the bottom four deciles in total income (from 15.8 to 17.7 per cent). But Rao 
stressed the problem of undercoverage in the income data he used, relative to 
the national income f igures on private consumption expenditures. A rather 
different approach to the estimation of income disparities in Singapore was 
that taken by Atkinson (2010). Using income tax data, he calculated the share 
of the top 1 per cent in the distribution from 1947 through to 2005, and the 
share of the top 5 and 10 per cent from 1969 onwards. His results showed that 
in 1947, the share of the top 1 per cent was almost 11 per cent, and increased 
to 14.8 per cent in 1951, but by 1960 had fallen back to where it had been in 
1947. From then on, the share of the top 1 per cent was quite stable until the 
Asian crisis of 1998. Following Rao (1990: 155-156), Atkinson suggested that 
the extreme openness of the Singapore economy together with the proactive 
wage policy followed by government led to a fairly stable distribution of 
income over three decades when per capita GDP was growing fast.
Estimates from Thailand, 1962/63 to 1981
The f irst household survey of Thailand was held in 1962/63 and a further 
one in 1968/69. As in the Philippines, the analysis of these surveys, and 
10 Rao and Ramakrishnan (1976: 121) estimated a higher Gini (0.527) using a generalized Pareto 
model.
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subsequent ones, was carried out by academics, often with support from 
the International Labour Organization and the World Bank. The 1968/69 
survey confirmed the widespread belief that regional variations in household 
incomes per capita were large; average household per capita incomes in 
Bangkok were well over three times those in the northeast which was the 
poorest part of the country. In order to estimate poverty, Meesook (1975: 
349-353) used a cut-off of 1,000 baht ($50 at the prevailing exchange rate) 
as an annual poverty line and found that, in 1968/69, 24 per cent of all 
households had incomes below this threshold. Almost 53 per cent of all poor 
households were in the northeast and a further 30 per cent in the north. 
Meesook also found that the incidence of poverty increased directly with 
household size, and with numbers of children under f ifteen. Poverty was 
much lower in households where the head had at least some secondary 
education (Meesook 1975: 354).
Meesook stressed the importance of including income in kind in estimates 
of poverty. Income in kind was a much higher proportion of total income 
in the lowest income groups, especially in rural areas. On average it ac-
counted for 22 per cent of total income in rural areas and 4 per cent in towns. 
Excluding income in kind led to a substantial increase in the incidence of 
poverty (41 per cent compared with 24 per cent). But it did not make much 
difference to the extreme concentration of poor households in the north 
and northeast of the country. The 1962/63 household survey did not collect 
data on income in kind, which limited the extent to which comparisons 
could be made with the 1968/69 survey.11 Based on money incomes alone, 
the incidence of poverty did decline between the two surveys from 61 per 
cent of all households to 41 per cent. Meesook (1975: 371) also found that 
average money incomes had grown rapidly in the north and northeast of 
the country between the two surveys, but much of the growth occurred in 
households which were already above the poverty threshold in 1962/63. In 
spite of slower income growth in the south of the country, the incidence of 
poverty fell rather more there than in the northern regions.
A further analysis of the 1968/69 data was carried out by Krongkaew 
(1979) using a rather different poverty line from Meesook. He introduced the 
concept of the poverty band, based on upper and lower limits of the poverty 
threshold, which were estimated using consumer expenditure patterns. 
Using the lower limit income threshold, he found that 52 per cent of rural 
families and 11.2 per cent of urban families could be categorized as poor in 
11 For these and other reasons Visaria (1980: 153) excluded the Thai data from his detailed 
examination of poverty and living standards in Asia.
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1968/69. In total, 46.8 per cent of all households fell below the threshold. He 
also found that there were considerable regional differences; 75 per cent of 
rural households in the northeast fell below the threshold compared with 
only 7.3 per cent of the population in urban Bangkok. Another household 
survey was carried out in 1975/76; an analysis by Meesook (1979: 52-55) found 
that between 1968/69 and 1975/76 the headcount measure fell from 39 to 
31 per cent. The fall was especially pronounced in the northeast (from 65 
per cent to 44 per cent). But in spite of this decline, 50 per cent of the poor 
population was still located in the northeast in 1975/76, and a further 23 
per cent in the north of the country.
Various other estimates of the headcount measure over the 1970s are avail-
able from other sources. Warr (2009: Table 9) showed a steep decline from 
1962 to 1975, but his estimate in 1962 of 88.3 per cent of the total population 
below the poverty line (96.4 per cent in rural areas) was much higher than 
that estimated by Meesook. One has to assume that a different poverty line 
was used. It also appears that income in kind was excluded from Warr’s 
poverty estimates for the 1960s, which probably overstated these estimates 
in relation to the later estimates. Another series on the headcount measure 
of poverty for the years from 1962/63 to 1981 was given in Krongkaew and 
Kakwani (2003: 742-744). They also found a consistent decline, from 57 
per cent in 1962/63 to 31.3 per cent in 1981. They acknowledged that the 
estimates might not be strictly comparable, but claimed that the decline 
was not in doubt. Krongkaew and Kakwani also gave estimates of the Gini 
coeff icient from 1962/63 to 1975/76; they found an increase from 0.56 to 
0.605. They also found a further increase in the Gini coeff icient between 
1975/76 and 1981. As in Malaysia, it appears that the decline in poverty over 
the two decades from the early 1960s to the early 1980s took place in spite 
of an increase in inequality.
A comparative study of income distribution across countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America using data from the 1970s found that the Gini coef-
f icients in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand were roughly similar 
(Lecaillon et al. 1984: Table 6). Using data on household income, the study 
reported estimates of 0.52 for Malaysia, 0.49 for the Philippines and 0.50 for 
Thailand. These estimates were lower than for most, although not all, of the 
Latin American and African countries in the study, although among the 
Asian countries they were on the high side. Hong Kong, India, Sri Lanka and 
the Republic of Korea all had lower estimates. The study supported the view 
that these three Southeast Asian countries were not especially egalitarian 
around 1970, although the distribution of income was less skewed than in 
some African countries (Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Kenya). It 
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was also less skewed than in Brazil, Mexico, Honduras and Peru. This study 
also cast doubt on the assertion that income distribution in the Philippines 
was more unequal than in other parts of Southeast Asia, and similar to 
countries in Latin America such as Brazil and Mexico.
Estimates from Indonesia, 1963/64 to 1980
Apart from a small number of village-level studies, few studies were car-
ried out on poverty in Indonesia until the 1970s, although many observers 
suspected that, given Indonesia’s low per capita GDP, the problem must be 
worse there than in the Philippines, Thailand or Malaysia.12 Compared with 
these three countries, the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics was slower 
to implement nation-wide household income and expenditure surveys. The 
National Socio-economic Survey, usually known by its Indonesian acronym 
Susenas, was f irst carried out in 1963/64 but only in Java. A further survey 
in 1964/65 covered most, but not all provinces outside Java, while the one 
carried out in 1967 again only covered Java. The Susenas surveys carried 
out in 1969/79, 1976, 1978 and 1980 covered most of the country although 
Maluku and Irian Jaya were excluded in 1969/70 and Irian Jaya in 1976. In 
subsequent surveys, rural areas of both Irian Jaya and East Timor were 
excluded; indeed, the f irst truly national Susenas was not carried out until 
1987. The samples were not large enough to permit a breakdown by province 
until the early 1990s; until then data were only published for Java and the 
rest of the country.
An early analysis of the Susenas data for Java between 1963/64 and 1969/70 
was carried out by King and Weldon (1977). They found little change in 
expenditure distribution over these years in rural Java, but evidence of 
growing disparities in urban areas, and especially in Jakarta. They did 
not attempt to estimate the changing percentage of the population below 
a stipulated poverty line, although they noted the estimates made by 
Sajogyo for 1969/70, which are discussed below. Their estimates of weekly 
rice consumption by quintile group in both rural and urban areas showed 
a considerable increase in rural areas, especially between 1964/65 and 1967 
for the poorest 20 per cent. There was little change for the bottom quintile 
in urban areas. Real per capita food expenditures increased for the top 80 
per cent in both urban and rural areas between 1967 and 1969/70 but fell 
12 A brief summary of work carried out in the early 1970s is given in King and Weldon (1977: 
699).
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for the bottom 20 per cent (King and Weldon 1977: Table 6). The authors 
concluded that the evidence suggested some decline in the real standard 
of living for the poorer groups and growing disparities between rich and 
poor in urban areas.
Indonesia could be used as a case study of the impact of rapid inf la-
tion, culminating in hyperinf lation, on the distribution of income and 
expenditure but data for the years from the late 1950s to the late 1960s 
for the entire country are very diff icult to assemble. It seems probable 
that most urban households suffered real declines in income in the 
early and mid-1960s as prices for food and other basic needs increased. 
Government employees and some private sector workers received part 
of their salary in rice and thus were partially protected from price rises, 
but most other urban workers, who were usually poorer than government 
workers, had little protection. In rural areas, the landless and near landless 
who depended on food purchases for at least part of their income would 
also have suffered. Only those farmers with a marketed surplus would 
have benef ited from rising prices. Timmer (2015: 102-103) found that in 
1963/64 there were sharp differences in rice consumption per capita 
by expenditure quintile in both urban and rural areas in Java. In rural 
areas the top quintile consumed more than three times the amount of 
the poorest quintile. Timmer found convergence in rice consumption by 
quintile group only after 1976.
The f inding of Van Leeuwen and Foldvari (2016: Table 4) that employees 
in agriculture and farmers operating less than 0.5 hectares increased their 
share of total consumption expenditure between 1960 and 1975, while 
those operating over one hectare saw a decline in their consumption share 
seems implausible, even if employees and small farmers did experience 
an improvement in real consumption after prices stabilized in the late 
1960s. The f inding of these authors that the Gini coeff icient declined from 
0.55 in 1953 to 0.51 in 1959, and 0.28 in 1975 also seems dubious. There is 
little evidence that any country has experienced such a massive decline in 
inequality over less than two decades. It seems doubtful that such a decline 
occurred in Indonesia after 1959. It is likely that the departure of Dutch and 
other foreign nationals after 1945 would have had some equalizing impact 
on incomes, as these people were highly paid compared to most indigenous 
Indonesians. But this cannot explain the large drop in the Gini coeff icient 
between 1959 and 1975, as almost all foreigners had left by the late 1950s. 
Given the differential impact of inflation by income class over the 1960s, 
it is probable that inequality in real expenditures would have increased, 
rather than declined, over that decade.
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The f irst attempt to propose a poverty line for Indonesia and measure 
the proportion of the population below the line was made by Sajogyo (1975). 
He set the poverty line in terms of rice: 240 kg per year for rural areas and 
360 kg for urban areas.13 The use of milled rice equivalent as a ‘basic needs 
standard’ has a long history in Java in particular, where it extends back 
to the rural welfare surveys carried out by the Dutch in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. A number of investigations of rural poverty in 
Java adopted the concept in one form or another. Penny and Singarimbun 
(1973) in their study of Sriharjo in Yogyakarta claimed that villagers had a 
concept of ‘suff iciency’ (cukupan) which they expressed in terms of rice, 
and many studies have used rice prices to deflate rural wage data.14 In 
fact, if it is accepted that rice is the most ‘basic’ of basic needs in Indonesia, 
its use in determining a poverty line would seem to be close what Lipton 
(1983: 6) had in mind in suggesting that poverty be defined in terms of the 
fulf ilment of one ‘key’ need.
When the rice-based poverty lines were converted into rupiah and applied 
to the National Socio-economic Survey (Susenas) data for the years from 
1963/64 onwards, there was an increase in the proportion of the population 
considered poor in Java until 1967, from 61 per cent to over 67 per cent. Then 
there was a steady decline until 1980, when only 32 per cent were below 
the Sajogyo poverty line. Outside Java, the proportion fell from 52 per cent 
in 1964/65 to 14.5 per cent in 1980 (Booth 1988: 193). But in spite of these 
declines, several studies suggested that nutritional standards in Indonesia 
were far from satisfactory in the late 1960s and early 1970s. An analysis of 
the 1969/70 Susenas data by Van Ginneken (1976: 32-33) showed that average 
per capita intake of both calories and protein was low in comparison with 
recommended standards, and lower than in Pakistan, Mexico, Tanzania 
and Tunisia. While it is possible that food consumption was understated in 
the Susenas, especially in urban areas, the evidence suggested that in both 
urban and rural areas there was still a wide disparity in calorie and protein 
intake by expenditure group in the late 1960s. In rural areas the bottom 
10 per cent of the population were consuming only 1,117 calories per day, 
compared with an average intake of 1,885 calories per day. Protein intake 
was only 29 grams per day, compared with the average of 44 grams. These 
13 There was a history of using rice as a standard in determining poverty lines and minimum 
wages, not just in Indonesia but also in other parts of Southeast Asia; for a discussion of the 
rice-wage formula in the Philippines, see Abrera (1976: 232-233).
14 This is particularly true of the numerous village studies carried out by the Agroeconomic 
Survey. See Collier et al. (1982) for a survey of this literature.
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disparities by expenditure class were larger than in Pakistan. The 1969/70 
data confirmed that the very marked differences in food consumption by 
expenditure class, found in the Kutowinangun study in the 1930s, were still 
evident 30 years later.
Sundrum and Booth (1980: 463) extended the Sajogyo analysis to 1976, 
breaking down the poverty data into urban and rural areas. They found 
that the percentage of the population below the 240 kg poverty line in rural 
areas of both Java and the Outer Islands fell, although in Java the fall was 
not very rapid (from 39.5 per cent to 33.7 per cent). In urban areas, both in 
Java and elsewhere, the fall was greater. Other estimates, including some 
put forward by the World Bank, showed a greater decline in the headcount 
measure of poverty between 1970 and 1976, especially in rural Java.15 But 
several analysts pointed out that using rice, or a price index heavily weighted 
towards rice, probably underestimated the impact of the inflation over these 
years on the poor. It was argued that the consumption basket of the poor, 
especially in rural Java, contained more non-rice staples, especially corn and 
cassava, whose prices had risen faster than rice. Thus the rate of inflation 
for the bottom 40 per cent in rural areas was higher than for upper income 
groups (Dapice 1980: 71; Asra 1989a: 107). Asra (1989a: 104-105) also argued 
that the Gini coeff icient for household expenditures increased slightly over 
these six years, once corrections had been made for the differential impact 
of inflation on different expenditure groups.
Whatever the statistics showed, there can be no doubt that many people 
concerned with poverty issues in Indonesia, and especially in Java, over 
the decade from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s felt disappointed that 
the real per capita GDP growth in Indonesia which had occurred (67 per 
cent over the decade from 1966 to 1976) was not having a more dramatic 
impact on the incomes of the poorer sections of the population, whether 
in Java or elsewhere. Some analysts put the blame on the impact of the 
oil boom, which had led to a sharp increase in revenues accruing to the 
central government budget. This in turn led to increased expenditures on 
salaries for government employees, who were mainly based in urban areas 
and had a higher propensity to consume on luxury and semi-luxury goods 
and services. An analysis of the cost of living surveys carried out in urban 
areas in 1968/69 showed that families where the household head was in 
government service were already earning well above the average for all 
15 Asra (1989b: Table 1) presented estimates which showed quite a rapid decline in the headcount 
measure of poverty between 1970 and 1976 in both urban and rural areas, but the measures were 
presented for Indonesia as a whole.
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urban households (Booth and Sundrum 1981: 198). The disparity probably 
grew over the 1970s. The evidence from the Susenas surveys for 1970 and 1976 
showed that urban-rural disparities in per capita household expenditures 
had widened, although they were not as high as in Malaysia or Thailand 
(Sundrum and Booth 1980: 459-460).
The latter part of the 1970s saw a moderation in the rate of inf lation 
in Indonesia, and also considerable growth in agricultural production, 
especially rice. Numbers falling below the rice-based poverty line fell steeply 
between 1976 and 1981. But by the early 1980s, it was argued that the changes 
in consumption opportunities which had occurred in Indonesia since 1965 
made the Sajogyo poverty line an anachronism. This was partly because 
many Indonesians, especially in Java, were living in urban and peri-urban 
areas where the Sajogyo poverty concept was never very satisfactory 
anyway.16 But also a diminishing number of Indonesians anywhere in the 
country by 1980 embraced the concept of cukupan, expressed exclusively in 
terms of rice. The proportion of total consumption expenditures devoted to 
purchase of cereals had fallen steadily everywhere in Indonesia since 1970, 
and other expenditures, including housing and education, assumed a much 
greater role in both actual consumer budgets and in concepts of basic needs.
The series on poverty published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
in the 1980s used a broader poverty line although one which became increas-
ingly controversial in the last part of the Suharto era.17 Between 1976 and 
1980, the CBS series showed the percentage of the population in poverty to 
have fallen from 40.1 per cent to 28.6 per cent, and the absolute numbers of 
poor to have fallen from 54 million to 42 million (Central Bureau of Statistics 
1997: 570). Other Indonesian economists queried the use of a rice-based 
poverty line. Esmara put forward a poverty line concept in terms of average 
per capita expenditure on a package of basic needs (Esmara 1986: 286-349). 
Using the household expenditure data from successive rounds of the Susenas 
for 1970, 1976, 1978 and 1980, Esmara estimated average expenditures on this 
basic needs package, which included cereals and tubers, nuts, f ish, meat, 
vegetables, fruit, clothing, housing, education and health. The package for 
urban and rural areas was broadly similar although a few extra food items 
were added for rural areas. The Esmara approach was a novel one in that 
16 The Sajogyo poverty line in urban areas was simply the rural poverty line increased by 50 per 
cent, although no justif ication was given for such an arbitrary markup. In Eastern Indonesia, 
where rice was often not the staple food, and was a relatively expensive source of calories, the 
use of a rice-based poverty line led to overestimates in the headcount measure of poverty.
17 The CBS began to publish data on poverty in 1984; the series, published in the annual 
statistical yearbooks, was taken back to 1976.
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it explicitly allows for the concept of ‘basic needs’ to change over time by 
using average per capita expenditure on the basic commodities rather than 
expenditures on a f ixed basket of needs (however def ined).
Much of the change in per capita expenditures on the basic needs pack-
age over the 1970s reflected changes in prices. But a part also reflected a 
decision on the part of households to consume more food, clothing, housing, 
education etc. According to the Esmara approach, this revealed a change in 
social attitudes to, and perceptions of, what comprises basic needs which 
should be incorporated in the poverty line concept. The Esmara poverty 
line, like that of Sajogyo and the CBS, was higher in urban areas than in 
rural, and the gap widened over the decade of the 1970s. But in spite of this, 
he found that the percentage of the population below the poverty line in 
rural Indonesia had consistently been higher than in urban areas.
Esmara acknowledged that his concept of a ‘dynamic poverty line’, which 
altered not just with changing prices but also with changing real consump-
tion patterns, was open to objections. He also proposed a more orthodox 
alternative, which derived a poverty line for the years 1976-1980 from the 
1970 data simply by adjusting for changes in the Jakarta Cost of Living 
Index. This alternative poverty line in rural areas was not very different 
from the ‘dynamic’ poverty line except for 1980. But in urban areas it was 
much lower (Esmara 1986: 329). Thus the estimate of the percentage in 
poverty is also lower using this measure. But there were obvious problems 
with this approach as well. Why should the Jakarta index be used to adjust 
an all-Indonesia poverty line for inflation? To the extent that the rate of 
inflation had not been the same in urban and rural areas, or in different 
regions of the country, the use of the Jakarta index to adjust the poverty line 
for changes in prices could have under- or overstated changes in poverty.
Beginning in the 1970s, the World Bank also paid considerable attention 
to issues of poverty and income distribution in Indonesia and published 
a number of estimates of the proportions of the population in poverty 
and its changes over time. Most of these estimates were made in internal 
documents, but publicly available estimates were given in a country study 
published in 1980 (World Bank 1980a). In addition, two staff working papers 
by Chernichovsky and Meesook (1984a and 1984b) used the 1978 Susenas. 
The 1980 World Bank study used a poverty line of Rp 3,000 per month 
everywhere in the country although to correct for regional differences in 
price levels, rupiah consumption expenditures were adjusted to Jakarta 
prices (World Bank 1980a: 84). The most striking aspect of these estimates 
was the very marked difference in poverty incidence in urban and rural 
areas; the disparity was much greater than that shown by either of Esmara’s 
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estimates. Whereas according to Esmara, 16.3 per cent of the poor were 
located in urban areas in 1976, the World Bank found only 8 per cent.
Chernichovsky and Meesook (1984b: 2) tried to avoid the problem of 
choosing a poverty line altogether by simply defining the ‘poor’ as the bottom 
two deciles of the population ranked by household per capita consumption 
expenditure. Using this approach they found a large disparity between 
urban and rural poverty incidence in 1978 (14.1 per cent of urban households 
were considered poor compared with 41.7 per cent of rural households). 
By contrast, the CBS estimates for the same year found that 30.8 per cent 
of urban households were below the poverty line compared with 33.4 per 
cent of rural households. Chernichovsky and Meesook criticized absolute 
poverty lines as ‘incorporating many arbitrary assumptions’ but their method 
appeared just as arbitrary.
The bewildering diversity of estimates of the incidence of poverty, num-
bers in poverty, and the location of the poor, together with evidence that, 
as in the Philippines, the Susenas surveys seemed to be underestimating 
total household expenditures, encouraged other analysts to adopt different 
approaches to the measurement of poverty in Indonesia. Papanek (1980) 
compiled several series on real wages; the longest was for real wages for both 
temporary and permanent plantation workers in Java and Sumatra from 1951 
to 1978. He found that real wages fell fairly consistently from 1953 to 1968, 
although the fall was steeper in Java; by 1968 wages in Java were well under 
half those in Sumatra. Part of the fall between the 1950s and 1963 might 
have been the result of increased employment; total numbers of workers 
increased in all plantations except coffee (Papanek 1980: 86). Employers 
could have been reacting to the economic diff iculties of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, as well as to increasing opposition by trade unions to laying 
off workers, by keeping workers on, but reducing their remuneration. From 
1968 to 1972, real wages increased sharply although numbers employed fell. 
But after 1972, the various wage series he examined did not show much sign 
of real increases. Papanek (1980: 102) attributed the improvement in real 
wages between 1967 and 1972 to the rebuilding of a shattered economy. But 
given that total plantation sector employment fell after 1967, it is probable 
that the reduction in trade union power made it easier for the estates to get 
rid of older, less productive workers, which must have impacted adversely 
on their living standards.
Living standards were almost certainly lower in Indonesia than in the 
other four ASEAN countries in the mid-1960s, and poverty incidence higher, 
but were they still lower in 1980, after more than a decade of rapid growth 
of GDP? Comparisons of the national headcount measures of poverty are 
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not really feasible, given that the poverty lines in Indonesia were lower in 
dollar terms than in Malaysia, Thailand or the Philippines (Booth 1993: 
Table 11).18 Even allowing for differences in the purchasing power of the 
rupiah compared with the other Southeast Asian currencies which might 
not have been fully incorporated in the exchange rate, it is probable that the 
poverty line in Indonesia allowed for a lower basket of goods and services 
than in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.19 In 1972, the consumption 
of cereals in Java was well below that in the Philippines; in spite of higher 
consumption of roots and tubers, the total intake of calories was lower, 
although it was higher outside Java (Table 5.5). Protein intake was much 
lower in both Java and the Outer Islands than in the Philippines. By 1981, the 
percentage of the Indonesian population below the Malaysian poverty line 
was more than f ive times that in Malaysia, and over twice that in Thailand 
(Table 5.6). Even those resource-rich provinces which had a much higher per 
capita GDP compared with the national average also had a higher headcount 
measures of poverty than in Malaysia.
Table 5.5:  Estimated food availability in the Philippines and Indonesia, 1972 
(grams per day)
Food Type Philippines Java Outer Islands Indonesia
Cereals 363 297 347 325
roots/tubers 66 216 202 211
Sugar 51 27 45 34
Pulses/nuts 15 33 10 24
vegetables 77 36 19 30
fruits 99 90 100 94
Meat 43 8 10 9
eggs 9 1 3 2
fish 107 3 18 8
fats/oils 10 7 16 11
Calories Per day 2,047 1,850 2,208 2020
Protein Per day (grams) 53 36 42 39
Sources: Philippines: nedA (1975); indonesia: nicol (1974: tables 1-4).
18 Mangahas (1983) compared the various poverty lines used in Southeast Asian studies in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. He came to the conclusion that, once adjustments had been made for 
differences in purchasing power, there was not a great difference between them, although the 
Malaysian poverty line was higher than most of the others.
19 It is worth noting that the effect of the rice premium and other export taxes in Thailand was 
to lower the domestic price of rice in Thailand in dollar terms, compared with other countries 
in Southeast Asia.
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Table 5.6:  Percentage of the population below a ‘Malaysian’ poverty line, 1980-
1981
Percentage of the 
population below the 
poverty line
Average monthly per 
capita consumption 
expenditures in US$ 
(Kravis $ in brackets)
indonesia (1981) 76.1 17.29 (37.24)
Aceh 67.5 20.53 (44.22)
north Sumatra 73.2 18.49 (39.82)
West Sumatra 68.0  20.32 (43.77)
riau 60.3 22.14 (47.69)
east Kalimantan 49.6 25.17 (54.21)
Peninsular Malaysia (1980) 14.7 61.27 (110.77)
thailand (1981) 30.9 34.36 (82.30)
bangkok 4.8 62.60 (149.94)
north 34.6 31.10 (74.48)
northeast 49.1 22.96 (54.99)
Central 17.3 40.45 (96.88)
South 36.9 34.82 (83.40)
note: the poverty line estimated by the economic Planning unit for 1977 (as reported in Shari 
[1979]) was adjusted upwards to 1980 and 1981 prices using the Peninsular Malaysia CPi. this 
was converted into rupiah and baht at the prevailing exchange rate and adjusted to allow for 
differences in purchasing power using the 1980 index for consumption expenditures supplied in 
Summers and heston (1991). indonesian and Malaysian data refer to the percentage of the popula-
tion; thai data refer to the percentage of households whose per capita consumption expenditures 
fall below the poverty line. Average per capita consumption expenditures for Malaysia in 1980 
were adjusted to 1981 data using the Peninsular Malaysia CPi. Per capita consumption expendi-
tures were converted into 1981 dollars at the prevailing exchange rates and to Kravis dollars using 
the indices for 1980 reported in Summers and heston (1991). 
Source: booth (1997a table 3.12).
Estimates from Burma in the 1950s
The government of Burma conducted a household survey in Rangoon 
in 1958, and in four rural areas in 1960-1963. Samples were small; in 
Rangoon 500 households were surveyed, with incomes of not more than 
400 kyats per month. The four rural areas surveyed were the Irrawaddy 
Delta, Central Burma, Arakan and Tenasserin; 6,000 households were 
surveyed. The statistical yearbooks, published in the 1960s, included 
tables which compared the food consumption data collected in 1958 with 
those collected in a 1927 enquiry into the standard of living of the working 
classes in Rangoon. The proportion of household budgets spent on food 
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had increased from 53 per cent to 66 per cent. This increase could have 
indicated a decline in living standards although it might also have been 
the result of lower housing costs in the post-independence years. Per 
capita consumption of rice, pulses, vegetable oils and sugar had increased, 
although consumption of meat and f ish had declined (Table 5.7). Perhaps 
a better indicator of improvement in living standards is the improvement 
in infant mortality rates which took place over the 1950s. In 1930, Sundrum 
(1957: 18) estimated that the infant mortality rate in Burma was around 
200 per 1,000 live births, although this could have been an underestimate 
as some infant deaths were probably not reported. The f igure was little 
different in 1954, but dropped after that to 130 in 1961 (Central Statistical 
and Economics Department 1963: 42).
Table 5.7: Household consumption in Rangoon, 1927 and 1958
1927 1958
food as percentage of total expenditures 52.8* 66.1
Food consumption (per capita per month)
rice (Kg) 12.4 13.2
Pulses (Kg) 0.1 0.4
Meat (Kg) 1.2 0.75
eggs (unit) 0.3 2.6
fish (Kg) 2.2 1.2
oils/fats 0.6 0.9
Sugar 0.1 0.2
* burmese households only.
Sources: bennison (1928: 97); Central Statistical and economics department (1963: 313-314). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, real per capita consumption expenditures did 
increase, although the data did not separate out government and private 
expenditures, and much of the growth was probably due to the government 
(Booth 1997a: Table 3.1). On the other hand, per capita rice availability 
increased steadily from the 1950s to the early 1970s (Booth 2003: Table 12). 
This improvement could have been partly due to an increase in real per 
capita expenditures, but was also the result of the government policy of 
diverting the exportable surplus to the domestic market at prices well below 
the world market price. While the government probably wanted to devote 
more resources to sectors such as health and education, it was constrained by 
falling tax revenues relative to GDP. By the mid-1970s, government revenues 
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were only 12 per cent of GDP, which was much lower than in the late 1950s 
(Booth 2003: 146). Defence expenditures continued to have top priority in 
the allocation of government expenditures.
Lessons from the Country Studies
The considerable body of research on inequality, poverty and living standards 
in Southeast Asia from the 1950s to around 1980 highlighted a number of 
issues which were to recur in more recent research. Measurement problems 
were of concern to most of the studies cited here. How should be poverty line 
be set? How should it be adjusted for differences in prices between regions, 
and for changes in prices over time? How should the urban poverty line be 
set relative to the rural one? Several studies emphasized the differential 
impact of inf lation on different expenditure groups. This was likely to 
be important in those economies experiencing high rates of inf lation. 
Governments often tried to control prices of some basic staples such as rice, 
but not of corn and cassava, which in some regions were more important 
in the consumption baskets of the poor.
Another problem which emerged was whether the headcount and other 
measures of poverty should be estimated using household income or expendi-
ture data. The Malaysian f igures used income data, as did most estimates 
from the Philippines and Thailand. But in Indonesia, the Central Bureau of 
Statistics only published expenditure data. Opinions varied as to whether 
income or expenditure figures were likely to be more accurately reported in 
the household surveys. Visaria (1980: 29) suggested that ‘it would be advisable 
to emphasize the data on expenditure over those on income and to collect 
them for relatively short reference periods to reduce the problems of recall 
lapse’. Others argued that income data collected over a longer period would 
be less prone to temporary fluctuations. The broader issue of the accuracy of 
the survey data was of concern to most analysts in the 1970s. Chander (1980: 
88-98) concluded his analysis of the household survey results for Malaysia 
and the Philippines by drawing attention to four key lessons; these related 
to the sampling frame, the questionnaire design, the implementation of field 
operations and the problems of data processing and publication of the final 
results. He stressed the importance of keeping the sampling frame up to date, of 
keeping questionnaires short to avoid respondent fatigue, of proper supervision 
of field staff, and of recruiting trained staff to carry out data processing. These 
points might seem obvious, but as will be seen in subsequent chapters, they 
are as relevant today as when they were written almost four decades ago.
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Van Ginneken (1976: 61) argued that ‘the reliability of the f indings of a 
sample survey of households varies with the size of the sample’. He followed 
other statisticians in suggesting that one way of checking the reliability of the 
sample survey data was to blow up the expenditure data using population 
f igures and then compare the survey estimates of household expenditure 
with those of private f inal consumption expenditure in the national ac-
counts. Household survey data were likely to be lower, because consumption 
of non-household institutions was excluded. But if the disparity was greater 
than 30 per cent, it was probable that the survey data were underestimating 
total expenditure (Van Ginneken and Park 1984: 4). It was noted in the 
discussion of the FIES surveys in the Philippines that some analysts argued 
that when the ratio of FIES expenditures to those in the national accounts fell 
much below 70 per cent, the resulting measures of inequality were unlikely 
to be accurate, especially if the disparities were the result of under-reporting 
in richer households. But could the results still be used to measure poverty? 
The problem of disparities between survey and national accounts data, far 
from being resolved, continues to be debated down to the present.
Most of the studies cited in this chapter found that the headcount measure 
of poverty was high in the 1960s and declined only slowly through to the mid-
1970s or early 1980s, even in those economies where per capita GDP growth 
was quite rapid. Where there were rapid declines, as in the Indonesian case 
using a rice-based poverty line, critics argued that the poverty line was no 
longer suitable by the end of the 1970s. The poverty line introduced by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in Indonesia in 1976 was based on a broader 
basket of goods and services. The headcount estimates of poverty based on 
the CBS poverty line also showed a signif icant decline between 1976 and 
1981, which was to continue down to 1996 (Central Bureau of Statistics 1997: 
570). But the methodology used to construct the CBS poverty line was not 
transparent; this was also true of the estimates published by the Malaysian 
government in off icial documents. Some researchers argued that, given 
the problems with both the household survey data and the poverty line 
estimates, headcount measures of poverty should be abandoned. Other 
estimates of living standards should be computed using demographic data, 
wage data or food consumption f igures from food balance sheets.
The problems can be illustrated in the case of the Philippines. Not only 
did per capita GDP grow over the 1960s, but average calorie and protein 
consumption increased and infant mortality rates dropped (Table 5.3). 
Educational enrolments and literacy also increased from the already high 
f igures recorded in the late 1930s. But at least according to some estimates, 
the headcount measure of poverty also increased. Certainly there was little 
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evidence that it had declined. How could these apparently contradictory 
trends be reconciled? Was it the case that average improvements in non-
monetary indicators such as literacy and mortality rates masked large, 
and growing disparities by income class, regions or ethnic groups? This 
question also arose in the other countries which achieved improvements in 
educational and health indicators from the 1950s onwards. To what extent 
did improved performance go along with growing inequalities in access to 
both healthcare and education? If inequalities were increasing, then some 
young people on entering the labour market were far better prepared than 
others to seize the opportunities which came with faster economic growth.
In both Indonesia and the Philippines, some researchers argued that the 
benefits of accelerated growth after 1966 in the agricultural sector accrued 
mainly to those who owned agricultural land, or were able to access land 
on reasonably favourable terms. The problem of landlessness received some 
scholarly attention, although as Boyce (1993: 132) pointed out in the context 
of the Philippines, the definition of landlessness proved ‘slippery’. After 1950, 
population censuses and labour force surveys in many parts of Asia made a 
distinction between family and hired labour, but in practice in many rural 
settings the boundary between the two was often unclear. In addition, not 
all people classif ied as wage workers were landless; village surveys found 
that some of those who worked for wages also hired in labour to cultivate 
their own land. Many rural households were found to be employed in more 
than one sector. Earnings from agriculture, whether from cultivating a small 
holding or from wage labour in agriculture, were often supplemented with 
earnings from other sectors, including trading, transport, construction and 
manufacturing.
In spite of all these diff iculties, Boyce did f ind some support for the 
oft-repeated argument that ‘a distinct class of landless wage labourers’ 
had emerged in the Philippines by the 1960s. He argued that longitudinal 
studies in parts of Luzon had found that the number of households headed 
by landless labourers was increasing over time. In 1975, the labour force 
survey attached to the National Sample Survey found that the proportion 
of the male agricultural labour force working as employees was around 
15 per cent; it was slightly higher in Indonesia in 1980 (Table 5.2). Other 
estimates of landlessness in Indonesia produced different results, although 
it was clear that the problem was worse in Java than in the other islands 
(Booth and Sundrum 1981: 189). A detailed breakdown of rural households 
by landownership in the district of Klaten, in Central Java, found that almost 
30 per cent were landless in the sense that they did not own any land at all, 
and a further 37 per cent owned only house gardens (Booth 1974: 136). The 
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1971 census found that this district had a low percentage of the economically 
active rural population working in agriculture compared with rural Java 
as a whole. How many were forced to seek non-agricultural employment 
through lack of access to agricultural land was not clear. But by the 1980s, 
many agricultural households in Java were supplementing their incomes 
from agriculture with off-farm jobs; the evidence for this will be reviewed 
in more detail in subsequent chapters.
A further set of issues concerned trends in inequality. In those economies 
where there was some economic growth, and the headcount measure of 
poverty did decline over the 1960s and 1970s, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailand, the fall did not appear to have been due to a dramatic reduction 
in income inequality. In most parts of Southeast Asia, there was not much 
evidence of redistribution with growth in the decades up to 1980. Rather, 
the distribution of household incomes or expenditures, as shown by the Gini 
coeff icient or the shares of the top to bottom deciles of the distribution, 
remained stable, so the decline in poverty, where it occurred, was the result 
of an increase in average incomes. This appears to have been the case in 
the Philippines and Thailand over the 1960s, and in Indonesia and Thailand 
over the 1970s.20
For much of the period under review, almost all the research on poverty 
and distribution was carried out by the International Labour Organization 
and the World Bank, or by independent scholars, sometimes with assistance 
from bilateral and international donors. Most government statistical agencies 
did not begin to publish f igures on poverty or income distribution until 
the 1980s or later. In the Philippines, the FIES results were not published 
between 1975 and 1985, and the Marcos government in its f inal years did not 
encourage debate about trends in poverty. Malaysia was the only country 
to publish off icial estimates of poverty, and these were often criticized for 
their lack of clarity. The Malaysian government was reluctant to publish the 
results of household income surveys, which made it diff icult for academic 
researchers to check the government claims about trends in poverty and 
income distribution. Estimates of the headcount measure of poverty made by 
academics or international organizations in Southeast Asia often produced 
very different results, because different methods for estimating poverty lines 
20 The estimates of the Gini coeff icients in Indonesia for 1964 and 1970 given in Van Leeuwen and 
Foldvari (2016: Table 5) show a decline from 0.39 to 0.35. The two f igures may not be comparable 
because of differences in survey coverage, although it is possible that the dramatic drop in 
inf lation at the end of the 1960s did bring about some improvement in real incomes for the 
poorer groups relative to others.
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were used as well as different approaches to adjusting poverty lines over time. 
This understandably caused confusion and some degree of cynicism. Some 
political activists thought that the whole approach to poverty measurement 
in Southeast Asia was motivated mainly by a concern on the part of national 
governments and international agencies to demonstrate that accelerated 
economic growth was helping the poor, regardless of whether that was true 
or not. These doubts persisted in subsequent decades.
Rankings in 1980
By 1980, Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia were well above other countries in 
Southeast Asia in terms of per capita GDP, and were also making progress on 
health and educational indicators. Thailand’s per capita GDP was above that 
of the Philippines, although the country was still well behind on educational 
indicators. The Philippines was still above Indonesia in terms of both per 
capita GDP and health and educational indicators, in spite of the gains which 
Indonesia had made over the 1970s. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were well 
behind in terms of per capita GDP, and were struggling with the legacies of 
more than three decades of conflict. Myanmar had achieved some growth 
in per capita GDP since the 1950s, but was still behind the peak achieved in 
the early 1930s. A ranking of 48 of the world’s poorest countries compiled 
by Dasgupta (1993: Table 5.2) included three Southeast Asian countries, 
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia 
were presumably excluded because they were not considered poor, while 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma were excluded through lack of data. 
Six indicators were used including per capita GDP, life expectancy and 
infant mortality, adult literacy and two indexes of political and civil rights. 
Thailand and the Philippines were ranked sixth and eighth from the top, 
with Indonesia further back at seventeenth. Indonesia was below both 
China and India. It fell behind China on GDP and demographic indicators, 
and behind India on political and civil rights.
The Human Development Index was not published until the 1990s, but the 
twentieth anniversary edition did publish estimates for some countries from 
1980 to 2010 (UNDP 2010: 148-151). Estimates for 1980 were only available for 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. In 1980, the Philippines 
had a composite score below that of Malaysia, but above Thailand and 
Indonesia. Thailand in 1980 had very low mean years of schooling, only 3.5 
years for adults over 25, compared with 6.6 years in the Philippines (UNDP 
1991: 128). In that year, the Philippines was still above several countries which 
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had by 2010 moved into the high human development category, including 
Algeria, Turkey, Jordan and Tunisia. Indonesia was still well behind a number 
of other countries in the medium human development group, which it would 
overtake in the next three decades, including Syria, Nicaragua, Guatemala 
and the Congo (Brazzaville). In subsequent chapters the reasons for the 
relative success of Indonesia and the weaker performance of the Philippines 
are further investigated.
6 The 1980s and the 1990s: The Fast and 
the Slow in Southeast Asia
Rapid Growth in the ASEAN Four in the 1980s
Within Southeast Asia, the policy reforms which were discussed in Chapter 4 
began to have an impact on economic growth in the years from 1965 to 1980. 
Singapore, which was troubled by a range of political, economic and social 
problems in the aftermath of the Japanese occupation, had experienced 
very little economic growth in per capita terms until 1965, but between 
1965 and 1980 per capita GDP more than trebled. The development strategy 
implemented after Singapore’s break from Malaysia was far more successful 
than most observers had predicted in 1965 and by the latter part of the 
1970s was influencing policy in neighbouring countries. Rapid growth was 
sustained until 1996, when real per capita GDP was almost nine times the 
1950 level (Table 4.6).
Accelerated growth in both Thailand and Malaysia in the 1960s and 1970s 
was in part the result of growth in the traditional export sectors (agriculture 
and mining), but both countries began to attract foreign investment into 
manufacturing industries oriented not just to local markets but also to 
export markets. The Philippine economy also achieved some success in 
diversifying its export base, although growth was slower between 1965 
and 1980 than in Malaysia and Thailand, and by 1980 per capita GDP had 
fallen behind that of Thailand and was little more than half that of the 
Republic of Korea (Table 4.6). Over the 1980s, both Thailand and Malaysia 
forged ahead while the Philippines fell behind. In 1996, per capita GDP in 
the Philippines was slightly below the 1980 f igure. Indonesia which had 
achieved rapid growth over the 1970s as a result of improvement in the terms 
of trade, managed to sustain growth from 1980 to 1996 by a successful policy 
of export diversif ication. After two devaluations in 1983 and 1986, and the 
introduction of a duty drawback scheme, non-oil exports grew rapidly in 
the decade up to 1996 (Hill 1996: 161-164).
The perceived success of these economies in achieving rapid growth 
began to influence thinking over the 1980s in the leading development 
agencies. It was pointed out in Chapter 4 that in the 1980s both the World 
Bank and important bilateral donors turned away from many of the concerns 
expressed in the 1970s about poverty and distribution and concentrated 
more on macroeconomic reform and also reform of trade and investment 
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policies. ‘Structural adjustment’ policies were implemented in a number 
of countries, but they appeared to have been most successful in Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia which by the early 1990s were considered success 
stories along with the four tigers (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the 
Republic of Korea). These seven countries, together with Japan were the 
focus of the ‘East Asian Miracle’ report, published by the World Bank in 1993.
The message was that the ‘fast-growing four’ in Southeast Asia had managed 
to achieve growth if not with equity at least with a substantial decline in 
absolute poverty, through open-type trade and investment policies which 
other countries, both in Asia and elsewhere, should learn from and emulate. 
These countries had encouraged foreign investment in export-oriented 
manufacturing and, particularly in the case of Malaysia, had reduced the 
role of government in the economy through privatization of state enterprises. 
But some reviews of the ‘Asian Miracle’ report pointed out that the evidence 
that the four Southeast Asian countries included in the report had got their 
policies right, and were following in the footsteps of Japan, Taiwan and Korea, 
was open to question. The vulnerabilities in the financial sectors of Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia which were a causal factor in the crisis of 1997/98 were 
largely ignored in both World Bank and other evaluations until 1997. The claims 
made about educational attainment were also misleading. Although the report 
claimed that the eight countries were all characterized by ‘higher initial levels 
and growth rates of human capital’, in fact it was clear by the 1980s that several 
Southeast Asian countries, especially Thailand, had neglected education, at 
least beyond the primary level. In 1992, when per capita GDP in Thailand 
was about the same as in South Korea in 1984, the secondary enrolment rate 
was only 37 per cent, compared with 91 per cent in South Korea (Booth 2001b: 
Table 2.3). Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand had more favourable resource 
bases than the northeast Asian economies and had developed as exporters 
of agricultural products and minerals. The ready availability of rents from 
the exploitation of natural resources meant that the nature and purpose of 
government intervention in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia differed 
from Taiwan and South Korea (Gomez and Jomo 1997: 177-181).
In the 1980s, some doubts were raised about the sustainability of the 
Southeast Asian model. One economist went so far as to call capitalism in 
Southeast Asia ‘ersatz’ or fake, and by implication unsustainable (Yoshi-
hara 1988). Yoshihara stressed the high dependence on foreign capital and 
technology, the dominant role of entrepreneurs of Chinese descent, and the 
tendency of many business groups to focus on rent-seeking activities. The 
large conglomerates which emerged in Indonesia and Malaysia from the 
1970s onwards were often controlled by people with close links to powerful 
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politicians. ‘Crony capitalism’, which had flourished in the Philippines under 
Marcos, spread to other parts of the region. But according to the World Bank 
and many other economists in the region and elsewhere, these problems 
were belied by the growth f igures. By the 1990s, Thailand had outperformed 
not just the Philippines but also most of the African countries which had 
had similar levels of per capita GDP in 1965. Indonesia’s successful policies 
of post-oil boom restructuring could be contrasted with other petroleum 
economies such as Nigeria. Indonesia’s per capita GDP almost doubled 
between 1980 and 1996, whereas in Nigeria, it had decreased over these 
years by over 20 per cent (Table 4.6).
Estimating the Changes in Poverty and Living Standards in 
Southeast Asia: The Achievements of the ‘Miracle Economies’
An important part of the World Bank message in the early 1990s was that the 
fast-growing economies in East Asia had also experienced rapid declines in 
poverty. The 1990 World Development Report put forward a new international 
poverty line, this time set at between $275 and $370 per capita per year, 
converted not using market exchange rates but the 1985 exchange rates 
derived from the International Comparisons Project. It was argued that 
this range ‘was chosen to span the poverty lines estimated in recent studies 
for a number of countries with low average incomes – Bangladesh, the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, and Tanzania’ 
(World Bank 1990: 27). The lower limit coincided with the poverty line 
commonly used for India. Because the upper limit of the poverty lines 
suggested in this report corresponded to roughly a dollar day, this was the 
poverty line which became the standard one used by the World Bank for 
much of its comparative work on poverty for the next two decades. With 
some adjustments, it remains in use. For some observers, especially those 
who welcomed the renewed emphasis on problems of global poverty, the 
choice of a global poverty line ‘was a sensible yardstick for the Bank to 
adopt in order to focus its work and to measure progress’ (Konkel 2014: 
298). The use of an income-based measure was defended on the grounds 
that non-monetary measures were usually highly correlated with monetary 
measures. In addition, it permitted a relatively straightforward way of 
measuring the relationship between economic growth, measured in terms 
of GDP, and poverty alleviation. The old debate about whether, and to what 
extent, growth helped the poor could be settled more easily if changes in 
poverty could be measured using a money metric.
158 Living StAndArdS in SoutheASt ASiA 
A further reason for the introduction of a global poverty line was implied 
in several World Bank publications, as well as those put out by other agencies, 
although often not addressed directly. This related to the greater availability 
of statistics. By the 1980s, the work of the International Comparison Project 
had been extended to a much greater number of countries than were covered 
in the reports discussed in Chapter 4. The World Bank eventually took over 
responsibility for producing these estimates. Another crucial requirement for 
the estimation of global poverty estimates were household surveys; they were 
needed for every country included in the global estimates. Some countries, 
where violent conflict over a long period prevented the implementation of 
household-level surveys or even population censuses, were excluded from 
the early World Bank estimates. But for many countries with a history 
of conflict, including several in Southeast Asia, survey data did become 
available through the 1990s, although the coverage and accuracy of these 
surveys remained a matter of dispute.
The 1990 World Development Report used the global poverty lines of 
$275 and $370 per capita per year, in 1985 PPP dollars, to estimate the 
headcount and poverty gap measures for all developing countries, and for 
broad geographic regions (World Bank 1990: Table 2.1). But when the report 
discussed changes in poverty indicators in a group of sixteen countries 
in Asia and Latin America, it used the national poverty lines in these 
countries. The report noted that several countries in Asia had experienced 
rapid declines in poverty in the 1970s and 1980s. Indonesia was singled 
out as an especially strong performer, cutting its headcount measure of 
poverty by 41 percentage points in just seventeen years. This led to a very 
sharp decline in the numbers of poor, in spite of the fact that population 
growth had been quite rapid over these years (Table 6.1). The estimates in 
this table were also used in the Asian Miracle report (World Bank 1993: 
4-5). It was claimed that not only had the headcount and other measures 
of poverty declined rapidly, but other economic, social and demographic 
indicators had improved, and income distribution had either improved 
or stayed constant.
There was little attempt in these reports to analyse the poverty data 
produced by national governments in detail, although the f igures shown 
in Table 6.1 did raise some perplexing questions. Why, for example, was the 
headcount measure of poverty in Indonesia in 1987 lower than in Thailand, 
and only slightly higher than in Malaysia, in spite of the fact that per capita 
GDP, and other indicators such as life expectancy, were higher in both 
Malaysia and Thailand than in Indonesia? In fact, the answer to this question 
should have been quite obvious: both the Malaysian and Thai estimates 
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used poverty lines which were considerably higher than the Indonesian one. 
The World Bank in several publications issued in the early 1990s claimed 
that the poverty lines used in comparing headcount and other measures 
of poverty were broadly comparable in that they permitted similar calorie 
intakes. But in fact they were not comparable; in Thailand the basket of 
foodgrains contained higher quality and more expensive foods than in 
Indonesia. In addition, the mark-up for non-food expenditures was higher 
(Booth 1997b; Asra 2000). When in the latter part of the 1990s, the World 
Bank began to publish estimates of poverty using the $1 a day poverty line, 
it became clear that the headcount measure was much lower in Thailand 
than in Indonesia (World Bank 2001: 280-281).
Comparisons were also made in the measurement of poverty between In-
donesia and the Philippines. It was argued that, when comparable estimates 
of poverty incidence (the percentage of the population below the poverty 
line) in the 1980s were estimated, the difference was in fact quite small, and 
certainly far lower than shown in Table 6.1. This was because the national 
poverty lines were estimated according to different methodologies. Using 
the national poverty lines, the headcount measure of poverty in Indonesia 
was only 17 per cent in 1987, compared with 44 per cent in the Philippines. 
But the adjusted estimates showed that the difference was much less; 47.3 
per cent of the population were below the poverty line in Indonesia in 
1987, compared with 55 per cent in the Philippines in 1988 (Asra, David 
and Virola 1997: 271).1
1 The Indonesian f igures, relative to those from the Philippines were also queried by Balisacan 
(1997: 2).
Table 6.1:  Estimates of the headcount measure of poverty and the population 
below national poverty lines (World Bank estimates)
Region/Country Percentage below the 
poverty line
Numbers (millions) GDP Per 
Capita 
(1987)*
(First Year) (Final Year) (First Year) (Final Year)
indonesia (1970, 1987) 58 17 68 30 2,138
thailand (1962, 1986) 59 26 17 14 3,421
Malaysia (1973, 1987) 37 15 4 2 4,218
Singapore (1972, 1982) 31 10 0.7 0.2 11,743
Philippines (1971, 1988) 52 44 19 26 2,019
*Per capita gdP in 1990 international gK$.
Sources: World bank (1990: 41); Philippines: balisacan (1994: table 2.4). gdP data from bolt and van 
Zanden (2014). 
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But the different poverty lines used by national statistical agencies, and by 
academic researchers, were not the only reason for the rather questionable 
results shown in Table 6.1, and in some other World Bank publications 
issued in the 1990s. In addition, there were queries about the survey data 
used to estimate the headcount measure. Several commentators pointed 
to the disparity between the household income and expenditure estimates 
shown in the survey data and those derived from national accounts data. In 
the Philippines, the survey data on household expenditures were estimated 
to be around 80 per cent of the national accounts data in 1971, falling to 69 
per cent in 1991 (Balisacan 1994: Table 2.3). In Indonesia the ratios fell from 
71 per cent in 1970 to 61 per cent in 1990 (Booth 2016: 177). The reasons for 
these disparities are complex, and may reflect problems with the national 
accounts data as well as the household survey data. But they do suggest that 
caution is needed in comparing poverty estimates from household survey 
data both over time in one country, and between countries.
Even allowing for the problems with both poverty lines and household 
survey data, there were good reasons for arguing that living standards did 
improve in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia in the three decades from 1965 
to 1995, compared to other parts of Asia, and other parts of the developing 
world. Already by 1980, these three countries had an HDI which was above 
the ‘medium human development’ average, and in all cases it increased 
through to 1995 (Table 6.2). By that year, the HDI in these three countries 
was above Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Most observers expected that 
the improvement would continue into the new century. What they did not 
anticipate was the serious growth collapses which occurred in 1998. The 
implications of this for living standards are examined below.
Table 6.2: Human Development Index, 1980 to 2010
Year 1980 1995 2000 2010
Malaysia 0.541 0.659 0.691 0.744
thailand 0.483 0.581 0.600 0.654
Philippines 0.523 0.569 0.597 0.638
indonesia 0.390 0.508 0.500 0.600
vietnam n/a 0.457 0.505 0.572
Lao Pdr n/a 0.388 0.425 0.497
Cambodia n/a 0.385 0.412 0.494
Myanmar n/a n/a n/a 0.451
Medium human development (Average) 0.361 0.480 0.510 0.586
Source: undP (2010: 150-151).
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Trends in Inequalities in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore
As the international debate on poverty gathered pace through the 1990s, 
attention was also given to inequality issues. For any given rate of growth, 
the impact on poverty would obviously be greater if incomes of the poorer 
groups were growing at the same or a faster rate than the better off groups. 
But to the extent that the better off were benefiting from growth to a greater 
extent than the poorer groups, growth would be less ‘pro-poor’. Definitions 
of pro-poor growth have in fact varied in the literature. Some studies assume 
that if growth is accompanied by a decline in the headcount measure of 
poverty or a decline in numbers of poor people, then it can be termed ‘pro-
poor’. Timmer (2004: 184-185) argued that growth in Indonesia, and several 
other Asian countries was pro-poor in the decades from the 1960s to the 
1990s in the sense that the incomes or expenditures of the bottom quintile 
of the income distribution grew at roughly the same rate as average incomes. 
According to Timmer’s analysis, growth was pro-poor in Indonesia the sense 
that incomes of the bottom quintile grew faster than the average in some 
years between 1967 and 2002 but not in others. Other studies have argued 
that pro-poor growth should imply that the poor benefit from growth to a 
greater extent than the non-poor (Kakwani and Pernia 2000).
Over the 1980s, the Thai case received considerable attention. Some econo-
mists argued that the rapid GDP growth over that decade was having little 
impact on the poor, especially in rural areas. Real per capita GDP increased 
by 75 per cent between 1981 and 1990, but the numbers below the poverty line, 
as estimated by Warr (2009: 67), dropped by only about 1.6 million, or 9.4 per 
cent over these years (Table 6.3). The household survey data also showed that 
the rapid growth in incomes until 1992 was accompanied by an increase in 
inequality. Between 1981 and 1992, the share of the top 10 per cent as a ratio 
of the bottom 40 per cent increased from 2.3 to almost 3.9 (Phongpaichit 
and Baker 2016: 10). Tinakorn (1995: 224-225) found that most of the poor 
in the latter part of the 1980s were in rural areas and were mainly farmers 
and farm labourers. The headcount measure of poverty was especially high 
in the northeast, where many households still lacked basic amenities such 
as piped water, toilets and electricity. She questioned whether the ‘trickle 
down’ mechanism had in fact worked well in Thailand, at least over the 1980s.
But it did appear to be working more strongly over the early part of the 
1990s. Both the headcount measure of poverty and numbers below the 
poverty line fell sharply between 1990 and 1996, and there was some fall in 
inequality from the high level reached in 1992 (Table 6.3). Over the decade 
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from 1986 to 1996, per capita GDP more than doubled, and numbers in 
poverty fell by more than half. Kakwani and Krongkaew (2000: 152-153) 
disaggregated the data by region, and showed that the decline in the head-
count measure of poverty was particularly rapid in the northeast region. In 
1988, 48.4 per cent of the population were below the poverty line. By 1996 
that had fallen to 19.4 per cent. For all rural areas, the headcount measure 
of poverty over these years fell from 40.3 per cent to 14.9 per cent. At the 
national level, the headcount measure of poverty fell from 32.6 per cent to 
11.4 per cent. But Kakwani and Krongkaew argued that, even given these 
impressive rates of decline, signif icant numbers of Thais in 1996 remained 
poor, especially among the elderly and children.
Table 6:3:  Headcount measure of poverty, poor population and Palma ratio: 
Thailand, 1975 to 1996
Headcount (% below poverty line) Poor population (millions) Palma ratio
1975 48.6 20.6 n/a
1981 35.5 17.0 2.3
1986 44.9 23.8 2.7
1990 27.2 15.4 3.4
1992 23.2 13.4 3.9
1996 11.4 6.9 3.4
Sources: Warr (2009: table 9); Palma ratio: Phongpaichit and baker (2016: 10).
An important reason for the fall in poverty in rural Thailand between 
1988 and 1996 was the improvement in the performance of the agricultural 
sector. In response to the weak growth of the agricultural sector in the 
mid-1980s, the government implemented several reforms including removing 
most export taxes, especially on rice. These policies helped to boost farm 
gate prices. In addition, the booming economy in the Greater Bangkok 
region created employment opportunities for many migrants from the 
poorer regions in other parts of the country, and their remittances boosted 
incomes in their home regions. But as Warr (2009: 75) argued, low standards 
of education in rural areas placed many rural migrants at a disadvantage in 
urban labour markets, where they could not compete with better educated 
graduates from urban schools and tertiary institutions for the well-paid 
jobs. The government used minimum wage legislation to improve incomes 
of unskilled workers. But this policy had negative effects as well. By the 
early 1990s higher wages, especially in the Greater Bangkok region were 
forcing many labour-intensive industries to relocate to other parts of Asia, 
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including China and Vietnam, where wage rates were less than half of those 
in the Greater Bangkok region.
The Indonesian estimates of the Gini coeff icient of household expen-
ditures using the Susenas data were quite stable between 1976 and 1990. 
Between 1990 and 1996 there was some increase (Asra 2014: 34). Even 
allowing for problems with the survey data in Indonesia, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, it is probable that there was 
some increase in income and expenditure inequalities in the decade up to 
1996. The estimates of relative poverty (the percentage of the population 
below half the average per capita consumption expenditure) also showed 
some increase between 1984 and 1996. The increase occurred entirely in 
urban areas, especially in Jakarta (Booth 2016: 171). This indicator has been 
criticized for conflating poverty estimates with inequality, but it can be 
argued that by the 1980s many Indonesians were comparing their living 
standards not with some abstract poverty threshold set by government 
off icials, but with those of their neighbours and others with whom they 
came into contact on a regular basis. To the extent that some people felt 
left behind in a comparative sense, they probably experienced a sense of 
grievance, even if their absolute living standards were improving.
In Malaysia, most studies of poverty and inequality from 1970 to 1997, and 
beyond, have relied on the f igures published in off icial documents. They 
showed a very rapid decline in the headcount measure of poverty between 
1970 and 1997, from 49.3 per cent to 6.1 per cent. The decline took place across 
all ethnic groups; by 1997 the headcount measure for the Malay population 
was only slightly above the national average (7.7 per cent). Over these years 
there was also some decline in the Gini coefficient of household income from 
0.53 to 0.47 (Ragayah 2012: Tables 11.3 and 11.5). Milanovic (2006) analysed 
changes in the distribution of earnings between 1984 and 1997. He found that 
both the Gini coeff icient and the Theil index of real earnings fell. Together 
with the off icial data, his f indings supported the view that Malaysia did 
experience some redistribution with growth, although the redistribution 
was modest. Much of the poverty decline was the result of sustained growth 
of income over the decades from the 1970s to the late 1990s.
An analysis of the distribution of earnings in Singapore also found little 
change in the Gini coefficient between 1984 and 1997, and some decline in 
the Theil index (Mukhopadhaya 2014: 65). Over these years, the composition 
of the labour force began to change in Singapore, with more migrant workers 
being employed in both skilled and unskilled occupations. Malaysia also 
began to use more foreign workers, especially in agriculture and construction. 
Shari (2000: 121) argued that growing numbers of unskilled workers imported 
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from Indonesia and Bangladesh depressed wages for local workers. But this 
trend did not appear to have had much impact on earnings inequality in 
either Singapore or Malaysia, at least until 1997. In 1997, the Gini coefficient 
of earnings in both countries was around 0.47. Comparable data on earnings 
were not available for other Southeast Asian countries in the 1990s, but the Gini 
coefficient for earnings in Taiwan was much lower than in either Singapore or 
Malaysia, even allowing for the inclusion of property incomes in the Taiwanese 
data. Mukhopadhaya (2014: 76) pointed out that if property income had been 
included in the estimates for Singapore, the Gini would have been higher.
An important aspect of the debate on growth, poverty and inequality 
in Southeast Asia, beginning in the 1970s, was the regional dimension. In 
Thailand, the much higher headcount measure of poverty in the north 
and northeast of the country, compared with other regions, was already 
obvious in the 1960s. This was the result of lower per capita GDP in what 
were predominantly agricultural regions. But as more f igures on regional 
GDP became available in Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as poverty data 
broken down by region or province, it became clear that there were a number 
of states in Malaysia and provinces in Indonesia where per capita GDP was 
close to or above the national average, but where poverty was above the 
national f igure. In Malaysia in 1987, the national headcount measure of 
poverty was reported to be 17.3 per cent, but state-level estimates ranged 
from 36.1 per cent in Terengganu to 5.2 per cent in the Federal Territory 
of Kuala Lumpur. Some of the states where poverty was higher than the 
national average, such as Kedah and Kelantan, had lower per capita GDP 
than the national average, but others including Terengganu, Sabah and 
Sarawak had per capita GDP that was as high or higher than the national 
average (Government of Malaysia 1989: 45-51). In Indonesia, when headcount 
measures of poverty by province began to be published in the 1990s, it was 
clear that in several resource-rich provinces where per capita GDP was 
higher than the national average, the headcount measure of poverty was 
also close to, or even higher than the national average.
The extreme outlier was the province then known as Irian Jaya, now 
divided into the two provinces of Papua and Papua Barat. Poverty was 
estimated to be almost twice the national average in 1993 and 1996, but 
regional GDP was 60 per cent above the national average.2 The reason 
2 Estimates of the provincial headcount measures of poverty in Indonesia reported in Asra 
and Santos-Francisco (2003: Appendix 1) use a different approach to the estimation of regional 
poverty lines from that used by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). They showed that the 
proportion of the population below the provincial poverty line in Irian Jaya in 1993 was not as 
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for this was that much of the GDP produced in the province did not stay 
there; revenues from mining and other resource-based industries were 
either remitted abroad, or accrued to the central government. Thus, per 
capita consumption expenditures were only a small fraction of regional 
output. Even in those resource rich provinces where poverty was below 
the national average, such as East Kalimantan, poverty was much higher 
than in the neighbouring Malaysian state of Sabah, although per capita 
GDP was higher in East Kalimantan in 1993 (Table 6.4). Drains from the 
resource-rich provinces to the centre remained high in Indonesia until the 
reforms in regional f inance implemented after Suharto’s departure in 1998; 
in East Kalimantan they persisted into the 2000s (Booth 2015: Table 2.4)







GDP per capita 
(Rupiah ‘000) ***
Sabah 33.2 33.2 4750
Sarawak 19.1 19.1 6517
Peninsular Malaysia 10.5 10.5 7136
east Kalimantan * 13.8 79.4 7630
riau ** 11.2 80.6 4779
Aceh ** 13.5 86.7 3019
irian Jaya ** 24.2 81.5 2641
* using the Sabah poverty line.
** using the Peninsular Malaysia poverty line.
*** exchange rate: rp 811 = Malaysian ringgit.
Sources: department of Statistics: Malaysia (1997), department of Statistics: Sabah (1996), depart-
ment of Statistics: Sarawak (1998), Central bureau of Statistics (1997).
Estimating Changes in Poverty and Living Standards in the 
Non-miracles in the 1980s and 1990s: The Philippines, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar
Although the Philippine economy grew quite rapidly from the 1950s to the 
1970s, the growth was increasingly viewed as debt-driven and much of the 
high relative to the national average as the CBS f igures. In that year Irian Jaya was ranked 25th 
in terms of the headcount measure out of 27 provinces using the CBS poverty line; using the 
alternative estimates it was ranked 11th.The difference resulted in part from the higher weight 
given to rice, and the lower weight given to root crops in the food basket in the CBS poverty line.
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foreign borrowing was used for prestige projects which often did not yield 
reasonable economic returns. The report of a World Bank mission published 
in 1976 argued that the economy could grow at around 4 per cent per annum 
in per capita terms if appropriate economic reforms were adopted in both 
the public and the private sector (Cheetham and Hawkins 1976: 38-41). 
But in the latter part of the 1970s and the early 1980s, growth slowed as 
the country found it more diff icult to borrow abroad. After 1983, both the 
economic and the political situation deteriorated further until President 
Marcos was forced to resign after popular protests in 1986. Balisacan (1994: 
Table 2.4) estimated that the headcount measure of poverty increased 
from 52.2 per cent in 1971 to 53.9 per cent in 1985. This might not appear to 
be a large increase, given the economic problems the country endured in 
the latter part of the 1970s and the early 1980s. But population growth was 
rapid by Asian standards, and numbers in poverty increased substantially 
from 19.5 million in 1971 to 29.15 million in 1985. Boyce (1993: Table 2.13) 
presented estimates of the headcount measure of poverty which showed a 
greater increase, from 43.8 per cent in 1971 to 58.9 per cent in 1985, although 
he emphasized the problems of data comparability.
There were high hopes that the economic situation would improve 
after 1986, but in fact the economic recovery was patchy. Reforms were 
implemented by President Cory Aquino, who was elected in 1986, but a 
combination of political instability and natural disasters meant that busi-
ness conf idence was slow to recover, and per capita GDP only returned 
to the 1982 level in 1988. During the Ramos presidency, there was some 
acceleration in growth, and the economy was not as badly affected by the 
Asian crisis as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (Balisacan and Hill 2003: 
5). Given the slow pace of the economic recovery after 1986, it might have 
been expected that there would have been an adverse impact on poverty, 
and on non-monetary indicators of development in the Philippines. But 
in fact the evidence does not support this pessimistic view. The poverty 
indicators presented by Balisacan (2003: Table 10.1) showed that both the 
headcount measure and the poverty depth measure fell between 1985 and 
1997. The fall in poverty between 1985 and 1988 was due to the economic 
recovery which occurred over these three years from the trough in 1985.3
3 It should be noted that the estimates prepared by Balisacan used the expenditure data 
from the FIES, whereas estimates prepared by the government statistical agency (the off icial 
estimates) used the household income f igures, which gave higher estimates of poverty. Balisacan 
(1997) gives more detail on the differences between his methodology and that used in the off icial 
estimates.
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It seems probable that a considerable number of people had fallen slightly 
below the poverty line by 1985, so even the modest economic recovery was 
enough to push their expenditures back above the line. A further fall between 
1994 and 1997 was due to the increase in real per capita expenditures of 21 
per cent over these three years (Balisacan 2003: 319). In spite of population 
growth, which was still rapid by Asian standards, numbers below the poverty 
line also fell by almost four million from 1985 to 1997 (Table 6.5). As the 
Gini coeff icient increased slightly, these falls could not be attributed to an 
improvement in income or expenditure distribution; changes in real per 
capita expenditures were the crucial factor. In an earlier paper, Balisacan 
(1999: 39) argued that the agricultural sector led the way in poverty allevia-
tion, at least until 1994. This was in contrast to the experience in the 1960s, 
where it had been argued that growth in the agricultural sector had not led 
to rapid poverty decline (Bautista 1994).
Table 6.5:  Poverty incidence and depth, numbers in poverty and Gini coefficient, 
Philippines, 1985-2000








1985 40.9 13.2 22.2 0.41 1967
1988 34.4 10.1 20.2 0.40 2105
1991 34.3 10.6 21.8 0.43 2136
1994 32.1 8.7 21.9 0.40 2144
1997 25.0 6.4 18.3 0.43 2331
2000 27.5 7.2 21.4 0.45 2336
* 1990 international gK$.
Sources: balisacan (2003: table 10.1); gdP: Maddison Project database, 2013.
The estimates of household income inequality for the Philippines compiled 
by Estudillo (1997) showed a decline in the Gini coeff icient between 1965 
and 1985 (Table 6.6). It is not clear what caused this decline, although it is 
possible that the growth slowdown over the years from 1970 to 1985 had a 
more serious impact on higher income households than on those on lower 
incomes. Estudillo’s estimates confirm those of Balisacan that there was an 
increase in inequality between 1985 and 1991, although her estimates refer 
to household income, not expenditure. Her estimates also suggest that by 
the 1980s, household income distribution in the Philippines was not much 
higher than in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. The estimates in Table 
6.6 are all derived from household income, rather than expenditure, but 
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still might not be fully comparable, as def initions of income could well 
have varied, both across countries and over time. But they do not support 
the view that household income distribution in the Philippines was more 
unequal than in other parts of Southeast Asia in the years from 1965 to 1990.4
Table 6.6:  Gini coefficient of household income distribution, 1965-1982: 
Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia














note: estimates for indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia 1970 refer to household income. 
estimates for thailand refer to household per capita income.
Sources: indonesia: Asra (2000: table 6); Philippines: estudillo (1997 table 1); thailand: Warr (2009: 
67). Malaysia: ragayah (2012: table 11.5).
In contrast to the Philippines, where there was some optimism about growth 
prospects, at least until the mid-1970s, the three countries which emerged 
from the French possession of Indochina had a far more diff icult post-
independence experience. In Vietnam, the struggle against the French ended 
in 1954, but the subsequent division of the country was not accepted by many 
who had participated in the battle against the French. The prolonged and 
destructive war in Vietnam, which spread to both Cambodia and Laos, was 
f inally brought to an end with the reunification of Vietnam in 1975 under the 
Vietnamese Communist Party, and the emergence of communist regimes in 
both Laos and Cambodia. In Cambodia, the Pol Pot government embarked 
on a brutal policy of ‘de-urbanization’ which destroyed the educated middle 
4 The estimates of the Gini coeff icient based on household expenditures given by Asra (2000: 
Table 4) for Indonesia and Balisacan (2000: Table 2) for the Philippines show that inequalities 
were higher in the Philippines in the years from 1985 to 1994.
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class; most of those who were not killed fled the country. Even after Pol Pot 
was deposed in 1978, the Cambodian economy was slow to improve. Per 
capita GDP in 1990 was little different from a decade earlier.
For more than a decade after 1975, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia had 
few diplomatic or commercial ties with other countries in Southeast Asia. 
Vietnam relied heavily for rehabilitation of its war-shattered economy on 
aid from the former Soviet Union and from Eastern European countries 
and Sweden. Economic growth, and growth in per capita consumption 
expenditures, were positive but slow in real terms, at least until the mid-
1980s.5 In the latter part of the 1980s, influenced in part by the Deng reforms 
in China, the government embarked on a process of structural reform, aimed 
at reducing inflation and opening up the economy to trade and investment 
from other parts of Asia and Europe. These reforms had some success, 
although in the early 1990s, Vietnam was still considered a low-income 
economy whose per capita GDP was well below the six member states of 
ASEAN. The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the country of its major 
source of foreign assistance, and many Vietnamese who had worked in 
Eastern Europe were repatriated, depriving the country of an important 
source of foreign exchange. The birth rate had surged after reunif ication, 
and more young people were entering the labour force by the early 1990s. 
This, combined with the return of migrant workers and the reduction in 
the military, created serious problems of unemployment.
A report published by the World Bank in 1995 stated that there was ‘little 
systematic knowledge about the prevalence and distribution of poverty on a 
national scale’. Using a calorie-based poverty line, and data from the living 
standards survey conducted in 1992/93, the report estimated that 51 per 
cent of the population was below the poverty line. There was considerable 
regional variation, with the highest incidence of poverty in the north-central 
region, and the lowest in the southeast (World Bank 1995: 10-11). Subsequent 
revisions produced a somewhat higher estimate of poverty incidence in 
1993, of 58 per cent. Almost 25 per cent of the population was estimated 
to be below the extreme poverty line which meant they were not able to 
afford suff icient food. Almost 64 per cent were below the World Bank’s 
international poverty line of $1.25, in 2005 PPP prices (Demombynes and 
Vu 2015: Table 2). A further survey carried out in 1997/98 found a sharp fall 
in the headcount measure, from 58.1 per cent of the population to 37.4 per 
5 Dollar (2004: 33) quotes World Bank estimates of growth over the 1970s and 1980s. In per 
capita terms, growth accelerated from 3 per cent per annum in the 1970s to 3.5 per cent per 
annum over the 1980s.
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cent.6 In spite of quite high population growth over this period, numbers 
below the poverty line fell from 40.46 million in 1993 to 28.22 million in 1998.
The HDI in 1995 showed that Vietnam remained well behind other parts of 
ASEAN, including the Philippines (Table 6.2). This reflected not just lower per 
capita GDP in Vietnam compared with the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand 
and Malaysia but also problems in the delivery of both health and education. 
Haughton and Haughton (1997: 542), using the 1992/93 Living Standards 
Survey, found that 22 per cent of children under 13 were severely stunted, 
which was similar to the results of a survey in the Philippines in 1978. Prescott 
(1997: 2-5) argued that school enrolments actually fell after 1987, especially at 
the secondary and post-secondary levels. He attributed this fall to the rising 
costs of education, in terms of both fees and other costs, including uniforms 
and books, and also to the rising opportunity costs to the family of keeping a 
young person in school beyond the primary level. With accelerated growth, 
and a return to household responsibility, came greater opportunities for 
households to develop businesses in both agriculture and other activities, 
and this encouraged many parents to withdraw children from school after the 
completion of the primary cycle. But this trend seems to have been reversed 
by the early 1990s. Glewwe (2004a: 269) found that net enrolment rates at the 
secondary level had returned to the 1985 levels by 1993/94, and grew after that.
Improving secondary enrolments after the early 1990s reflected a growing 
awareness among parents in Vietnam that education was the key to obtain-
ing well-remunerated jobs, especially in urban areas. Glewwe, Gragnolati and 
Zaman (2002: 790) found that Vietnam’s gains in terms of poverty reduction 
between 1992/93 and 1997/98 were striking, in spite of a small increase in 
inequality. But the gains were not evenly shared among all regions and 
classes. The growth in export-oriented activities benefited those who were 
best able to take advantage of the new employment opportunities. They were 
usually the better educated living in urban areas, although improvements 
in agricultural productivity helped to boost incomes in rural areas. Poverty 
among ethnic minorities remained very high. These problems were to persist 
into the new century.
Social surveys were also carried out in both Cambodia and Laos in 
the early 1990s. The f irst Socio-economic Survey of Cambodia (SESC) 
6 Dollar (2004: 39-40) claims that the rate of poverty reduction in Vietnam between 1992 
and 1998 was higher than in India but lower than in China. Haughton and Khandker (2009: 13) 
claimed that the 1997/98 survey oversampled the sparsely populated central highlands and 
undersampled the dense and populous Red River delta. They do not speculate on what impact 
this had on poverty estimates.
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was implemented in 1993/94. An analysis by Prescott and Pradhan (1997) 
found that 39 per cent of the population were below a poverty line set in 
terms of food and non-food expenditures.7 The regional disparities were 
quite marked; the headcount measure was only 11 per cent in Phnom Penh, 
compared with 43 per cent in rural areas. These authors argued that ‘reliable 
comparisons between Cambodia and other countries cannot be made at 
the national level because a large part of the country was excluded from 
the SESC sample frame’ (Prescott and Pradhan 1997: xi). They did however 
suggest that the results were broadly in line with those from Vietnam and 
Laos. Another examination of the Cambodian data from the 1990s argued 
that ‘no robust poverty trends for the 1990s can be calculated from these 
irreconcilable data’ (Gibson 2005: 137). A further study of the surveys car-
ried out in 1997 and 1999 found little evidence of any improvement in the 
poverty measures, although the authors pointed out that there were very 
wide differences in the results between the two rounds in the 1999 survey, 
which cast doubt on the accuracy of the data (Beresford et al. 2004: Table 1.1).
Beresford et al. (2004) also drew attention to Cambodia’s low HDI com-
pared with other countries in Southeast Asia (Table 6.2). They argued that 
there had been some improvement in infant and child mortality rates after 
1978, when the Pol Pot regime was driven out of most parts of the country, 
but little change in more recent years. Laos also began to implement liv-
ing standards surveys in the 1990s. An analysis prepared for the Swedish 
International Development Agency found some decline in the headcount 
measure of poverty between 1992/93 and 1997/98, from 46 per cent to 39 
per cent, although doubts were raised about sample coverage (Andersson, 
Engvall and Kokko 2006: Table 2). By 1997/98 a gap had opened up between 
the capital, Vientiane, where the headcount measure was only 13.5 per cent, 
and most other regions of the country. In spite of some progress in health 
and education, the HDI was almost as low as in Cambodia in 1995, and 
considerably lower than in other parts of Southeast Asia (Table 6.2).
Little can be said about trends in living standards in Burma, or Myanmar 
as it was called, over the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1990s, many observers 
considered the country to be a development disaster, whose economic 
performance had little in common with most other parts of Southeast 
Asia. In the previous chapter, it was argued that some indicators pointed 
to rising living standards in the two decades after independence in 1948. 
7 A report published by the Asian Development Bank in 2012 found that 47 per cent of the 
population in 1994 was below the poverty line, which was presumably higher than the one used 
by Prescott and Pradhan. See Asian Development Bank (2012: 4).
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But for most of the time Ne Win was in power there was little enthusiasm 
for comprehensive economic reform, and trade and investment policies 
did not encourage greater links with the regional or the global economy. 
Over the 1980s, growth in real GDP was erratic, and growth in per capita 
consumption expenditures was negative (Booth 1997a: Table 3.1). There were 
hopes that economic policies would change after the coup which ousted Ne 
Win in 1988 and which led to the establishment of a new military regime 
apparently more committed to economic reform. Real per capita GDP did 
increase over the 1990s, but there was little evidence that this led to a marked 
improvement in living standards. A report prepared by the UNDP argued that 
four factors constrained human development in the country: low revenue 
mobilization, high defence expenditures, weak public administration and 
an uncertain policy environment (UNDP 1998: 32). The report pointed out 
that budgetary expenditures on defence were almost twice as high as those 
on health and education; the latter comprised less than 2 per cent of GDP, 
which was lower than in most other Asian countries.
In 1997, a household income and expenditure survey was carried out which 
claimed to be comprehensive. An analysis of the survey by the World Bank 
was contained in a report that was never made public, although it received 
some circulation in non-government circles. The report estimated that 23 
per cent of the population fell below a poverty line set in terms of a packet 
of basic needs. There was wide variation by region; as would be expected, 
poverty was higher in rural areas than in urban areas. A headcount ratio 
of 23 per cent might appear quite low, at least compared with f igures from 
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, and even the Philippines from the latter part 
of the 1990s. But the poverty line was probably not comparable with those 
used in other parts of Asia, and it is likely that some more remote regions in 
Myanmar were excluded altogether. On the other hand, the policy of keeping 
rice prices low did reduce the costs of calories in Myanmar compared with 
neighbouring countries (Booth 2003: 164).
An Emerging Consensus in the Mid-1990s?
By the mid-1990s, it seemed that a consensus was emerging in Southeast 
Asia that rapid economic growth was leading to a broad-based improve-
ment in living standards and a fall in poverty. This was the message which 
the World Bank (1993) put forward; even allowing for the problems with 
their poverty estimates, it was widely accepted that poverty had fallen 
in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia in the decades from 1965 to 1996. 
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Balisacan (2000: 137-138) argued that the Philippine evidence from 1985 
to 1994 conf irmed the ‘usual story about growth and poverty reduction 
in East Asia. […] [T]he main reason for the relatively high poverty in the 
Philippines is primarily the short duration of growth and the slowness of 
this growth.’ These views influenced the international debate at the time, 
but even before the tumultuous events of 1997/98 it was clear that there was 
some dispute about the policy mix which had produced the poverty decline. 
The experience of several countries in Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s 
revealed anomalies which did not always f it with the received wisdom. 
In particular, it was clear that there were important differences between 
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea on the one hand and the Southeast Asian 
countries on the other (Booth 1999). While there were some similarities 
between the ‘northeast Asian’ model and the high-growth Southeast Asian 
economies, including the high levels of investment, and government policies 
which encouraged export growth, there were also a number of differences. 
Partly because of their natural resource wealth, governments in Southeast 
Asia were less inclined to invest in post-primary education, with the result 
that most countries in the region had fallen well behind Taiwan and South 
Korea in terms of educational enrolments by the 1980s. The lack of educated 
workers with the skills needed in rapidly growing economies, combined 
with restrictions on recruitment from abroad, meant that skilled workers 
often earned large salaries. This contributed to the greater disparity in 
incomes of the top decile compared to the bottom two deciles in Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines compared with Taiwan in the 1970s 
(Booth 1999: Table 8).
It was clear by the early 1990s, that the problems of poverty and skewed 
distribution of income in the fast-growing four were rather more serious 
than both the World Bank and some academic observers appeared to think, 
especially in Indonesia. When comparable poverty lines were used, the 
Indonesian headcount measure was well above that in Thailand, and not 
much below the Philippines in the 1980s. Estimates of inequality using 
household income showed that there was little difference between Indonesia 
and the Philippines over the 1980s (Table 6.6). A further problem was the 
regional disparities; in Indonesia the relatively rich provinces in Sumatra 
and Kalimantan where per capita GDP was closer to the Malaysian level 
had much higher levels of poverty than in Malaysia. By the 1990s, many 
Indonesians were crossing to Malaysia to work in sectors such as agriculture 
and construction, attracted by the higher wages. Inevitably they began to 
question why regions with broadly similar resource endowments differed 
so much in the living standards of their populations.
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In Chapter 5 it was noted that, in the Philippines, a number of studies 
emphasized the problem of landlessness in rural areas. It was argued that, 
by the 1960s, many rural households had little or no access to land, and were 
forced to rely on wage labour for most of their income. This was also the 
case in parts of Indonesia. Ranis and Stewart (1993) in their comparison of 
employment growth in Taiwan and the Philippines pointed out that after 
the comprehensive land reform implemented in Taiwan in the early 1950s, 
growth of rural incomes appears to have been both rapid and remarkably 
egalitarian. They argued that the difference between Taiwan and the 
Philippines did not lie in the growth of agricultural incomes which were 
quite similar in the two countries in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather, it lay in 
the very different growth rates of rural non-farm income (RNFI). In the 
Philippines between 1965 and 1985 RNFI grew slightly less rapidly than 
farm incomes while in Taiwan between 1962 and 1980, it grew more than 
three times as fast (Ranis and Stewart 1993: Table 14). They found that an 
important reason for the rapid growth of RNFI in Taiwan was the fast growth 
of exports of processed non-traditional crops; part of this production took 
place in rural areas.
Many of the reasons for the rapid growth of Taiwan’s non-traditional 
exports lay with reforms in trade and exchange rate policy which have been 
extensively discussed in the literature. Vested interests made such changes 
much more diff icult to implement in the Philippines. In addition, the more 
skewed distribution of land in the Philippines meant that in 1971 much more 
land was in larger holdings compared with Taiwan, where there was greater 
use of labour-displacing machinery (Ranis and Stewart 1993: Table 10). In 
1980, more labour per hectare was employed in rice agriculture in Taiwan 
than in the Philippines, while at the same time rural workers in Taiwan had 
greater access to off-farm employment. The result was much faster growth 
of rural incomes in Taiwan which led to rapidly expanding demand for a 
range of goods and services produced in both urban and rural areas.
To what extent did the Ranis and Stewart arguments hold in other parts 
of Southeast Asia? In Indonesia, the agricultural census of 1983 found that 
a higher proportion of land was in holdings under one hectare than in the 
Philippines, and a smaller proportion was in holdings over ten hectares 
(Booth 2002b: Table 2). By 1993, the proportion of land in holdings under one 
hectare had risen further, although it was still lower than in Taiwan in 1975 
(Table 6.7). The linkage ratio between growth in farm and off-farm incomes 
between 1984 and 1993 was higher than in the Philippines especially in Java 
and Bali, but still lower than the high ratios achieved in Taiwan (Booth 2002b: 
Table 4). In Thailand, the proportion of agricultural land in holdings under 
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f ive hectares was lower than in Indonesia in 1993, and much lower than 
in Taiwan in 1975 (Table 6.7). The linkage ratio in Thailand over the 1970s 
was lower than in Taiwan in the previous decade, although slightly higher 
than in Indonesia over the 1980s. Although they performed rather better 
than the Philippines, neither Indonesia nor Thailand was as successful as 
Taiwan in generating rapid growth of rural non-farm incomes in the years 
from the 1970s to the 1990s.
Table 6.7:  Distribution of land by holding size in hectares: Taiwan (1975), 
Indonesia (1993), Thailand (1993) and the Philippines (1980)
Holding Size (ha) Taiwan 1975 Indonesia 1993 Thailand 1993 Philippines 1980
under 1.0 39.0 26.4 3.0 3.8
1-3 48.0 38.7 22.8 25.9
3-5 9.2 13.1 17.9 21.2
5-10* 3.8 7.5 32.0 23.1
over 10 n/a 14.3 24.2 26.0
total 100 100.0 100.0 100.0
* data for taiwan include land in all holdings over five hectares.
Sources: booth (2002: table 2), with additional data for indonesia from Central bureau of Statistics 
(1995: 43-44).
But even if the faster-growing economies of Southeast Asia were not fol-
lowing the Taiwan model of egalitarian development, many observers of 
Asian development in the 1990s argued that poverty decline had been 
substantial in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Even if fast economic 
growth had produced greater inequalities, the reduction in poverty was still 
signif icant. Part of the poverty decline was the result of progress within 
the agricultural sector, but part was also due to the relocation of labour 
from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations. It was expected that 
export-oriented growth would continue in the countries which had already 
achieved sustained growth in the decades from the 1970s to the 1990s, and 
this model would spread to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, if the 
governments in these countries were willing and able to implement the 
necessary policy reforms. What many observers, both in Southeast Asia 
and abroad, did not fully appreciate was that growth had been achieved in 
spite of serious shortcomings in economic institutions. The growth collapses 
which occurred in 1997/98 were not just the result of vulnerabilities in the 
f inancial sectors of several economies in the region, but also of deficiencies 
in governance.
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Growth Collapses in 1997/98
To many people, both in Asia and elsewhere, the crisis which struck in 
mid-1997 appeared like a bolt from the blue, a meteor crashing from outer 
space into what many development experts had considered to be the most 
dynamic and successful part of the world economy. As the crisis deepened, 
it became clear that its economic and political consequences would be 
serious, especially for the three worst affected economies in Southeast 
Asia, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Not only were their currencies 
depreciating rapidly but real GDP was also contracting. Other countries in 
Southeast Asia experienced some collateral damage; the Philippine peso 
experienced a substantial fall, but there was only a slight fall in real GDP. 
In Vietnam, the off icial f igures showed that real GDP continued to grow, 
and by 2000 was 40 per cent higher than in 1995 (Table 6.8).
Table 6.8: Index of GDP growth, 1995-2005
Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Philippines Vietnam
1995 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1996 110.0 107.8 105.9 105.8 109.3
1997 118.1 112.9 104.4 111.3 118.3
1998 109.4 98.1 93.5 110.7 125.1
1999 116.1 98.9 97.6 114.5 131.0
2000 125.8 103.7 102.3 119.0 139.9
2001 126.8 107.3 104.5 123.0 149.6
2002 132.3 112.0 110.0 129.8 160.2
2003 139.5 117.3 117.9 136.3 171.9
2004 149.6 123.2 125.3 143.0 185.1
2005 157.3 130.2 130.9 149.9 200.9
Sources: international Monetary fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues, with extra 
data from bank negara Malaysia (2006) and bank of thailand website (www.bot.or.th) accessed 20 
december 2010).
In Thailand, real GDP had already fallen in 1997, and the further decline 
in 1998 meant that real GDP in that year was around 12 per cent less than 
in 1996. In 1996, GDP growth, although positive, was slower than in the 
decade from 1985 to 1995, prompting some comments in the international 
media that the era of high growth in Thailand was probably over. It was 
argued that, although the growth of export-oriented manufacturing had 
been impressive, the government had made a serious error in the early 
1990s in removing most controls on capital inflows, while at the same time 
the 1980S And the 1990S: the fASt And the SLoW in SoutheASt ASiA 177
maintaining the peg against the dollar. The resulting inflow of capital led 
to a real estate boom, faster inflation than Thailand’s trading partners, and 
a real appreciation of the baht.8 Wage rates, although low in comparison 
to the OECD economies, were higher than in China and Vietnam, and, in 
the absence of any compensating fall in the value of the currency, export 
industries were moving off-shore to take advantage of lower production 
costs. Export growth slowed to almost zero in 1996.
But in spite of the problems in Thailand, and the accelerating capital 
outflow which in early July 1997 f inally forced the Bank of Thailand to float 
the baht, many observers both in the Asian region and elsewhere thought 
that it was unlikely that there would be serious contagion to other countries, 
where economic fundamentals were considered to be sound. There is now a 
considerable literature on why the contagion spread from Thailand to other 
parts of Southeast Asia, with commentators blaming the decline in the 
influence of technocrats in economic decision-making, as well as premature 
f inancial liberalization in the context of weak regulation of the f inancial 
sector. Other, mainly foreign, commentators argued that fundamentals 
in these economies were indeed sound and that the real problem lay with 
foreign speculation and the response of the International Monetary Fund. 
Still others blamed the growth in cronyism and corruption, which affected 
public confidence in the ability of governments across the region to deal with 
the crisis once it had erupted (Booth 2001a). These debates have continued 
down to the present, and may never be fully resolved. But it was clear by 
1999 that, in two economies in particular, output appeared to have been very 
seriously affected by the crisis. They were Indonesia and Thailand, where 
GDP in 2000 was still below 1996 levels. In Indonesia, per capita GDP only 
returned to pre-crisis levels in 2004. In Malaysia, GDP fell by over 7 per cent 
in 1998, but had recovered by 2000. Elsewhere the impact of the crisis on 
output growth appeared to have been less serious (Table 6.8).
The Impact of the Crisis on Poverty: Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia
Given the magnitude of the GDP decline, especially in Thailand and 
Indonesia, coming after decades of solid growth, it was hardly surprising 
8 Although commentators in Europe and North America were openly discussing the weak-
nesses in the Thai economy at least a year before July 1997, the Thai government appeared to 
be in denial, and discouraged any open debate about the economic situation.
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that there was widespread concern about the impact on poverty. Many 
observers, both inside and outside the region, predicted an increase in 
the headcount measure of poverty. Such an increase did indeed happen. 
In Thailand, Krongkaew and Kakwani (2003: Table 5) estimated that the 
headcount measure of poverty rose from 11.4 per cent in 1996 to 16.2 per 
cent in 2000. Sarntisart (2005: Table 4.4), using a lower poverty line, found 
that the headcount measure increased from 6.35 per cent to 8.45 per cent 
between 1996 and 2000. His estimates were valuable in that they broke down 
the headcount measures by region, and by farm and non-farm employment 
He found little change in the headcount measure in Bangkok (which was 
already very low by 1996), but a sharp increase in the northeast region, 
which historically had always been the poorest part of the country, although 
there had been a decline in the headcount measure of poverty between 1986 
and 1996. Breaking down the headcount measure by farm and non-farm 
employment, he found that the largest increase was among farmers not 
owning land. For the country as a whole, numbers in poverty increased 
from 3.8 million in 1996 to 5.3 million in 2000 (Table 6.9).
Table 6.9: Headcount measures of poverty in Thailand, 1990, 1996 and 2000
Region 1990 1996 2000
bangkok 2.0 0.1 0.1
bangkok vicinity 2.7 1.0 0.5
Central thailand 13.9 3.1 2.7
north thailand 17.8 5.8 8.4
northeast thailand 30.9 10.4 15.1
South thailand 20.0 6.9 7.7
thailand* 20.1 (11.4) 6.4 (3.8) 8.5 (5.3)
non-farm 9.9 2.8 3.6
owners 29.3 12.1 16.0
non-owners 33.1 13.6 20.2
* figures in brackets show population in millions.
Source: Sarntisart (2005: tables 4.4 and 4.8).
The series given by Warr (2009: Table 9), which was based on estimates from 
the National Economic and Social Development Board, found that there was 
an increase in the headcount measure from 11.4 per cent in 1996 to almost 
16 per cent in 1999, although the headcount measure fell after 1999 and by 
2002 it was lower than in 1996. The estimates of Sarntisart showed that the 
impact of the crisis on poverty was more severe in rural than urban areas 
and was most severe in the northeast and among farmers not owning land. 
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This contradicted the view of some commentators that the crisis was largely 
urban, and that the brunt of the income decline was borne by the urban 
middle classes. Boonyamanond and Punpuing (2012: 351) argued that an 
important reason for the more severe impact on rural areas was the return 
of migrant workers from the cities whom the rural sector had to absorb. 
The households to which the migrant workers returned had extra mouths 
to feed, while at the same time they were deprived of their remittances. 
Bresciani et al. (2002: 12) found that farm households which depended most 
on off-farm income experienced the biggest decline in income, because 
much of the off-farm work was tied to those sectors most affected by the 
crisis, especially construction.
In Indonesia, given the extent of the GDP decline in 1998, a lively and at 
times acrimonious debate emerged about the consequences for poverty. A 
full round of the National Socio-economic Survey was carried out in 1996 
and another was planned for 1999. In the absence of solid statistical evidence 
on the impact of the crisis, several different estimates were circulated in 
the latter part of 1998 (Booth 2003: 122-123). The World Bank took the view 
that the decline in GDP of around 12 per cent (in fact it was slightly higher 
than this) could push the headcount measure of poverty up to around 14 
per cent compared with an estimated 10.1 per cent in 1997. Their argument 
was that the decline in GDP affected investment expenditures more than 
household consumption expenditures, although it was acknowledged that 
the El Niño drought would also have a serious impact on rural incomes in 
some parts of Eastern Indonesia. A much more pessimistic set of estimates 
was prepared by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and published in the 
appendix to the state speech of President Habibie in August 1998. These 
estimates showed that by mid-1998 the headcount measure of poverty 
had increased to almost 40 per cent compared with 11.3 per cent in 1996. 
Numbers below the poverty line increased from 22.5 million to 79.4 million 
(Department of Information 1998: Table IV-1).
These estimates, and some even more alarming ones contained in an 
ILO/UNDP report, received wide circulation, but were not subject to much 
critical scrutiny at the time. They were based on an assumption that poorer 
groups in both urban and rural areas would experience a sharper decline 
in incomes and expenditures than the fall in real GDP. Certainly it was true 
that inflation was high through 1998 and into early 1999, and real wages 
declined sharply. But at the same time it was also argued that many of those 
who had lost their jobs in sectors such as construction had returned to their 
homes and managed to get some employment in the agricultural sector, or 
elsewhere. As a result, open unemployment f igures increased only slightly 
180 Living StAndArdS in SoutheASt ASiA 
between 1997 and 2000. But on the other hand, further analysis of the 1999 
Susenas, when the results became available, showed a substantial increase 
in the headcount measure of poverty. The f igures published by the CBS 
showed an increase in the headcount measure between 1996 and 1999 from 
17.5 per cent to 23.4 per cent. An alternative set of estimates prepared by the 
Social Monitoring and Economic Response Unit (SMERU) using the same 
data found an even greater increase in the headcount measure, from 15.7 
per cent to 27.1 per cent (Table 6.10). The methodology adopted by the CBS 
used a higher poverty line in urban areas relative to rural areas than did the 
SMERU estimates, so that their results found that around 44 per cent of the 
increase in numbers in poverty occurred in urban areas, compared with 32 
per cent in the SMERU estimates. These differences in the measurement of 
urban and rural poverty persisted after 2000.
Table 6.10:  Headcount measures of poverty and numbers below the poverty line 
in Indonesia: Central Board of Statistics and SMERU estimates, 1996 
and 1999
1996 1999
CBS SMERU CBS SMERU
Percentage below the Poverty Line
urban 13.4 7.2 19.4 16.3
rural 19.8 20.5 26.0 34.1
total 17.5 15.7 23.4 27.1
numbers in Poverty (Millions)
urban 9.4 5.1 15.6 13.2
rural 24.6 25.3 32.7 42.4
total 34.0 30.5 48.0 55.6
Sources: Central board of Statistics (2009: 181), Pradhan et al. (2000: tables 2 and 4).
A further set of estimates were prepared by Ravallion and Lokshin (2007: 
37). They used a price index based on consumption patterns of those at the 
poverty line to adjust the poverty line from 1996 onwards. This index gave 
greater weight to food prices which had increased more rapidly than the 
general price index. According to their estimates, the headcount measure 
of poverty almost trebled between 1996 and 1998, from 12.1 per cent to 36.5 
per cent which was only slightly lower than the f igure in the appendix to 
the president’s speech. But they also found that the headcount measure 
fell sharply after 1998, and by 2001 was lower than in 1996, whereas the 
CBS estimates found a slower decline. Ravallion and Lokshin (2007: 53-54) 
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concluded that the diverse impact of the crisis across the country was 
partly explained by initial conditions; poorer and more remote regions 
were less affected than those which were well integrated into the national 
economy. The integrated regions were richer in the pre-crisis years, but 
more vulnerable to the fall in national output. Bresciani et al. (2002) found 
that urban-rural linkages were weaker in Indonesia than in Thailand, and 
the impact of the contraction in the rural economy less severe. Farmers 
growing export crops benefited from the rapid depreciation of the rupiah.
Malaysia was the third country to experience a significant drop in income 
in 1998, but the fall in real GDP was less marked, and the impact on poverty 
was less dramatic than in Thailand and Indonesia, at least according to the 
estimates given by Ragayah, which were based on off icial data (2012: Table 
11.1). The headcount measure of poverty rose from 6.1 per cent to 7.5 per 
cent between 1997 and 1999; numbers in poverty increased from 274,200 
to 360,100. Around 57 per cent of the increase in the poor occurred in rural 
areas, and 43 per cent in urban areas.9 Ragayah (2012: 237) claimed that 
poverty remained stable in rural areas, and increased in urban areas, but 
this claim did not appear to be supported by her f igures. Poverty increased 
in both Penang and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, albeit from very 
low levels in 1997, but there were also increases in states such as Kedah, 
Perak and Sabah, which were more rural. While it might have been true 
that government policies protected the rural population in some states, 
this was not the case everywhere in the country.
The Impact of the Crisis on Poverty: The Philippines, Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia
Other countries in Southeast Asia did not experience declines in gross 
domestic product between 1996 and 1998 of the same magnitude as Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia. In the Philippines, there was a slight decline in GDP 
in 1998, but a recovery in the following year. Between 1995 and 2000, total 
GDP increased by 19 per cent (Table 6.8), although in per capita terms there 
was little change. But according to the estimates compiled by Balisacan, the 
headcount measure of poverty increased between 1997 and 2000. Numbers 
in poverty, which fell between 1994 and 1997, rose again between 1997 and 
9 The estimates given by Ragayah (2012) in Tables 11.1 and 11.2 show that the headcount measure 
of poverty was 7.5 per cent in 1999; in Tables 11.3 and 11.4 a f igure of 8.5 per cent is given. No 
explanation is offered for the disparity.
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2000 (Table 6.5). The increase was partly due to the impact of the severe El 
Niño weather effect in 1998. In addition, after a jump between 1994 and 1996, 
employment fell between 1996 and 1998 (Herrin and Pernia 2003: Figure 
9.6). For many people who were just above the poverty line in 1997, even a 
small fall in income was enough to push them back into poverty.
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia all began to carry out household surveys 
in the 1990s; it was pointed out above that problems were raised about 
the coverage of the surveys, especially in Cambodia. Given that all three 
countries were not severely affected by the 1997/98 crisis, there was little 
reason to expect that poverty levels would increase. In fact, the available 
data show that headcount measures fell steadily in the decade from the 
early 1990s to the early 2000s. In Vietnam, which achieved a faster growth 
of GDP in the decade from 1995 to 2005 than any other country in the region, 
the headcount measure fell between 1993 and 2002 according to various 
measures (Table 6.11). The series compiled by the General Statistics Off ice 
and the World Bank showed a fall in the headcount measure of poverty 
from 58 per cent in 1993 to 29 per cent over these nine years. Such a rapid 
decline was probably due to the fact that many were close to the poverty 
line in the early 1990s, so the increases in household income which occurred 
after 1993 were suff icient to push many millions of Vietnamese above it. 
But it should be noted that the fall in numbers under the $2-a-day poverty 
line was much less spectacular.
Table 6.11:  Headcount measures of poverty in Vietnam: Results from different 
poverty lines
Year Molisa GSO/WB $1.25 $2.00
1993 26.0 58.1 63.8 85.7
1998 16.0 37.4 49.4 78.1
2002 11.4 28.9 40.1 68.7
2004 6.8 19.5 31.4 60.4
2008 12.1 14.5 16.8 43.3
2010 14.2 20.7 3.9 16.8
2012 9.6 17.2 2.4 12.5
note: the Molisa poverty line was revised in 2001, 2005 and 2010, so the headcount estimates are 
not comparable over these years. in 2010 there were several survey and methodology revisions so 
the gSo data are not comparable with previous years.
Source: demombynes and vu (2015: table 2).
The estimates of poverty given in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 are derived from the 
household income and expenditure surveys which had been carried out 
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in Thailand and Indonesia since the 1960s. The f igures in Table 6.5 use 
data from the Philippine surveys which began in the 1950s. Most analysts 
using these surveys, including those in the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, appear to have accepted the results without too much 
scrutiny of their reliability. The data for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were 
derived from surveys initiated in the 1990s, which followed the World 
Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) template, which was 
introduced in the 1980s. Pyatt (2003: 345) argued that the primary concern 
of the LSMS ‘was to provide information on who was benef iting from 
development and by how much. This put a premium on the consistency 
of survey results, and, therefore, on the consistency of survey design over 
time.’ But in spite of these goals, doubts were raised about the accuracy of 
the LSMS. The problem of survey reliability will be addressed in greater 
detail in Chapter 7.
The Impact of the Crisis on Inequality
In the immediate aftermath of the 1997/98 crisis, some analysts argued that 
income inequality might be reduced, as the fall in incomes was more severe 
among relatively highly paid urban workers in sectors such as construction, 
banking, f inance and other modern services. Incomes of rural workers 
were less affected, and some rural producers might have benef ited from 
the increase in prices of export commodities such as rice, rubber, vegetable 
oils and spices. The evidence from household income and expenditure 
surveys across Southeast Asia from 1996 to 1999 offered some support for 
this argument. Gini coeff icients were either stable or fell between 1996 
and 1999 (Table 6.12). Only in the Philippines did expenditure inequalities 
show a slight rise.
But these estimates are derived from nominal data and ignore the pos-
sibility that real incomes of the poor in both urban and rural areas fell 
sharply as a result of the rapid rise in prices of basic needs, especially food. 
This argument was most relevant to the Indonesian case, where inflation 
accelerated rapidly as the crisis worsened, and the rise in the cost of basic 
needs led to falling real incomes for wage earners. In their analysis of a rural 
survey conducted in 100 villages in Indonesia in 1998, Skoufias, Suryahadi 
and Sumarto (2000) found that, once adjustments had been made for price 
increases, inequality did increase after the crisis erupted. Similar studies 
are not available for Thailand or Malaysia, although inflation was lower in 
these economies than in Indonesia in 1997 and 1998.
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What happened to the share of the highest income groups in total income 
after the crisis? There is some evidence from Indonesia that the income 
share of the top decile dropped slightly between 1996 and 1998, which is 
consistent with the argument that these households were more adversely 
affected by the crisis than other income groups. But the very rich households 
(the top 1 per cent of the distribution) appear to have increased their share 
of total income in the years after 1996. Leigh and Van der Eng (2009: Table 
1) estimated that in 1996, the top 1 per cent received slightly less than 10 per 
cent of total income; that share increased steadily after the crisis and peaked 
at 15.5 per cent in 2001. If these estimates are correct, it appears that the 
incomes of the very rich were largely protected from the immediate impact 
of the decline in GDP in 1998, even if their net wealth might have declined.
Table 6.12: Gini coefficients in Southeast Asia, 1996, 1999, 2004 and 2011
Country 1996 1999 2004 2011
Singapore 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.53
Malaysia 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.44
thailand (1) 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.48
thailand (2) 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.37
indonesia 0.35 0.31 0.32 0.41
Philippines 0.43 0.46 0.44 0.43
vietnam 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.36
Laos n/a 0.35 0.33 0.37
note: estimates for Malaysia refer to 1997, 1999, 2004 and 2009; for the Philippines 1997, 2000, 
2003 and 2012; for vietnam, 1996, 1998, 2004 and 2012; for Laos, 1997/98, 2002/3 and 2012/13. 
Countries are ranked according to estimates of expenditures per capita using 2011 PPP data, 
from World bank (2014a: table 6.2). estimates are based on household expenditures, except for 
Singapore (earnings), Malaysia (income), thailand (1) (income) 
Sources: Singapore: Mukhopadhaya (2014: table 3.1); Malaysia: ragayah (2012: 240); thailand (1), 
Warr (2009: table 9); indonesia: Asra (2014: 34); Laos: Warr, rasphone and Menon (2015: table 7). 
other estimates from unu-Wider (2018).
7 Growth, Poverty and Distribution in 
the Early Twenty-first Century
The Impact of Accelerated Growth after 2004: The Evidence from 
National Poverty Lines
From the early 2000s onwards, the Southeast Asian countries put the events 
of the late 1990s behind them, and growth rates of GDP recovered, although 
there was some variation across countries. In the decade from 2005 to 2015 
most experienced fairly robust growth in GDP, ranging from 3.3 per cent 
in Thailand to almost 7 per cent in Cambodia, and 7.8 per cent in Laos, 
although in this case the figures may well be overstated (Table 7.1). The global 
f inancial crisis (GFC) which erupted in the USA and Britain in the latter part 
of 2007 did affect growth in Southeast Asia, but the impact was not nearly as 
severe as the Asian crisis of a decade earlier. The impact was transmitted to 
Southeast Asia mainly through a fall in demand for manufactured exports 
in the developed world, and a decline in numbers of tourists. Malaysia 
and Thailand experienced a slight contraction in GDP in 2009, while there 
was almost zero growth in Cambodia. But in all three countries growth 
rebounded the following year, although Thailand experienced a further fall 
in output in 2011, mainly as a result of catastrophic f loods. In most other 
countries in the region, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos 
and Myanmar, GDP continued to expand in 2009, although at a lower rate. 
Demand for commodities continued to be buoyant, especially from China.
Some commentators predicted that the GFC would affect poverty across 
Asia, but in fact the statistical evidence showed that the impact was small. 
Most countries in Southeast Asia were by the early 2000s publishing 
estimates of the headcount measure of poverty using ‘off icial’ poverty 
lines. There was a general tendency for the improved growth performance 
to lead to a decline in the headcount measure of poverty, although there 
were some critical voices. The Eleventh Malaysia Plan, scheduled to run 
from 2016 to 2020, claimed that poverty had declined from 3.8 per cent of 
the population in 2009 to only 0.6 per cent of the population by 2014. But 
no details were given about the poverty line used, and Malaysian off icials 
were still reluctant to publish the household survey data on which the 
estimates were based. To some informed observers, the discussion of poverty 
was both perfunctory and non-transparent (Chander and Welsh 2015: 7). 
They pointed out that the problems of East Malaysia received very little 
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discussion; indeed, the plan documents had very little to say about poverty 
alleviation strategies in either urban or rural areas. It remains to be seen 
whether the new coalition government which was elected in 2018 will address 
issues relating to poverty and inequality in more depth. In Indonesia, the 
headcount measure of poverty as measured by the Central Board of Statistics 
(CBS) had been trending downwards since 1999, but it increased from 16 
per cent of the population in 2005 to 17.8 per cent in 2006. Numbers below 
the poverty line jumped from 35.1 million to 39.3 million. This increase 
preceded the global crisis, and was attributed in large part to the increase 
in domestic rice prices, which resulted from increased protection against 
foreign imports. Both the headcount measure of poverty and the numbers 
in poverty fell after 2006. By 2010 the headcount measure was 10.7 per cent 
and numbers in poverty 31 million, which was lower than the numbers of 
poor in 1996, in spite of the population growth which had occurred (Central 
Board of Statistics 2015b: 175).
In the Philippines, as in Indonesia, the global recession also hit at a time 
when the country was still affected by the increase in rice prices in 2007/8 
(Balisacan et al. 2010: 8). But the impact on poverty was modest. Estimates 
prepared by the Philippine Statistics Authority showed that the headcount 
measure of poverty was almost constant between 2006 and 2009, although 
Table 7.1: Growth in GDP, 2005-2015, and Gini coefficients 
Country Average annual 




Singapore 5.7 0.42 0.39
Malaysia 4.9 0.46 0.40
thailand 3.3 0.43 0.36
indonesia 5.7 0.33 0.41
Philippines 5.4 0.43 0.40
vietnam 6.1 0.35 0.34
Lao Pdr 7.8 0.33 0.37
Cambodia 6.9 0.35 0.31
* Singapore: 2006 and 2014; Malaysia and vietnam: 2004 and 2014; thailand: 2004 and 2015; 
indonesia: 2005 and 2015; Philippines: 2006 and 2015; Laos: 2002-2003 and 2012-2013; Cambodia: 
2004 and 2012. the ginis are comparable for each country over time, but not comparable across 
countries, as some are estimated from income data and some from expenditure data. 
note: gdP data refer to constant prices in local currencies from the websites of national statistical 
agencies.
Sources: indonesia: Asra (2014: 34) and Central board of Statistics (2015a: 27); Laos: Warr, rasphone 
and Menon (2015: table 7); vietnam: benjamin, brandt and McCaig (2016: table 1); Singapore: 
department of Statistics (2015: tables 4.6 and 4.7). other countries: unu-Wider (2018). 
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numbers below the poverty line increased because of population growth 
(Table 7.2). Using a different poverty line, Balisacan et al. (2010: Table 4) 
estimated that there was a continual decline in the headcount measure 
from 33 per cent in 2006 to 29.7 per cent in 2009. They also found a small 
decline in numbers of poor. They also gave a counter-factual estimate of 
what poverty might have been, had there not been a slowdown in growth 
of GDP in 2008/9. These authors claimed that numbers of poor people could 
have declined to 25.6 million in 2009. In other words the global crisis meant 
that over four million people in the Philippines stayed poor who might 
otherwise have moved above the poverty line.
Table 7.2:  Headcount measure of poverty and numbers below the poverty line: 
Philippines, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015






Sources: Philippine Statistics Authority (2016); population data from Philippine Statistical Yearbook 
(Manila: national Statistical Coordination board and Philippine Statistics Authority), various issues.
In Thailand, where GDP did decline in 2009, and the dollar value of merchan-
dise exports fell by 19 per cent, the net impact on real spending was small. 
Haughton and Khandker (2014: 90) concluded that the only demographic 
group to be affected were young adults, especially those residing in the 
Bangkok region. They were hurt by the decline in jobs in export-oriented 
manufacturing, and in tourism. In Vietnam, the headcount measure of 
poverty did increase between 2008 and 2010, but this was the result of 
changes in the way the poverty line was estimated. Even before the impact 
of the global crisis, a surge in inflation had led to a reduction in real wages. 
A World Bank report argued that, as GDP growth slowed in Vietnam in 2009, 
there was a negative impact on living standards but only of short duration. 
The group most affected were migrant workers; to the extent that their 
remittances to rural areas were reduced, there was also an adverse impact 
on those rural households which relied on remittances (Kozel 2014: 37).
In Cambodia, both government and World Bank estimates showed that 
there was a decline in the headcount measure of poverty between 2004 and 
2011, with much of the decline taking place before 2009. The Cambodian 
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government introduced a new poverty line in 2013 and revised the headcount 
measures from 2004 to 2012. Much of the fall at the national level took place 
between 2007 and 2009 (48 per cent to 23 per cent). In 2012 the national 
headcount measure had fallen further to 19 per cent, although there was an 
increase in the headcount measure in Phnom Penh between 2011 and 2012, 
which could have been a delayed reaction from the impact of the global 
crisis on exports (Asian Development Bank 2014b: 3-5). In Laos, Estudillo, 
Phimmavong and Quimba (2017: Table 4) estimated that the headcount 
measure of poverty fell from 35.5 per cent in 2002 to 14 per cent in 2012; again 
most of the fall took place in the years from 2002 to 2007. In the southern 
region of Laos, there was actually an increase in the headcount measure of 
poverty between 2007 and 2012. Estudillo, Phimmavong and Quimba (2017: 
42) found that poverty was lowest in urban areas, especially the capital 
(Vientiane) and in those rural areas which had access to roads and electricity.
In the previous chapter, the problem of comparability of national poverty 
lines in the 1980s and 1990s was noted. It was clear from the 2011 estimates 
that the problem had not gone away in the early twenty-f irst century (Table 
7.3). Although most countries claimed to be using the ‘cost of basic needs’ 
approach to setting both national and regional poverty lines, by the early 
twenty-f irst century it appeared that the different approaches used by 
different statistical agencies across Southeast Asia were producing poverty 
lines which varied considerably. There was a tendency for the countries 
with higher per capita GDP to have a higher poverty line, but this was not 
always the case. In 2011, Indonesia stood out as having a low poverty line 
in comparison with the Philippines and Cambodia, in spite of the fact that 
Indonesia’s per capita GDP was higher.1 National poverty lines also varied as 
a proportion of household consumption expenditures, although the variation 
was greater using the national accounts data than those from household 
surveys (Table 7.4). The reasons for this will be discussed further below.
Over the years, the national poverty lines estimated by statistical agencies 
in Southeast Asia have attracted criticism from various quarters, including 
academics and NGO activists. In Indonesia there were criticisms in the early 
1990s that the poverty line estimated by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
was not only low, and falling relative to per capita consumption expenditures, 
1 Bhalla (2010: 137) regressed national poverty lines on per capita consumption from the 
national accounts data for a cross section of countries; there was a clear trend for countries with 
higher per capita consumption to have higher poverty lines. But several large countries in Asia, 
including China, India and Indonesia, were below the trend line; their national poverty lines 
were lower than would have been expected given their per capita consumption expenditures.
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especially in urban areas (Booth 2016: 177). In 1996 the CBS came up with 
a new set of poverty lines for both urban and rural areas. The justif ication 
for the increase was that, as per capita GDP increased, Indonesians were 
consuming a broader range of goods and services, including more education 
and healthcare. The new poverty lines for 1996 were 10 per cent higher than 
Table 7.3: National poverty lines, 2011 (per person per month)





Cambodia (2009)*** 29 77
* the poverty line is the population-weighted average of the urban and rural poverty lines given 
in Central board of Statistics (2012). the poverty line for the March quarter is used.
** the poverty line is the population-weighted average of the urban and rural poverty lines given 
in general Statistics office (2013). 
*** the poverty line of 3,871 riels per day is used, as reported in Asian development bank (2014b: 5).
Sources: thailand: national Statistical office (2015); indonesia: Central board of Statistics (2012): Phil-
ippines: Philippine Statistics Authority (2014); vietnam: general Statistics office (2013); Cambodia: 
Asian development bank (2014b). exchange rate and PPP data from World bank (2014a, 47).
Table 7.4:  National poverty lines as a percentage of household consumption 
expenditures from surveys and national accounts estimates  
Country Household surveys National accounts
Cambodia (2009)* 45.7 61.2
vietnam (2010)** 57.4 47.4
vietnam (2010)** 37.8 31.3
vietnam (2012)** 38.0 29.1
Philippines (2009) 47.4 25.6
Philippines (2012) 43.6 22.9
indonesia (2010) 43.0 16.6
thailand (2009) 45.1 32.2
thailand (2011) 44.6 29.7
* estimate made using the poverty line of 3,871 riels per person per day, as reported in Asian 
development bank (2014b: 5).
** estimate made using revised poverty line of 653,000 dong per person per month for 2010, given 
in Kozel (2014: 5). the other estimate for 2010 and that for 2012 uses the lower poverty lines given 
in general Statistics office (2013). 
Sources: thailand: national Statistical office (2015); Cambodia: national institute of Statistics 
(2014); Philippine Statistics Authority (2014); vietnam: general Statistics office (2013); indonesia: 
Central board of Statistics (2012).
190 Living StAndArdS in SoutheASt ASiA 
the old ones in urban areas and 14.4 per cent higher in rural areas (Central 
Board of Statistics 2009: 181). In Vietnam, the poverty lines used by both the 
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the General 
Statistics Off ice were revised upwards in 2010 reflecting the decision to use 
a more comprehensive consumption welfare aggregate.2 The new poverty 
lines were almost twice as high as the old ones in urban areas and exactly 
twice as high in rural areas (Demombynes and Vu 2015: 16). These changes 
meant that in both Indonesia and Vietnam it is not possible to compare the 
headcount measures of poverty over the long term: in Indonesia the break 
came in 1996 and in Vietnam in 2010.
In the Philippines, a debate emerged in the 1990s when academic econo-
mists at the University of the Philippines criticized the approach to poverty 
measurement used by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). 
One issue concerned the use of income rather than expenditure data from 
the Family Income and Expenditure Surveys. Professor A. Balisacan from the 
University of the Philippines argued that expenditure data should be used 
because it is a household’s spending rather than its income which determines 
its welfare. In this he was following the recommendation of a number of 
international experts, in the World Bank and elsewhere.3 Following their 
reasoning, he argued that it was likely that households would give more 
accurate information on expenditure rather than income (Balisacan 1997: 
4-5). But statisticians from the NSCB argued that, faced with a lengthy and 
complicated questionnaire which took several hours to complete, many 
respondents were likely to have better recall about their income over a period 
of months than about their expenditures. They conceded that the diary 
approach might avoid at least some of the recall problems, but experience 
in the Philippines had shown that it had not worked well in 1979 (Virola, 
Ganac and Bacani 2000: 4). These problems with household survey data are 
examined further below.
If expenditure data are used to measure the proportion of the popula-
tion below a given poverty line, the results will usually be lower than if 
income data are used, especially when households can draw down savings 
in hard times or when they receive assistance, in cash or kind, from outside 
the household. Balisacan (2003: Table 10.1) calculated that 32.1 per cent 
of the population were below his poverty line estimate in 1994 using the 
2 See Kozel (2014: 68-74) for a discussion of the changes which were made in the estimation 
of the poverty line.
3 See Haughton and Khandker (2009: 183-184) and World Bank (2017: 38-44) for further discus-
sion of the income versus expenditure debate.
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expenditure data from the FIES. This was lower than the estimates using 
the off icial poverty line and household income data from the FIES. Other 
statistical agencies in Asia also use the income data from household surveys 
to measure both poverty and inequality. In Thailand and Malaysia, income 
data are used for the off icial estimates, although in the case of Thailand 
estimates of poverty using the household expenditure data collected in 
the household surveys have been published by UNU-WIDER (2018). This of 
course means that the headcount and other estimates of poverty in these 
two countries published in off icial documents are not directly comparable 
with those from Indonesia (where the estimates of the Central Board of 
Statistics use expenditure data from the household surveys).
By the 1990s, Myanmar was considered a development disaster by many in 
international development circles. Some estimates of poverty were contained 
in a World Bank report which had limited circulation in the late 1990s, but 
the survey data on which they were based were not publicly available. In 
the early years of the twenty-f irst century, the government of Myanmar 
published estimates of GDP growth which were considered very high, but 
verif ication of the f igures was diff icult, given the fact that Myanmar was 
subject to strict international sanctions, and was cut off from contact with 
most development agencies. After political liberalization and elections, 
most sanctions were removed and a process of economic reform began. 
But it was only in 2017 that the Ministry of Planning and Finance, together 
with the World Bank published an analysis of poverty in Myanmar based 
on household surveys carried out in 2004/5, 2009/10 and 2015. These surveys 
found a substantial decline in both the headcount measure of poverty 
and numbers below the poverty line, especially between 2009/10 and 2015 
(Table 7.5).
Table 7.5:  Headcount measures of poverty in Myanmar and numbers in poverty, 
2004/5, 2009/10 and 2015
Year Headcount measure of poverty Numbers  
(millions)
national* urban rural
2004/5 48.2 (44.5) 32.2 53.9 23.3
2009/10 42.2 (37.5) 24.8 48.5 22.2
2015 32.1 (26.1) 14.5 38.8 16.8
* estimates refer to the headcount measure using 2015 living conditions poverty line.figures in 
brackets refer to the headcount measure of poverty, using the 2009/10 living conditions poverty 
line.
Source:  Ministry of Planning and finance and World bank group (2017: Part 01, p. 19; Part 02, p. 25).
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Creating Internationally Comparable Poverty Estimates
Because national poverty lines often ref lect not just the economic, but 
also the social and political concerns of national governments and are not 
comparable across countries, or even over time in the same country, efforts 
have been made in recent decades by international agencies to establish 
‘international poverty lines’. These are supposedly more comparable across 
national boundaries, and can also be used to monitor poverty trends at the 
regional and global level over time. The World Bank used the ‘dollar a day’ 
measure until the early years of the twenty-f irst century, when $1.25 and $2 
lines were introduced.4 These poverty lines were converted into national 
currencies using data on the purchasing power of the national currency, 
relative to the American dollar (PPP adjustments). In Chapter 4, the original 
work on the development of purchasing power adjusted GDP f igures by 
economists at the University of Pennsylvania was discussed. The early work 
included data for only two Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines and 
Malaysia (Table 4.5). In both cases the estimate of per capita GDP after the 
PPP adjustments was considerably higher than using the off icial exchange 
rate. Over time the country coverage was greatly expanded, and the estimates 
were published by the Penn World Tables (PWT) project.
It has been argued that the PPP-corrected estimates published by the PWT 
had been developed as a means of comparing national accounts f igures, and 
were not well suited to poverty comparions (Aten and Heston 2010: 155-156). 
In many countries, the price data were mainly collected in urban areas; 
it was often considered too expensive, and sometimes too dangerous, to 
collect information from remote rural locations (Ravallion 2015: 15-16). The 
World Bank began to generate its own PPP data in 1993; new estimates were 
published in 2005 and 2011. In 2005 the country coverage was expanded, and 
China was added for the first time, although the data for China were confined 
to eleven large cities and could not claim to be nationally representative. In 
2011, further changes were made to the methodology which led to significant 
changes in the estimation of poverty in Asia and elsewhere; these changes 
will be discussed below.
The Asian Development Bank also became involved in the measurement 
of poverty in developing member countries, and took an approach which dif-
fered from that of the World Bank. An important study which endeavoured 
to estimate poverty using PPP data incorporating prices paid by the poor 
4 A detailed discussion of the changes in the World Bank methodology up to 2005 is given by 
Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2009).
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was published by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2008 in its Key 
Indicators for Asia and the Pacific. Together with the national statistical 
agencies in sixteen developing member countries (China was not included), 
the ADB carried out a series of poverty surveys which estimated prices paid 
by the poor for 2005. For several countries in South and Southeast Asia, the 
headcount measures of poverty measured using the PPPs derived from the 
poverty surveys were lower than those derived from the unadjusted PPP 
data. This was true for India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, as well as for Indonesia 
and Vietnam (Table 7.6). These f indings were greeted with some surprise, 
as it was often assumed in the literature, based mainly on evidence from 
rich countries, that the poor pay more for basic needs that the better-off, 
who buy in bulk from large stores (World Bank 2017: 75-78).5
Table 7.6: Headcount estimates of poverty, 2005 ($1.35 Per Person Per Day)
Country Headcount Index
Consumption PPP Poverty PPPs
ICP PS
thailand 0.1 0 0
vietnam 25.6 24.2 16.0
Philippines 27.0 24.1 29.5
indonesia 39.2 38.7 24.1
Cambodia 35.4 36.2 36.9
Lao Pdr 48.8 52.5 53.6
note: Poverty PPPs are estimated using the data on the consumption basket of the poor; poverty 
survey PPSs are estimated using prices paid by the poor, derived from the poverty survey.
Source: Asian development bank (2008: 32).
It is possible that the results for South Asia were influenced by the fact that 
many of the poor purchase basic staples in government ‘fair price’ stores. 
In Indonesia the post-1998 policy of supplying rice at subsidized prices was 
also likely to have helped the poor, although critics argued that the targeting 
was weak. Most analysts have acknowledged that this is a topic which needs 
more research, both in Asia and elsewhere, although there has been some 
5 For a more detailed discussion of the importance of using prices paid by the poor, see 
Aten and Heston (2010: 158-160). They cite evidence that in India the poor tend to buy smaller 
quantities of food and other goods and often pay a higher price per kilo compared with those 
who buy in larger quantities. This point has often been made in the Southeast Asian context as 
well.
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criticism of the ADB approach. Deaton and Dupriez (2011: 161) pointed out 
that it is diff icult to control for quality differences; poor people tend to 
buy lower-quality rice and other foodgrains, which may not be reflected 
in the PPP data. It is also important to look at the prices the poor pay for 
services such as healthcare and education, as the cost of these services is 
now included in most off icial poverty lines. A study in Thailand found that 
the poorest quintile of the population in the urban area studied (a town in 
the centre of the country) were paying a much higher proportion of their 
income on health services than the richest quintiles. The authors argued 
that the generous health benefits enjoyed by civil servants explained this 
result (Pannarunothai and Mills 1997). It is likely that these f indings also 
apply to other middle-income countries in Asia.
In 2014, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) suggested a poverty line of 
$1.51, again converted into local currencies using exchange rates adjusted 
for differences in the purchasing power of currencies. The higher poverty 
line compared with the World Bank one of $1.25 was justif ied on the grounds 
that developing member countries in Asia are on average rather better off 
than those in Africa, whose lower national poverty lines influence the World 
Bank line. The estimates of the headcount measure of poverty in 2010 were 
given in Table 1.2. As was noted in Chapter 1, these estimates raised a number 
of questions. Why, for example, was the headcount estimate for Indonesia 
higher than for Vietnam and Cambodia, in spite of the fact that per capita 
GDP in these two countries was much lower? Did these disparities reflect 
problems in the household survey data? I return to this question below, 
but f irst it is important to examine the most recent World Bank poverty 
estimates for Asia, based on the 2011 PPP data.
The new estimates of GDP and household expenditures based on the 2011 
PPP estimates were published by the World Bank in 2014, and were greeted 
with some surprise, and a degree of skepticism. The data showed that 
there was a large increase in PPP-adjusted GDP f igures for the non-OECD 
countries relative to the USA. China’s total GDP was thus close to that of the 
USA, while India’s GDP was larger than Japan. The ten ASEAN countries had 
a combined GDP which was around 38 per cent of that in China, and about 
the same as the combined GDP of Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Norway and Sweden. Researchers were not slow to spell out the implications 
of these new estimates for world poverty. Dykstra, Kenny and Sandefur 
(2014) argued that, as a result of the new PPP data, the proportion of the 
population in the developing world below the poverty line of $1.25 fell 
from 19.7 per cent to 8.9 per cent, with a particularly large drop in South 
Asia, whose share of the global poor population dropped from 49 per cent 
groW th, Povert Y And diStribution in the eArLY t Went Y-firSt CenturY 195
to 29 per cent. The explanations for these results were complex; to some 
extent they were due to overestimation of poverty, especially in Asia, in 
2005.6 The literature on the implications of the new PPP estimates has 
grown rapidly, and will no doubt continue to grow when further PPP data 
become available.
The World Bank used the new PPP data to produce new estimates of both 
GDP and consumption per capita in PPP dollars (World Bank 2014a: Tables 
6.1 and 6.2). New poverty lines were adopted of $1.90 and $3.10, adjusted for 
the new PPP data. The headcount measures of poverty for seven Southeast 
Asian countries, together with India and China, using the new PPP data are 
given in Table 7.7. The most striking difference with the earlier data using 
the $2-a-day line is that the new headcount measures were much lower. 
For example, using the $2-a-day measure, it was reported that around 42 
per cent of the population in the Philippines was below the $2 line in 2012 
(Table 7.7). Two years later, using the new $1.90 line and new PPP data, the 
percentage drops to 13.1 per cent. In Indonesia there was a drop from 43 per 
6 A useful overview of the reasons for the changes can be found in Deaton and Aten (2017).
Table 7.7:  Headcount measures of poverty in Southeast Asia using World Bank 
and national poverty lines
Country $2.00* $1.90** $3.10** national
Malaysia (2009) 2.3 0.3 2.7 3.8
thailand (2012) 3.5 0.1 1.2 12.6
indonesia (2013) 43.3 9.8 39.4 11.4
Philippines (2012) 41.7 13.1 37.6 25.2
China (2012) 18.6 6.5 19.1 n/a
india (2011) 59.2 21.2 58.0 n/a
vietnam (2012) 12.5 3.2 13.9 17.2
Laos (2012) 62.0 16.7 46.9 23.2
Cambodia (2012) 41.3 2.2 21.6 20.5 (2011)
* estimates using the $2 poverty line converted into local currencies using the 2005 PPP data. 
estimates refer to 2009 for Malaysia, 2010 for thailand, 2011 for Cambodia, indonesia, india and 
China and 2012 for Laos and vietnam.
** estimates using the $1.90 and $3.10 poverty lines converted into local currencies using the 2011 
PPP data.
Sources: $2 poverty line estimates from Asian development bank (2015: table 1.9); estimates using 
$1.90 and $3.10 poverty lines from wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.2,(accessed 20/3/2016): 
Malaysia: ragayah (2012: table 11.2); thailand: national Statistical office (2015: table 8.12); 
indonesia: Central board of Statistics (2015b: table 4.6.1); Philippines: Philippine Statistics Authority 
(2016); Cambodia: World bank (2014b: table 1); Laos: Warr, rasphone and Menon (2015: table 10); 
vietnam: demombynes and vu (2015: table 2).
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cent in 2011 to just under 10 per cent in 2013. Using national poverty lines, 
the Philippine Statistics Authority showed a far more modest decline in 
the headcount measure from 25.2 per cent in 2012 to 21.6 per cent in 2015 
(Table 7.2). In Indonesia, the CBS headcount measure showed a decline from 
12 per cent in 2012 to 11.2 per cent in 2015. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many 
statisticians and economists in Southeast Asia, confronted with the very 
large revisions in the World Bank f igures, argued that the poverty estimates 
based on national poverty lines gave a more reliable guide to policy.
The new estimates based on the $1.90 poverty line and the 2011 PPP data 
gave headcount measures of poverty for several countries in Southeast Asia 
which were closer to the headcount measures derived from the national 
poverty lines than were the older estimates. But there were still quite large 
disparities in the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. There were also 
differences between the ranking of countries according to the per capita 
estimates of actual individual consumption expenditures using the 2011 
PPP data (AICE), and the headcount measure of poverty using the $1.90 
poverty line (Tables 7.7 and 7.8). Vietnam’s estimates of per capita AICE 
was less than $3,000 in 2011, which was considerably lower than either the 
Philippines or Indonesia. But the headcount measure of poverty was lower 
Table 7.8:  Actual individual consumption expenditures per capita: Southeast 
Asian Countries, China and India, 2011









Singapore 24,725 21,960 110.7
brunei 15,683 10,124 80.5
Malaysia 11,082 5,354 60.2
thailand 8,477 3,343 49.2
indonesia 4,805 2,044 53.0
Philippines 4,490 1,831 50.8
vietnam 2,991 978 40.8
Laos 2,341 740 39.4
Cambodia 2,277 760 41.6
Myanmar 2,273 638 35.0
China 4,331 2,341 67.4
india 3,023 907 37.4
note: Actual individual consumption includes all household consumption expenditures, as well 
as general government and nPiSh (non-profit institutions serving households) expenditures on 
goods and services, such as health and education. 
Source: World bank (2014a: table 6.2).
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in Vietnam. Did this reflect greater equality in expenditure distribution 
in Vietnam? Or does it suggest that the 2011 PPP f igures have not captured 
important differences in the price of basic goods such as rice in Vietnam 
compared with Indonesia and the Philippines? In principle, differences in 
the price of basic needs such as rice and housing should be reflected in the 
PPP data but in practice this might not be the case. In addition, there may 
be problems in the sample coverage of the household surveys which lead to 
the exclusion of poorer households. These questions are addressed further 
in the next two sections.
Trends in Inequality, 2005 to 2015
The decade from 2005 to 2015 was one where most countries in Southeast 
Asia experienced growth in GDP of between 5 and 7 per cent per annum 
(Table 7.1). In most cases, this growth was accompanied by either a fall in 
income/expenditure inequality, as shown in the Gini coeff icients, or only 
a slight increase. The important exception to this trend appears to have 
been Indonesia. But there are a number of caveats which must be attached 
to the estimates of the Gini coeff icients given in Table 7.1. First, although 
in most cases they relate to inequalities in household expenditure per 
capita, as reported in household surveys, this is not the case for Singapore 
and Malaysia. In Singapore the estimate is derived from household income 
from employment, and is adjusted for the impact of taxes and transfer 
payments. In Malaysia, the data refer to household income, and is not fully 
comparable with the estimates from expenditure data. Second, even for those 
countries where the Gini is derived from household expenditure per capita, 
they may not be comparable because of different approaches to measuring 
expenditure in household surveys. Third, the survey data themselves may be 
flawed because certain groups of households are undercounted, or omitted 
altogether.
Even where inequality estimates are comparable both across countries 
and over time, they are often not accepted as useful indicators of changes in 
the distribution of income and wealth. While conceding that the household 
survey f igures on income and expenditure in Thailand did show some 
fall in inequality between 1992 and 2013 (the Palma ratio fell from almost 
four to under three), Phongpaichit and Baker (2016: 12-13) identif ied three 
problems which had emerged since 2000. First, there appeared to be a ‘1 
per cent’ problem in Thailand in that the richest households had over 
time increased their share of both income and wealth by amassing not 
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just f inancial assets but also property. Second, the least advantaged 5 per 
cent of the population, who were mainly rural and uneducated, were not 
able to increase either their physical assets or their human capital. Third, 
while spatial inequalities may have been reduced over time, disparities 
in education and skills increased. Phongpaichit and Baker quoted studies 
which showed that while the quantity of education has increased sharply 
in Thailand since the 1990s, there were still sharp differences in quality. 
PISA tests showed that students at the best schools in Bangkok performed 
as well as, or better than, those in most OECD countries. But those in 
rural areas, especially in the northeast, performed even worse than in 
parts of Africa.
Among the countries for which data are available, the largest increase 
in inequality in the decade from 2005 to 2015 was found in Indonesia. It is 
now widely believed, both in Indonesia and in international circles, that in 
spite of, or perhaps because of, the progress towards greater democracy since 
the fall of Suharto, inequalities in income and wealth have increased. It has 
not infrequently been claimed that Indonesia has become a very unequal 
society, both in comparison with the Suharto era, and with other parts of 
Asia. But there are several problems with this argument. The Indonesian 
Statistics Agency (CBS) has in recent years changed both the way the Gini 
coeff icient has been calculated, and the sample frame for the household 
surveys (Susenas). Both these changes have consequences for the increases 
shown in Table 7.1. Asra (2014: 34-35) has shown that the CBS moved from 
using grouped data to individual household data, and this led to an increase 
in the Gini from 0.33 to 0.36 between 2006 and 2007.7 Between 2010 and 2011 
there was a further increase in the Gini, from 0.38 to 0.41, which was at least 
partly due to a change in sampling methodology (World Bank and Australian 
Aid 2016: 41). Given these problems, and also other problems with the Susenas 
surveys which will be discussed in the next section, the conclusion given 
in a report published in 2016 by the World Bank and Australian Aid that 
the Gini coeff icient increased ‘from 30 points in 2000 to 41 points in 2014’ 
must be treated with considerable caution (World Bank and Australian 
Aid 2016: 7). Using the year 2000 as the base year is also misleading insofar 
as there had been a very sharp decline in GDP in 1998, and no recovery in 
1999, which was accompanied by a fall in the Gini. A better comparison 
would be between 1996 and 2006; according to Asra (2014: 34), the Gini did 
fall over this decade but only from 0.35 to 0.33. There has probably been 
7 Van Ginneken and Park (1984: 13-16) discussed the bias which the use of grouped data can 
introduce.
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some increase in inequality in the decade from 2005 to 2015, but bearing in 
mind the changes in the estimation methodology, it is far from clear how 
large this increase was.8
In Myanmar, f igures from the 2015 household survey were used to 
estimate several measures of inequality. The Gini coeff icient of household 
expenditure was estimated at 0.32, which was lower than most other 
Asian countries. The proportion of total expenditure made by the top 
decile of the expenditure distribution was also quite low at 26 per cent, 
although the report noted that households in the top decile had seen a 
faster growth in their expenditures between 2009/10 and 2015 than other 
households (Ministry of Planning and Finance and World Bank Group 
2017: 25). The share of expenditures made by the bottom 40 per cent of the 
expenditure distribution fell over this period. Inequality in expenditures 
in urban areas were considerably higher than in rural areas. Given that 
urbanization rates are still low in Myanmar compared with most other 
Asian countries, at only 30 per cent, and given that they are likely to 
increase rapidly in coming decades, it is probable that inequalities will 
also increase.
Recently some attention has been given to the estimates of the distribu-
tion of wealth in parts of Southeast Asia. Laovakul (2016: 37) estimated the 
Gini coefficient of asset distribution in Thailand, based on the data collected 
in the Socio-Economic Household Surveys of 2006, 2007 and 2008. For all 
assets he found that the Gini coeff icient was 0.68 in 2006, falling to 0.66 in 
2009. The Gini was higher for f inancial assets and for land and buildings 
used for business and agricultural purposes. Both Thailand and Indonesia 
were also ranked among the countries with highly skewed wealth holdings, 
as reported in the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook for 2017 (Table 
7.9). In Thailand it was estimated that 56 per cent of the total wealth of the 
economy was owned by the richest 1 per cent of the population, which was 
about the same as Russia, and higher than China or India.9 In Indonesia, 
the richest 1 per cent owned around 45 per cent of total wealth. The only 
other Southeast Asian country to be investigated was Singapore, where the 
top 1 per cent owned 34 per cent of the wealth, a higher proportion than in 
South Korea or Japan.
8 Yusuf and Warr (2018: 136) claimed that the post-crisis rise in measured inequality in 
Indonesia was one of the largest increases found in any country in recent times, second only to 
that in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. That might be true if 2015 is compared 
with 2000, but not if 2015 is compared with 1996.
9 Credit Suisse (2018) estimated the Gini coeff icient of the wealth distribution in Thailand 
to be 90.1, which was the highest for all the countries investigated.
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Table 7.9: Share of total wealth: Ten countries
Country Share of total wealth 
Richest 1 per cent 
(%)
Richest 10 per cent 
(%)
Poorest 10 per cent 
(%)
thailand 56.2 78.7 0.1
russia 56.0 77.4 0.2
China 47.0 71.9 0.2
indonesia 45.4 74.8 -0.1
india 45.1 73.1 -0.9
brazil 43.5 72.3 -0.7
South Africa 41.2 75.0 -1.1
Singapore 34.0 63.1 0
taiwan 29.6 57.9 0.4
Japan 14.6 45.2 0.3
Source: Credit Suisse (2017: table 6.5).
Flaws in the Household Survey Data
Previous chapters have discussed the results of the household income 
and expenditure surveys which have been carried out in the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia since the 1960s. These surveys, and 
similar surveys from other parts of the world, have come under criticism 
for several reasons. The most frequent allegation is that they underestimate 
the incomes and expenditures of both the upper and the lower income 
groups (Milanovic 2016: 15-16). It is often claimed that homeless, internally 
displaced and migrant populations are not included in the sample if they 
lack a f ixed abode, and these groups are likely to be poorer than average. 
In addition, workers living in accommodation provided by employers are 
often not included. Whether all these people are really poor can be debated; 
construction and factory workers living on-site in urban areas may in fact 
be quite well-paid and they or their family may own a home in another part 
of the country. Even those migrants who lack a f ixed abode in the town 
or city to which they move may own property in their place of origin. At 
the other end of the scale, the very aff luent people living in gated housing 
complexes are often hard to approach, and if they are included, they may 
under-report their income and expenditure, probably through fear of 
tax demands. A study carried out in eighteen Latin America countries 
found not just that high earners do tend to under-report their incomes, 
but also that there was a general tendency to under-report earnings from 
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self-employment (Pyatt 2003: 343). This is probably true in many parts of 
Asia as well.
The exclusion of high earners, or their tendency to under-report income 
and expenditure is almost certainly one reason for the gap between the 
estimates of household income and expenditure in household surveys, 
and that given in the national accounts in Indonesia and the Philippines 
in recent years.10 Under-reporting of income by the richest households is 
likely to produce lower measures of inequality, and to the extent that such 
households refuse to participate at all, the headcount and other measures 
of poverty could be overstated (World Bank 2017: 31). On the other hand, 
the exclusion of other groups of the population such as migrant workers, or 
those in camps for internally displaced people could lead to underestimates 
of poverty, if indeed these groups are poorer than those households which 
are captured in the surveys. Even if they are not poor, their exclusion could 
help to explain the gap between the survey and the national accounts data, 
which has widened in several countries in Southeast Asia in recent years 
(Table 7.10). In Indonesia, the gap seems to have been widening since the 
1980s, and by the early 2000s the survey data was well under 50 per cent of 
that in the national accounts (Booth 2016: 177). The reasons for the decline 
do not seem to have attracted much scholarly attention, at least compared 
with India where the problem of the disparity between the National Sample 
Survey (NSS) data on household consumption and the national accounts has 
been widely discussed since the 1970s.11 While there are valid reasons for 
disparity between the two data sets, there appears to be some consensus that 
when the survey data fall below 50 per cent of the national accounts f igures, 
there is likely to be a problem with the coverage of the household surveys.
Deaton (2010: 194) pointed out that in the OECD countries, where the 
quality of both household survey and national accounts f igures is assumed to 
be higher than in the rest of the world, surveys tend to pick up around three-
quarters of the estimated consumption expenditure in the national accounts. 
The difference is due to items such as imputed value of owner-occupied 
housing, which is usually excluded from surveys, and expenditures by 
non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH). While expenditures by 
various non-governmental organizations, including religious charities, have 
10 In the Philippines, it has also been argued that the FIES has been increasingly underestimat-
ing the f low of remittances, especially among high-income groups (Ducanes 2010). But Ducanes 
also argued that understatement of remittances is unlikely to explain the large difference 
between the national accounts data and the FIES.
11 See, in particular, Deaton and Kozel (2005), Chapters 4 to 8.
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certainly been growing in many parts of Southeast Asia, and are now given in 
the national accounts data for both Thailand and Indonesia, it appears that 
they are very small relative to household consumption expenditures (less 
than 2 per cent in Indonesia). A more important reason for the disparities 
in the Philippines and Indonesia could be that the household expenditure 
component of the national accounts is estimated as a residual. Total gross 
domestic product is estimated from the production side, and estimates 
of government consumption expenditures, investment expenditures and 
exports less imports are subtracted from total GDP. The residual thus in-
corporates the errors in the other components of expenditure, which may 
be underestimated, thus inflating the estimate of household consumption 
expenditures. But even allowing for these problems, the survey f igures on 
household income and expenditure are probably underestimated, although 
the extent of the under-reporting is very diff icult to assess. It might not be 
confined to the richest decile of the distribution, but could well affect the 
returns of many households further down the distribution.
The evidence from both Cambodia and Vietnam raises different problems. 
In Cambodia, the survey data have been higher than the national accounts 
since 2004, although the disparity has been narrowing (Table 7.10). Ratios 
greater than unity have been found in some African countries where they 
have been attributed, in part at least, to underestimation in the national 
accounts (Deaton 2010: 194). Pyatt (2003: Table 4) compared national accounts 
Table 7.10:  Household survey consumption data as a percentage of national 
accounts consumption expenditures, 2000-2013
Thailand Cambodia Philippines* Indonesia Vietnam**
2000 74 n/a 70 42*** 74
2004 74 251 60 42 76
2007 67 n/a 55 38 75
2009 72 132 54 37 n/a
2011 67 n/a 53 45**** 83
2013 66 126 n/a 44**** 77
* data refer to 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
** data refer to 2000, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2012.
*** 1999 data.
**** March quarter data.
Sources: thailand: Statistical Yearbook of Thailand (bangkok: national Statistical office), various 
issues. Cambodia: Statistical Yearbook of Cambodia (Phnom Penh: national institute of Statistics), 
various issues. Philippines: Philippine Statistical Yearbook (Manila: national Statistical Coordination 
board and Philippine Statistics Authority), various issues. indonesia: booth (2016: table 8.5). 
vietnam: Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam (hanoi: Statistical Publishing house), various issues.
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data with those on household consumption expenditure from the Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS), and found that the LSMS f igures 
exceeded those from the national accounts not just for Tanzania, Ghana, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Morocco but also for Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan.12 
It is possible that understatement in the national accounts explains the 
Cambodian result, although it is likely that the problems with the household 
survey coverage in Cambodia which were discussed in the previous chapter 
have persisted after 2000. The World Bank claimed that in 2004 a more 
standardized methodology was introduced in implementing the household 
surveys, with assistance from the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA). This was intended to promote best practice and 
to limit comparability problems over time (World Bank 2014b: 6). This report 
did not directly address the disparity between the national accounts f igure 
and the survey data. More recently, the World Bank’s poverty estimates for 
Cambodia, based on the 2011 PPP data, show that the country had a lower 
headcount measure than Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, in spite of 
the very low estimate of expenditure per capita compared with these other 
countries (Tables 7.7 and 7.8). Are these f igures plausible? It seems probable 
that the measurement problems in Cambodia have not been fully resolved.13
In Vietnam, the household survey data have also fallen short of the 
national accounts f igures: the ratio has f luctuated between 74 and 83 
per cent between 2000 and 2013 (Table 7.10). This might suggest that the 
household surveys in Vietnam are of high quality, although some critics 
have suggested that this is not in fact the case. Pincus and Sender (2008) 
argued that many poor migrants to urban areas are excluded from the sample 
which only includes registered households, and this leads to understatement 
of numbers under the poverty line. Poorer households in remote rural 
regions are also likely to be undercounted, or missed out completely in the 
surveys.14 Undercounting of the poor in Vietnam might explain the appar-
ently paradoxical results that the proportion of the population in Vietnam 
below the $1.90-a-day poverty line was lower in 2012 than in Indonesia or 
the Philippines, in spite of the fact that average consumption expenditures 
12 Haughton and Khandker (2009: 192) argue that there is a universal tendency for average 
national accounts data to be higher than the f igure obtained by grossing up data from household 
surveys. But the evidence from several parts of the world refutes this argument.
13 The World Bank stopped publishing poverty estimates for Cambodia in the World Develop-
ment Indicators in 2018. No estimate for Cambodia was included in Asian Development Bank 
(2018).
14 A report by the World Bank acknowledged that some unregistered short-term migrants were 
probably vulnerable to short-term shocks such as the 2009 growth slowdown (Kozel 2014: 60).
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per capita, in PPP terms, were considerably lower in Vietnam (Tables 7.7 
and 7.8). But it is also likely that poor migrant households are excluded in 
Indonesia and the Philippines as well.
Part of the puzzle could be explained by the fact that economic growth 
in Vietnam has been more egalitarian, and more consistent since the 
early 1990s. Vietnam introduced comprehensive land reform policies after 
reunif ication and, at least until the early 1990s, private enterprise was 
strictly controlled, public sector salaries were low, and there were very few 
‘rich’ people. Thus the accelerated growth in the 1990s until recently might 
have begun from an unusually egalitarian base.15 But in 2005 and 2010, it 
appears that the Gini coeff icient for household per capita expenditures in 
Vietnam was about the same as in Indonesia, although lower than in the 
Philippines (Table 7.11). Only in 2012 and 2014 was the Gini in Indonesia 
higher. So the argument that the higher headcount measure for Indonesia 
was the result of higher inequalities does not seem plausible, at least until 
after 2010. Perhaps a more important factor in explaining the low poverty 
headcount measures for both Vietnam and Cambodia in recent years is the 
lower prices of basic needs, including food, housing, education and medical 
care. In principle this should be captured in the PPP f igures, and it is true 
that in 2011 the general price level was lower in Vietnam and Cambodia 
than in Indonesia and the Philippines (Table 7.8). But it is possible that the 
PPP data derived from the 2011 exercise do not capture fully the difference 
in the cost of living of households at or near the poverty threshold in these 
countries.
Table 7.11: Gini coefficient of household consumption expenditures
Vietnam Indonesia Philippines* Thailand
2002 0.34 0.32 0.41 0.42
2004 0.35 0.32 n/a 0.43
2006 0.34 0.33 0.43 0.42
2008 0.33 0.35 0.42 0.40
2010 0.38 0.38 n/a 0.39
2012 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.39
2014 0.34 0.41 n/a 0.37
* estimates for the Philippines refer to 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.
Source: vietnam: benjamin, brandt and McCaig (2016: table 1); indonesia: Asra (2014: table 6.1); 
thailand and the Philippines: unu-Wider (2018).
15 The estimates of the Gini coeff icient for 1993 given in Glewwe (2004b: Table 1.4) indicate 
that the Gini coeff icient of household income was 0.33 in 1993 and rose to 0.35 in 1998.
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To sum up, it seems probable that f laws in the household surveys them-
selves, together with problems in the PPP estimates, explain at least 
some of the differences between countries in the poverty estimates of 
the Asian Development Bank for 2010 given in Table 1.2, and in the more 
recent estimates of the World Bank, given in Table 7.7. Problems in the 
household surveys can result from non-compliance, or under-reporting, 
which might affect not just the richest households but those households 
whose incomes and expenditures are closer to, or even below the poverty 
threshold. It is also likely that non-compliance may result from a reluctance 
on the part of householders to devote many hours to keeping a diary, or to 
responding to a long questionnaire. In the Philippines, the Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey (FIES) takes place every three years, and involves 
a lengthy questionnaire of 78 pages, with 24 questions on income and 47 
on expenditures. It takes f ive hours to administer (Albert, Dumagan and 
Martinez 2015: 4). In Indonesia, the full Susenas survey as administered in 
the 1990s included 320 questions (Pradhan 2009: 391). In Vietnam the Living 
Standards Measurement Survey has also been criticized for its length (Kozel 
2014: 60). Unsurprisingly, it seems that many households simply refuse to 
participate if they have other demands on their time. Enumerators will try 
to f ind other, more cooperative, households to f ill their quota. These may 
well be households which are easier to access, and also smaller, given that 
obtaining data from large households takes more time. To the extent that 
richer households value their time more highly, they may be more likely to 
refuse to cooperate than poorer ones.
Given how crucial household survey data are to the estimation of both 
poverty and distributional indicators, it is surprising how little research 
has been carried out on ‘best practice’ ways of designing and adminis-
tering such surveys in middle- and low-income countries. In the 1970s 
experienced statisticians were pointing out that long questionnaires risked 
respondent fatigue and possible non-compliance. But it appears that the 
World Bank did not always heed this advice in compiling the global poverty 
estimates. In the early 2000s, they f inanced an experiment in Tanzania 
which administered eight different types of survey to 4,000 households. 
It was found that the surveys based on recall were much less expensive to 
administer than those based on diaries, especially when diary-keeping was 
combined with frequent visits from enumerators. But they were sometimes 
less accurate. Attempts to cut costs by reducing the number of questions 
led to a substantial loss in accuracy. This study concluded that a long-list 
recall module with a reference period of one to two weeks might produce 
the best results, given cost constraints (Beegle et al. 2012: 17). But it was 
206 Living StAndArdS in SoutheASt ASiA 
clear from their results that there was a trade-off between the time taken 
to administer a survey and accuracy. The World Bank report on monitoring 
global poverty recommended that there should be an investigation into 
the extent to which people are missing from household surveys, and the 
extent of under-representation and non-coverage of surveys (World Bank 
2017: 33). But such an investigation would be expensive, and would require 
the cooperation of national statistical agencies. It is far from clear that such 
cooperation would be forthcoming, either in Southeast Asia or elsewhere.
Should Monetary Estimates Be Abandoned?
The various estimates using internationally comparable poverty lines pub-
lished by the World Bank since the 1990s were no doubt done in good faith. 
But it is diff icult to avoid the conclusion that the World Bank has consistently 
underestimated the diff iculties not just in designing and implementing 
household surveys across the developing world, but also in estimating 
purchasing power parities (PPP). As a result of the changes in the PPP data, 
in both 2005 and 2011, major changes had to be made in their estimates of 
global poverty. This in turn has led to a loss of credibility regarding their 
estimates. Statisticians in countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia 
can reasonably point out that, if they want to monitor poverty trends over a 
period of years, it is preferable to use their own poverty lines, which generate 
data that are more useful to domestic policymakers.
It is now widely acknowledged that the data requirements for comparable 
estimates of poverty across countries are formidable. The authors of the report 
on the 2011 PPP revisions set out these requirements with admirable clarity:
Global poverty numbers require a large and varied set of data collected 
from different places, time periods, and sources. Five unique data sources 
are required for the World Bank’s calculation of global poverty numbers 
and global poverty lines: household surveys, population censuses, national 
accounts, consumer price indexes, and PPPs from the ICP. Each new round 
of the ICPs brings revisions of the PPPs, and these revisions, like revisions 
of the other data sources, can have large effects on global, regional and 
national poverty counts. The global poverty line itself is calculated as an 
average of the PPP equivalents of the poverty lines of the world’s poorest 
economies. In general, therefore, the global line will also change with the 
new PPPs, even if the underlying national poverty lines remain unchanged. 
(World Bank 2014a: 24)
groW th, Povert Y And diStribution in the eArLY t Went Y-firSt CenturY 207
These data requirements would tax the capacity of even the most advanced, 
and well-funded, statistical offices. It is hardly surprising that in many parts 
of the developing world, poverty estimates using ‘internationally comparable’ 
poverty lines have produced results which have conflicted with estimates 
using national poverty lines, which themselves may have serious flaws, and 
with evidence from national accounts. The ranking of countries in Southeast 
Asia according to per capita consumption expenditures published by the 
World Bank might appear broadly plausible, given what we know from the 
national accounts across the region. Singapore and Brunei have the highest 
per capita consumption expenditures, and Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar 
the lowest. Perhaps surprisingly, both Thailand and Indonesia had higher per 
capita consumption expenditures in PPP-adjusted dollars in 2011 than China 
(Table 7.8). This could reflect the higher level of prices in China, and also the 
higher proportion of GDP devoted to investment expenditures in China. As 
would be expected, the price level relative to the world average is highest in 
Singapore and Brunei, and lowest in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar.
It might therefore be expected that the headcount measure of poverty 
would broadly follow this ranking as well, unless income or expenditure 
inequalities were much higher in some countries compared with others. But 
it seems that there are some anomalies, especially in the case of Vietnam 
and Cambodia. In the case of Cambodia, it appears that successive surveys 
have under-represented poorer, more remote, parts of the country. This 
might also be the case in Vietnam. In both Indonesia and the Philippines, 
it appears that in recent years, the survey data have underestimated the 
incomes and expenditures of the upper income groups, or perhaps excluded 
them altogether. If the sample is biased towards poorer households, it is 
likely that the poverty estimates are too high.
Does this mean that attempts to rank countries according to monetary 
estimates of poverty and inequality should be abandoned? Should more 
reliance be placed on non-monetary estimates of welfare? The Human 
Development Index was devised by the United Nations as a tool for ranking 
countries according to GDP and several non-monetary indicators relating 
to life expectancy and education. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, the 
HDI has attracted criticism over the years from several quarters, not least 
because, like other composite indicators including both monetary and 
non-monetary components, arbitrary assumptions have to be made about 
weights attached to each component. These assumptions often change over 
time. For example, Ravallion (2016: 284-289), who has been very critical of 
what he terms ‘mash-up indicators’ pointed out that changes to the HDI made 
in 2010 greatly reduced the implicit weight on longevity in poorer countries.
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Another ‘mash-up’ indicator which has attracted considerable attention 
in recent years is the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) developed by 
a group working at Oxford University. This index incorporates ten non-
monetary indicators grouped into three dimensions: education, health 
and living standards. It is an attempt to measure poverty using what its 
designers term the direct method, which ‘shows whether people satisfy 
a set of specif ied basic needs, rights, or – in line with Sen’s capability ap-
proach – functionings’ (Alkire and Santos 2014: 251). The MPI has been used 
to rank low- and middle-income countries according to a composite index 
derived from the ten non-monetary indicators. The rankings for seven 
Southeast Asian countries together with China and India were given in 
Table 1.8. The rankings differ in several respects from those derived from 
the headcount measures of poverty given in Tables 7.6 and 7.7. Cambodia, 
which had a very low headcount measure of poverty, ranks below all the 
other countries in the table except Laos and India according to the MPI 
index. The Philippines ranks above Indonesia according to the MPI index, 
although its headcount measure of poverty was above Indonesia’s. Vietnam 
is below China in the MPI rankings, although its headcount measure of 
poverty was lower than China.
There are good reasons why the MPI rankings might differ from the 
ranking according to the headcount measure of poverty. They are exclusively 
non-monetary, whereas the headcount measures of poverty derive from 
household survey data on income or expenditure, and PPP-adjusted poverty 
lines. The problems associated with both household surveys and PPP data 
have already been discussed, but how reliable are the data used to compile 
the ten indicators used in the MPI? In most cases they are derived from 
the Demographic and Health Surveys which have been conducted in most 
countries in Southeast Asia for several decades. It has been suggested that 
these surveys may be biased towards poorer households. On the other hand, 
the results of the MPI estimates in Southeast Asia do confirm that some 
countries have achieved more in health, education, sanitation, electrif ication 
and housing than others, at similar or even higher levels of per capita GDP. 
Vietnam stands out as a relatively poor country which seems to have done 
especially well, in comparison with richer countries such as the Philippines 
and Indonesia.
Vietnam also appears to have achieved good results in child health indica-
tors (prevalence of wasting and stunting) compared with both Indonesia 
and the Philippines (Table 7.12). This is in spite of the fact that FAO estimates 
show that the percentage of the total population which is undernourished 
in Vietnam was in fact slightly higher than the average for Southeast Asia, 
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although lower than in the Philippines. In 2014/16, the percentage of the 
population considered undernourished was highest in Cambodia, Laos 
and Myanmar, although these countries have all experienced some reduc-
tion since 2004/6. The evidence assembled by the FAO indicate that most 
countries in Southeast Asia still face problems with both child and adult 
nutrition, which policymakers will need to address.
Table 7.12:  Percentage of the population undernourished and stunting and 
wasting in children
Country Percentage undernourished 
(total population)
Stunting in children Wasting in 
children 
2004/6 2014/16 2005 2016 2016
Malaysia 3.9 under 2.5 17.2 17.7 8.0
thailand 12.3 9.5 15.7 16.3 6.7
indonesia 18.6 7.9 n/a 36.4 13.5
vietnam 18.2 10.7 33.3 24.6 6.4
Philippines 16.3 13.8 33.8 30.3 7.9
Laos 26.8 17.1 47.6 43.8 6.4
Cambodia 20.0 15.3 43.7 32.4 9.6
Myanmar 32.1 16.9 40.6 29.2 6.4
Southeast Asia 18.1 10.2 34.1 25.8 8.9
note: Countries ranked according to their hdi position in 2015. Stunting in children refers to the 
percentage of children too short for their age. Wasting in children refers to the percentage of 
children too thin for their height.
Source: fAo et al. (2017: table A1.1).
Human Development Rankings
The second decade of the twenty-f irst century has seen the publication of 
several studies which rank countries according to composite indicators 
of human capital. The most ambitious in terms of country coverage was 
a measure of expected human capital def ined for each birth cohort as 
the expected years lived from ages 20 to 64, and adjusted for educational 
attainment, learning or educational quality, and functional health status 
(Lim et al. 2019). The results, for 195 countries, were published for 2016 and 
also for 1990. In 2018 the World Bank published its Human Capital Index, 
which ranked 157 countries according to a number of educational and health 
indicators (probability of survival to age f ive, adult survival rates, under-five 
stunting rates, expected years of schooling, harmonized test scores, and 
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learning-adjusted years of schooling). In 2017 the World Economic Forum 
published its Global Human Capital Index which was another composite 
index comprising indicators of capacity (the existing stock of education), 
deployment (skill accumulation through work experience and adult educa-
tion), development (current efforts to educate coming generations) and 
‘know-how’ (the breadth and depth of specialized skills used in the economy).
Country rankings for the ten countries of Southeast Asia, plus the Republic 
of Korea, China and India, are given in Table 7.13. Broadly the rankings follow 
per capita GDP, but there are outliers. Vietnam has a higher place than its 
per capita GDP alone would indicate; this was especially the case in the 
World Bank index, where it was ranked higher than any other Southeast 
Asian country except Singapore. Indonesia was ranked lower than Vietnam 
according to both the World Bank index and that compiled by Lim et al. 
(2018). It did rather better on the World Economic Forum index, probably 
because that index did not include any health indicators, where Indonesia 
does rather badly in comparison with other countries in Southeast Asia. The 
indexes compiled by Lim et al. (2018) for 1990 and 2016 show that neither 
Indonesia not the Philippines improved their rankings over these 26 years; 
the Philippines slipped back six places.
Table 7.13: Human Development Indexes: Rankings 
Country World Bank 
2017
Lim et al. 2016 
(1990)
World Economic Forum 
2017
Southeast Asia
Singapore 1 13 (43) 11
brunei n/a 29 (35) 58
Malaysia 55 79 (106) 33
thailand 65 72 (103) 40
indonesia 87 131 (130) 65
Philippines 84 130 (124) 50
Lao Pdr 111 149 (157) 84
vietnam 48 85 (116) 64
Myanmar 117 140 (152) 89
Cambodia 100 153 (158) 92
Other Asia
republic of Korea 2 6 (18) 27
China 46 44 (69) 34
india 115 158 (162) 103
note: Countries ranked according to 2017 per capita gdP. the World bank ranked 157 countries, 
Lim et al. (2018) ranked 195 and World economic forum ranked 130.
Sources: World bank (2018), Lim et al. (2018), World economic forum (2017b).
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The composite indicators shown in Table 7.13 are only as good as the data 
on which they rely. Doubts have been expressed about the reliability of the 
educational indicators, especially those relating to educational quality. To 
the extent that many countries do not include schools in more remote rural 
areas in the international tests, the results are probably overstated. The 
same arguments apply to the f igures on childhood wasting and stunting. 
On the other hand, it does seem that several countries in Southeast Asia 
are not performing as well on several of these indicators as their per capita 
GDP alone would predict. When the scores of 157 countries in the World 
Bank sample were plotted against per capita GDP, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Laos and Myanmar were all found to be below the regression line. To the 
extent that GDP is a reasonable indicator of national economic capacity, 
these countries should have been achieving rather more in terms of health 
and education outcomes than is currently the case.
Inequality in Non-monetary Indicators
Therborn (2013: 48-54) has argued that three types of inequality should be 
of interest to social scientists in all parts of the world. The f irst is what he 
terms resource inequality, which usually emphasizes inequalities in income 
and wealth. This is the type of inequality which has attracted most attention 
from social scientists, both in rich countries, and in the developing world. 
A second type of inequality, which has generated a considerable body of 
research in the rich countries, concerns what Therborn (2013: 49) terms 
vital inequality, or ‘socially constructed unequal life-chances’. Typically 
the study of this type of inequality involves differences in life expectances 
and mortality rates, across regions and social classes, as well as evidence 
from surveys of hunger and malnutrition. It can also include inequality in 
access to education, although this might more properly be placed under 
resource inequality, given the tight link which exists between education 
and earnings in most societies. The third type is existential inequality 
which is inequality based on attributes which people are born with, such 
as gender, race and social status.
Research on vital inequality in many low- and middle-income countries 
has been hampered by inadequate, or non-existent, systems of vital registra-
tion. Births and deaths in poor households, with poorly educated parents are 
often the least likely to be off icially registered. The main change in recent 
decades has been the growth in comprehensive population censuses and 
surveys, although these often do not ask questions about household income 
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and wealth. The Demographic and Health Surveys do attempt to estimate 
household assets. Since the 1980s these surveys have been monitoring 
population, health and nutrition developments in over 70 countries, mainly 
in Asia and Africa. These surveys have been used to estimate the MPI (Table 
1.8), and have also been used by researchers investigating socio-economic 
inequalities in infant and child mortality in a number of low- and middle-
income countries.
A survey of this research came up with several important f indings 
(Houweling and Kunst 2010). The f irst was that the poorer and less educated 
groups exhibited considerably higher childhood mortality rates than better-
off ones. In almost all of the 55 countries investigated by these authors, child 
mortality among the poorest households (based on ownership of household 
assets) exceeded that of the richest group, often by a large margin. The 
authors argue that huge population health gains could be made if these 
inequalities were directly addressed by policymakers. A second point made 
by Houweling and Kunst (2010: Figure 2) was that inequalities in under-f ive 
mortality did not always exhibit a linear gradient; especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the most obvious gap was between the top one or two deciles and the 
rest. There were also striking differences in under-f ive mortality between 
Asian countries at broadly similar levels of per capita GDP; Vietnam, for 
example, had lower levels of child mortality in each quintile group than 
India.
Houweling and Kunst argued that these differences between countries in 
childhood mortality, as well as improvements in the same country over time, 
showed that the problem was amenable to policy intervention. They cited 
earlier work by Houweling et al. (2006) which found that socio-economic 
inequalities in childhood mortality declined in Indonesia between 1982 and 
1997, a period of rapid economic growth. Over these years there were equally 
strong declines in under-f ive mortality among households with poorly 
educated mothers as in households with well-educated mothers, although 
the paper also drew attention to the gap between the more remote parts 
of the country and Java-Bali. Research by Hodge et al. (2014), also using the 
Demographic and Health Surveys but extending the period to 2010, found 
that absolute inequalities in under-f ive mortality across wealth and educa-
tion in Indonesia showed a decreasing (and statistically signif icant) trend 
over three decades.16 But there did appear to be an increase in inequalities 
16 Lieberman, Capuno and Minh (2004) found that there were still high disparities in infant 
and child health mortality by wealth categories in Indonesia in the late 1990s compared with 
other countries in South and Southeast Asia.
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by wealth and education, both for under-f ive and for neo-natal mortalities 
after the 1990s. The absolute disparities across island divisions remained 
and showed some signs of increasing. These authors suggested that the 
decentralization reforms, which began in 2001, might have contributed 
to a slowdown in mortality rate reduction, and also to the widening gap 
between Java-Bali and the rest.
A comparative analysis of the consequences of decentralization reforms 
for health policies in the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia made the 
important point that the implementation of decentralization, especially 
in Indonesia, but also in the Philippines and Vietnam, took place at a time 
of considerable macroeconomic instability associated with the Asian 
crisis and its aftermath (Lieberman, Capuno and Minh 2004). In all three 
countries, government budgets came under pressure. The high cost of bank 
restructuring after 1998 in Indonesia meant that budget resources for health, 
education and infrastructure policies were very limited (Booth 2016: 101-102). 
In addition, the central governments were reluctant to give more taxing 
powers to regional and local governments, which meant that they continued 
to depend on grants from the centre to fund health, education and other 
services. There were also problems of poor targeting, although given the 
dearth of information on who and where the poor were, governments at the 
sub-national level could hardly be blamed for an inability to concentrate 
resources on localities where they were badly needed.
The Philippines has had the longest experience with decentralization 
reforms, which began in the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s, gaps across regions 
in infant and child mortality rates were closing, although they widened 
again after 1998. Local governments were spending a signif icant proportion 
of their budgets on health; on average the ratio had increased to almost 21 
per cent by the early 2000s (Lieberman, Capuno and Minh 2004). But after 
2000, in spite of accelerated rates of GDP growth, the evidence pointed to a 
slowdown in rates of decline of both infant and under-f ive mortality rates 
while neo-natal mortality rates remained high (Kraft et al. 2013). This study 
found that important within-country inequalities in child health persisted 
in the Philippines. Child mortality rates varied substantially across several 
dimensions, including rural/urban locations, provinces and wealth status. 
The study also identif ied a lack of health professionals in some regions, 
together with geographic inaccessibility of facilities, as causes of high infant 
and child mortality. These problems appear to have persisted in spite of 
decentralized funding.
Several comparative studies have suggested that, by the early twenty-
f irst century, Vietnam had achieved very high rankings in infant and 
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child mortality, as well as in life expectancies, compared with other 
Asian countries with similar or higher per capita GDP (Table 1.1). But an 
analysis of data on Vietnam over the 1990s found that the fall in under-
f ive mortality which occurred was not spread evenly across the whole 
population (Wagstaff and Nguyen 2004: 320-323). The top two quintiles 
in the wealth distribution had a rapid fall, while the bottom quintile 
saw little improvement. Lieberman, Capuno and Minh (2004) found that 
inequalities in infant and child mortality in Vietnam were about the same 
as the Philippines in the late 1990s, but after that, Vietnam experienced 
faster declines in child mortality than the Philippines. Houweling and 
Kunst (2010: Figure 2) in their comparative survey found that the differ-
ences in under-f ive mortality by wealth quintile in Vietnam were much 
lower than in India or Brazil. The Vietnamese experience conf irms the 
argument of Houweling and Kunst that government policies do make a 
difference, given that outcomes can vary so much in countries at similar 
levels of per capita GDP.
In most countries in Southeast Asia, governments have been trying for 
decades to increase school attendance. Most claim to have come close 
to achieving universal primary enrolments (UPE), and have plans for a 
compulsory nine-year cycle. But even at the primary level, many children 
drop out before completing the full cycle. At the secondary level progress 
in reaching universal enrolments has been much slower; even at the lower 
secondary level, not all children complete the cycle in many parts of South-
east Asia. In 2010, there were striking differences in the percentage of the 
population over 25 with at least secondary education. In Singapore almost 
65 per cent of men had secondary education and 57 per cent of women 
(Table 7.14). As would be expected the poorer countries in terms of per 
capita GDP had lower percentages, and in the case of Laos and Cambodia 
wider gaps between men and women. Adult literacy was over 90 per cent 
in all countries except Laos and Cambodia.
Several points emerge from the f igures on secondary education. The 
Philippines, which had the most favourable legacy from the colonial era, 
still had high rates of secondary attendance among the adult population 
in 2010 compared with Thailand and Indonesia, in spite of lower per capita 
GDP. The Philippines also continues to have high tertiary enrolment rates in 
comparison with most other parts of Southeast Asia. Singapore and Malaysia 
have both invested heavily in education since gaining independence, and 
by 2010 had achieved high rates of secondary and tertiary enrolments, while 
Indonesia in 2010 still had less than 30 per cent of the adult population with 
secondary schooling. In Thailand which only began to expand post-primary 
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enrolments in the 1990s, the proportion of the adult population with second-
ary qualif ications was only slightly higher than in Indonesia.
Thailand has seen a dramatic expansion in upper secondary enrolments 
since the 1990s, in spite of the fact that education is only compulsory to the 
lower secondary level. Furthermore, the expansion has been most rapid 
for the poorer income groups, with the result that the very large gap in 
enrolments between income groups which existed in the 1980s has narrowed 
considerably (Lathapipat 2016: 44). This outcome is the result of expanded 
facilities on the one hand, and growing parental awareness of the importance 
of education for a child’s earning capacity on the other, especially after 
the post-1997 growth slowdown. But at the tertiary level there appears to 
have been an increase in enrolment inequality between income groups, 
although for most income groups enrolment growth slowed after 2000. 
Lathapipat suggests that the implementation of fees, and the introduction 
of the Education Loan Fund, may have had a deterrent effect, especially on 
potential students from poorer households.
The available evidence from Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as 
Thailand, suggests that access to education at the tertiary level is still to a 
considerable extent determined by household income, and that people with 
tertiary qualif ications earn more, and are less likely to be poor. In Indonesia, 
Table 7.14: Educational indicators and gender inequality index














Singapore (27) 57.3, 64.8 95 n/a 10
brunei (37) 66.6, 23.5 95 16 n/a
Malaysia (57) 66.0, 72.8 92 30 50
thailand (92) 25.6, 33.7 94 n/a 69
Philippines (97) 65.9, 63.7 94 28 78
indonesia (108) 24.2, 31.1 92 18 100
vietnam (113) 24.7, 28.0 93 10 58
Lao Pdr (122) 22.9, 36.8 73 13 88
Cambodia (124) 11.6, 20.6 77 7 95
Myanmar (132) 18.0, 17.6 92 11 n/a
* figure in brackets show rankings according to the human development index for 2010 in which 
169 countries were ranked.
** figures refer to the percentage of the population over 25 with secondary education, 2010
*** gender inequality index rankings for 2008 in which 137 countries were ranked.
Sources undP (2010: 144-159). 
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successive rounds of the Susenas have showed quite marked differences in 
educational participation rates by expenditure groups, especially in the over-
sixteen age groups. In 2012, around one-third of people in the 19-to-24 age 
groups in the top 20 per cent of the expenditure distribution in urban areas 
were enrolled in educational institutions (Booth 2016: 186). But in the bottom 
40 per cent of the expenditure distribution in rural areas, less than 5 per cent 
of those in the 19-to-24 age group were still in education. In the Philippines, 
Ducanes and Tan (2014: Table 4) have shown that poverty incidence falls 
steeply when the most educated household member has graduated from 
high school or college. Using the 2009 FIES data, they estimated that at the 
national level, poverty incidence was 41 per cent for households where the 
most educated member had only primary education, falling to 2.4 per cent 
when the most educated member was a college graduate. Households with 
at least one college graduate earned more than other households from all 
income sources, including remittances.
Ducanes and Tan (2014) did f ind that there was some improvement in 
educational attainment among the younger age cohorts in poor households, 
although the improvement was slow. Poor households where at least one 
younger member managed to reach college were more likely to move out 
of poverty, especially if that member completes college. But the gap in 
college graduates between poor and non-poor households remained very 
large. Among the adult population aged 25 to 40 in poor households, only 1.6 
per cent were college graduates, compared with 23.2 per cent in non-poor 
households. Narrowing the educational gap between poor and non-poor 
households remains a crucial challenge for educational policy not just in the 
Philippines but elsewhere in Southeast Asia as well. As long as most young 
people from poor households fail to at least graduate from high school they 
are likely to face a lifetime of low and unstable earnings.
The third aspect of inequality to which Therborn drew attention was 
what he termed existential inequality, which refers to inequality based 
on attributes which people are born with, such as race or gender. In recent 
years there have been several attempts to rank countries according to gender 
inequality and gender gaps. The Gender Inequality Index, published in 
the Human Development Reports, showed that in 2010 Singapore achieved 
the highest ranking among the Southeast Asian countries, at tenth out of 
138 countries, followed by Malaysia and Vietnam (Table 7.13). The Global 
Gender Gap Index (GGGI) has been published since 2006 by the World 
Economic Forum. Its focus is on measuring gaps rather than levels, and 
examines gender disparities in four broad categories. These were economic 
participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, 
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and political empowerment. The 2017 ranking places the Philippines in the 
tenth spot, out of 144 countries (World Economic Forum 2017a: Table 3). It 
was ranked above France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and 
Australia. The other nine ASEAN countries were ranked much lower, from 
64 (Laos) and 65 (Singapore) to 104 (Malaysia). Another ranking, which 
used OECD data to compile a Social Institutions and Gender Index, ranked 
101 countries according to a range of criteria. The Philippines was ranked 
seventh and Thailand sixteenth, although the Philippines slipped eighteen 
places when an abortion rights indicator was added (Branisa et al. 2014).
The high ranking achieved by the Philippines, especially in the GGGI, 
reflects the fact that gender disparities were quite low by global standards, 
even if absolute levels achieved in areas such as economic participation, 
education and health were not especially high. Critics point out that the 
GGGI does not take into account inequalities in economic opportunity, or in 
access to education and health facilities, or in political empowerment, across 
regions and social classes. Given that these disparities remain considerable, 
and may be getting worse, the high ranking of the Philippines in the GGGI 
may not fully reflect the reality of gender relations, where many girls from 
low-income families struggle to get education beyond the primary level, and 
where the women who have achieved high political off ice have often come 
from elite families. But the fact that no other country in Southeast Asia is in 
the top 60 countries in the GGGI, and only two are in the top 60 countries 
in the UNDP index, should be a cause for concern among policymakers.

8 Government Policy Interventions
Introduction
Since the 1950s, most governments in Southeast Asia have implemented poli-
cies which are intended to increase incomes and improve living standards 
for their populations. Because in the 1950s and 1960s, the great majority 
of the populations across the region derived most of their income from 
agricultural activities, the agricultural sector was often given priority in 
development plans. In some countries, especially those which had inherited 
a skewed pattern of land distribution from the colonial era, it was argued 
that land reform should be a crucial component of agricultural policy. 
Where rural population densities were already high, and extending the 
cultivation frontier was no longer possible, settling surplus rural populations 
in less densely settled areas also became a focus of government policy. In 
addition, the importance of providing rural non-farm employment (RNFE) 
was recognized. This could be done by government through employment 
on labour-intensive public works projects; following models developed in 
South Asia, a number of programmes were initiated in various parts of 
Southeast Asia.
Family planning programmes were also initiated in several countries, in 
the expectation that slowing population growth would make it easier for 
governments to improve child health and educational attainment, which in 
turn would allow young people to move to more productive employment. 
More recently, following the model developed in parts of Latin America, 
some countries are implementing cash transfers which are conditional on 
children attending school and receiving healthcare. In the expectation 
that regional and local governments often have a better idea of what sorts 
of policies might be most effective in their areas, several countries have 
implemented decentralization and community empowerment policies. 
They have also intervened in markets for basic commodities, especially food.
Given that most countries in Southeast Asia have tried to implement 
at least some of these policies over the last f ive decades, and several have 
experimented with most of them, is there strong evidence that at least 
some of them have produced positive results in terms of improving the 
incomes of the poorest people? Have some policies, such as labour-intensive 
public works, land reform, land settlement or community empowerment 
programmes, been more successful in alleviating poverty in some countries 
than others, and if so why? Is it, for example, possible to identify those 
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who have been left behind, even in the fast-growing economies, and offer 
them assistance through cash transfers? The rest of this chapter attempts 
to answer some of these questions by examining the experience of various 
countries in the region since the 1950s.
In assessing the impact of these policies, two points need to be empha-
sized. The f irst is that most governments have had multiple objectives in 
implementing them, of which poverty alleviation was often not the most 
important. Rural public works projects, for example, were intended to 
rehabilitate and improve infrastructure; the benefits from these improve-
ments often accrued, at least in the short run, to segments of the population 
which were not poor. The second point is that government budgets in many 
Southeast Asian countries have been, and are still, small relative to popula-
tions. Thus the amount of money in per capita terms available to spend on 
anti-poverty programmes has often been very small. To the critics, this 
means that many of these programmes are unlikely to have much impact, 
and are often implemented for political reasons, to appease particular 
interest groups. These points are important, and will be taken up again in 
the concluding section.
The Challenge of Land Reform
All the countries of Southeast Asia, with the exceptions of Singapore and 
Brunei, emerged into independence with a large fraction of their populations 
dependent on agriculture for at least part of their income. Across the region, 
access to agricultural land and problems of land tenure were of paramount 
importance to many of the nationalists who had come to power after 1945. 
In several countries, including Indonesia (especially Java and Sumatra), 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Southern Vietnam, the available land was 
divided between smallholders and large estates, the latter often owned by 
foreign interests.1 Even among smallholdings, the distribution of land was 
skewed and many rural households operated only small parcels from which 
it was diff icult to earn incomes above the poverty threshold. In several 
1 The def inition of an estate has varied between countries and over time in Southeast Asia. 
Often it has referred to any holding above the size which can be cultivated by a family, using 
some hired labour, although there are differences between countries, and even within countries 
over time, on how large that holding is. But in some countries a legal def inition has been used; an 
estate is an enterprise incorporated as a business under the relevant legislation. This def inition 
probably excluded some holdings which might have been considered estates under the former 
def inition.
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countries, a considerable part of the land controlled by smallholders in the 
latter part of the colonial period was tenanted.
In Burma it was estimated that almost 60 per cent of land was under some 
form of tenancy arrangement (Pfanner 1969: Table 15). In the Philippines, the 
1939 census found that 30.7 per cent of cultivated land was tenanted, and 49 
per cent was in wholly owned holdings. The remainder was mainly in part-
owned holdings. Only in one province (Negros Occidental) was a significant 
proportion of cultivated land in holdings run by managers (Spencer 1952: 
Table 8). Spencer (1952: 120-121) reflected a widespread view among both 
Filipino and American observers that the land tenure system had created 
widespread discontent, especially in those parts of Luzon where more than 
half of the cultivated land was under tenancy. Spencer argued that there were 
wide variations in the extent of tenancy which could not be explained just 
by population pressure alone. Some regions, especially in northern Luzon, 
had low rates of tenancy in spite of high population pressures.
Given these problems, land reform was a major concern of successive 
governments, both during the American and Commonwealth periods, 
and after the transfer of power in 1946. The reform agenda consisted of 
the regulation of landownership in less densely populated provinces, and 
the appropriation and redistribution of land above a stipulated threshold. 
But progress was often slow, and opposition from landed interests in the 
congress was considerable, although in the face of considerable pressure 
from radical groups the Congress did pass the Code of Agrarian Reform in 
1971 (Fuwa 2000: 3). After Marcos declared martial law in 1972, one of his 
f irst presidential decrees was PD 27, which set up Operation Land Transfer 
(OLT). The main purpose of OLT was to convert tenant farmers in rice and 
corn areas to landowners by allowing them to purchase the land they were 
cultivating. Landowners were permitted to retain up to seven hectares of 
their land, which could continue to be leased out. Above that limit, land 
had to be transferred to the tillers. It was estimated that around 400,000 
tenant farmers out of a total of between 900,000 and one million were in 
a position to benefit, each operating 1.8 hectares (Mangahas 1985: 221). By 
1981, it was claimed that almost 90 per cent of potential farmer-beneficiaries 
had been identif ied, and 80 per cent had been issued certif icates of land 
transfer. But a much smaller fraction had actually benefited in the sense 
that they were either full owners or amortizing owners of their land. Fuwa 
(2000: Table 2.5) argued that only about 15,000 hectares of land had actually 
been transferred, which was less than 3 per cent of the total.
Critics of OLT pointed out that the Marcos programme was riddled with 
loopholes; for example, farmers could avoid land transfer if they planted 
222 Living StAndArdS in SoutheASt ASiA 
crops other than rice or corn. The decree also adversely affected landless 
labourers, who were a large segment of the rural poor. They had gained 
nothing directly from OLT, but their access through tenancy contracts was 
often prevented because landowners were worried that renting out land 
would lead to confiscation (Balisacan, Fuwa and Debuque 2004: 249). Their 
exclusion, together with the exclusion of many tenant farmers cultivating 
land below the owner’s retention limit, or cultivating land growing crops 
other than rice and corn, meant that the impact of OLT on rural poverty 
was limited. Mangahas (1987a: 150) argued, ‘OLT has not come close to such 
sweeping reforms as were implemented in Taiwan or in South Korea but 
can be rated as a moderate, somewhat long-drawn-out beginning at land 
reform.’ Other evaluations were more critical. Putzel (1992: 154) claimed that 
Marcos depended on both the landed oligarchy and the military to maintain 
martial law, and neither supported comprehensive agrarian reform. A more 
complete programme would clearly have to include all land irrespective 
of tenure status or crop grown, and potential beneficiaries would have to 
include landless workers as well as tenant farmers.
Such a programme was in fact embodied in the Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Law (CARL) passed by the Aquino administration in 1988. The f irst 
phase of this reform covered rice and corn land as well as idle, foreclosed 
and abandoned land and private land voluntarily offered by owners. The 
second phase included all public land which could be alienated and private 
land in excess of 50 hectares. The third phase covered all other private 
land above the retention limit of f ive hectares. Thus CARL covered an 
estimated 9.77 million hectares or about 50 per cent of all productive forest 
and cultivated land in the country (Balisacan 1990: 94). Of this, two-thirds 
was public alienable and disposable land. Much of this was not vacant but 
cultivated by an estimated 15 million ‘squatters’ who required security of 
tenure. Beneficiaries of land reform in the public sector would not receive 
permanent title but 25-year non-transferable stewardship titles, which could 
not be used as loan collateral.
Such an ambitious programme of land reform, embracing so much land 
and so many potential beneficiaries, was bound to run into implementation 
diff iculties. Putzel (1992: 212-213) argued that the f irst Aquino cabinet 
was dominated by conservative reformers, with at best lukewarm support 
for CARL. Even the more radical ministers were urban-based and lacked 
a deep knowledge of rural problems. But Fuwa’s estimates indicate that 
during the Aquino presidency, much more was achieved than under the 
OLT programme during the Marcos era, although some parts of the CARL 
legislation ran into problems. One issue which received much publicity 
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involved the provision that corporations owning agricultural land could 
transfer stock to potential beneficiaries rather than land. Many corporations 
were thought to have undervalued their stock for the purposes of transfer. 
Financing the programme also became a major problem, especially in 
the light of the very substantial pressures being put on the Philippines by 
international agencies to cut the budget def icit and control bank lending. 
There were endless controversies about the retention limits, exemptions, 
land valuations, grace periods and definitions. The Department of Agrarian 
Reform, essentially a bureaucracy left over from the Marcos regime, proved 
ill-equipped to meet the challenge of a new and greatly expanded agrarian 
reform programme. Even where off icials were sincerely committed to 
implementation of the land reform programme, they ran into opposition 
from powerful vested interests in the legislature and in local governments 
who had little desire to see the power of the landowning class reduced.
Some analysts pointed out that successful implementation of compre-
hensive agrarian reform in the Philippines would not be possible until there 
was a radical shift in the political balance of power in favour of tenants and 
landless workers. The ‘EDSA Revolution’ which deposed Marcos and installed 
Cory Aquino did not produce such as shift, and thus it was hardly surprising 
that implementation of CARL was so slow (Balisacan 1990: 103; Putzel 1992: 
193-216). Some argued that a less ambitious programme targeted more 
specifically towards landless agricultural labourers and marginal farmers in 
the poorest parts of the country would have been easier to implement, and 
might have incurred less f ierce political opposition than the comprehensive 
strategy enacted by the Aquino administration. It was also suggested that 
more indirect methods of inducing large landowners to divest themselves 
of at least part of their land, such as progressive land taxes, might be more 
effective than mandatory land ceilings. The ILO report on the Philippines 
published in 1974 recommended a progressive tax on presumptive income 
from agricultural land as a means of encouraging greater utilization of 
agricultural land (ILO 1974: 264-265). Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano 
(1990: 163) also argued in favour of a progressive land tax coupled with a 
progressive land rent on public lands so that the large corporations currently 
renting these lands could be induced to use more small contract farmers. 
Unfortunately it proved diff icult to implement progressive land taxes for 
the same reasons as it was diff icult to implement programmes involving 
land redistribution.
The Ramos administration which succeeded that of Cory Aquino pushed 
ahead with the various parts of the CARL programme. Ramos appointed a 
new head of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), who came from the 
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NGO sector. Under his leadership the OLT programme was largely completed. 
Around 584,000 hectares were redistributed under the voluntary offer of 
sale and voluntary land transfer sections of CARL. Another important 
development was the acceleration of land settlement policies, which had 
begun during the Marcos presidency, and were expanded under CARL. 
It was estimated that 193,000 hectares were resettled during the Aquino 
presidency and a further 352,000 hectares under Ramos (Fuwa 2000: Table 
2.5). Much of this resettlement took place in Mindanao; its consequences 
will be examined in more detail in the next section.
Implementation of the CARL legislation continued under the presidents 
who succeeded Ramos, although in the opinion of some commentators the 
political commitment declined, especially in the second Aquino administra-
tion (2010-2016), where it was argued that redistribution proceeded at a 
snail’s pace (Tadem 2015: 3). In June 2014, there was supposed to be at least 
one million hectares of land still remaining to be redistributed, although 
some analysts contested this. Ballesteros (2019) pointed out that the budget 
for land acquisition and distribution declined from 0.44 per cent of GDP 
in 1988-1991 to only 0.15 per cent in 2010-2016, and that the Department of 
Agrarian Reform was forced to redirect its priority from land acquisition 
to the provision of support services for the 2.8 million benef iciaries of 
land reform. But even given the declining political support for land reform 
Ballesteros argued that a major achievement of the land reform programme 
has been to abolish the hacienda estate system in most parts of the country, 
with the exception of the sugar estates in Negros Occidental. After 40 years 
of land reform initiatives, the average holding size in the country had fallen 
to 1.29 hectares, and only 0.03 per cent of farms exceed 50 hectares.
But the abolition of large estates, and the consequent reduction in farm 
size does not appear to have led to a more dynamic and competitive agri-
cultural sector in the Philippines. In 2010-2016, the sector only managed 
to grow at 1.7 per cent per annum, and contributed only a small part of 
the total growth in GDP of over 6 per cent per annum (Batalla 2016: 173). 
Can this poor performance be attributed to land redistribution, or are 
there other explanations? Balisacan and Fuwa (2004: 1902) analysed the 
processes of growth and poverty reduction in the Philippines and found 
that greater implementation of CARL provisions was positively related to 
provincial growth, although other factors were also signif icant. But Fabella 
(2014: 13) claimed that the land reform legislation ‘effectively chased away 
private capital from agriculture with the f ive-hectare ownership limit’. 
He argued that the constraints placed on the selling or renting of land by 
beneficiaries had forced the land market to go underground, and created a 
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new class of landed poor in rural areas. These criticisms were not shared by 
all researchers, although Ballesteros, Ancheta and Ramos (2017: 39) in their 
evaluation argued that ‘land reform as a policy lever to address inequalities 
and poverty in the agricultural sector has become obsolete’. They advocated 
policies to improve productivity on small holdings, and suggested that 
government support for land consolidation and contract farming may be 
necessary to boost productivity on smaller farms.
Debates over the effect of land reform on rural poverty in the Philippines 
are likely to continue for some time. But the Philippines is not the only 
country in Southeast Asia which has pursued land reform policies since 
independence. It has frequently been argued in the literature that land 
reform in the Philippines has had so much policy attention because the 
country has a much more skewed distribution of land than other parts of 
Southeast Asia, and the problems of tenancy and landlessness are much 
worse (Balisacan, Fuwa and Debuque 2004: 234). But the empirical evidence 
to support these assertions is not very strong. If we examine the data on the 
distribution of holdings by size in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines 
for the 1980s and 1990s, we f ind that in 1980, well before CARL was initiated, 
around 51 per cent of agricultural land in the Philippines was in holdings 
under f ive hectares. This was lower than in Indonesia, but higher than in 
Thailand. The proportion of land in holdings over ten hectares was much 
higher in the Philippines than in post-reform Taiwan, but this was also true 
in both Indonesia and Thailand (Booth 2002b: Table 2; see also Table 6.7).
In Burma, immediately after independence, the government adopted a 
radical solution to problems of land tenure by nationalizing all land, and 
in the latter part of the 1950s the government enacted further land reform 
legislation. But the impact on the country’s agrarian structure, and especially 
on the growing numbers of agricultural labourers was small. The reforms 
covered only 17 per cent of the targeted area, and 6 per cent of the total 
area (Fujita 2009: 247). The government gave priority to tenant farmers, 
but Steinberg (1981: 126) argued that in effect tenants just experienced a 
change of landlord from the private sector to the government. This did not 
always eliminate insecurity of tenure. By banning mortgages and tenancy, 
the government made it almost impossible for landless rural households to 
get access to land, and their numbers grew in subsequent decades. Than and 
Nishizawa (1990: 91) argued that the main result of government agrarian 
policy from 1948 to the 1980s was to replace the old landowner-tenant 
relationship with a new relationship between the government and owner-
cultivators which strengthened government control over the agricultural 
sector, while not conferring any obvious benefits on land-poor farmers.
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In Thailand, the government in the 1950s and 1960s also faced a series of 
problems in the agricultural sector. Population growth was rapid and job 
creation outside agriculture was limited, so much of the growing popula-
tion had to be accommodated in the agricultural sector. But increasing 
population pressure was creating serious land shortages, especially in the 
central part of the country. Radical land policies such as nationalization 
had been advocated by Pridi Phanomyong in the 1930s but rejected by the 
government of the time. In 1954 a land reform act was passed, but the limit 
was high (eight hectares) and applied only to individuals, so families could 
easily get around the limit by distributing land among relations. After the 
student protests in Bangkok in 1973, a more reformist government took 
off ice and in 1975 a further land reform act was passed (Suehiro 1981: 318). 
The act tried to deal with the high levels of tenancy (41 per cent of all farm 
households were classif ied as tenant household in the central region in 
the mid-1970s, and 27 per cent in the northern provinces), and also with 
the growing problem of illegal squatting on land, which was nominally 
under the control of the government. Squatters in theory at least could be 
evicted at any time, even if they had cultivated the land for years, which 
was a deterrent to investment in improving land productivity. A further 
problem which worried the government was growing agricultural debt, 
which often led to loss of land.
Suehiro (1981: 341-343) in his evaluation of the 1975 legislation argued that 
political changes had an important impact on implementation. The Khukrit 
government was not as committed to land reform as was its predecessor, 
and it gave greater priority to the tambon public works programme. After 
the military coup of October 1976, government commitment declined even 
further. The more moderate Kriangsak government, which took off ice in 
1978, was supportive of assistance to the agricultural sector, but favoured 
debt relief rather than land redistribution. As a result, the distribution 
of land in Thailand by holding size changed very little between 1978 and 
1993 (Booth 2002b; Table 2). The major achievement over the 1980s and 
1990s was in giving legal titles to cultivators who previously had none. The 
Thai government with support from the World Bank and the Australian 
government implemented what has been viewed as a successful policy of 
land titling, aimed at the northern and northeastern provinces. As much 
of the land to which titles were granted was controlled by the government 
rather than private owners, this policy ran into fewer problems than policies 
which involved compulsory redistribution from private owners.
In Indonesia, the Dutch colonial government had begun to worry about 
the problem of ‘overpopulation’ in Java in 1900, when the population of 
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the island was around 30 million. They offered several solutions, includ-
ing agricultural settlement outside Java, a policy which continued after 
independence, and will be discussed in the next section. Land redistribution 
in Java and other densely settled islands such as Bali and Lombok was not 
part of the Dutch policy agenda. But after independence, and especially 
during the Guided Democracy era, land reform became an important part 
of Sukarno’s emphasis on Indonesian socialism. The Agrarian Law of 1960 
was one of the few pieces of socialist legislation which was enacted in the 
years between 1958 and 1967. The aim was to prohibit ownership of land 
above stipulated maximum amounts, and absentee ownership, and to take 
surplus land for redistribution. The maximum amount of irrigated land 
which a household might own varied from five hectares in densely populated 
regions to 15 hectares in regions of low population density; slightly higher 
maximum amounts applied to non-irrigated land. The government stated 
that every nuclear household should have a holding of at least two hectares 
(Mortimer 1974: 286).
It was obvious to any informed observer that these maximum and 
minimum amounts were quite unrealistic, given the amount of arable 
land available, and the numbers in rural areas available to cultivate land, 
especially in the densely settled parts of the country. The minister for 
agriculture, who drew up the law, was reported as stating that 60 per cent 
of all cultivators were landless, although no def inition of what this really 
meant was given. Senior off icials appeared to assume that redistribution of 
land from ‘large farmers’ could make a signif icant difference (Utrecht 1969: 
78). The results of the 1963 agricultural census showed that the real problem 
in Java, Bali, and several other provinces in Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia 
was that the average size of holdings was low (under one hectare) and that 
many rural households across the country were cultivating holdings which 
could not, given the prevailing yields of both food and non-food crops, give 
them a basic income.2 How many households were landless in the sense that 
they operated no land at all was open to dispute, but what was clear was 
2 The 1963 agricultural census was the f irst such census to be carried out in Indonesia, and it 
was implemented at a time of considerable tensions in rural areas in many parts of the country. 
There seems to be little doubt that the total amount of land under cultivation in various parts of 
the country was under-reported. In Java, the agricultural census found that 5.64 million hectares 
were under cultivation, compared with 8.42 million hectares reported by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (Nugroho 1967: 235-237). The 1963 census excluded land in holdings under 0.1 hectares, 
but this is unlikely to explain the difference. On the other hand, the land area reported by the 
CBS was based on pre-1942 data, which might not have been accurate in the post-independence 
period.
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that many millions of farm households controlled less than two hectares, 
and there simply was not enough land above the maximum limits stated in 
the law to give every household the minimum amount. Some government 
ministers suggested that the problem could be solved by moving people 
from Java to less densely settled provinces, but in the two decades after 1950 
the numbers moved were small, and it seemed clear that migration could 
not solve the basic problem of too many people and not enough land, not 
just in Java but in other parts of the country as well.
There were other problems, including protecting the rights of squatters 
on land controlled by large estates, which the 1960 legislation did not really 
address. Figures from the 1963 estates census showed that large estates 
controlled 1.59 million hectares in 1962, of which almost 237,000 hectares was 
‘not in their possession’, which implied that it was controlled by squatters 
(Nugroho 1967: 262). The Indonesian Communist Party pressed the govern-
ment to grant these people secure title. It also advocated lower maximum 
ceilings, the nationalization of those foreign estates which had not already 
been converted to state enterprises in the late 1950s and the abolition of 
grants of land to village officials in lieu of salary (Mortimer 1974: 287-288). It 
used these demands to gain popular support, especially in Java, but it did not 
have enough votes in parliament to make radical changes to the legislation. 
Mortimer argued that in the years from 1961 to 1965, the party was playing 
consensus politics, demonstrating its moderation and loyalty to President 
Sukarno. It did not want to further rock what was already a very unstable boat.
After the failed coup of 30 September 1965, the army and Muslim youth 
groups set out to destroy the Communist Party and their supporters through 
killings and imprisonment. This slowed down the redistribution of land, 
and some land which had already been redistributed appears to have 
been taken back by the previous owners or passed to third parties. But the 
redistribution programme did continue through 1968; by the end of that 
year Utrecht (1969: 87) estimated that around one million hectares had 
been reallocated to one million households. Some of this land was probably 
former estate land, and also land which had been owned by people killed 
in 1965/66. Exactly who the beneficiaries were has never been clarif ied but 
to the extent that they were households farming very small holdings, they 
would have received some boost to their income from the extra land even 
if it was of poor quality. But the government of President Suharto showed 
little enthusiasm for continuing land redistribution. Instead, it was much 
more interested in a massive increase in government-sponsored migration 
from Java and Bali to other parts of the country. The results of this policy 
are examined in the next section.
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The history of land reform in Vietnam is very different from other parts 
of Southeast Asia, partly because of the colonial legacy, and partly because 
of the course of Vietnamese history after 1945. Data on landownership 
and land tenure were considered sparse and unreliable until the 1930s, 
when a detailed report on landownership was published by the colonial 
Agricultural Department under the direction of Yves Henry. The economic 
geographer Pierre Gourou also undertook major surveys in various parts 
of the country (Murray 1980: 396-397). Their work has been used by most 
subsequent scholars. In Tonkin, the data collected by Henry showed that 
the great majority of rural households (over 90 per cent) possessed less than 
f ive mau (1.8 hectares), and over 60 per cent were farming less than one mau 
(0.36 hectares). On the other hand, a very small group of large landowners 
(less than 0.1 per cent of the total) owned about 17 per cent of the total 
land in Tonkin. A further set of data from 1941 found that 66 per cent of 
cultivators were farming holdings under 0.36 hectares, while 0.9 per cent 
controlled holdings over f ive hectares. López Jerez (2014: 129-135) argued 
that those landowners controlling more than f ive hectares probably rented 
out the land in smaller parcels. The government of Tonkin found that there 
were 17.7 million parcels of land in 1941, so on average a cultivator could be 
cultivating up to ten parcels.
In Cochinchina, where the amount of cultivated land had been expand-
ing rapidly since the nineteenth century, it was estimated that around 
one-quarter of all landowners owned between 5 and 50 hectares, and 2.5 
per cent owned in excess of 50 hectares. This small group owned around 
45 per cent of all the land in Cochinchina. Many were absentee landlords 
who rented out the land and lived in urban areas (Wiegersma 1988: 77). In 
some parts of the Mekong Delta around 45 per cent of the land area was in 
holdings over 50 hectares, according to the f igures compiled by Henry, and 
cited in López Jerez (2014: Table 4.3). López Jerez also found evidence that 
between 1930 and 1936, the middle class of landowners in Cochinchina lost 
land to the larger landowners controlling over 50 hectares.
After 1945, as the Viet Minh gained greater political control over much 
of the country, agricultural development was given high priority, but land 
redistribution was not at f irst accorded much attention. But by 1949, the Viet 
Minh realized that the skewed landownership was a matter of great concern 
to many Vietnamese, including those who were f ighting against the French. 
In 1953, the Land to the Tiller (LTT) policy was adopted. Wiegersma (1988: 
110) argued that this policy was designed to show the soldiers f ighting the 
French that they could expect grants of land when the French were f inally 
driven from the country. But after the French were defeated, the Geneva 
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Accords partitioned the country and only the northern part was controlled 
by the Workers’ Party. After the f ifth plenum in March 1955, the decision 
was made to accelerate land reform by destroying the landlord class. As 
Chinese influence became more pronounced, radical cadres pressed for the 
establishment of collective agriculture, but the Maoist model was never fully 
implemented, and the peasant family economy continued in many, if not 
all rural areas. In the decade from 1955 to 1965, this model was successful 
in raising production of food staples, mainly through the construction of 
small-scale water control projects (Wiegersma 1988: 149-151).
In the south, the Diem government was not supportive of land redistribu-
tion policies, and even more moderate LTT programmes were opposed. 
Although the government of France handed over 230,000 hectares of land 
formerly owned by French citizens to the Diem regime, most remained 
under the control of local off icials who prof ited from the rental incomes. 
Putzel (1992: 100) claimed that the American advisers who wanted the 
Diem government to pursue a Taiwan-style reform policy became very 
disillusioned. Diem was killed in 1963, but little progress was made with 
land reform in the south until President Thieu signed a LTT law in 1970. The 
law was the result of American pressure, and was modelled on Taiwan and 
Korean experience, but by the time it was passed large parts of the south 
were effectively controlled by the National Liberation Front. Even in areas 
nominally under the control of the Saigon government the LTT programme 
was seen as favouring better-off farmers and offering few benefits to smaller 
cultivators, let alone landless labourers.
After reunif ication in 1975, the victorious Communist government 
quickly realized that it would be diff icult to impose the northern system 
(semi-collectivization) on the south. They encouraged cooperatives but by 
the early 1980s the country faced severe food shortages. Prices of staples 
were controlled, but black markets emerged, and popular unrest mounted 
with what was seen as the ineff iciencies of the socialist system. As liberal 
reformers gained more power in the planning system and in the party itself, 
the scene was set for the major reforms of the Doi Moi era. In 1988 a new land 
law was passed which granted individual long-term use rights over land to 
cultivators who had formerly been members of cooperatives or collectives. 
This law did not permit voluntary re-contracting of cultivation rights and 
land sales were still banned. Debates raged about whether Vietnam should 
move towards a free market in land-use rights, or whether the system of 
controls should continue, including the periodic reallocation of land by the 
cooperative or the collective. By 1993 the debate was resolved in favour of 
those who advocated the market model. The Land Law of that year went 
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some way towards establishing free markets in land use across the country 
(Ravallion and Van de Walle 2008: 25-26).
There has been considerable controversy over the impact of these reforms 
which went further than the Chinese reforms in freeing up land markets. 
On the plus side, many rural households appear to have used the money 
they have gained from selling or leasing the land they were allocated before 
1988 to diversify into non-agricultural activities, such as trade and transport. 
Some have tried their luck in urban areas, seeking wage employment in the 
manufacturing sector. Inevitably there have been some whose diversif ica-
tion strategies failed, and they have found themselves without the assets 
necessary to obtain the credit which could help them f ind other sources of 
income. Ravallion and Van de Walle (2008: 172) argued that ‘the landless poor 
are not being well served by the market and non-market institutions that 
have emerged in Vietnam’s agrarian transition’. This neglect was a problem 
on both eff iciency and equity grounds. Given the evidence of growing 
inequalities in household incomes, at least until 2010, it could be argued 
that Vietnam still faced a need for targeted programmes which addressed 
the particular needs of those who found themselves without assets in the 
brave new world of market capitalism.
Land Settlement Policies
Land settlement programmes have f igured prominently in the poverty 
alleviation strategies of several Southeast Asian governments since the 
colonial era, and have sometimes been viewed as an alternative to land 
reform. In Indonesia, the policy of moving people from overcrowded to 
underpopulated islands was initiated in the colonial era. After independ-
ence, the policy was revived, and was used by the Sukarno government to 
justify pro-natalist policies. It was argued that if there really was a problem 
of overpopulation in Java, Bali, and some islands to the east, then it could 
easily be dealt with by moving people to the supposedly empty lands outside 
the densely settled core of the country. In fact, it appears that between 
1950 and 1968, around 416,000 people were moved, the great majority to 
Sumatra (Suratman and Guinness 1977: 83). While this was more than 
the numbers moved in the colonial era, it was insuff icient to make much 
impact on population growth in Java, bearing in mind that there was also 
considerable in-migration to Java in the early post-independence years. The 
1961 population census showed that the proportion of the total population 
in Java had changed little since 1930.
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The New Order government of President Suharto, once it had abandoned 
the land reform policies of the early 1960s, embarked on an expanded 
programme of subsidized migration from Java and Bali to other parts of 
the archipelago. The motives of the government were mixed; on the one 
hand, some economic planners did genuinely believe that migration from 
Java would ease the pressure on resources in that island and also help to 
develop the areas to which they were sent. On the other hand, there were 
those, especially in the military, who thought that the movement of Javanese 
to other parts of the archipelago would mitigate the separatist tendencies 
which had emerged in the decade from 1955 to 1965, and create a national 
identity which supported Javanese hegemony.
During the first five-year plan of the New Order (1969-1974), the total number 
of families moved amounted to around 40,000, a modest f igure when set 
against the increase in the population of Java over these years. In addition, 
there was rapid growth in the population of the islands outside Java, which 
was leading to greater pressure on land in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, 
the three islands which were expected to receive most migrants. The second 
f ive-year plan (1974-1979) proposed a target of 250,000 families, although 
government f igures indicated that only about 20 per cent of the target was 
achieved (Table 8.1). There were several reasons for this result. First, accelerated 
growth in Java as revenues from the oil boom fed into the domestic economy 
created new employment opportunities even for those with few skills. In 
addition, the cities in Java continued to be a magnet for young people looking 
for advanced education and professional, technical and managerial jobs. But 
even allowing for the tug of Java, net out-migration did increase over the 1970s: 
in 1971, the census of that year showed that net outward migration was almost 
one million, while in 1980 it had increased to 2.35 million (Hugo et al. 1987: 178).
Table 8.1:  Transmigration in Indonesia: targets and actual movement (numbers of 
persons)
Years Target Moved with assistance Moved without assistance
1969/74 38,141 39,436 n/a
1974/79 250,000 55,083 7,281
1979/84 500,000 365,977 169,497
1984/89 750,000 228,422 521,728
1989/94 550,000 94,864 152,136
1994/98 n/a 122,316 193,579
Sources: department of information (1993: table Xii-16), department of information (1994: table 
Xii-16), department of information (1998: table iX-35).
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In spite of the relatively poor performance of the transmigration programme 
in meeting plan targets in the decade from 1969 to 1979, many influential 
policymakers in the government continued to support subsidized movement 
of people from Java to other islands in the archipelago. The third development 
plan of the Suharto era (1979-1984) doubled the target of families to be moved 
from 250,000 to 500,000. An important reason for setting this increased 
target was that the World Bank had committed substantial funding to the 
programme; between 1976 and 1985, loans to transmigration projects totalled 
almost $600 million. An estimated 163,550 hectares of land was cleared 
(Fearnside 1997: Table 2). Off icial f igures show that almost 366,000 family 
heads did move under the off icial programme. In addition, almost 170,000 
moved as voluntary migrants (Table 8.1). It is probable that many of these 
voluntary migrants were friends or family of those who moved off icially.
The fourth f ive-year plan (1984-1989) contained an even more ambitious 
target of 750,000 families although in the event the government only man-
aged to move 228,422 families through the off icial programme. The target 
was ‘achieved’ through the somewhat dubious procedure of counting in 
almost 520,000 unoff icial migrants who had, according to the government, 
moved of their own accord. One reason for the fall in families moved under 
the off icial programme after 1984 was the contraction in the government 
development budget, necessitated by the oil price fall and the sharp increase 
in government debt-service obligations. But the transmigration programme 
suffered a much larger cut than most other sectors in the development budget 
over the fourth plan (Asher and Booth 1992: 60). This reflected growing 
disenchantment with the whole policy in many parts of the Indonesian 
bureaucracy, as well as in the international development community.
The reasons for this disenchantment were several. First, it was becoming 
increasingly obvious that there were not abundant supplies of ‘empty’ land 
suitable for agriculture in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Much of the 
land onto which settlers were moved was of poor quality and food crop 
yields were low and erratic. The World Bank acknowledged that in many 
sites food crop production was inadequate to meet even subsistence needs 
and advocated increased emphasis on tree crops to support viable farm 
enterprises (World Bank 1988: 128). In fact, it appeared that many migrants 
were earning a considerable part of their income from wage employment. 
To the extent that this wage employment was dependent on short-term site 
development, what would happen when this was terminated? A second 
problem concerned the environmental impact of large-scale clearing of 
forest and swamp land for agricultural settlement. Little consideration 
was paid to the environmental consequences of the programme until a 
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vociferous international campaign was launched, which forced the Indo-
nesian government to give the problem greater attention. A third problem 
concerned the relationship between the mainly Javanese migrants and the 
indigenous inhabitants. This was especially sensitive in Irian Jaya where 
the transmigration programme exacerbated existing conflict between 
indigenous separatist movements and the central government. But tensions 
were also growing between migrants and the local population in parts of 
Kalimantan and Sulawesi as well, and these erupted into violent conflict 
over the 1990s.
Behind all these problems was the increasing awareness that the alleged 
‘overpopulation’ of rural Java which had given rise to the whole preoccupa-
tion with moving people away from Java, both in colonial times and since 
independence, was no longer such a pressing concern. Although popula-
tion densities in Java and Bali continued to be much higher than in other 
parts of the country, by the early 1990s many rural people were obtaining 
an increasing proportion of their incomes from off-farm activities. The 
1993 agricultural census showed that in that year almost half of total farm 
household incomes were derived from off-holding sources (Booth 2002a: 
Table 3). The rapid growth in food crop production in Java combined with 
the growth in the manufacturing, construction, transport and trade sectors 
led to increased employment opportunities for both men and women in 
a range of activities. Some rural people relocated to urban areas to take 
advantage of new employment opportunities while others commuted on a 
daily, weekly or monthly basis. Still others found that their rural homes were 
fast becoming part of spreading urban areas, which offered new employment 
opportunities to people without having to move. The increased migration 
combined with urban growth and falling fertility in Java and Bali had led to 
a marked slowdown in rural population growth; indeed, the results of the 
1990 population census indicated that the rural population in many parts 
of Central and East Java and Bali was scarcely growing at all. Some argued 
that the slowing population growth combined with rising incomes indicated 
that over time a smaller proportion of the rural poor would be located in 
Java and a rising proportion in other parts of the country, especially in 
Eastern Indonesia.
Given such developments, it was increasingly argued that, even before 
the crisis of 1997/98, moving people from Java and Bali to other parts of the 
archipelago was no longer a sensible poverty alleviation strategy for the 
sending regions, and could lead to serious problems in the receiving areas. 
While it was probably true that the movement of substantial numbers of 
poor people from Central Java and parts of East Java to the Outer Islands 
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in the early 1980s did contribute to a fall in poverty in the sending regions, 
it was less clear what impact the migrants were having on the economies 
of the receiving provinces. On the basis of surveys carried out in the early 
and mid-1980s, the World Bank argued that most migrants improved their 
incomes and living standards as a result of their move (World Bank 1988: 
18ff.). But at the same time these surveys also showed that transmigrant 
households were crucially dependent on off-farm earnings for much of their 
income. If their farms could be made viable, or if off-farm employment 
could be found in the local area, they would stay where they were, but 
otherwise it was argued that many would return to Java, move on to other 
parts of the country, or go abroad. As a result of doubts about the economic 
viability of many of the projects, and in the face of mounting criticism 
from environmental groups, the World Bank withdrew from funding new 
projects. Around $220 million was disbursed over the 1990s in the ‘second 
stage’ transmigration programme which, as critics pointed out, mainly 
comprised attempts to remedy problems in the design and implementation 
of earlier projects (Adhiati and Bobsien 2001).
The transmigration programme was always viewed as integral to the 
Suharto vision of Indonesia’s economic and political development, and when 
he resigned in May 1998, it rapidly became clear that focus of the govern-
ment policy would shift away from government-f inanced land settlement 
projects. The f iscal constraints imposed after the 1997/98 crisis meant that 
f inancing for development projects through the budget was very limited. 
In addition, the decentralization reforms introduced by President Habibie 
empowered the district governments in the receiving regions, and made 
them less willing to cooperate with projects ‘dropped’ from the centre, 
which they did not view as being in their interests. The unrest in several 
provinces outside Java in the latter part of the 1990s led to large numbers 
of internally displaced people. As the government struggled to cope with 
the refugee problem, there was a tendency both within the government and 
in the NGO community to blame population movement for many of the 
economic and social problems in parts of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku 
and Papua. Stopping government-sponsored land settlement would not 
prevent movement of people around Indonesia in search of better economic 
opportunities, but those who moved would not be the responsibility of the 
central government.
As f iscal constraints were gradually eased, and as government concern 
about food imports grew during the Yudhoyono presidency, it seemed that 
the central government might once again finance land development projects 
outside Java. But there were continuing controversies about what projects 
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were likely to be viable. There were increasing worries about the development 
of peatlands in Sumatra and Kalimantan for both palm oil and other crops; 
these worries appeared to be justif ied when serious f ires erupted in the dry 
season in 2015. That there is still land of agricultural potential outside Java 
seems clear; the debate is over what crops are likely to be most profitable for 
farmers, and least damaging to regional ecologies, which in many parts of 
Indonesia are still poorly understood. Some have argued that the appropriate 
strategy would be to focus on tree crops, and to rely more on imports of 
staple foods. Others queried the role of large estates, especially in the palm 
oil sector. Many were controlled by companies outside Indonesia.
Inevitably because of its size, and the controversies which it has aroused, 
the Indonesian transmigration programme has dominated the literature 
on land settlement in Southeast Asia. But other governments have also 
implemented similar programmes. After the introduction of the New Eco-
nomic Policy (NEP) in 1970, the Malaysian government invested heavily in 
land development as a means of rural poverty alleviation. The main vehicle 
was the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), which had in fact 
been established in 1956, and was intended to assist those rural Malays who 
were poor because they did not have enough land through resettlement 
on new land. The FELDA schemes were mainly conf ined to peninsular 
Malaysia, but there were also a number of other land development schemes 
at both state and federal level. Between 1971 and 1980 FELDA succeeded in 
opening up some 373,705 hectares, and settling some 42,000 families, while 
other federal and state programmes brought the total to 866,000 hectares 
(Osman-Rani 1987: 284). Although the pace of land development slowed 
somewhat in the 1980s, FELDA was still targeted to develop some 175,000 
hectares between 1986 and 1990; total resettlement schemes, including 
state and joint-venture projects were targeted to cover 287,000 hectares 
(Government of Malaysia 1989: 141).
But as in Indonesia, the impact of both FELDA and other land settlement 
schemes on rural poverty alleviation was controversial. There was little 
doubt that the great majority of the settlers chosen were poor, unskilled rural 
Malays with no access to land of their own, and that their incomes increased 
as a result of participation in the FELDA scheme. MacAndrews (1977: 196) 
quoted several studies which concluded that the scheme benefited between 
15 and 20 per cent of the country’s poor – which seemed a reasonable achieve-
ment. However, many of the schemes were expensive to develop and critics 
argued that greater numbers of the rural poor would have benefited from 
alternative uses of the funds. In addition, as Jomo (1990: 100) argued, much 
of the land development was carried out by large contractors, often close to 
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the ruling party, who made substantial profits. The policy of concentrating 
on only two crops, rubber and palm oil, was also criticized, as this made 
the incomes of settlers very vulnerable to f luctuations in their prices. In 
addition, observers pointed to the possibly adverse demographic impact of 
the FELDA and other schemes on both the sending and the receiving areas. 
The sending areas lost many of their most productive workers, while the 
newly settled areas had large numbers of households, both indigenous and 
migrant, at the same stage in their life cycles. They would eventually face 
a problem of aging populations and young people in their turn leaving the 
FELDA sites for urban areas or other resettlement sites (Osman-Rani 1987: 
288-289). If the younger generation stayed, the original holdings might have 
to be sub-divided into uneconomic units.
By the 1990s, it was considered that the programme of land settlement had 
largely achieved its purpose, and no new land was allocated. FELDA itself 
diversif ied into a range of businesses. FELDA Global Ventures Holdings was 
established as a private venture, and has become one of the largest plantation 
operators in the world. Less is known about the other land development 
projects in Malaysia, although King (1986) examined various schemes in 
Sarawak. He concluded that ‘given the f inancial resources, time, energy and 
personnel devoted to these schemes, the yield has not been very great’. He 
argued that the schemes had been very expensive relative to the numbers 
of settlers involved, and failed to provide a solution to the long-term poverty 
problems in Sarawak, which were due to poor soils, primitive technolo-
gies, inappropriate cropping practices and poor infrastructure rather than 
landlessness as such. He concluded that, especially in the interior of the 
state, the goal of poverty reduction would be better achieved by spending 
the available funds on improving existing farming practices, rather than 
embarking on ambitious land development programmes which the state 
government did not have the capacity to implement. This argument was 
also relevant to the problems of Indonesia’s Outer Islands, especially those 
provinces where poverty incidence has in recent years been as high or even 
higher than in parts of Java. Rather than developing new land in marginal 
areas, the need was, and continues to be, to improve agricultural technolo-
gies and infrastructure in existing settlements and thus increase incomes 
and improve the living standards of both indigenous populations and those 
migrants who are already in place.
In Vietnam, land settlement policies were also pursued with considerable 
vigour in the years after reunif ication. There appeared to be at least four 
objectives behind Vietnamese population redistribution policies adopted 
at that time (Desbarats 1987). One was the need to boost food production 
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and provide employment. A second was the perception, which had persisted 
since the colonial era, that population must be moved away from the densely 
populated Red River Delta region in the north. A third was the desire to 
move people out of the cities in the south, into which many thousands of 
rural people had fled during the war. After reunif ication, urban employ-
ment opportunities were limited, and there was off icial fear that urban 
unemployment would lead to political unrest. A fourth objective was the 
strategic one of populating the border regions close to Cambodia, Laos and 
China. These objectives were translated into a set of targets for population 
movement in the second and third plans of f ive million people.
As was the case in both Indonesia and Malaysia, the Vietnamese govern-
ment had considerable diff iculty in achieving these targets. Desbarats (1987: 
61) quoted off icial statements to the effect that 2.4 million were resettled 
between 1975 and 1984, although there was considerable return migration, 
especially from the New Economic Zones. Many of these were prepared in 
haste and turned out to be quite unsuited to intensive food crop agriculture. 
The combination of return migration from the New Economic Zones and 
accelerated migration to towns and cities in the north in the 1980s frustrated 
off icial targets for reducing urban populations. The 1989 population census 
indicated that the urban population was growing at around 3 per cent 
per annum, compared with 2.3 per cent for the population as a whole. As 
in other parts of Asia, the Vietnamese authorities were by the mid-1980s 
forced to concede that the goal of accelerated agricultural production could 
be better achieved by improving agricultural technologies and cultivation 
practices on existing farms, rather than through ambitious and costly land 
settlement schemes, whose results were often disappointing. This change 
of thought ushered in the market reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In the Philippines, the data assembled by Fuwa (2000: Table 2.5) indicated 
that over the Aquino and Marcos presidencies, around 546,000 hectares of 
land was devoted to ‘resettlement projects’. In fact, resettlement projects have 
a long history going back to the American era; even before the presidency 
of Quezon in the latter part of the 1930s, land settlement in Mindanao had 
been seen as a solution to the problem of landlessness in Luzon and Cebu 
(Spencer 1952: 142-149; Paderanga 1987: 10-12; Fuwa 2000: 4). The thinking 
of the American, Commonwealth and post-1946 governments in the Philip-
pines was not dissimilar to that in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Given that 
population densities varied considerably in different parts of the country, 
and that land tenure disputes were becoming more violent in the densely 
settled regions, surely the obvious solution was to move people to those 
parts of the country where land of arable potential was still available? 
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Paderanga (1987: Table 6) estimated that 52,728 households were moved 
under the auspices of the land settlement projects administered by the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform between 1950 and 1976; they were allocated a 
total of 737,000 hectares. This was a lower total than the 127,000 families who 
were moved in Indonesia between 1950 and 1974, although the Indonesian 
families were given, on average, less land.
The off icial f igure cited by Paderanga refers only to those who moved 
with assistance, although (as in Indonesia), it appears that many people 
moved on a voluntary basis, often following family and friends. Where 
did these families move to? Increasingly, the destination was the island of 
Mindanao. By the 1970s, there was growing evidence that land settlement 
by mainly Christian people from other parts of the country was causing 
tensions with the local Muslim population in Mindanao (Abaya-Ulindang 
2015). The region of Mindanao-Sulu experienced faster population growth 
than the country as a whole over the twentieth century; total population was 
around one million in 1918, increasing to 14.1 million in 1990 (Costello 1992: 
Table 3.1). This rapid growth had inevitable environmental consequences, 
including the destruction of much of the upland forest. Repeated attempts 
by successive administrations from Marcos to the present have failed to 
solve the religious and demographic problems and violence remains a fact 
of life for much of the population.
Employment Creation through Labour-Intensive Public Works
Labour-intensive public works programmes began to be implemented 
in several countries in both South and Southeast Asia in the 1960s. Their 
fundamental rationale was that the demand for labour in many parts of 
rural Asia was very seasonal, and that for some months of each year, there 
were considerable numbers in rural areas who were able and willing to work, 
but could not f ind employment within a reasonable distance of their home. 
Some were able to migrate to where work was available, usually in larger 
towns and cities, but many could not move because of family responsibilities 
or other constraints. The purpose of rural public works programmes was to 
provide work for such people in the agricultural slack season, with a focus 
on constructing or repairing infrastructure such as irrigation works, roads, 
bridges, grain silos etc. To the greatest extent possible, it was argued that the 
planning and implementation of such projects should be decentralized, so 
that regional and local governments who supposedly understood the needs of 
a particular region, could decide what sorts of projects should be constructed.
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In Indonesia, a rural public works programme was initiated in 1970, 
as one of the initiatives adopted by the Suharto government to address 
what was then seen as a serious problem of rural underemployment. 
Although the funds were disbursed from the central government budget, 
the responsibility for selecting and implementing projects was delegated 
to the district (kabupaten and kota) governments. This was the level of 
government immediately below the province, and in Java the average popu-
lation approached one million in 1971. Although this level of government 
had its own technical and administrative staff, operated its own budget 
and had some autonomous sources of f inance, its capacity to implement 
projects in the f ield of infrastructure rehabilitation and extension was 
severely constrained by lack of funds. The programme of government 
grants to districts (which became known as the Inpres programme) was 
designed to alleviate this f inancial constraint. The subsidy was disbursed 
on a per capita basis, and its use was limited to infrastructure projects 
which were to be implemented using labour-intensive techniques. The 
programme achieved considerable initial success, and at the beginning 
of the second plan of the Suharto era (1974-1979) Inpres grants were also 
given to the provincial governments although the disbursement criteria 
were somewhat different (Van Leeuwen 1975). A further innovation was to 
allocate regional development subsidies for specif ic purposes, such as the 
construction of primary schools, rural health clinics and village markets 
as well as reafforestation.
The various Inpres allocations allowed regional governments (provinces, 
kabupaten and villages) throughout the archipelago to rehabilitate and 
extend physical infrastructure, and build primary schools and health 
clinics in areas where none had existed before. Improved infrastructure 
in turn meant better access to markets and allowed previously isolated 
rural populations to link up with the growing national economy. The Inpres 
grants were thus one element in the government’s success in reducing rural 
poverty in the years from 1976 onwards. By 1981 the various regional grants 
accounted for 16 per cent of development expenditures and 2 per cent of 
GDP (Asher and Booth 1992: 68). But their importance diminished through 
the 1980s relative to total government expenditures and relative to GDP. 
This was mainly because most government development expenditures were 
squeezed during the decade, as oil revenues contracted, and the rupiah value 
of government debt service obligations grew. Some observers argued that 
the reduction in Inpres expenditures would have a more direct and severe 
impact on rural welfare, because they were targeted to rural areas and to 
labour-intensive projects.
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In practice, it was diff icult to assess the full impact of Inpres expenditures 
on the alleviation of rural poverty in Indonesia. Evidence on their direct 
employment generation effects were only available for the Inpres grants to 
the kapupaten and kota. The number of ‘jobs’ of 100 days each grew from 
around 200,000 in 1970/71 to over one million in 1975/76 (Asher and Booth 
1992: 69). It was estimated in the early years that wage payments comprised 
60 per cent of total programme expenses (Patten, Dapice and Falcon 1980: 
169). Employment generation reached its peak in 1975/76, and declined 
thereafter, so that by the latter part of the 1980s only about 500,000 to 600,000 
jobs were available, even though in real terms expenditures continued to 
increase until the early 1980s. After the mid-1970s there was a switch in the 
type of project selected away from irrigation works and towards roads and 
bridges, which utilized less labour per rupiah of expenditure. Of course, 
the indirect impact of building roads and bridges on rural incomes and 
employment may have been considerable, but such indirect effects were more 
diff icult to assess. What was clear from an examination of Inpres allocations 
by province was that there was a tendency from the 1980s onwards for the 
smaller, less densely settled provinces to receive higher Inpres grants, both 
in per capita terms and relative to provincial GDP. By the early 1990s, many 
of the grants were skewed to regions outside Java; certainly there was no 
‘Java bias’ in their allocation (Booth 2014a: 37).
Other labour-intensive public works implemented in the 1970s included 
the Padat Karya programme, which was revived in 1997, as one of the social 
safety net programmes implemented in the wake of the 1997/98 crisis. An 
evaluation of these labour-intensive public works programmes claimed that 
they were ‘hastily developed by sectoral or line ministries to absorb recently 
retrenched workers, especially in rural areas’ (Perdana and Maxwell 2005: 
101). Some observers thought that the main reason for these programmes 
was that the relevant ministries wanted to capture a share of the budget 
allocations for emergency relief projects. Many of the projects were criticized 
for poor results; while the aim of the projects may have been to provide some 
employment for those desperate for some work and income, in practice the 
rules were often flouted and the supervision lax. Targeting was weak. One 
study found that 70 per cent of those who participated in the Padat Karya 
activities were from non-poor households. Most were young men, as the 
work was physically quite demanding. Older men and women could not 
participate.
With the introduction of the sweeping decentralization reforms im-
plemented after Suharto left off ice, the Inpres grants were abolished, and 
instead districts received several new grants from the centre, and were 
242 Living StAndArdS in SoutheASt ASiA 
given more discretion about how to use these grants. Critics of the labour-
intensive works programmes pointed out that, by 2001, the unemployed, 
and especially young people seeking work for the f irst time, did not see 
their future as unskilled workers, sitting by the side of the road breaking 
up stones, or doing other forms of manual labour. They wanted work which 
would lead to permanent jobs, with secure career prospects. The challenge 
for governments at all levels was to implement policies which would expand 
employment opportunities, especially for young, f irst-time job seekers 
graduating from the school and college system.
Another country in Southeast Asia which devoted considerable budget-
ary resources to rural employment generation schemes was Thailand. 
In the 1960s, the Thai Ministry of the Interior began to rationalize local 
government and improve the calibre of the personnel. By the mid-1970s, 
after a more democratic government came to power, it was decided that 
a sub-provincial level of government (tambon) had the capacity to imple-
ment labour-intensive public works. In 1974/75 the Tambon Development 
Programme was initiated with funding of 2.5 billion baht (about 0.8 per 
cent of 1975 GDP).3 This money was spread among 5,027 rural tambons. In 
1975/76 funding was increased to 3.5 billion baht (Poot 1979: 16-19). These 
funds came from the central government budget, and were to be used for 
labour-intensive infrastructure projects, especially irrigation works, roads 
and bridges, in the agricultural slack season. It was estimated that between 
45 and 50 per cent of total disbursements were spent on wage payments, 
and some 56 million person-days of employment were created. The average 
wage paid was quite high in comparison to that paid in alternative jobs, 
and there was little diff iculty in procuring labour (Poot 1979: 58). Most of 
the projects were either roads or irrigation works, and although simple 
construction techniques were used there were problems of quality control, 
so that roads constructed in one dry season were in need of repair again 
by the next year.
The Tambon Development Programme was suspended after the military 
coup in 1976, although in 1978 a programme of public works was initiated 
as a drought relief measure. In 1980, the Rural Job Creation Programme 
(RJCP) was implemented along the same lines as the Tambon Development 
Programme (Krongkaew 1987: 238-239). In 1980, 3.5 billion baht was allocated 
to the RJCP, about the same amount in nominal terms as was allocated to 
the Tambon Development Programme f ive years earlier, although in real 
terms and as a proportion of GDP the allocation was lower. Throughout 
3 The tambon is a unit of local government below the province.
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the 1980s the budgetary allocation fell in nominal terms and relative to 
GDP so that by 1989 the total allocation was 2.35 billion baht or only 0.1 
per cent of GDP. There was also a sustained drop in the number of projects 
implemented, and in the number of workers employed. Whereas in 1980 
an estimated 3.75 million workers were given employment, by 1989 only 
415,450 were employed (Krongkaew 1990: Table 6). Some argued that this 
decline was caused by declining demand for off-season employment in 
rural areas as a result of increased migration to urban areas, and especially 
to Bangkok. While it was true that employment opportunities in Bangkok 
and surrounding areas had expanded rapidly over the 1980s, the evidence 
from the labour force surveys indicated that there were still signif icant 
numbers of men and women in rural areas who reported themselves as 
‘unemployed and available for work’ in the late 1980s. In 1988 over 1.2 million 
were enumerated in this category in the slack season.
Several commentators pointed to the apparent mismatch between al-
locations of RJCP funds and levels of income and poverty by region. In his 
evaluation of the original tambon programmes, Poot (1979: 19) showed that 
the northeast, the poorest region in the country, received the least funds 
in per capita terms, while the central region, the richest after metropolitan 
Bangkok, received the most. Jitsuchon (1990: 54) found that this disparity 
continued with the RJCP programme after 1980, and in 1985 the average 
additional income per head received as a result of the RJCP was over 2,000 
baht in the central region, where poverty incidence was least, and only 
870 baht in the northeast where the majority of the rural poor were con-
centrated. This indicated a failure to target funds to the regions where the 
incidence of poverty was most severe. Furthermore, Krongkaew (1987: Table 
3) showed that the ratio of wage to non-wage expenditures in all parts of 
the country fell sharply after 1980, and by 1984 wage payments accounted 
for only 32 per cent of total expenditures. This change in the focus of the 
programme from labour-intensive public works to more capital-intensive 
infrastructure projects was a response to public criticism about the poor 
quality of the infrastructure built by labour-intensive means. Inevitably, 
as less labour was hired, and contractors looked for skilled rather than 
unskilled labour, the impact of the RJCP on rural poverty was reduced 
(Krongkaew 1987: 250-257).
Under the Marcos regime, the Philippines did not place much emphasis 
on mobilizing underutilized rural labour for labour-intensive public works. 
With the advent of the Aquino administration in 1986, the Community 
Employment and Development Program (CEDP) was initiated. The CEDP 
was part of the government’s ‘short-term development strategy of stimulating 
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recovery by inducing demand through increased incomes’, especially in 
rural areas (Mangahas 1987b: 170). As such, the programme was expected 
to be discontinued at the end of 1987. The budgetary allocation for the 
second half of 1986 was 3.93 billion pesos, or about 0.6 per cent of GDP in 
that year. The aim was to create one million jobs of 60 days’ duration. About 
two-thirds of the funds were under the control of the Ministry of Public 
Works and Highways to be used for feeder roads, schools and irrigation works. 
The rest were controlled by a variety of ministries and agencies including 
agriculture, agrarian reform and natural resources. An important feature 
of the programme was the involvement of non-governmental organizations 
in the monitoring of the projects. But in spite of the NGO involvement, 
the CEDP was subject to delays and it is not clear what proportion of the 
allocated funds were f inally spent.
To sum up, the various labour-intensive public works programmes which 
were implemented in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines did play a 
useful role in generating employment and income in the agricultural slack 
season. But over the 1980s funding in both Thailand and Indonesia for 
these programmes was reduced in real terms, and more capital-intensive 
construction techniques were used. As a result, numbers employed fell, 
although it was not obvious that problems of rural unemployment and 
poverty in these countries had been solved. One problem with both the 
Thai RJCP and the Indonesian Inpres programmes was that neither was 
targeted towards the regions, and the people within those regions, where 
the problems of poverty and seasonal unemployment were most acute. In 
addition, as labour markets tightened over the 1980s, rural public works were 
increasingly viewed by government officials as irrelevant to the employment 
problems facing economies where pools of rural surplus labour were drying 
up, and where young people in particular wanted jobs which gave them 
skills which could then be used to secure more permanent employment in 
other parts of the economy.
Controlling Food Prices
By the 1980s, the proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture was 
falling in several countries in Southeast Asia, and the incomes of many rural 
households were becoming more diverse. In Thailand, it was estimated that 
almost 60 per cent of farm household income was derived from off-farm 
sources in 1982/83, which was almost as high as in Taiwan in 1980. The 
proportion for the Philippines was estimated to be 56 per cent in 1985, 
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and 50 per cent in Indonesia in 1984 (Booth 2002b: Table 4). Given these 
trends, which accelerated over the 1990s, the focus of government policy 
in all three countries shifted from programmes specif ically targeted to 
the agriculture sector to economy-wide measures. These included policies 
to stabilize food prices, and attempts to make government expenditures 
more pro-poor through cash transfers. In addition, several governments 
implemented fertility control policies and also began to experiment with 
various types of decentralization policies which were designed to give local 
communities more say in framing projects. In the remaining part of this 
chapter, the results of these policies are evaluated.
For well over a century, the countries of Southeast Asia have been divided 
into net foodgrain exporters and importers. Rice has been the key staple 
across the region, although corn, sweet potato and cassava have been 
widely consumed for many decades, and in recent years consumption of 
wheat-based foods has been growing rapidly. Some countries have switched 
from importing to exporting rice in particular years, but broadly speaking 
Thailand has always been the largest exporter, while Vietnam, Myanmar and 
Cambodia have all re-emerged as significant exporters since the early 1990s, 
as they were in the pre-1940 era. In 2016/17, these four countries exported over 
20 million tons of rice, or about 45 per cent of global exports. The Philippines, 
Malaysia and Singapore are net importers while Indonesia has swung from 
being a large importer in the 1970s to a small exporter in the 1980s, and once 
again an importer in the 1990s and 2000s. Recent governments have pledged 
to achieve ‘self-suff iciency’ in rice, although imports have been permitted 
in years when dry weather affected domestic production. In 2018, imports 
exceeded two million tons. The Southeast Asian countries have also emerged 
as signif icant importers of wheat in recent years; Indonesia is now one of 
the top three wheat importers in the world. In 2016/17 wheat imports into 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand and Vietnam amounted to 25.1 
million tons, or 14 per cent of global imports (USDA 2018: 21). Southeast Asia 
as a region is also a net importer of corn and soybeans.
By the early twenty-f irst century, it had become clear that, with growing 
incomes and rapid urbanization, food consumption patterns were changing 
rapidly across Southeast Asia. Government responses to these changes 
have varied. Because rice has been the main staple, it has tended to be the 
focus of government intervention, but government policies have varied over 
time according to world market conditions, and fluctuations in domestic 
production and consumption. The proportion of total world rice production 
which is marketed internationally has always been quite small, and world 
market prices have been subject to considerable volatility. In both Indonesia 
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and the Philippines, government agencies have been charged with regulating 
domestic markets to ensure ‘remunerative’ prices for farmers while at the 
same time keeping retail prices reasonably stable. In Indonesia, the National 
Logistics Board (Bulog) was given a monopoly over imports in the Suharto 
years, and did manage to keep domestic prices more stable than world prices 
for the years from 1969 to 1994 (Timmer 1996). Given the importance of rice 
in the Indonesian diet, and in household budgets over these years, this was 
a signif icant achievement. But after Suharto left off ice, the role of Bulog 
attracted considerable criticism, for reasons which will be discussed below.
In the Philippines, the National Food Authority (NFA) has been the key 
government agency charged with rice price policy and with food security. 
As with Bulog, its function is to ensure remunerative prices for farmers 
while at the same time stabilizing domestic wholesale and retail prices 
and protecting consumers from the volatility of world rice markets and 
also from fluctuations in domestic production due to climatic and other 
factors. Between 1990 and 2008, it achieved some success in stabilizing 
real prices of rice at the farm gate and in wholesale and retail markets 
(Intal, Cu and Illescas 2012: Table 1). But in most years from 1990 to 2002 
domestic price stability was achieved at the cost of high nominal rates of 
protection. The wholesale price of rice within the Philippines was usually 
between twice and three times as high as the ex-Bangkok price of 35 per 
cent broken rice, adjusted for transport and handling costs (Intal, Cu and 
Illescas 2012: Table 2).
The high profits which the NFA made from buying cheap in international 
markets and selling dear in the domestic markets did reduce its need for 
budgetary subsidies, but that changed after 2004, when the ex-Bangkok 
price in peso terms rose sharply relative to the domestic price (Table 8.2). 
This greatly increased the budget support to the NFA, and led to a debate 
about the costs and benefits of its functions. Critics argued that the impact 
of NFA operations on farmgate prices was in fact quite small and varied 
across regions. Its dominant role in the import market did protect domestic 
consumers from fluctuations in the international market price, but the 
same result could have been achieved at less cost to the budget through a 
variable tariff. This would have the advantage that the profits accruing to 
the NFA in times of low world prices would instead accrue directly to the 
national budget (Intal, Cu and Illescas 2012: 41). These authors also argued 
that the private sector should be given a greater role in the internal rice 
market, which it could carry out more eff iciently in most regions. To reduce 
storage and other costs, the size of the national stock should be reduced, 
and confined to low-quality rice.
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Table 8.2:  Domestic prices of medium-quality rice as a ratio of ex-Bangkok prices 
(35 per cent broken), 2000-2007









Sources: ex-bangkok 35 per cent broken and Philippine prices: intal, Cu and illescas (2012: table 2); 
Jakarta wholesale prices from www.bps.go.id (accessed 20/11/2016).
Most studies of the NFA in the Philippines agree that the agency’s operations 
have had little impact on poverty in the country and that the considerable 
budgetary outlays could have been better spent on other programmes, 
targeted more directly to the poor. Tigno (2012: 270) argued that ‘the Philip-
pine government appears to be highly sensitive to the political signif icance 
of its rice subsidy programme but insensitive to the f inancial and f iscal 
implications of such a programme and the fact that it fails to have a serious 
positive impact on overall poverty’. This raised the question of what other 
policies the government could implement which would have a greater 
impact. Would conditional cash transfers work better? Their role is examined 
in more detail below.
Over the 1990s and in the early 2000s, it was argued that Bulog in Indonesia 
played a more effective role in stabilizing rice prices without recourse to large 
budgetary subsidies, although it did receive assistance through subsidized 
loans from the state-owned banks. But by the early 2000s, it was clear that 
domestic rice prices were rising relative to ex-Bangkok prices; from 2003 to 
2007 the differential was greater than in the Philippines (Table 8.2). Several 
studies pointed out that import restrictions which raised the domestic 
price of rice would have an adverse impact on poverty, as the poor in both 
rural and urban areas were in most cases net purchasers of rice (Warr 2005; 
McCulloch 2008). But since the spike in the world price in 2008/9, Indonesian 
policy has been directed towards using import controls to keep domestic 
prices above international levels. Rice self-suff iciency became off icial 
policy, although the policy has been modified under President Joko Widodo, 
with the result that domestic rice prices have risen sharply, even when 
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international prices have been stable or falling. Between 2010 and 2016, the 
wholesale price of medium-grade rice increased by over 60 per cent, and in 
2016 the average wholesale price in Indonesian markets was over twice the 
ex-Vietnam export price of 5 per cent broken grain, converted into rupiah.
The administration of Joko Widodo, which has frequently stated its com-
mitment to reducing poverty, has permitted more rice imports since 2015, 
and the rate of increase in rice prices has slowed, although domestic prices 
are still well above world prices. But more sweeping reforms of food policy 
in Indonesia are diff icult to implement. Many politicians still think that it is 
dangerous for Indonesia to rely on international markets for rice and other 
food staples, including corn and soybean, although the reasons for this concern 
are seldom clarif ied, and indeed imports of corn and soybean have been 
increasing. Several economists have pointed out that if the government wants 
to increase rice production, it would be preferable to focus on the rehabilitation 
of irrigation systems, both in Java and elsewhere, and on more investment in 
research (Simatupang and Timmer 2008). Others advocate a greater emphasis 
on crop insurance (Patunru and Respatiadi 2017). If the government wants to 
boost agricultural production more generally, it would be preferable to focus 
on crops where Indonesia continues to have a strong comparative advantage, 
such as rubber and oil palm, and allow more imports of foodgrains. In Java, 
many farmers are switching to horticulture, which is often more profitable 
than growing rice, especially for producers cultivating small plots close to 
large urban markets. It seems inevitable that, given continued population 
growth, Indonesia will have to rely more on food imports, and that attempts 
to curb imports through quantitative controls will only penalize the poor.
Concerns about the impact of rising rice prices on consumer welfare have 
not been confined to the two main rice-importing countries in Southeast 
Asia. In Vietnam, it has been argued that poorer households tend to be net 
buyers of rice and even ‘among the 21% of households nationally that are 
net sellers of rice, only half (or 11.5% of all households) sell a fraction of their 
output large enough to ensure that their income gains outweigh their losses 
as consumers’ (Coxhead, Linh and Tam 2012: 590). But the general equilib-
rium model results reported by these authors did show that the rural poor 
benefited in the longer run from the impact of higher rice prices on labour 
productivity and employment. Rice exports in Vietnam are dominated by 
state trading f irms and they are required to use windfall gains from higher 
world prices to promote agricultural development. But in 2007/8 when 
world prices increased rapidly, there was little evidence, according to these 
authors, that the state trading companies did use their prof its either to 
stabilize domestic prices or to promote productivity growth in the sector.
governMent PoLiCY interventionS 249
Making the Budget Pro-poor: What Can Governments Do?
The problem of the impact of the f iscal system on income distribution began 
to attract attention in Southeast Asia the 1970s, and several studies were 
published in that decade. Snodgrass (1975a: 283) argued that at independence 
the West Malaysian f iscal system ‘was marked by regressivity in taxation 
of low-income groups and a highly unequal distribution of public services’. 
He pointed out that Malaysia was not a typical developing country in that 
budgetary revenues comprised 26-27 per cent of GDP, which was much higher 
than the Asian average. Even the poorer groups were taxed through export 
and import taxes and excises; export taxes fell to a disproportionate extent 
on the incomes of smallholder producers, which were often lower than those 
of urban wage earners who were below the income tax threshold (Booth 
1980: 47-50). After independence, Snodgrass argued that the f iscal system 
became more progressive, but mainly because of changes in expenditures. 
In particular, he stressed the rise in expenditures aimed at low-income 
groups, especially Malays, through increased expenditure on agricultural 
development between 1958 and 1968. This was before the New Economic 
Policy placed even more emphasis on expenditures in agricultural develop-
ment, land settlement and education. These findings were broadly confirmed 
by Meerman (1979: 324), who found that in 1974, after all budgetary effects 
had been considered, the share of the bottom four deciles in total income 
rose from 14 to 18 per cent.
In the Philippines, Tan (1975) examined the impact of the government 
budget for the early 1970s, and came to the conclusion that the government 
sector as a whole had virtually no impact on the distribution of income. On 
the tax side, she concluded that indirect taxes (in particular, taxes on alcohol, 
tobacco, and import duties) were inherently regressive and contributed 
to the overall regressivity of the tax system. On the expenditure side, she 
found that government expenditures on primary education and agricultural 
extension were progressive, but higher education expenditures largely 
benefited the higher income groups. Research in other parts of Southeast 
Asia tended to focus more on specif ic taxes: in Thailand a number of studies 
examined the impact of rice export taxes. It was argued that foreign demand 
elasticities and domestic supply elasticities were such that much of the tax 
was passed back to farmers in the form of lower prices. As farmers were on 
average earning lower incomes than many rice consumers, who benefited 
from lower prices in domestic markets, the tax had a signif icant adverse 
impact on the intersectoral distribution of income, although within both 
urban and rural areas, the rice export taxes improved the real incomes of 
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the poor, as they were net purchasers of rice (Booth 1980: 50). Ingram (1971: 
258) argued that Thai export taxes on rice were a tool for regulating the 
price of the economy’s main wage good, and in effect became a means for 
keeping domestic wages lower than they might otherwise have been. This 
encouraged labour-intensive industrialization.
In Malaysia and Indonesia, export taxes on rubber also reduced the 
incomes of smallholder producers. Critics argued that their tax burden was 
higher than on urban workers earning incomes which fell below the thresh-
old for the income tax (Booth 1980: 47-51). In Malaysia, smallholders received 
government assistance for replanting, which at least partially compensated 
for the higher tax burden, but this was not the case in Indonesia, where 
during the 1970s, smallholders were further penalized through the impact 
of the oil boom on the real exchange rate. These arguments ultimately led 
to the abolition of rice export taxes in Thailand, and changes in assessment 
procedures for rubber taxes in both Malaysia and Indonesia.
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, there was less interest on 
the part of international development agencies in the impact of government 
budgets on income distribution. The prevailing view was that governments 
in most middle- and low-income countries could do little to inf luence 
income distribution through the budget, and government expenditures 
should be conf ined to sectors where there was clear evidence of market 
failure, although there was often debate about which sectors these were. But 
in the early years of the new century, there was renewed interest in what 
governments could do to mitigate inequalities in the distribution of income 
and wealth in the developing world. What role could governments play in 
building social protection systems, which could help the disadvantaged to 
get access to government services such as health and education? In part, 
this focus on social protection was due to the impact which conditional 
cash transfers appeared to be having in several Latin American countries, 
which historically had had very skewed distributions of income and wealth, 
including both Brazil and Mexico. But it also reflected a renewed awareness 
on the part of politicians of the widespread popular concern about social 
and economic inequalities, and the growing expectation among electorates 
that governments must do something to correct these inequalities.
These concerns were especially apparent in Indonesia, where in the run-up 
to the 2014 election, inequality became an important issue. The National 
Medium-Term Development Plan explicitly included a target of reducing 
the Gini coeff icient to 0.36 by 2019, although it was not clear how this was 
to be achieved. A survey commissioned by the World Bank found that a 
large majority of the respondents (92 per cent) felt that the distribution of 
governMent PoLiCY interventionS 251
income was quite unequal, or not equal at all (World Bank and Australian 
Aid 2015a: 9-10). There appeared to be a widespread conviction among 
those surveyed that inequality was increasing, that the rich were getting 
richer, and the poor, if not actually getting poorer, were falling behind in 
comparative terms. Another report published in 2015 found that, in 2012, 
the impact of the budget on income inequality was mildly progressive, 
mainly because of progressive social spending (World Bank and Australian 
Aid 2015b: 31). Perhaps surprisingly, the report found that energy subsidies 
were ‘very slightly progressive and large enough in magnitude to roughly 
cancel out the indirect tax burdens created by Indonesia’s VAT and excise 
tax regime’. The report also found that direct transfers more effectively 
targeted the poor than in-kind transfers, but the absolute amounts were 
also small, and they did not have broad coverage.
Other studies have agreed that government efforts to assist the poor in 
Southeast Asia have had limited impact. Warr and Sarntisart (2005: 217) 
found that Thailand’s record of poverty reduction between the 1960s and 
2000 was mainly due to rapid economic growth and that explicit govern-
ment programmes to assist the poor were ‘small in magnitude’ and not well 
targeted. They argued that although the Thai government has claimed that 
pro-poor expenditures have increased as a proportion of total government 
expenditures in the 1990s, most programmes did not really focus on poor 
people. Their analysis showed that non-poor provinces in the early 2000s 
actually received somewhat higher per capita levels of poverty-related 
expenditures than poor provinces. Balisacan and Edillon (2005) in their 
analysis of the impact of government expenditures in the Philippines also 
found that up to the early 2000s, only very modest amounts had been spent 
on targeted schemes, and evaluations found that their impact was slight. 
These authors argued that sustained economic growth over decades was the 
key to the poverty problem in the Philippines, although they pointed out that 
the economic growth which had occurred in the 1990s appeared to have had 
only a weak impact on incomes of the poor. This point was also made by the 
Asian Development Bank. In a report published in 2009, it was argued that 
the economic growth which had occurred in recent years in the Philippines 
had not been translated into substantial poverty reduction, and that more 
targeted programmes were needed (Asian Development Bank 2009: 4).
Beginning in 2007, the Philippines launched a small pilot project called 
the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), which was modelled on 
conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America. It offered 500 pesos 
per month to 6,000 households selected from the poorest municipalities, 
providing they agreed to six conditions regarding their children’s school 
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attendance, and participation in government-provided health programmes 
(Reyes and Tabuga 2012: 2-3). In the following years, the popularity of the 4Ps 
led to its rapid expansion under both President Arroyo and her successor, 
President N. Aquino. By 2014, it was estimated that 4.2 million families were 
participating (Kim and Yoo 2015: Figure 1). In its initial stages much of the 
funding came from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank but 
by 2014 around two-thirds of the cost came from the national budget. The 
World Bank has claimed that it was one of the largest and best targeted 
conditional cash transfer programmes in the world.
Some evaluations of the programme have been carried out by independent 
researchers in the Philippines. Tutor (2014) found that it did have a signif i-
cant impact on enrolments for children under twelve in the participating 
households but there was little impact on enrolments of children over twelve. 
She argued that the opportunity cost of a child’s labour increased once they 
reached their teenage years, and very poor families needed their earnings. 
She also found that there was little impact on total household consumption 
of participating households, although they did increase their expenditures 
on carbohydrates and clothing. She suggested that it would be more efficient 
to target poor households in poor localities, although Reyes et al. (2015) 
argued that this could lead to exclusion of many poor households in other 
regions. Their analysis agreed that in its early years, the 4Ps had the greatest 
impact on primary enrolments; they argued that there was a need to boost 
transition from primary to secondary education for participating households.
Given the popularity of the 4Ps, it is likely that political support for it will 
continue in the Philippines. In Indonesia, the government has continued 
with the subsidized rice policy, f irst introduced in 1998. This accounted 
for around half of the household targeted social protection budget in 2010 
(Alatas et al. 2013). In 2005 and 2008 a temporary unconditional cash transfer 
programme was introduced (Bantuan Langsung Tunai, or BLT), mainly to 
mitigate the impact of price shocks, including higher rice, gasoline and 
kerosene prices on poorer households. After that, a conditional cash transfer 
programme was introduced (Program Keluarga Harapan, or PKH), which 
reached 1.1 million households in 2010. By 2017, it had been expanded to reach 
6.2 million households (TNP2K 2018: 19). The PKH was aimed at households 
where there were children below f ive, or children below 18 that have not 
f inished the nine years of compulsory education. An evaluation of the 
targeted household programmes carried out in 2011 found little evidence 
of local elite capture, although those local elites who gained inf luence 
through informal institutions were found to be less prone to capture than 
those who held formal off ice (Alatas et al. 2013: 29).
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Given the abundant evidence that poor families have higher infant and 
child mortality rates, and lower educational enrolments than those with 
higher incomes, a programme which makes government assistance to 
families conditional on both school attendance and attendance at health 
clinics could in principle help poorer households to close the gaps. But 
governments must be prepared to make resources available not just for 
the transfers, but also for increased health and education facilities. In both 
Indonesia and the Philippines, the main constraint on expanding provision 
of health and education facilities is limited budgetary resources. In both 
countries the ratio of budgetary revenues and expenditures to GDP was low 
compared with other ASEAN countries in 2015 (Table 8.3). In Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam, total budgetary expenditures per capita in 2015 
were between $540 and $590 per capita, and only a small percentage of these 
expenditures were allocated to social protection policies. Ramesh (2014: 
52) argued that in 2012, average per capita spending on social protection 
was only 1.1 per cent of per capita GDP in Indonesia, and 2.1 per cent in the 
Philippines, although a large part of expenditures in the Philippines went 
on social insurance which was mainly restricted to formal sector workers. 
The Indonesian system was more egalitarian, but in both countries the 
programmes in place were aimed at poor families with children, and did 
not cover the aged or the disabled. Ramesh also argued that more should be 
done to assist the transient poor, possibly through employment on public 
works projects.
Table 8.3:  Government revenues and expenditures as a percentage of GDP and 
expenditures per capita in ASEAN countries, 2015
Country Revenues  
(as % of GDP)
Expenditures*  
(as % of GDP)
Expenditures per capita 
(current 2015 dollars)
brunei 20.3 34.3 (66.0) 13,212
Singapore 22.5 18.1 (15.6) 9,548
Malaysia 18.9 22.1 (22.1) 2,307
thailand 19.2 20.5 (15.3) 1,166
Philippines 15.8 16.7 (18.2) 588
vietnam 23.5 28.5 (23.8) 567
indonesia 13.0 15.7 (14.7) 540
Lao Pdr 15.5 23.5 (26.7) 470
Myanmar 21.7 26.0 (9.8) 309
Cambodia 16.8 19.4 (14.8) 208
* figures in brackets refer to 1995.
Sources: Asian development bank (2015, table 2.3: 2017: tables 8.3 and 8.4).
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Population Policies
As was pointed out in Chapter 1, population growth in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was considerably faster in Southeast Asia than 
in either China or India. By the 1930s, population was around 27 per cent of 
that in China, and 40 per cent of that in India. By 2015, these proportions had 
changed to 46 per cent and 37.5 per cent. In the roughly eight decades from 
the late 1930s to 2017, rates of population growth varied from 1.5 per cent per 
annum in Myanmar to over 3 per cent in Brunei (Table 8.4). International 
migration over these decades played only a limited role in population growth; 
the main reasons were high fertility and falling mortality. By the 1960s, 
several countries were concerned about what were seen as unsustainably 
high rates of population growth, and implemented national family planning 
programmes. In Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia total fertility rates did 
fall through the decades from 1970 to 2010, and it is widely believed that 
the availability of modern contraceptive advice from both government and 
private clinics played a role in this fall. In the 1990s, fertility also began to 
decline in Vietnam. By 2017, total fertility rates were at or below replacement 
levels in Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam (Table 8.4). But 
in other countries in the region they were still above replacement levels, 
and rates of population growth, although falling, were still above 1 per cent 
per annum.
The Philippine case is of particular interest as rates of population growth 
have been high over the past eight decades, although no higher than Malay-
sia. In both countries, government-f inanced family planning policies have 
been limited. In the Philippines, the Roman Catholic Church has opposed 
the use of most forms of contraception, while in Malaysia, governments 
have been reluctant to encourage the Malay majority to limit their fertility 
for reasons of population balance. But in both countries fertility has been 
falling in recent years, as more people access modern forms of contracep-
tion, especially in urban areas. An increase in the age of marriage has 
also occurred. In the Philippines, the evidence from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys shows that fertility declines steeply by wealth quintile. In 
the richest quintile, the total fertility rate in 2012 was below replacement 
at only 1.7, compared with 5.2 in the poorest quintile (Table 8.5).
Economists have argued that falling fertility affects economic growth 
as a result of the so-called demographic bonus, which results from a shift 
in the age structure of the population towards the 15-to-65 age group, who 
are assumed to be working. It is argued that children and the elderly are 
consumers rather than producers. A high percentage of the population 
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under the age of f ifteen, such as still occurs in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, 
implies that countries will struggle to provide adequate food, education and 
healthcare for all children. On the other hand, an increasing proportion of the 
population over 65 will place new strains on medical and care services. The 
demographic bonus is of limited duration; in much of Europe, and in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan it lasted from the 1950s to 2000, but now these countries 
are facing higher costs of providing for the over-65 age group. Those who do 
not have occupational pensions and private healthcare provision become 
a charge on the state. But in those countries where around two-thirds of 
Table 8.4:  Population in 2017 and estimated population growth rates, c. 1939 to 
2017, total fertility rates (TFR) and dependency ratios, c.2017










Singapore (1939) 5.7 2.7 1.2 27
brunei (1939) 0.4 3.1 1.9 28
Malaysia (1939) 31.6 2.5 2.0 31
thailand (1937) 66.1 1.9 1.5 29
Philippines (1939) 105 2.4 2.8 37
indonesia (1940) 264.0 1.7 2.4 33
Lao Pdr (1940) 7.0 2.2 2.8 38
vietnam (1939) 93.7 1.7 2.1 32
Myanmar (1941) 53.4 1.5 2.3 33
Cambodia (1940) 15.9 2.0 2.6 36
* Annual average growth rate of population from the years shown to 2017. 
** total fertility rates refer to the average number of children a women has from age 15 to 45.
*** Population under age 15 and over age 65 as a percentage of the population aged between 15 
and 65.
Source: Population reference bureau (2017).
Table 8.5: Total fertility rates in the Philippines, by wealth quintiles, 2007 and 2012
Wealth Quintile 2007 2012
Poorest quintile 5.2 5.2
Second quintile 4.2 3.7
third quintile 3.3 3.1
fourth quintile 2.7 2.4
richest quintile 1.9 1.7
Average 3.3 3.0
Source: Mapa et al. (2017: table 2); data from the demographic and health Surveys, Philippines.
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the population, or more, are in the 15-to-65 age groups, countries have the 
potential to achieve higher economic growth, because these people can be 
in productive employment rather than consuming resources.
It should be emphasized that the potential offered by the demographic 
bonus is not always realized. If rates of open unemployment are high, if 
many women are unwilling to work, or cannot f ind work, or if those in 
employment are trapped in low productivity occupations, the impact of the 
bonus created by falling fertility on economic growth may not be very great. 
Low productivity per worker translates into low incomes and persistent 
poverty. In the Southeast Asian context, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand 
all managed to achieve rapid growth of output per worker in the decades 
after 1970 with low levels of open unemployment and high labour force 
participation rates. These countries have also seen a very sharp fall in 
poverty. This has also been the case in Vietnam since 1990, but because 
Vietnam started the transition later, the full impact of slowing population 
growth on incomes and poverty will take longer to materialize.
The Southeast Asian examples confirm that declining population growth 
can have a positive impact on incomes and the standard of living, providing 
governments also put in place other policies to achieve economic growth. 
Thailand has achieved faster poverty decline than the Philippines since 
the 1960s in part because of a reduction in fertility but, in addition, trade, 
exchange rate and foreign investment policies all allowed Thailand to realize 
the potential of the demographic bonus, at least until 1996. Myanmar has 
experienced low population growth for many decades, and fertility in 2017 was 
lower than in Indonesia, and not much higher than in Malaysia. Yet economic 
growth has been slow and poverty is probably higher than in many other 
Asian countries. Policies designed to slow population growth can certainly 
help in accelerating output per capita, and in reducing poverty, but they must 
be combined with other policies to promote sustained economic growth.
Decentralization Policies
In both Indonesia and the Philippines, the departure of Marcos in 1986 and 
Suharto in 1998 both led to policies aimed at decentralization of powers to 
subnational levels of government. In both countries, there is a large body of 
literature on the results of the various decentralization measures. In their 
survey of this literature, Malesky and Hutchinson (2016: 136) argued that 
many researchers found that ‘decentralization had not fulf illed its economic 
and governance promises, even in the countries where it was implemented 
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most earnestly’. This conclusion echoes research in other parts of the world, 
where reforms aimed at devolving more powers to sub-national levels of 
government have often failed to deliver the benefits which reformers hoped 
and expected of them. Explanations for this failure include the reluctance 
of central governments to devolve signif icant tax powers to the regions, the 
lack of administrative and technical competence at sub-national levels, and 
in some cases an increase in corruption, where sub-national governments 
lack even basic audit functions and local parliaments are either unable to 
control corrupt off icials, or are complicit in their behaviour.
The reluctance to devolve taxation powers to the regions has inevitably 
made most sub-national levels of government across Southeast Asia depend-
ent on central grants for many of their functions. This leads to what Tanzi 
(1996: 297) termed administrative rather than f iscal decentralization, where 
local government units (LGUs) account for a substantial proportion of total 
government expenditures (30 per cent or more in many cases) but collect 
a much lower proportion of total government revenues. In Indonesia, the 
reforms implemented after 2001 did lead to part of the revenues from natural 
resource exploitation being remitted back to the provinces and districts. 
This was intended to address the large imbalance between expenditures on 
consumption and investment within the province and total provincial GDP. 
But it was still the case that most taxation of mining companies is done at 
the central level, although some LGUs appear to have imposed extra levies.
There is also considerable evidence from Southeast Asia that many LGUs 
have struggled to cope with some of the spending responsibilities devolved 
to them. Typically, large infrastructure projects, such as main roads, remain 
the responsibility of the central government but the construction and 
maintenance of secondary roads are often the responsibility of LGUs. Even 
if they have the budgets to carry out this work (it appears that many do 
not), there are often coordination problems between the various levels of 
government, with the result that feeder roads are not built or maintained, 
and many rural communities cannot easily get produce to markets, or take 
advantage of employment opportunities in urban areas, while still living 
at home. Where health and education responsibilities have been devolved 
to provinces and sub-provincial governments, their efforts are hampered 
by a lack of qualif ied teachers, doctors and nurses. This problem has been 
made worse in Indonesia by the tendency to split provinces and districts 
outside Java into smaller units, which often cannot recruit or retain the staff 
needed to implement the spending functions allocated to them.
There is a large literature in Southeast Asia which argues that decentrali-
zation policies, especially when combined with elections of key off icials 
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in LGUs, have often led to elite capture of budgetary expenditures. The 
evidence for this is often based on f ieldwork in a few regions, and it is often 
diff icult to determine how widespread the problem is. A study based on 
statistical data for a large number of districts in Indonesia found that on 
balance ‘decentralization seems to have improved service delivery and has 
made budgets more needs-oriented’ (Schulze and Sjahrir 2014: 204). But the 
results were not uniform across all regions. Indeed, given that there are 
now more than 500 districts in Indonesia, it is to be expected that there 
would be considerable variation in outcomes. What is perhaps of concern 
is that these authors found that richer districts with larger revenues per 
capita tended to have better service delivery. Over time this may mean that 
existing disparities between districts in provision of health and education 
facilities, and certain types of infrastructure, may increase.
In the Philippines, where the decentralization reforms began in 1991, 
a literature has emerged which has tended to be critical of the results in 
terms of service delivery. Shair-Rosenfield (2016: 168) suggested that three 
factors, apart from lack of administrative capacity, explain the disappointing 
outcomes. First, there is often a lack of f iscal resources to carry out all the 
functions allocated to LGUs. Most of the important taxes including income, 
estate and inheritance taxes, the value added tax and customs duties have 
been retained at the centre, which appears reluctant to engage in even 
limited revenue sharing. Only the cities were able to cover more than half 
of their current operating income from their own revenues, while other 
LGUs remained very dependent on grants from the centre. Second, there is 
the problem of weak accountability, which is linked to the third factor, the 
persistence of patronage politics. Politicians at the national level continue 
to be beholden to local elites for electoral support, and have been reluctant 
to interfere with the ways in which the LGUs spent their budgets.
The problem of inadequate f iscal resources to fund local government 
activities appears to be universal throughout Southeast Asia. In Vietnam, 
Anh (2016: 204-205) pointed out that the central government has been 
reluctant to allow even limited decentralization for fear of undermining 
the uniformity of national policies. Fiscal resources have been inadequate 
even for those functions which have been devolved to LGUs, and there is 
still a lack of government accountability. Malesky and Hutchinson (2016: 136) 
argued that in Vietnam, along with Cambodia and Myanmar, government 
elites at the national level are still fearful of losing control over key sectors 
of policy. Thailand, which had been a highly centralized unitary state for 
over a century, appeared to be embarking on a new course with the 1997 
constitution, which mandated a number of decentralization measures. But 
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developments since 2006 have not supported either democracy or devolved 
government. Unger and Mahakanjana (2016: 185) found that inadequate fiscal 
resources and the ‘meddlesome ways of central government off icers’ have 
impeded decentralization, but there have also been failings within LGUs, 
which have often failed to exploit the opportunities available to them. 
These opportunities in turn have been curtailed in the latest constitution, 
although there will probably be further changes in Thailand in the not too 
distant future.
It would be diff icult to argue, on the evidence available in the second 
decade of the twenty-f irst century, that decentralization measures have by 
themselves played an important role in improving living standards across 
Southeast Asia, although in several cases they might have defused some 
tensions about the division of revenues, especially from natural resource 
exploitation, between the centre and the regions. For a variety of reasons 
most LGUs do not appear to have used whatever limited f iscal resources 
they have at their disposal on pro-poor expenditures. Although many donors 
have in recent decades become enthusiastic about community-driven 
development, it has been argued that the projects selected are often of 
limited value in empowering the poor (Sari and Widyaningrum 2012: 101).
Concluding Comments
Over the last six decades, most countries in Southeast Asia have experi-
mented with a range of programmes, including land reform, land settlement 
projects, labour-intensive public works, interventions in the markets for basic 
staples, especially rice, and family planning policies. In almost all cases the 
results have been mixed, with only a limited impact on poverty alleviation. 
Part of the problem was that these policies often addressed several different 
goals, with poverty alleviation not always the most important. Labour-
intensive public works were intended to provide employment for rural 
workers (mainly able-bodied males) during the agricultural slack season. It 
was expected that most of the beneficiaries would be poor, although many 
poor people were excluded from the programmes by reason of age, gender 
or physical disabilities. Land settlement policies were aimed at alleviating 
poverty in the sending regions, and might have achieved this goal, if only 
to a limited extent. But they were also intended to promote growth in those 
regions whose development potential was thought by government planners 
to be held back by small populations. In fact, large-scale in-migration of 
agricultural settlers often caused problems in the receiving regions. Many 
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settlements were poorly planned and migrants were forced to take wage 
employment to make an adequate living. Where this was not available they 
often returned to their home regions, or to other locations. Had poverty 
alleviation considerations been paramount, the settlement programmes 
would probably have been implemented in different ways. Indeed, it might 
well have been more cost-effective to have implemented policies aimed at 
increasing the availability of non-agricultural employment in the sending 
regions, rather than moving people to new locations.
In recent years, cash transfers to the poor have gained favour, especially 
where these policies are made conditional on sending children to school, and 
attending health clinics. Given that there are still considerable differences 
across income groups in infant and child mortality, and in school attendance 
in most parts of Southeast Asia, there would seem to be considerable scope 
for extending these policies. But targeting is a problem. Dreze and Sen (2013: 
191-192) have argued that the Bolsa Familia, the family welfare programme 
of the government of Brazil, has made an important contribution to poverty 
reduction in Brazil because there was a ‘fairly well identif ied target group’ 
mainly in urban areas. Around 85 per cent of the population in Brazil lives 
in towns and cities, which is a much higher proportion than in most parts 
of South and Southeast Asia. Dreze and Sen also found that Brazil had a 
fairly sophisticated administration in charge of screening applicants, and 
determining what sort of assistance they needed. The experience of India 
in targeting poverty assistance has been ‘far from encouraging’, for reasons 
which Dreze and Sen set out in considerable detail. Whether the Philippines, 
Indonesia and other countries in Southeast Asia who are contemplating 
conditional cash transfers will go down the Brazilian or the Indian route 
remains to be seen.4
Budgetary expenditures per capita are still low in most Southeast Asian 
countries; in six countries, total expenditures per capita were less than $600 
in 2015 (Table 8.3). In the four countries where expenditures were higher, 
the headcount measure of poverty as measured by the World Bank was low. 
That does not mean that problems of relative deprivation have been solved 
in these countries; Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand continue to have high 
levels of income inequality, although there is evidence of decline in both 
4 McCarthy and Sumarto (2018: 231) argued on the basis of surveys carried out in two vil-
lages in Aceh on the impact of a conditional cash transfer program that the targeting was very 
unsatisfactory. Only 14 per cent of households identif ied as poor using wealth rankings approved 
by the community actually received assistance, Half those receiving cash transfers were not 
poor using the community’s standards.
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Malaysia and Thailand in recent years. But their governments do have 
greater resources at their disposal to rectify at least some of the problems 
caused by these high inequalities, such as unequal access to education and 
healthcare. Elsewhere, government resources relative to population are 
much smaller. Limited budgetary resources do not necessarily imply that 
there is nothing governments can do to alleviate poverty. In the Indonesian 
case, a relaxation of controls on the import of food, especially rice, would 
certainly have an immediate impact on food prices and poverty, while not 
involving any direct budgetary outlay. In Vietnam, the government has 
apparently been able to provide most of the population with quite good 
basic healthcare in spite of limited budgetary expenditures. There seems 
much that the countries in Southeast Asia can learn from one another about 
what governments can do to improve living standards, and what policies 
should be avoided.

9 What Have We Learned?
A Century of Growth and Change
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from this survey of 
living standards across the ten countries of Southeast Asia is that, on most 
of the indicators widely used to measure living standards, there has been 
progress since the early years of the twentieth century. Although population 
growth has been rapid, national output and income have grown faster 
than population in all countries over the decades from the early twentieth 
to the early twenty-f irst century. Years of schooling have increased, and 
the great majority of people are now able to read and write in the national 
language. This is a considerable achievement given the low levels of literacy 
which prevailed in much of the region in 1950. Health indicators such as 
life expectancy have also improved, as have housing conditions. Increased 
provision of transport and communications infrastructure has led to better 
connectivity for many millions of people, who can travel both within and 
across national boundaries for employment and leisure activities.
But these improvements, while impressive, have not been uniform either 
within countries over time, or across countries and regions at a point in 
time. By the second decade of the twenty-f irst century, there were striking 
differences across the ten countries not just in per capita GDP but also in 
non-monetary indicators, including infant and child mortality, educational 
attainment, housing conditions and access to modern transport and com-
munications infrastructure. There is also evidence that progress in reducing 
poverty, as measured by the proportion of the population below the poverty 
lines used by the World Bank, has differed across countries and between 
regions and socio-economic and ethnic groups within countries. Even those 
countries which have reduced extreme poverty to very low levels, such as 
Malaysia and Thailand, still exhibit quite high levels of income and wealth 
inequality. Indeed, one estimate shows that the Gini coeff icient of wealth 
distribution in Thailand is the highest in the world (Credit Suisse 2018: 
Table 6-6). While economic growth in Thailand has been accompanied by 
a reduction in the headcount measure of poverty to low levels, it appears 
that a small number of Thais have been able to amass enormous wealth, 
while the great majority have only managed to accumulate far more modest 
holdings.
It has been argued in previous chapters that the ten countries of Southeast 
Asia have, in recent decades, shown considerable variation in a number 
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of rankings of human development. According to the widely used Hu-
man Development Index, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand were 
all included in the very high or high human development categories in 
2015, while the remaining countries were included in the medium human 
development group. Indonesia was ranked slightly higher than Vietnam 
and the Philippines, with Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar further down 
(Table 1.1). This contrasts with the situation in 1990, when the Philippines 
was included in the ‘medium human development’ category, while both 
Indonesia and Vietnam were still in the ‘low human development’ category 
(UNDP 1991: 120). The Inclusive Development Index published by the World 
Economic Forum used a broader range of indicators grouped under three 
headings: growth and development, inclusion and intergenerational equity, 
and sustainability. Of the 74 developing countries included in this index, 
Malaysia in 2018 was ranked 13, Thailand 17, Vietnam 33, Indonesia 36, the 
Philippines 38 and Laos 58 (World Economic Forum 2018: Table 1). Cambodia 
and Myanmar were excluded because of a lack of data.
The Human Development Index (HDI), and other composite indexes 
show that in recent years the Philippines has fallen behind, and Vietnam 
has forged ahead. While there have been absolute improvements in the 
components of the HDI in the Philippines, they have been slower than 
in both Indonesia and Vietnam. The relative decline of the Philippines is 
particularly striking given its high ranking in the latter part of the 1930s 
on both GDP per capita and a range of non-monetary indicators, including 
health and education. Both Indonesia and French Indochina by contrast 
were ranked much lower (Bennett 1951). The reasons for these reversals of 
fortune are examined further below. But f irst, it is important to look at the 
ongoing debate over the link between economic growth as conventionally 
measured using the System of National Accounts (SNA), and improvements 
in poverty.
Is Growth Enough?
At the turn of the millennium, a number of economists involved in research 
on international development argued that sustained economic growth 
over a period of decades was essential in order to achieve a broad-based 
improvement in living standards and a significant decline in income poverty. 
But was growth alone enough? Dollar and Kraay (2002: 218) argued that the 
evidence, derived from cross-country regressions from a sample of countries 
spanning four decades, showed that ‘average incomes of the poorest f ifth of 
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a country on average rise or fall at the same rate as average incomes’. They 
also found that a variety of ‘pro-growth’ macroeconomic policies, such as 
low inflation, moderate size of government, sound f inancial development, 
respect for the rule of law, and openness to international trade, raise average 
incomes with little systematic effect on the distribution of income. They 
argued that their f indings did not suggest a trickle-down effect whereby 
the rich got richer f irst and some of the benefits eventually trickled down 
to the poor. The conclusion they drew was that a sound macroeconomic 
environment encouraged a growth process which raised all incomes of rich 
and poor households alike.1
Dollar, Kleineberg and Kraay (2013) updated and expanded the results 
of Dollar and Kraay (2002) and conf irmed the earlier results. They also 
claimed that the income shares of the bottom 20 per cent and the bottom 
40 per cent of the distribution showed no systematic tendency to decline 
over time, although they did not deny that there were some changes in 
inequality in particular countries and time periods. They pointed out that 
in Asia in the 1990s and 2000s, the income growth of the bottom 40 per 
cent was only about 0.6 of mean growth, although they did not offer any 
explanation for this. In the Southeast Asian context, it has been argued, 
again on the basis of regression results, that poverty reduction across the 
region was ‘overwhelmingly attributable to the high rate of growth of GDP 
per person’ (Warr 2015: 325). Warr argued that the sectoral composition of 
the growth in Southeast Asia also had an impact; he found that poverty 
reduction outcomes were strongly related to the growth of both agriculture 
and services, but not to industrial growth.
These f indings, which replicated earlier results for India by Ravallion 
and Datt (1996), contrasted with the Taiwan experience where Warr and 
Wang (1999) argued that the growth of the industrial sector was strongly 
associated with poverty reduction. The usual explanation for these dif-
ferences is that Taiwan and the Republic of Korea adopted an export-
oriented manufacturing strategy which, beginning in the 1960s, made use 
of abundant supplies of labour to increase exports of garments, textiles, 
shoes, toys and some electronic products. Although several countries in 
1 The Dollar-Kraay work has attracted considerable criticism over the years. Perhaps the 
most serious is that relating to the accuracy of the data they used on income distribution and 
poverty. To the extent that the data are f lawed for reasons discussed in previous chapters, 
their conclusions may not be robust. Pritchett and Kenny (2013: 24) drew attention to the 
problem in India of a large disparity between survey and national income data on household 
consumption. Chapter 7 has drawn attention to similar disparities in Indonesia and the 
Philippines.
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Southeast Asia have also been successful in adopting this model, oth-
ers relied to a greater extent on resource-based exports and used tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to foster import-substituting industries for the 
domestic market. Large investments were also made in the processing of 
oil, gas and other mineral products. To the extent that these industries 
were capital-intensive, they tended to absorb less labour, which either 
stayed in the agricultural sector, or was absorbed into various service 
sector occupations. In the case of the Philippines, Bautista (1990) argued 
that in spite of the rapid agricultural growth which occurred in the years 
from 1965 to 1980, the benef its accrued mainly to the more aff luent seg-
ments of the rural population who controlled most of the arable land. 
They tended to buy capital-intensive products which were produced in the 
protected manufacturing sector, but their demand alone was insuff icient 
to sustain rapid growth of manufacturing industry. Labour absorption in 
both agriculture and industry was low, and together with continued high 
rates of population growth, many workers had no alternative to seeking 
work in low-productivity service sector employment.
Bautista’s analysis is confirmed by the evidence on the distribution of 
the labour force by sector in various Southeast Asian countries, compared 
with the f igures for Japan, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea when those 
countries had a roughly similar level of per capita GDP (Table 9.1). Several 
countries in Southeast Asia had a higher proportion of the labour force in 
agriculture than Japan and Taiwan, and also a higher proportion of the 
non-agricultural labour force in services. In the Philippines in 1982, almost 
78 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force was employed in services, 
compared with 57 per cent in Taiwan in 1970. The service sector contains 
a range of occupations, not all of which are of low productivity, but the 
evidence indicates that in the Philippines only a small proportion of the 
service sector labour force was employed in skilled, high-income occupations. 
This was also the case in Indonesia, where the service sector accounted for 
a much higher proportion of the non-agricultural labour force in 1990 than 
was the case in Taiwan two decades earlier.
There are of course good economic reasons why service sector employ-
ment should be higher in Southeast Asia in recent decades than was the 
case in Japan in the mid-1950s, or Taiwan in the 1970s. The tourist sector has 
grown rapidly in most ASEAN countries in recent decades, and is oriented 
to both foreign and domestic tourists. The evidence suggests that this does 
create considerable employment in the hospitality sector and also in trade 
and transport. In 2016 the ten ASEAN countries received 115.6 million 
foreign tourists, of which 32.5 million went to Thailand, and 26.7 million 
WhAt hAve We LeArned? 267
to Malaysia.2 Domestic tourism numbers are also growing rapidly in most 
parts of the region. Of course, not all the growth in service sector employ-
ment in the ASEAN countries was in the hospitality sector, but it has made 
a signif icant contribution.
The growing contribution of export-oriented services to foreign exchange 
earnings should also be borne in mind in interpreting the evidence on the 
share of the various Southeast Asian countries in total merchandise trade 
in the almost eight decades from 1937 to 2015 (Table 9.2). In the late 1930s, 
Indonesia accounted for around one-third of total exports from the region: 
by 2015, the proportion had fallen to a little under 13 per cent. The fall in 
Indonesia’s share has been the result of a rapid increase in the share of the 
countries comprising the former Indochina, especially Vietnam, and also of 
the countries comprising what was British Malaya, although their share fell 
between 1995 and 2015. Thailand has steadily increased its share, while that 
of the Philippines increased between 1937 and 1965, but has fallen thereafter. 
Would the growing importance of service sector exports make any difference 
to the trends shown in Table 9.2? Probably not, as those countries which 
have experienced rapid growth of merchandise trade since the 1960s have 
also experienced fast growth in service sector exports, including tourism.
2 These f igures are taken from ASEAN Secretariat (2018), Chapter 9.
Table 9.1:  Agricultural share of the labour force (ALF/TLF) and services as a share 
of the non-agricultural labour force (NALF)
Country/Year ALF/TLF Services/ NALF
Japan (1955) 42.9 59.8
taiwan (1970) 36.7 55.8
ro Korea (1973) 50.0 60.6
Malaysia (1975) 49.3 68.8
thailand (1978) 66.5 64.3
Philippines (1982) 51.7 77.6
indonesia (1990) 49.9 64.7
vietnam (2006) 54.7 59.6
Cambodia (2012) 33.2 62.2
note: in the years shown per capita gdP (1990 international gK$) was between 2,400 and 2,600 
for all the countries shown except Japan (2,771) and ro Korea (2,800). data from Maddison Project 
database, 2013.
Sources: Japan, ro Korea, Philippines, and thailand: booth (2002b: table 6); taiwan: Council for 
economic Planning and development (1992: 18); Malaysia: government of Malaysia (1976: table 
8.1); Philippines: World bank (1987: table 1.3); indonesia: Central bureau of Statistics (1992: table 
41.9); vietnam: iLo (2012: table A2.2,); Cambodia: national institute of Statistics (2013: table 6.10).
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Table 9.2:  Country shares of ASEAN merchandise exports, 1937-2015 (percentage 
of ASEAN total)
Country 1937 1965 1995 2015
Myanmar 11.5 4.7 0.5 1.0




indonesia 33.6 15.1 13.2 12.8




Philippines 9.4 16.0 6.4 5.0
thailand 4.7 13.1 16.9 18.3
total 100 100 100 100
Sources: 1937 and 1965: booth (2004: table 4); 1995: ASeAn Secretariat (2010: table v.3); 2015: 
ASeAn Secretariat (2017: table 5.2).
The evidence in Table 9.2 could be used to support the argument that open-
type policies supporting the rapid growth of both exports and national 
income are all that is needed to bring about a rapid decline in poverty. 
The various international comparisons published by both the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank all agreed that by the early twenty-f irst 
century, the headcount measure of poverty had declined to negligible levels 
in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, all countries which have experienced 
rapid growth of both merchandise and service exports. Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia all experienced a rapid growth in exports since the mid-1990s, 
together with a fall in poverty, although, as was argued in Chapter 7, the 
off icial f igures on the extent of the fall can be contested. But even if the 
export growth benef ited certain sections of the population more than 
others, the trickle-down impact of the export growth appears to have been 
impressive, while those countries with slower export growth and declining 
export shares (especially the Philippines but also Indonesia) still appeared 
to be struggling with higher levels of poverty in the second decade of the 
new century.
But are other factors involved as well? What about access to land, or 
access to off-farm employment in rural areas? If indeed growth in the 
agricultural sector has had an important impact on declines in poverty 
across Southeast Asia in recent decades, to what extent have government 
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policies facilitated such growth, through, for example, input subsidies or 
the dissemination of higher-yielding varieties of both food and non-food 
crops? Warr’s regression analysis found that an increase in the real price 
of food reduces the rate at which poverty declines. This would suggest that 
governments should try to moderate the rate of growth of food prices in 
real terms through reducing those protectionist measures which increase 
domestic food prices relative to border prices, or even by subsidizing the 
price of key staples, such as rice. In fact, as was shown in Chapter 8, Indonesia 
has increased agricultural protection in recent years, especially in the food 
crop sector, and this has adversely affected the poorer households who are 
net consumers of rice. To compensate poor consumers for high rice prices, 
the Indonesian government has also introduced a policy of selling rice at 
subsidized prices to poor people.
It was argued in Chapter 8 that governments across Southeast Asia over 
the past six decades have experimented with a range of policies intended to 
reduce income poverty, and ensure a more equitable distribution of income 
and assets. The results have been at best mixed. Bold policy interventions 
have run out of steam, either for budgetary reasons or because of changes 
in the priorities of successive governments. Is this an argument for simply 
concentrating on those policies most likely to increase rates of economic 
growth, in the expectation that sooner or later the benefits of growth will 
trickle down to all sections of society? The problem with this argument 
is that, in the short and medium term, growth may be accompanied by 
increases in inequalities in the distribution of both income and wealth, 
which in turn can lead to social problems and the rise of new political 
forces which are less supportive of policies that are intended to promote 
rapid growth. In the next section, I try to summarize what we have learnt 
about the relationship between growth, poverty and inequality in Southeast 
Asia, before discussing future priorities for both government and civil 
society groups.
Growth, Poverty and Inequality: What the Evidence Shows
In spite of the ongoing debates about the reliability of the data, the following 
propositions about trends in poverty and inequality in Southeast Asia over 
the past f ive decades appear to be supported by the evidence:
(1) Rapid economic growth has over time reduced income poverty, using 
either the World Bank measure of extreme poverty or the various national 
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poverty lines. This has been true of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and In-
donesia since the 1970s, and more recently of Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar.
(2) But the extent of the decline in poverty can be contested. National 
poverty lines have tended to be low relative to the estimates of per capita 
consumption expenditures from the national accounts estimates (Table 
7.4). This reduces the credibility of the national poverty estimates among 
those civil society groups who are often distrustful of government claims 
about poverty reduction.
(3) When poverty lines are increased, as they have been by several statisti-
cal agencies in Southeast Asia in recent decades, there has often been a 
sharp increase in the headcount measure of poverty, which reflects the 
bunching of many households just above the poverty line.
(4) In the Philippines, the growth in per capita GDP which occurred in the 
years from 1950 to 1975 was not accompanied by falls in income poverty. 
Slow economic growth in the last two decades of the twentieth century 
meant that numbers in poverty remained stubbornly high, and indeed 
have fallen only modestly in the early twenty-f irst century, in spite of 
faster economic growth.
(5) Those countries and regions where fertility has fallen in recent decades, 
including Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam, appear 
to have reaped a demographic bonus in terms of faster growth and more 
rapid poverty decline.
(6) Periods of fast growth, including in Thailand (1970-1992), Indonesia 
(1984-1996) and Laos more recently have been accompanied by rising 
inequality in household income/expenditure. Slower growth in Thailand 
since 1997 appears to have been accompanied by a fall in inequality in 
household income and expenditure.
(7) The growth collapse in Indonesia in 1998, and the slow recovery caused 
the Gini of nominal household expenditures to fall very sharply. Since 
2010 the Gini for household expenditures has been higher than in Vietnam 
and Thailand and about the same as in the Philippines (Table 7.11)
(8) Doubts have been raised about the accuracy of household surveys 
in both Indonesia and the Philippines, where there are large disparities 
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between the household survey data and those from the national ac-
counts (Table 7.10). To the extent that these disparities are the result 
of under-reporting on the part of richer households, this suggests that 
the inequality estimates in both countries are underestimated. If some 
households are excluded from the sample altogether, this could affect 
the headcount measures of poverty.
(9) The estimates of wealth inequalities published by Credit Suisse are 
very high in global terms in both Thailand and Indonesia.
(10) Vietnam in recent years has a low headcount measure of poverty 
(using the World Bank estimates) given its low per capita GDP. It also 
has achieved quite high rankings in several recent estimates of human 
development using non-monetary estimates.
(11) As in many other countries, including those with high per capita GDP, 
there are sharp disparities in household access to health and education 
facilities by income or wealth status in most parts of Southeast Asia.
(12) Indonesia in recent rankings seems to have been a poor performer 
on health indicators, given its relatively high per capita GDP. This is 
especially the case for indicators relating to child health and maternal 
mortality.
(13) In most countries in Southeast Asia where headcount measures of 
poverty are available at the sub-national level, there appear to be marked 
differences by region. These differences are not always highly correlated 
with estimates of regional GDP, especially in the resource-rich regions of 
Indonesia, where at least until the 1990s, there were signif icant export 
surpluses, which funded an outward f low of funds to the centre and 
abroad.
(14) Until recently, it was argued that no country in Southeast Asia was 
following the ‘Northeast Asian’ model of rapid export-led growth with 
equity, although recent evidence indicates that Vietnam may be doing 
so to a greater extent than its neighbours.
If these propositions can be accepted as broadly accurate, they raise 
some important questions about why some countries, and regions within 
countries, have apparently performed better than others in terms of both 
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poverty alleviation and inequality, not just since the 1990s, but over the 
longer term. The Philippines appears to have experienced the most dramatic 
relative decline since the 1950s, while Vietnam since the 1990s seems to have 
experienced rapid growth with equity, and remarkable progress in human 
development, given its relatively low per capita GDP. The following section 
examines the reasons for these outcomes.
Reversals of Fortune: What Went Wrong in the Philippines and 
Right in Vietnam?
By the early years of the twenty-f irst century, it was widely argued that 
the Philippines had fallen behind other countries in the region in terms 
of both monetary and non-monetary indicators although as was shown 
in Chapter 7, the country scored better on some indicators than others. 
In particular, the country still scored well on a number of educational 
indicators, especially for women, compared with Thailand, Indonesia and 
Vietnam. It was also ranked very high on the Global Gender Gap Index, 
prepared by the World Economic Forum. But on other indicators, including 
the extent of undernourishment and poverty, the Philippines appeared to 
be doing less well than either Indonesia or Vietnam. Economists studying 
the Philippines often seemed to be convinced that the country has been 
plagued by very high levels of inequality, and that ‘deeply entrenched 
and high levels of inequality impede reform’ (Balisacan and Hill 2003: 
20). These authors pointed out that the Philippines never experienced 
a Taiwan-style land reform, and claimed that the poor rural constitu-
ency was neglected compared with post-1970 policies in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Elsewhere, Balisacan, Fuwa and Debuque (2004: 234) argued 
that ‘the Philippines has a higher incidence of rural landlessness than its 
Southeast Asian neighbours, due to a combination of a plantation sector 
growing tropical cash crops and a high incidence of tenancy within the 
peasant sector’.
These authors did not attempt any detailed comparisons of inequality or 
land tenure systems in other Asian countries to substantiate their claims. 
As far as income inequality is concerned, the evidence does suggest that 
inequality has been high in the Philippines for a number of decades, but not 
necessarily higher than in other countries in the region, including Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, which at least until 1997, performed better than the 
Philippines in terms of economic growth. Discussions of inequality in the 
Philippines have often been based on comparisons using household survey 
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data which are not always comparable.3 Neither is it easy to substantiate 
claims that rural landlessness and tenancy are greater problems in the 
Philippines than in other parts of Asia. It was argued in Chapter 5 that the 
concept of landlessness is not easy to quantify, although evidence from Java 
indicated that by the late colonial era many rural households were cultivating 
very small holdings, and a considerable number had no access to land at 
all. The problems became more acute after 1950, as the rural population 
continued to grow, and government attempts at land reform, and land 
settlement in other islands were frustrated by lack of budgetary resources.
The Philippines was hardly unique in having a large estates sector. In 
both Indonesia and Malaysia large estates were also developed during the 
colonial era. In most cases they were owned by foreign companies and were 
the target of nationalist resentment after independence. In the late 1950s, 
the Dutch-owned estates in Indonesia were nationalized, and became 
state enterprises, which they have remained. There was no attempt at the 
time or subsequently to distribute the estate land to smallholders. Land 
under smallholder cultivation of crops such as rubber, coffee and spices did 
increase in many parts of Southeast Asia, but mainly through extending 
the cultivation frontier. The amount of land controlled by large estates in 
Indonesia declined until the 1980s, when the palm oil boom led to a rapid 
resurgence of plantation agriculture, controlled by both Indonesian and 
foreign f irms (Booth 2012; Table 4.3). In the Philippines, the large estate 
sector was mainly owned by indigenous Filipinos, often of mixed Chinese 
and Spanish descent. These were the families who played a dominant role 
in post-1946 politics, and formed the backbone of what has been termed 
cacique democracy (Anderson 1988).
Building on the work of Anderson and others, Hutchcroft (1998) made a 
distinction between the patrimonial administrative state (Thailand since 
the 1960s, and Indonesia under Suharto) and the patrimonial oligarchic 
state (the Philippines since 1946). There was an assumption that the Philip-
pine oligarchic state produced a more skewed distribution of income and 
wealth, although this was not rigorously demonstrated. There was also an 
assumption that landed elites dominated the congress, and this prevented 
land reform. But as was argued in Chapter 8, the Philippines has had some 
success in implementing agrarian reform policies, at least compared with 
3 An example of this is a survey of poverty in the Philippines, published by the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (2009). The author appeared determined to show that inequality was higher in the 
Philippines than in other parts of Asia, and in Table 20 presented estimates of Gini coeff icients 
drawn from different, and non-comparable, sources.
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Indonesia and Thailand. It has been argued that the large estates (hacienda) 
have been abolished in many parts of the country, with the exception of 
the sugar-producing regions in Negros Occidental (Ballesteros 2019). The 
combination of land reform programmes and population growth has led 
to a continual reduction in average holding size to a little over one hectare. 
In Indonesia during the Suharto era, the emphasis was on moving families 
owning little or no land from densely settled regions to Sumatra, Kalimantan 
and Eastern Indonesia. These programmes were, at best, mixed in their 
results. In Thailand, land reform initiatives did not receive much political 
support after the 1970s, and by the 1990s, the proportion of land in holdings 
over ten hectares in Thailand was not much different from the Philippines 
(Table 6.7). In all three countries, the proportion of land in holdings over 
f ive hectares was much higher than in Taiwan in 1975.
Thus, while it is true that the Philippines has not followed the Taiwan path 
of growth with equity, the evidence indicates that Indonesia and Thailand 
have not done so either. In both countries, rural non-farm incomes grew 
more slowly than in Taiwan, and the proportion of land in holdings over 
f ive hectares was much higher in all three countries in the last decades of 
the twentieth century than in Taiwan. The argument that the Philippines 
had a higher proportion of landlessness than other countries in Southeast 
Asia has not been substantiated by any rigorous appraisal of the evidence. 
Tenancy was certainly high in the Philippines in the 1930s, although there 
were striking regional variations (Spencer 1952: Table 8). The various land 
reform programmes carried out since the 1950s have redistributed land 
from landlords to cultivators, but there appears to have been less success 
in dealing with the growing numbers of rural people who owned no land 
at all, or only very small plots which could not support a family of f ive 
or six. These households were forced to rely on self-employment in the 
non-agricultural sectors, and wage labour for most of their income, as was 
the case in the more densely settled parts of Indonesia.
A crucial difference between the Philippines and other Southeast Asia 
countries in the decades since the 1960s has been the slow decline in fertility 
and the faster growth of population in both urban and rural areas. As was 
argued in Chapter 8, there are striking differences between wealth classes 
in fertility, with the poorest 40 per cent of the population having the largest 
families (Table 8.5). Whether this reflects a deliberate strategy on the part of 
the poor to have larger families to provide security, or an inability to access 
modern family planning facilities, remains unclear. But the combination 
of low-income and larger families makes it diff icult for many households 
to break out of the poverty trap; children drop out of education early and 
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cannot obtain secure employment. It is striking that a very high percentage 
of the non-agricultural labour force in the Philippines is absorbed in services 
rather than industrial occupations compared with Taiwan and South Korea 
when they had roughly similar levels of per capita GDP (Table 9.1). While 
some service jobs are well-paid and secure, many are not. One explanation 
for the continuing high levels of poverty in the Philippines could be that a 
high percentage of the labour force, especially those with less education, 
continue to be trapped in unproductive service sector work.
If the slow progress in alleviating poverty in the Philippines can be 
attributed to rapid population growth, and a failure to generate suff icient 
employment in the more productive sectors of the economy, what explains 
the apparently better performance of the Vietnamese economy since the 
1990s? The poverty data published by the World Bank, which show a much 
lower proportion of the population under the $1.90 and $3.10 lines in Viet-
nam than in either the Philippines or Indonesia, are probably distorted by 
problems with the survey data in all three countries. But it is likely that 
poverty is lower in Vietnam than would be expected given low per capita 
GDP and low average household consumption because of the rather unusual 
conditions prevailing in the country when the reform process began, and 
the successful mix of economic policies which have been pursued over 
the past three decades. The reform process began when many Vietnamese 
were very poor and the distribution of household income rather egalitarian. 
Glewwe (2004b: Tables 1.1 and 1.2) estimated that 58 per cent of the population 
was below the off icial poverty line in 1994, and the Gini coeff icient was a 
relatively low at 0.33.4 Land reform policies had led to the elimination of 
large landholdings, and only about 8 per cent of the rural population was 
estimated to be landless in 1993. Many of these would have had access to 
some non-agricultural incomes (Ravallion and Van de Walle 2008: Table 3.3).
A second factor was the strong commitment of government to assist those 
who were seen as casualties of the long war against both the French and 
the Americans, which led to an unusually comprehensive health system 
for a poor country. To the extent that many people in both urban and rural 
areas were able to access free or low-cost healthcare, an illness might not 
have had the same serious impact on household budgets compared with 
other countries where income per capita was higher, but where the provi-
sion of free or subsidized healthcare was restricted to a limited number 
of households who were often quite well-off. A third factor relates to the 
export-led industrialization which has been an important feature of the 
4 It is not clear whether this was estimated from household income or expenditure data.
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Vietnamese economy since the 1990s. This strategy generated employment 
in the manufacturing sector and also in construction and utilities. The share 
of non-agricultural employment in the service sector in 2006 was quite close 
to that in Taiwan and South Korea when these countries had similar levels 
of per capita GDP, and much lower than in the Philippines (Table 9.1). In 
addition, fertility has been falling rapidly in Vietnam over the past three 
decades, and as a result the growth of the labour force is slowing and open 
unemployment is quite low.
As was pointed out in Chapter 8, the government of Vietnam had imple-
mented land reform in the north after 1955, and the south after 1975. But the 
distribution of land, although very egalitarian compared to most other parts 
of Southeast Asia, was not always very eff icient. The government adopted 
a more liberal approach to land market reform in the early 1990s, which 
permitted land to be reallocated to those households able and willing to 
cultivate it. Ravallion and Van de Walle (2008: Table 3.4) found evidence of 
rising landlessness after 1993, especially in the Southeast and Mekong Delta 
regions. But they argued that the rising landlessness did not lead to greater 
poverty. Even in the Mekong Delta the headcount measure of poverty among 
the landless households was falling, although it was higher in 2004 than 
for those households cultivating land. It appears that the rapid growth of 
non-agricultural employment opportunities absorbed many of those in the 
southern districts who gave up their rights to agricultural land.
The evidence does suggest that the Vietnamese government has been very 
successful in providing healthcare, including family planning services, to 
both urban and rural populations. Chapter 7 reviewed the evidence that by 
the early years of the twenty-f irst century, Vietnam had low levels of infant 
and under-f ive mortality compared with other Asian countries at similar or 
higher levels of per capita GDP. In addition, Vietnam achieved quite equal 
outcomes in under-f ive mortality across wealth quintiles, compared to 
other low- and middle-income countries. It also had lower levels of stunt-
ing and wasting in children than most other countries in Southeast Asia, 
including both the Philippines and Indonesia, although the percentage of 
the total population considered undernourished was slightly higher than 
the Southeast Asian average (Table 7.12). On the composite index of human 
capital compiled by Lim et al. (2018), Vietnam was already higher than either 
the Philippines or Indonesia in 1990, and was much higher by 2016 (Table 
7.13). It appears that the delivery of basic health services has been unusually 
successful for a lower-middle-income country, and this has helped to increase 
confidence among the population that the accelerated economic growth of 
the past three decades has brought benefits to most parts of the country.
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But it needs to be emphasized that the favourable national picture in 
Vietnam does mask considerable differences in the headcount measure 
of poverty between the majority Kinh-Hoa group and ethnic minorities, 
especially those concentrated in the northern uplands and central high-
lands. Furthermore, the differences appear to have been increasing over 
time (Baulch et al. 2012: 104). Distance from the main urban centres, low 
educational levels, and poor Vietnamese language skills are usually given 
as the main reasons why these groups face diff iculties in accessing jobs in 
the urban sector. The same problems seem to occur in those parts of the 
Philippines where Muslims comprise most of the population. The headcount 
measure of poverty in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 
was 40 per cent in 2015, compared with the national average of 16.5 per 
cent (Philippine Statistics Authority 2016: Table 3). While the headcount 
measure had declined for the country as a whole between 2006 and 2015, 
it had increased in the ARMM.
What Statistical Indicators Are Most Useful?
The last three decades have seen a proliferation of indictors intended to rank 
countries according to human development. Some of these ranking devices 
combine both monetary and non-monetary indicators, while others focus 
exclusively on non-monetary indicators. It was pointed out in Chapter 7 that 
there has in recent years been some criticism of ‘mash-up’ indices, and an 
appeal for a dashboard of discrete measures relating to specif ic develop-
ment goals (Ravallion 2016: 279-289). But what development goals should 
be given priority? All the countries in Southeast Asia are members of the 
United Nations and are presumably committed to pursuing the Sustainable 
Development Goals, adopted in 2014. They comprise seventeen goals which 
countries are supposed to work towards in the years from 2015 to 2030. The 
seventeen goals are related to alleviating poverty and hunger, and achieving 
good health, literacy, and gender equality. Environmental goals include 
provision of clean water and affordable clean energy, and protection of 
both land and the oceans. Economic goals include economic growth, the 
provision of decent work, and reduced inequality. Both governments and 
the private sector are also supposed to commit to the goals of responsible 
production and consumption, industrial innovation and the provision of 
infrastructure. The only political goal is a general commitment to peace, 
justice and strong institutions, plus international partnership in achieving 
these goals.
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The various indicators which have been discussed already in the context 
of Southeast Asia, including the Human Development Index (HDI) and its 
offshoots, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) and the Inclusive 
Development Index, as well as recent attempts to rank countries according 
to human capital, together provide a large body of information on all these 
goals. But they are not necessarily packaged in ways which are useful to 
policymakers, or to those parts of civil society with an interest in specif ic 
development goals. As we have seen, the countries of Southeast Asia have 
in fact had a very mixed record on particular indicators; some have done 
well on some goals and less well on others. Those countries which have been 
included in the very high and high human development categories (Singapore, 
Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand) have not just reduced the proportion of their 
populations below the $1.90 threshold to virtually zero; they have also done 
well on educational achievement and on child health indicators (Tables 7.12 
and 7.14). The Philippines continues to do well on educational outcomes, 
in spite of a higher proportion of the population under the $1.90 threshold 
and a lower overall ranking on the HDI, and on the Inclusive Development 
Index (World Economic Forum 2018). Indonesia, by contrast, ranks slightly 
above the Philippines and Vietnam using the HDI, but lower than either of 
these countries using the MPI (Tables 1.1 and 1.7). Indonesia’s achievement on 
some health outcomes has been especially disappointing, given its relatively 
high per capita GDP. It has rates of stunting and wasting in children that 
are well below the average for Southeast Asia (Table 7.12). Indonesia also 
has high rates of maternal mortality in comparison with other Southeast 
Asian countries. In 2010, only Laos and Cambodia had higher rates (National 
Academy of Sciences 2013: Table 2-10). These results help to explain Indonesia’s 
rather low score on the World Bank Human Capital Index for 2018, as well 
as on the composite human capital indicators compiled by Lim et al. (2018).
Indonesia also does not score very highly on the various indicators of 
gender inequality reviewed in Chapter 7, although it does better than most 
Muslim-majority countries. On the other hand, the Philippines ranks very 
high in the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI), although less well on the 
Gender Inequality Index. But it has been argued that the strong performance 
of the Philippines on the GGGI reflects the fact that women from urban 
middle- and upper-class families have for many decades had good access 
to secondary and tertiary education, and thus to professional careers. Both 
boys and girls from poorer, rural backgrounds have much less chance of 
completing high school and going on to college. These differentials in access 
to education by income group and region still persist in Indonesia and 
Thailand, and probably in other parts of Southeast Asia as well.
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To the extent that most countries in Southeast Asia are committed to 
attaining the sustainable development goals, they will need to monitor 
carefully a range of both monetary and non-monetary indicators. Under 
pressure from both national governments and international agencies as 
well as from a range of non-governmental organizations, statistical agencies 
across the region will continue to carry out household surveys, which will 
be used to estimate both poverty and inequality. In addition, both census 
and survey data will be used to monitor progress on other goals including 
health, literacy, gender equality and environmental protection. Where there 
are obvious problems of data quality, especially regarding household survey 
data, it is crucial that statistical agencies try to remedy the def iciencies. 
The problems of the social surveys across Southeast Asia were extensively 
discussed in Chapter 7; especially in Indonesia and the Philippines there 
would seem to be, as Srinivasan (2010: 150) argued, ‘an urgent need for a 
serious research programme for reconciliation’ between survey and national 
accounts data. It may be that the problems go well beyond a tendency 
on the part of the richest households to under-report their incomes and 
expenditures. In other parts of the world, it appears that households at 
different levels of income are reluctant to participate in surveys, and that 
is probably true in Southeast Asia as well.5
Another problem which has attracted scholarly attention in recent years 
concerns the estimation of the poverty line. Some analysts have been very 
critical of the World Bank’s poverty lines, which are considered to be too low 
to sustain even a very basic level of living, even in low- and middle-income 
countries (Pritchett and Kenny 2013; Hickel 2017: 48-51). The World Bank 
has defended its low poverty line (now $1.90 a day) on the grounds that it 
is important to measure extreme poverty. But Pritchett and Kenny (2013: 
3) point out that while tracking the numbers below a very low poverty line 
may be useful for some purposes in some countries, it should not be the only 
measure used. In the Southeast Asian context, where by the second decade 
of the twenty-f irst century it appeared that only Laos had more than 10 per 
cent of the population below the $1.90 poverty line, and where national 
poverty lines are also low relative to average household expenditures, 
there would seem to be a strong argument for using higher poverty lines 
which would sustain a higher quality of living. Where low poverty lines are 
used, whether set by international or national agencies, which result in low 
headcount measures of poverty, there is a danger that governments may 
5 See Economist, 26 May to 1 June 1 2018, p. 61 for a discussion of the problems with implementing 
social surveys in the United Kingdom and other high-income countries.
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think that the poverty problem has been solved and that policies intended 
to assist the poor are no longer needed.
If a higher poverty line is used in Southeast Asia, it is clear that the 
headcount and other measures of poverty would increase sharply. Even using 
the rather low international and national poverty lines currently adopted, a 
number of studies in various parts of Southeast Asia have argued that many 
households whose incomes are just above the poverty threshold are at risk 
of becoming poor if the income of one or more household members falls. 
This was an important explanation for the sharp increase in the headcount 
measure of poverty in Indonesia in the wake of the 1998 collapse in GDP. In 
Thailand, the impact of the crisis on poverty was less dramatic; it appeared 
that those people who lost jobs in the formal sector had savings to draw on, 
or were able to f ind other employment which kept them above the off icial 
poverty threshold, although it is likely that a higher poverty line would 
have shown a greater increase in numbers of poor. In Vietnam, an analysis 
of poverty dynamics using panel data from the Household Living Standard 
Surveys from 2002 to 2006 found that while large numbers of households 
moved out of poverty over these years, many did not move far above the 
poverty line, so that they remained vulnerable to further downturns (Baulch 
and Dat 2012: 38).
While many households tend to move in or out of poverty according to 
family circumstances, or to macroeconomic f luctuations, others remain 
chronically poor. These are often households living in remote regions, 
where households are poorly served by transport infrastructure, and access 
to health and educational facilities is very limited. Even in areas which are 
better connected to markets, when household members are old, or infirm and 
poorly educated, they have few opportunities for productive employment, 
and often depend on remittances from family members working away 
from home, or on charity from neighbours or religious institutions. Better 
government provision of healthcare would certainly help these people, but 
it may not by itself be suff icient to keep them above the poverty line. The 
problem of poverty among the aged will become more obvious as populations 
age, and will have to be addressed through more comprehensive pension 
provision, at least part of which will come from the government budget.
A related problem concerns the measurement of income distribution. 
With the exception of Singapore, all countries in Southeast Asia rely on 
household surveys to estimate inequality, and to the extent that the survey 
data underestimate the incomes and expenditures of the better-off, most 
measures, including those based on decile shares, as well as the Gini coef-
f icient, will underestimate the true extent of inequality. The lack of solid 
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evidence on underestimation of income and expenditures across the income 
range means that the use of household surveys to estimate any distributional 
indicator is fraught with problems. If the extent of underestimation varies 
across countries (or even across regions within countries) or varies over time, 
then comparisons of inequality indicators across countries and regions are 
likely to be problematic. This is also true of comparisons over time. This 
reinforces the need for more open discussions about the quality of household 
survey data in Southeast Asia. National statistical agencies and planning 
agencies have a crucial role to play in such discussions.
Concluding Comments
In concluding, it will be useful to return to the questions raised in the f irst 
chapter. As was argued at the beginning of this chapter, there is strong 
evidence that, according to most of the indicators widely used to measure 
living standards, there has been progress across Southeast Asia since the 
early years of the twentieth century. It is true that in both the colonial and 
postcolonial eras, many governments could have done more to improve 
the living standards of the peoples under their control, given the resources 
which they had at their disposal. In most cases they could have mobilized 
more from both domestic and foreign sources. But there has been progress 
on a range of monetary and non-monetary indicators, and this progress has 
often been widely shared. With the possible exception of the Philippines 
at some periods after 1950, there is little support for the argument that 
economic growth, where it has occurred, has been ‘immiserizing’ in the 
sense that it has left large sections of the population no better off, or even 
poorer than they had been before economic growth began. Where there 
have been periods when income poverty, or living standards more broadly 
def ined, stagnated or fell, they have usually been periods when per capita 
economic growth was low or negative, such as the 1940s in many parts of 
the region, in Indochina in the 1970s, or in Indonesia in the decade from 
1957 to 1967, or at the end of the twentieth century.
But the benefits of growth, as conventionally measured, have not been 
evenly spread, and this has often caused resentment in those regions, or 
among particular groups of people who feel they have been left behind. 
While there can be little doubt that most regions, and the great majority of 
people, in Thailand have experienced an improvement in living standards 
since the 1960s, many Thais living in the north and south of the country 
resent the fact that the central part of the country, especially the Greater 
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Bangkok region, has forged ahead more rapidly. Similar resentment is felt 
by many Indonesians at the rapid growth of the Greater Jakarta region, by 
Filipinos about Metro Manila, and by Malaysians about the booming region 
around Kuala Lumpur. In all these regions, poverty is much lower than 
the national average, and non-monetary indicators relating to health and 
education are often higher. While there are good reasons for the emergence 
of these dynamic growth poles, it is inevitable that those left behind in 
slower growing regions, often with poorer infrastructure, schools and health 
facilities, feel a sense of relative deprivation, if not actual impoverishment. 
High and in some cases increasing inequality has strengthened the percep-
tion that rising GDP will not necessarily lead to broad-based improvements 
in living standards for all. This perception is likely to be strengthened by 
the evidence that the distribution of wealth in countries such as Thailand 
and Indonesia is very skewed, with the top 1 per cent owning about half of 
total wealth. To the extent that much of this wealth is untaxed and can be 
passed on in its entirety to children and grandchildren, it is probable that 
inequalities in income and wealth will persist over generations.
Opinions vary about the impact of high inequality on economic growth 
over the longer term. Some have argued that high levels of inequality cause 
waste of talent if able students from poor backgrounds are forced to drop out 
of school, while more affluent but less gifted students continue, even though 
society might not benefit much from their education. Poor dropouts from 
the education system are sometimes tempted into criminal activities as a 
way of increasing their incomes; this in turn leads to higher expenditures 
by the wealthy on security (Bourguignon 2015: 132-134). To the extent that 
the wealthy use private schools and hospitals, as well as private security 
services, this makes them less willing to pay taxes to governments whose 
services they consider inadequate and do not use.
While some degree of inequality in income and wealth might create 
incentives for poorer groups to work harder to improve their own incomes, 
it will also lead to greater frustration if they feel that no amount of effort 
can lead to a signif icant improvement in their living standards, or those of 
their children. How these various forces will play out in Southeast Asia in 
coming decades is far from clear. Even in those countries such as Thailand 
and Malaysia, where sustained economic growth over decades has largely 
eliminated severe poverty, pronounced inequalities among both people and 
regions still exist, and have led to support for politicians, such as Thaksin 
in Thailand, who have promised to remedy these inequalities. To the extent 
that those who feel they have been left behind are able to express their 
frustrations through the electoral process, it is likely that politicians who 
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claim to represent their interests will attract considerable support, even if 
they are not very specif ic on policies. In the countries where the electoral 
process works less well, or not at all, those who feel they have not benefited 
from economic growth may turn to more violent forms of protest. As long as 
inequalities remain high, and governments are either unwilling or unable 
to assist those left behind, they are likely to pose a continuing threat to 
political and social stability.
Given that high levels of income inequality are likely to persist in South-
east Asia in coming decades, what can governments do to improve the 
living standards of the people and the regions which have been left behind? 
In recent years, there have been quite striking differences across the ten 
Southeast Asian countries in government expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP, ranging from 28.5 per cent in Vietnam to 15.7 per cent in Indonesia 
(Table 8.3). But government expenditures per capita only exceeded $600 
per capita in four Southeast Asian countries in 2015. Even if 20 per cent of 
total expenditures were devoted to policies designed to assist the poor, this 
would amount to at most $120 per capita, and much less in Myanmar and 
Cambodia. Even allowing for the fact that the cost of providing assistance 
would tend to be lower in the poorest countries where labour costs and 
prices of basic needs are lower, it is doubtful that governments could achieve 
much with these amounts. In the poorest countries in the region, budgetary 
funds for poverty alleviation policies will have to be supplemented by 
external assistance.
In middle-income countries, particularly Indonesia and the Philippines, 
increased expenditures on poverty alleviation strategies will have to come 
from increased government revenues. As was argued in Chapter 8, both these 
countries have implemented a range of policies over the past f ive decades 
which have been intended to alleviate poverty. The results have been at best 
mixed. Following the Latin American model, the Philippines and Indonesia 
are now implementing conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes, with 
most of the funding coming from budgetary sources. Whether these funds 
will be adequate for nationwide programmes remains to be seen. CCT 
programmes focus on families with children, and so often exclude the elderly 
poor, and those families who do not have children but are vulnerable to 
poverty for other reasons.
Given the limited government budgets available, there appears to be 
a consensus among governments in Asia that some form of targeting is 
essential in order to maximize the impact of government anti-poverty 
policies. But the problem of identifying the poor is far from easy to solve, 
especially when off icial poverty lines are often low relative to average 
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household expenditures, and many households classif ied as above the 
poverty line in one year may fall below it in the next. In the Indian context, 
some scholars have argued for universal provision of at least some welfare 
policies (Dreze and Sen 2013: 194-195). In states such as Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu, which have much higher HDI scores than the national average for 
India, health, education and other assistance policies have been provided 
on a universal rather than targeted basis. On the other hand, it seems clear 
that governments with limited resources could achieve more in terms of 
assisting poor families if accurate targeting of the available budget funds 
was feasible.
But even if targeting could be improved, most governments in Southeast 
Asia will still face budget constraints, so diff icult decisions will have to be 
made about allocating limited funds among competing policies. Which 
policies are most likely to be effective in combating poverty? To the extent 
that many families with incomes above the poverty threshold will face a 
sharp decline in income if a family member falls ill, there would seem to be 
a strong case for subsidized or even free provision of healthcare. Education 
is already heavily subsidized in most parts of the region, particularly at the 
primary and lower secondary levels, although there is plenty of evidence that 
teachers often demand extra payments from parents, and penalize those 
students whose parents are unable or unwilling to pay. Subsidized provision 
of basic foods, especially rice, have in some cases been an effective means 
of assisting the poor, especially in those countries such as Indonesia, where 
domestic rice prices are well above world market levels. But the f irst-best 
solution would probably be to eliminate agricultural protection.
More research is certainly needed on the most effective way of assisting 
the poor across the Southeast Asian region. There has been a distinguished 
tradition of research on poverty and inequality in Southeast Asia since 
the 1960s in the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand by both 
domestic and foreign scholars. More recently, researchers in Vietnam, Laos 
and Myanmar have also published studies, often in conjunction with foreign 
scholars. This research has complemented work by international agencies, 
especially the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The evidence 
suggests that, at the end of the second decade of the twenty-f irst century, 
problems of poverty and relative deprivation are still serious in many parts 
of Southeast Asia. Debates will continue about measurement of poverty, and 
better statistics, published in a timely and open way, will certainly assist 
these debates and hopefully lead to more effective policy interventions.
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